2017 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

9th EDITION - DECEMBER 2018
Cover Photo: Fanis Lisiagali, Executive Director of Healthcare Assistance Kenya, leads the White Ribbon Campaign in a march in Nairobi to promote its rapid response call center hotline, which responds to violence against women in elections (October 2017).

Photo Credit: Carla Chianese, Kenya Electoral Assistance Program, International Foundation for Electoral Systems
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United States Agency for International Development
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International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)

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The 2017 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa
INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the ninth edition of the Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for Sub-Saharan Africa. The Index describes advances and setbacks in the civil society sectors of thirty-one countries in 2017 through assessments of seven key dimensions: the legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image.

In 2017, USAID reaffirmed its commitment to working with a diverse array of partners, including civil society, to advance the principles of self-reliance and locally-sustained development. The CSOSI provides a comprehensive assessment of the capacity of civil society to serve as both a short-term partner in implementing development solutions and a long-term actor in ensuring development outcomes are sustained. The CSOSI empowers local civil society to collectively assess not only the environment in which they are operating, but also their own capacities to advocate, operate sustainably and communicate with citizens. Allowing local civil society to self-identify their development challenges is the first step in promoting resiliency and long-term self-reliance.

The Index is intended to be a useful source of information for local CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa’s CSO sector. It relies on an expert panel of CSO practitioners and researchers in each country to propose a score for each dimension. Scores may range from 1 (indicating advanced development and sustainability as a result of existing policies and practices) to 7 (indicating fragility, instability, and a low level of development because of impeding policies and practices, generally by a government that opposes an independent CSO sector). Dimension scores are averaged to produce an overall sustainability score. The Index groups all scores into three overarching categories: Sustainability Enhanced (scores from 1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1−5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1−7). An editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts reviews each panel’s findings to maintain consistent approaches and standards so as to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements similar publications covering twenty-four countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, nine countries in Asia, and seven countries and territories in the Middle East and North Africa. The various editions of the CSO Sustainability Index bring the total number of countries surveyed to seventy-one.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the ninth year in a row, the CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa offers a snapshot of developments in the region's CSO sectors. Overall, the year posed diverse and sometimes contradictory challenges for civil society. In some countries, economic decline began to turn around, armed conflicts abated, or political leaders in office for decades ceded power; although not always willingly. Elsewhere, economic and political trends increased suffering and political turmoil. CSOs usually responded to local developments as capable advocates and service providers, although in some countries they suffered severe setbacks as funding waned or government hostility intensified. In view of these divergent trends, this introduction seeks to point out patterns in this year's scores as well as events occurring across the continent, which can serve as guideposts for interpreting the country reports that follow.

As in 2016, this year's Index covers thirty-one countries. Nine of these countries (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) are in East Africa; thirteen countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone) are in West Africa; and nine countries (Angola, Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are in Southern Africa. While these regional divisions help inform broad-brush trends, the individual country reports are critical for understanding specific developments, given the vast ethnic, political, historical, and other differences among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

A YEAR OF ELECTIONS

In the past two decades, the number of countries holding democratic elections in sub-Saharan Africa has steadily increased. The presidential and parliamentary elections taking place in countries surveyed in this year's Index included a few stunning successes and several disappointing lapses in democratic practices. Wherever possible given their contexts, CSOs helped ensure that elections were peaceful, free, and fair.

Liberia celebrated a peaceful transition of power when Africa's first elected female head of state, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, stepped down after two terms in office, as required by the country’s constitution. In Angola the first turnover of presidents in thirty-eight years took place as João Gonçalves Lourenço of the ruling party won an election that observers noted was reasonably free and fair. The swearing in of President Adama Barrow of The Gambia marked the end of dictatorial rule by Yahya Jammeh, who was unexpectedly voted out of office in late December 2016 after twenty-one years in power.

In other countries, voters were less confident of election results. Many Kenyan voters were unhappy when the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, won a second term after the Supreme Court ordered a repeat round of polling amid allegations of fraud by the opposition candidate. At least ninety-two people were killed in election-related violence, according to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. In Tanzania and Senegal observers charged that irregularities tainted elections. In Zambia a constitutional crisis nearly erupted when the Constitutional Court failed to hear a petition contesting the election results within fourteen days, as required by the constitution. Meanwhile, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame was elected to a third term with 99 percent of the vote in elections that observers believed were undermined by irregularities and instances of ballot stuffing, according to the U.S. Department of State 2017 Human Rights Report for Rwanda.

Elsewhere, some of the region's longest-serving leaders sought to avoid having elections or to engineer the rules to ensure their continuation in office. Uganda's parliament approved a constitutional amendment to allow Yoweri Museveni to run for a sixth consecutive term in 2021, which led to countrywide protests in which sixty-seven people were killed. Zimbabwe's longtime head of state, President Robert Mugabe, was forced to step down late in 2017 following widespread demonstrations and an intervention by the army. In the DRC President Joseph Kabila failed to fulfill a pledge to hold elections in 2017 after already postponing them in 2016.
Meanwhile, protests broke out in Guinea when, for the second time, the president postponed local elections, which had not taken place in twelve years. Sierra Leone’s president delayed setting a date for elections until CSOs and other stakeholders successfully pressured him to do so. Gabon remained tense as voters continued to question the validity of President Ali Bongo’s narrow victory in 2016. Killings, disappearances, and arbitrary arrests and detentions continued in Burundi in the aftermath of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s controversial 2015 decision to seek a third term.

Throughout the countries that conducted, planned, or postponed elections in 2017, CSOs played a vital role in demanding and implementing healthy electoral processes. Angolan CSOs’ work with the Election Commission on voter education contributed to that country’s successful elections. Kenyan CSOs engaged in election monitoring and initiatives to share information and maintain peace during the election period. Organizations in Gabon, Guinea, and Uganda advocated to ensure that any constitutional changes or changes to the rules governing elections were in the interest of the electorates. After the military took power in Zimbabwe following Robert Mugabe’s departure, CSOs developed a roadmap for free and fair elections. Sierra Leonean CSOs forced the government to adhere to the legally mandated election calendar, and South African CSOs were instrumental in ensuring that President Jacob Zuma was unable to select his preferred candidate as the new president of the African National Congress—an achievement that was viewed worldwide as a victory for democracy and the rule of law.

Many country reports in this year’s Index emphasized that CSOs’ contributions to electoral processes were made possible by generous funding from foreign donors. In The Gambia, for example, donor funding for CSOs increased markedly during the democratic transition, and in Kenya, despite a generally difficult funding environment, considerable donor support was available for election-related activities. CSOs’ financial viability in Sierra Leone was boosted as donors provided ample funding for activities related to elections scheduled for 2018.

But as donors shifted their attention to elections, their support often meant that CSOs had to turn away from activities in other sectors. Several reports, including those for Ghana, Kenya, and Liberia, stressed that donors’ election-related funding was short-lived and organizations suffered when donor support abruptly ended. In Liberia, for example, Lofa United for 2017 and the Network for Professionals in Support of Building Order abandoned their core functions to devote energy and resources to election-related activities and then virtually ceased to exist once the elections were over. In Ghana, Liberia, and Zimbabwe, donors were reported to have compounded the post-election financial squeeze by holding off on funding new activities when election results were contested or a new government’s priorities were unclear. Even if provided for an important cause such as supporting elections, short-term project-based funding was noted in a number of reports (for example, those of Benin and Sierra Leone) as preventing CSOs from focusing on their core missions and institutional goals, thereby hindering their long-term sustainability.

**SOME LEGAL OPENINGS, BUT INCREASED CONSTRAINTS**

Along with free and fair elections, other essential aspects of civic space in sub-Saharan Africa—freedoms of speech, association, and assembly; the rule of law; and limitations on the power of police, military, and security forces—experienced both improvement and decline in 2017.

Governments in a handful of countries showed a new willingness to help strengthen civil society during the year. In Ethiopia, CSOs were heartened when the government expressed its intention to allow them to participate actively in the democratization process and stated its openness to amending key laws. In Angola, the new president announced that he would abolish Presidential Decree 74/15, which imposed significant obstacles to CSOs’ operations. In Burkina Faso a new law was adopted to protect human rights defenders, and in Guinea and Rwanda streamlined CSO registration procedures furthered freedom of association.

Elsewhere, governments unhappy with CSOs’ efforts to expose corruption or hold them accountable during elections sought to muzzle organizations by various means. There were several serious transgressions in this regard during the year.
At least one human rights worker died while detained on politically related charges in South Sudan. In Burundi, Niger, and Sudan, CSO staff were detained, fined, or imprisoned, and in Tanzania and Benin security forces used excessive force to break up demonstrations. In Uganda the offices of several advocacy organizations were raided. Freedoms of assembly, association, and expression were constrained in Gabon as striking workers were arrested and assaulted and in Senegal as police banned peaceful demonstrations and arrested protesters before the July 2017 elections. In Kenya CSOs protesting the election results were accused of illegal activities, such as defaulting on tax remittances.

Governments also introduced repressive laws or other measures to impede CSOs whose activities they did not like. For example, the Sierra Leonean government surreptitiously adopted new policy regulations that imposed stricter registration requirements and opened the door to increased government scrutiny. In Burundi two new comprehensive pieces of legislation introduced a host of oppressive constraints, including more stringent registration requirements and intrusive monitoring by the government. Meanwhile, in Malawi the government proposed imposing a new fee amounting to 10 percent of CSO's annual budgets, which CSOs saw as a blatant effort to constrict their space in the period leading up to elections in 2019. Similarly, in Botswana, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, the authorities sought to limit CSOs' activities with the introduction of new laws, regulations or, in the case of Tanzania, a three-month “verification exercise” during which all registrations were suspended. Organizations working on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people continued to be barred from operating in Botswana, Liberia, Tanzania, and elsewhere.

Such measures were often taken in countries in which governments worked well with advocacy CSOs in areas that did not focus on human rights, governance, or the needs of marginalized populations. For example, in Gabon, Kenya, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, CSOs interacted with the government through well-established processes on issues ranging from trafficking in persons to county budgets. In Sudan, Mozambique, and Madagascar, where human rights organizations faced serious constraints, CSOs’ cooperation with the government on non-controversial topics promised to deepen as new consultative processes emerged.

CSOS MEETING URGENT NEEDS

Violence and instability continued to affect sub-Saharan Africa in 2017. On one hand, the number of violent crises and limited wars in the region declined, according to the 2017 Conflict Barometer published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. In Mozambique, for example, an uneasy truce between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) brought relative tranquility to that country after years of fighting. A peace agreement also held, for the most part, under a new administration in Sudan, in recognition of which the United States permanently lifted economic sanctions imposed in 1997.

However, in other locations armed conflict continued to inflict misery. South Sudan was wracked by ongoing civil war. Renewed unrest in Ethiopia's Oromiya and Amhara regions led to violent confrontations in which hundreds of people perished, and Boko Haram continued to terrorize communities in northern Nigeria, despite the military's string of victories over the group in 2016. Islamist insurgency groups also attacked several localities in Niger, forcing entire villages to relocate and prompting the government to impose a state of emergency. Terrorist incursions in northern Mali led to counterattacks and human rights abuses by the government.

These and other developments caused the number of people displaced by conflict in sub-Saharan Africa to reach unprecedented levels in 2017. An analysis by the Pew Research Center showed that a new high of people living in sub-Saharan Africa were forced to leave their homes due to conflict in 2017. Uganda received the largest number of refugees, most of whom fled fighting in South Sudan. Elsewhere, refugees and IDPs sought to escape dire poverty or famine caused by several years of disastrous climatic conditions. About 41 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's estimated population lived in extreme poverty in 2017, according to World Bank estimates. For example, in the DRC alone, 7.7 million people, or nearly 10 percent of the population, faced extreme hunger during the year, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees.
CSOs were deeply involved in meeting the needs of the massive number of people affected by conflict, poverty, and famine in 2017. In South Sudan, for example, CSOs worked to relieve acute malnutrition, ensure access to clean water and sanitation facilities, build emergency shelters, and educate displaced children. In North East Nigeria CSOs helped meet the humanitarian needs of refugees and communities affected by insurgency. In Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, and Niger, CSOs provided communities with basic services to improve health, water, shelter, and education. In some places beset by conflict, these undertakings could be dangerous. Thirty South Sudanese aid workers were killed in the course of their work in 2017. Insecurity also hampered CSOs from reaching targeted beneficiaries in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, South Sudan, and elsewhere.

As in previous years, the enormity of need prompted governments that are otherwise hostile to civil society to work with service-providing CSOs. In Uganda, for example, the government clamped down on advocacy organizations but at the same time urgently depended on CSOs to provide services to the burgeoning refugee population. Many governments have put into place ambitious national development plans, often in line with the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other international mechanisms, which emphasize the importance of involving CSOs in delivering services and giving voice to the needs of local stakeholder groups. Yet governments’ efforts to include CSOs are sometimes uneven. For example, Botswana’s Vision 2036 recognizes the role of CSOs in driving national development and includes CSOs in various national plan oversight committees, yet its National Development Plan fails to even mention civil society. To overcome such omissions, donors including the United Nations and the World Bank often insist that local CSOs be included in large-scale humanitarian and development projects that they fund through governments or international organizations.

According to this year’s country reports, nearly all beneficiaries expressed appreciation for the contributions made by organizations working in malaria and HIV/AIDS prevention, women’s reproductive health, children’s education, and many other fields to saving lives and improving the quality of life in communities across the continent. In nearly every country, beneficiaries were reported to have highly positive or improving views of service-providing CSOs, even when their opinions of advocacy organizations were uncertain or they lacked understanding of the CSO sector as a whole.

**COPING WITH FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY**

Macroeconomic performance in sub-Saharan Africa was on a course of modest improvement in 2017. The decline in global commodity prices, which had devastated sub-Saharan Africa’s commodity-dependent economies in 2014, began to reverse in 2017. In addition, the economies of most countries were helped by improvements in the global economy, more favorable foreign exchange rates and external financing conditions, and an abatement of the severe weather conditions that had affected large areas of the continent in recent years. In particular, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia posted modest to notable economic growth in 2017.

But elsewhere, whether because of political unrest, a lack of political will to undertake needed policy reforms, corruption, or inadequate government capacity, economies failed to recover or fell into renewed crisis in 2017. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa’s three largest economies continued to struggle. Angola and Nigeria were still underperforming after the steep drop in the price of oil, their main commodity, while South Africa’s economy failed to overcome low productivity and deindustralization, according to the African Development Bank Group and the World Bank. Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan, and Zimbabwe were also hard hit by economic decline. In many countries households continued to be affected by high income disparities, inflation, low wages, declining living standards, and pervasive corruption in everyday life.

Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, governments have been slow to fund mechanisms that could throw a lifeline to CSOs during periods of economic stress. Government funding of CSOs is rare to non-existent in a majority of countries, including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique, and Tanzania. The governments of Niger and Burundi share development funds with CSOs when they are required to do so by donors. South Africa is a rare exception in having developed several funding streams that provide meaningful income for the CSO sector.
Similarly, in Kenya CSOs receive some parliamentary funding for programs to combat drug abuse, and the country’s National Government Affirmative Fund offers financial support to organizations engaged in community outreach and training in life skills.

Above all, this year’s reports mentioned the dwindling presence of foreign donors as the main factor hindering CSOs’ financial viability. As in years past, foreign donors continued to draw down their funding in many countries, including Burundi, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mozambique. As they departed, they typically left behind undeveloped local philanthropic practices, governments reluctant to support CSOs, and minimal corporate social responsibility programs. Thus CSO sectors that have developed since the early 1990s with a nearly total dependency on donors felt abandoned in the absence of other viable sources of support.

Even when they continued to fund CSOs in country in 2017, donors were sometimes described as having policies that undermined CSO sectors. In Guinea, Mali, Benin, and Angola, donors reportedly preferred to fund only international organizations or the largest local organizations, thereby marginalizing smaller local CSOs. Donors in Benin requested strategic plans but then provided only short-term funding that did not cover the cost of developing or implementing them. In Namibia donors avoided funding local CSOs because of their lack of capacity, but then overlooked CSOs’ need for capacity-building support. In many countries the lion’s share of donor funding was earmarked for service-providing CSOs, leaving advocacy organizations underfunded. Yet even some service-providing CSOs experienced difficulties in accessing sufficient funding in 2017. In Kenya, for example, CSO service provision declined as donors shifted their attention to election-related activities. Service provision by South African CSOs similarly declined as funding from governmental sources was cut and the United States reintroduced its Mexico City Policy, which prohibited funding from going to CSOs that support or work with organizations that support abortion.

Some CSOs began to actively overcome these negative financial trends with a host of promising innovations. Gabonese, Nigerian, Nigerien, and Sierra Leonean CSOs explored income generation through social enterprises in 2017, and organizations in Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya, Madagascar, Uganda, and Zambia conducted Internet-based fundraising campaigns. Although the amounts of money that these initiatives raised were usually small, they give hope that CSOs in the region will eventually overcome entrenched poverty and recalcitrant governments to develop steady, sustainable sources of local support.

**SCORING TRENDS IN 2017**

Overall CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa was largely stable in 2017. Twenty countries, or about two-thirds of the countries surveyed, reported no change in their overall scores from the previous year. Of the countries reporting change, six countries (Botswana, Burundi, Kenya, Namibia, Senegal, and Uganda) reported decline, balanced by five countries (Angola, The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, and Sierra Leone) reporting improvement. In 2017, as in 2016, twenty-one countries were in the Sustainability Evolving category, and ten countries were in the Sustainability Impeded range.
The number of countries reporting an overall decline in sustainability in 2017 was fewer than in 2016, when nine countries, or more than one quarter of all countries surveyed, reported deterioration. The reasons for overall decline varied greatly from country to country, but they generally reflected a confluence of diminished funding with efforts by governments to constrict the space for CSOs. In particular, all six countries reporting overall decline also reported deterioration in their legal environments, and four of the six countries reported poorer financial viability. This combination of negative trends tended to hit CSO sectors in their vulnerable areas to drive down their overall scores. For example, Botswana reported deterioration in advocacy because, in an era of scarce funding, government-funded advocacy organizations were afraid of losing their funding if they were too critical of the authorities. Namibia reported declines in organizational capacity, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure—three dimensions in which the country’s CSOs were already struggling in recent years. Unlike previous years, the countries reporting overall decline in 2017 were not concentrated in East Africa (although overall sustainability in East Africa continued to be significantly lower than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa).

As in every other year since the Index began covering sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa had the strongest level of overall sustainability in 2017. CSOs in South Africa continued to benefit from a relatively enabling legal environment and strong organizational capacities to act as robust advocates and service providers. Ethiopia and Angola again had the weakest scores, although the sustainability

The five countries reporting overall improvement in CSO sustainability attributed their improvement mainly to increased resources or more supportive governments. The Gambia and Guinea improved in every dimension in 2017 thanks to a combination of freer political environments and increased donor largesse. Angolan CSOs’ overall sustainability improved as a result of a more relaxed operating environment, while stronger financial viability contributed to overall advances in Niger and Sierra Leone.
of civil society in both countries was on an upward trajectory. While Ethiopia's overall score remained the same as in 2016, the legal environment regained ground lost in 2016 and advocacy recorded its first improvement since 2010 as CSOs entered into discussions with the government regarding amendments to the legal framework for their sector. Angola’s overall score improved for the first time, after the Supreme Court ruled that the main law governing CSOs was unconstitutional. Despite these positive developments, CSOs in both countries still struggled with limited organizational capacities, inadequate funding, and few opportunities to influence public policies.

Following are overviews of the trends of improvement and decline in each of the seven dimensions of sustainability covered by the Index.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT.** Sixteen countries (Burundi, Botswana, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda), or more than half of all countries surveyed, reported a decline in their legal environments in 2017. The reports for these countries describe a broad range of repressive new laws and increased government harassment. For example, Mozambique's legal environment eroded from the Sustainability Evolving to the Sustainability Impeded category as the government delayed the registration of certain advocacy organizations and interfered in CSOs’ internal operations. Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania recorded significant deterioration in their legal environments: Burundi, because of the government’s tightening of an already restrictive legal framework; Kenya, because of the government’s harassment of organizations involved in the disputed elections; and Tanzania, because of the government’s targeting of advocacy organizations and imposition of restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly. Only four countries (Angola, Ethiopia, The Gambia, and Guinea) reported improved legal environments, with the most common reason being the reform of laws that had previously constricted CSOs’ work. Of the thirty-one countries covered in the Index, the legal environments of seventeen countries were in the Sustainability Impeded category, and fourteen countries were in the Sustainability Evolving category.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY.** Changes in organizational capacity were evenly balanced, with six countries (The Gambia, Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan) reporting improvement, and six countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Namibia, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia) reporting decline. The scores for this dimension were more or less evenly divided between the Sustainability Enhanced and Sustainability Impeded categories. The reasons for improvement included enhanced capacity-building programs (Guinea) and funding for core costs (Sudan and Sierra Leone). Decline was largely attributed to the lack of funding for organizational development and short-term funding that did not allow CSOs to develop or implement strategic plans.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY.** Financial viability continued to be the weakest dimension of CSO sustainability in 2017. Twenty-five countries in this year’s Index were in the Sustainability Impeded category. Eleven countries (Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia) reported decline in this area, with more than half of these countries in Southern Africa. The most common reasons for decline were dwindling donor funding, especially for smaller organizations, and the lack of local sources of funding. Nineteen countries, or nearly two-thirds of surveyed countries, have reported a net deterioration in financial viability over the past three years. Only five countries (The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone), all in West Africa, reported improved financial viability in 2017, mainly because foreign donors increased funding for election-related or other activities.

**ADVOCACY.** As in previous years, advocacy and service provision were the strongest dimensions of CSO sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017. Scores for both dimensions averaged 4.2 for the entire region. Only three countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola) reported advocacy scores in the lowest category, Sustainability Impeded. At the other end of the spectrum, South Africa boasted an advocacy score in the Sustainability Enhanced category, the only score to reach this level in the 2017 Index. The remaining countries reported scores in the Sustainability Evolving category. Thirteen countries (Angola, The Gambia, Guinea, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Zambia) reported improved advocacy in 2017—by far the greatest number of improved scores in any dimension.
Their improvement was mostly attributed to CSOs’ better relations with the government, well-targeted advocacy campaigns, and, in the case of South Africa and Kenya, effective use of the courts for strategic litigation. Eight countries (Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) reported decline in advocacy, mainly because of repressive government attitudes, a lack of public support, or donors’ emphasis on CSO service provision over advocacy work. All countries reporting improvement in the legal environment also recorded improved advocacy scores. However, in some countries (Kenya, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan), advocacy improved even as the legal environment deteriorated, usually because advocacy organizations were well established or took advantage of opportunities to work on non-controversial issues with government bodies. In Kenya, Namibia, and South Sudan, new modes of advocacy that elude traditional governmental checks on CSOs, such as the refusal of registration, were also particularly effective. The new approaches included social movements such as Landless People’s Movement in Namibia and hashtag movements, or inexpensive, informal campaigns using social media to mobilize support quickly, as in Kenya and South Sudan.

SERVICE PROVISION. In the area of service provision, eight countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Sudan) reported improvement, and five countries (Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, and South Africa) reported decline. All countries were in the Sustainability Evolving category except Angola, Gabon, and Sudan, which were scored at the Sustainability Impeded level. Stronger service provision was usually driven by CSOs’ ability to provide more diversified services, their effective work with communities to design and monitor programs, and donors’ inclusion of local CSOs in large-scale projects. Decline in service provision was commonly attributed to dwindling financial resources for this purpose.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Civil society’s sectoral infrastructure was the most stable of any dimension in 2017. Only eight countries showed change, and of these three-quarters (The Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, and Tanzania) recorded improvement, mainly because of substantial training opportunities and enhanced cooperation within the sector through ad hoc collaboration, consortia, and coalitions. Only Kenya and Namibia reported decline in this dimension in 2017. The decline in Kenya, which has traditionally had the strongest sectoral infrastructure in all of sub-Saharan Africa, was caused by decreased information sharing among CSOs, while in Namibia CSOs lacked access to intermediary support and umbrella organizations, training, and resource centers because of the financial crisis in the CSO sector. Overall, the countries covered by this year’s Index were fairly evenly divided between the Sustainability Enhanced and Sustainability Impeded categories in the sectoral infrastructure dimension.

PUBLIC IMAGE. Finally, nine countries (Angola, Benin, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone) reported improvement in CSOs’ public image. This was more than twice as many as the four countries (Burundi, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Malawi) reporting decline. All countries reporting decline in this area also reported decline in the legal environment, suggesting that governments’ negative treatment of CSOs strongly shapes the perceptions of media, businesses, and the public. The reverse also seems to be true, as three of the four countries (Angola, The Gambia, and Guinea, but not Ethiopia) reporting improved legal environments also reported a better public image of CSOs.

CONCLUSION

The 2017 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa presents a portrait of an often challenged but still resilient civil society. Thousands of brave and determined staff members and volunteers play an indispensable role in helping develop one of the world’s neediest regions. They are supported in their work by generous funders, grateful communities, enlightened governments, and nurturing international counterparts. We hope that this year’s Index offers a useful tool for measuring CSOs’ achievements in the past year and charting a path for their work in the years to come.
In August 2017, in the first turnover of presidents in thirty-eight years, João Gonçalves Lourenço of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was elected to lead the country. Lourenço’s campaign promises included reducing corruption, creating jobs, and improving the healthcare and educational systems. Although the MPLA received more than 61 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections, five other parties gained seventy of 220 parliamentary seats, the highest proportion ever. The election was significant as a peaceful transition of power, and it opened the door to CSOs to participate in a wider range of activities.

Angola’s economy continued to struggle in 2017. As oil represents about one-third of the country’s GDP and more than 95 percent of its exports, the sharp, prolonged decline in the global price of oil since mid-2014 has had a significant impact. Reduced revenues caused GDP growth to decelerate from an annual average of 10.3 percent in 2004–14 to only 1.5 percent since 2015. The government has responded by cutting expenditures, devaluing the kwanza, and increasing non-oil revenues. Nevertheless, Angolans continued to experience a marked deterioration of their living conditions in 2017, including a lack of medicines in hospitals, depreciation of salaries, increased unemployment, and constant fluctuations in water and electrical supplies.

The National Teachers’ Union (SINPROF) effectively mobilized a countrywide strike to demand better wages for teachers, improved conditions in schools, and the protection of citizens’ rights. SINPROF initially called for the strike in February 2017, but after its leaders were intimidated by the authorities, it was postponed until April. The three-day strike affected 99 percent of schools in Luanda and finally ended with the government’s promise of wage increases, which were eventually granted by the new government in April 2018. The Union of Workers of the Public Ministry demonstrated in May to demand higher salaries and a better working environment.
Overall CSO sustainability improved in 2017. The legal environment improved significantly after the Supreme Court ruled that Presidential Decree 74/15 on the Regulation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), an unpopular law that had regulated CSOs since 2015, was unconstitutional. CSOs' public image and advocacy also improved in the wake of the court ruling, since CSOs were able to campaign without much interruption from the government, and coverage of their work in the state-controlled media was more positive. While other dimensions of CSO sustainability were stable, the ongoing financial crisis tested the resilience of many CSOs and forced some of them to improve their organizational capacity.

In 2017 the Institute of Promotion and Coordination of Aid Communities (IPROCAC), the government body responsible for overseeing CSOs, reported that 309 domestic and 55 international CSOs, or a total of 364 organizations, were registered and operational in Angola. These figures represent a 23 percent increase in domestic CSOs (from 252 organizations) and an 8 percent decrease in international organizations (from 60 organizations) over 2016. IPROCAC did not state a reason for the significant increase in local CSOs, which focus mostly on service provision, but some observers believe that it was due to young people’s lack of employment opportunities as well as their growing interest in community affairs. The number of international CSOs declined because of decreases in foreign assistance. IPROCAC also reported that 29 faith-based organizations (FBOs) (23 domestic and 6 international) were operational in 2017.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal environment for CSOs was enhanced in 2017 with the abolition of Presidential Decree 74/15. The government had used the decree since 2015 to impose significant obstacles to CSOs' operations. For example, the decree assigned IPROCAC significant powers to define priority areas for CSOs' interventions, guide their program implementation, supervise their operations, and restrict their access to funding. The decree also required CSOs to undergo costly registration procedures with multiple authorities, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2016 the Angolan Bar Association, SOS Habitat, Rede Terra (Land Network), and the National Counseling Center filed a lawsuit to have the decree declared unconstitutional. On July 5, 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that Presidential Decree 74/15 violated the constitution and that the authority to regulate CSOs resides with parliament rather than the president. In November the new president announced his intention to abolish the decree.

The court’s ruling significantly eased the operating environment for CSOs, especially those that had experienced difficulties in previous years. For example, the Alliance for the Development and Promotion of the Hoji-Ya-Henda Commune (APDCH), SOS Habitat, Omunga, and Human Rights Coordination Council resumed their activities after restrictions on their bank accounts were removed. Rede Terra, whose work on land issues in Kwanza Sul Province had been interrupted by provincial authorities, began to work on land conflicts again. Freedom of speech also opened up as the new government made changes in the management of Angolan Public Television, including removing some close allies of the previous administration. The government allowed Radio Eclésia, which had been confined to Luanda since 1975, to expand the geographic reach of its broadcasts, and the station began to cover FBO activities and promote human rights. Despite these changes, some organizations continued to face hurdles. For example, the Angola Network for AIDS Support Organizations (ANASO) experienced difficulties with its registration, including demands for additional documents by the Ministry of Justice and a longer than normal wait for approval. The Association of Seropositive Friends (AS) in Angola encountered similar obstacles during its effort to register. Both organizations were finally allowed to register in 2017.

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1 The 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa incorrectly reported the score for Angola’s Legal Environment as 6.2. The correct score was 6.3.
Law 2/11 of 2011 allows CSOs to provide services and products as private entities. As nonprofit organizations, CSOs may not earn profits per se, but they may charge to recover any costs incurred by the provision of services.

CSOs registered with the General Tax Administration (AGT) under the Ministry of Finance are entitled to duty-free import certain items needed for humanitarian work, such as used clothing and tents. CSOs may apply to AGT to import other items duty free, provided they obtain authorization from IPROCAC and the approval of the relevant ministry before applying to AGT for exemptions. In 2017 several organizations received exemptions, including People to People Development Aid (ADPP), which imported kick-start pumps for agriculture projects. Registered CSOs may obtain income tax exemptions for staff by applying to IPROCAC and the Ministry of Justice and then submitting the approval to the AGT. The application process is generally not difficult. In 2017 Development Workshop (DW) obtained tax exemptions for its staff.

In 2017 a group of independent lawyers known as Mãos Livre continued to provide pro bono services to CSOs needing legal advice, which are usually organizations that promote human rights.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

There was no change in CSOs’ organizational capacity in 2017. The country’s economic and financial crisis continued to have a negative impact on Angolan organizations, and declines in funding caused some organizations to fail to implement planned activities and others to lay off staff. At the same time, according to statements made by CSO representatives during a workshop in Luanda in July 2018, the crisis tested the resilience of organizations and even forced some to improve their organizational capacities.

Several CSOs sought to manage their financial difficulties by discussing their situation with their constituents. For example, the board of directors of ADRA informed members of the general assembly, National Meeting of Communities, and participants in training workshops on community development about its financial situation and the potential need to scale back some activities. The same approach was taken by OPSA and Christian and traditional churches, such as CEAST and the Angolan Council of Christian Churches (CICA). Their openness helped stakeholders understand and adjust to the situation imposed by the financial crisis.

CSOs in Angola have learned that longer-term strategic planning is beneficial, especially as it helps organizations focus on their areas of strength, develop funding proposals, and build the confidence of donors. In a gradual change from previous years, a growing number of larger organizations have adopted some kind of strategic plan. For example, DW, ADRA, Prazedor; Network of Women Living with HIV (Mwenho), International Humanitarian Organization (OHI), Youth Forum for Health Support and AIDS Prevention (FOJASSIDA), Rastafara Circle of Benguela (CRB), and Political and Social Observatory of Angola (OPSA) have strategic plans covering multiple years, which include achievable objectives based on their strengths and experience. Local medium-sized urban and provincial-level CSOs also tend to have mission statements, longer-term goals, and a few strategic objectives. Smaller CSOs have a sectoral focus but usually do not have strategic plans.

At a meeting organized by ANASO in 2017, many CSOs revealed that they do not hold meetings of their general assemblies, usually because of members’ lack of interest, a shortage of funds, or fears of leadership change. ANASO successfully pushed a number of its members to organize general assembly meetings during the year.
Only a few large organizations, such as ADRA, Mwenho, and DW, reported that they hold regular board meetings to discuss organizational issues, including key policy issues. Otherwise, CSOs continued to demonstrate weak internal polices and accountability procedures in 2017. For example, many CSOs do not have policies on human resource management, financial accounting, fundraising strategies, or administrative procedures, mainly because they lack the organizational knowledge and financial resources to develop them. However, several CSOs, including Prazedor and OPSA, made progress in developing manuals and guidelines during the year.

Most CSOs had difficulty retaining experienced and qualified staff because of their lack of longer-term income in 2017. Many organizations did not pay salaries, reduced salaries, delayed payment, or, in extreme cases, laid off staff. Their financial difficulties caused many staff still working with CSOs to have parallel jobs. The absence of adequate staff undermined organizations’ management and in turn made it difficult for them to attract new funding. Whenever possible, CSOs relied on volunteers. The country’s high unemployment caused many young people to organize local groups to provide humanitarian assistance and other services, which they operated on a volunteer basis. These groups sometimes partnered locally with more established CSOs, and volunteers could sometimes receive meals in exchange for work performed.

CSOs in the major cities with a number of projects rent offices equipped with computers and reasonably good furniture. CSOs in rural areas usually have basic office space in private houses close to municipal or communal administrative offices. Organizations in Luanda and other large cities have relatively good access to the Internet, but in remote areas Internet services are sparse, and CSOs usually rely on smartphones to access it. CSO staff with good communications skills often disseminate information through social media accounts in the names of their organizations or, in smaller CSOs, their own names.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3

The financial viability of CSOs did not change appreciably in 2017. Angolan organizations have been greatly affected by the ongoing economic and financial crisis. The organization OHI reports that national and international funders tend to fund the same organizations repeatedly, overlooking and thereby marginalizing other CSOs. According to ANASO, only those organizations with diversified sources of revenue or good connections with the government were active in 2017. A number of other organizations became temporarily inactive because of their lack of funds.

Bilateral and multilateral donors issued a limited number of calls for proposals during the year. For example, USAID solicited applications for a $63 million grant for services related to malaria and HIV/AIDS, which was awarded to Population Services International, an international CSO. USAID also continued its LINKAGES project, which funds local CSOs to provide HIV/AIDS-related services to key populations. The World Bank continued to provide funding to the Social Aid Fund (FAS), a government entity that manages World Bank funds for social projects, including community activities involving local organizations. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis continued to provide funding to CSOs through various United Nations (UN) agencies, and World Vision sub-contracted with local CSOs such as FOJASSIDA for projects aimed at improving the lives of children, families, and communities. The European Union (EU) also continued its funding programs.

Government funding is available to CSOs through contracts for services offered by municipalities and provincial administrations. For example, FOJASSIDA developed a credible niche in Cazenga municipality in Luanda working on youth development, which led to multiple service contracts with Cazenga and the administration of Bié Province.
Funds from the corporate social responsibility programs of oil companies are directed to a limited number of CSOs. In 2017 Eni, an Italian oil company, funded a four-year social integration project focused on solar energy, water, and farmers’ training in Benguela and Namibe provinces in cooperation with ADPP, and Unitel provided funding to Okutika Child and Adolescent Center in Huambo for vocational training for fifteen youths. Otherwise, funding from the private sector, private foundations, and individuals was extremely scarce in 2017.

CSOs do not conduct fundraising campaigns, and they do not usually charge membership dues. A few CSOs generate revenue for programs by selling products. For example, CRB sells handmade garments, Prazedor performs consulting work, and People Living with AIDS (LPV) sells handicrafts.

The financial management systems of most smaller CSOs are weak, mainly because they lack the skilled human resources and funding to develop such systems. Larger organizations, such as DW, Mosaiko, and APDCH, continued to maintain sound financial management systems and conduct annual audits in 2017. CICA and ADPP adopted a new financial system called Primavera, which enabled them to generate financial reports more efficiently.

**ADVOCACY: 5.2**

CSO advocacy improved in 2017. After Presidential Decree 74/15 was declared unconstitutional in July, CSOs were able to campaign to protect human rights without significant interference from the government. For example, Rede Terra resumed its support to small landholders seeking to end land grabbing by business entities in Kwanza Sul. Omunga worked in human rights and local development, with a focus on local issues that have national implications, such as the demolition of houses by the government. Omunga began a local campaign on the issue that eventually went national, and it also played a prominent role in preparing shadow human rights reports for the African Union and the UN. SOS Habitat resumed advocacy on human rights and democratic practices in Angola, especially those involved in land rights issues.

CSOs continued to interact effectively with governmental bodies in 2017. Local CSOs worked on voter education with the Election Commission, which recognized that CSOs had valuable connections with local and grassroots communities. ANASO held several national and regional workshops with CSOs from Cuanza Norte, Benguela, Huila, and Cunene provinces to discuss the inclusion of CSOs in municipal and provincial consultative forums. Some government officials participated informally in these meetings. Afterwards, as a result of these efforts, the vice president, other central government officials, and National Assembly deputies met with ANASO representatives, and municipal administrations invited CSOs to take part in local consultative bodies to discuss developmental plans.

A number of other advocacy efforts were successful in 2017. For the first time in Angola, SINPROF mobilized a countrywide movement to demand better wages for teachers and the protection of citizens’ rights enshrined in the law. In a rare show of tolerance, the authorities allowed a group of women to protest the proposed criminalization of abortion. In Benguela, a campaign coordinated by OHI and CRB and financed by the EU promoted protections against human rights violations. Other civil society actors also became more assertive. For example, the Union of Workers of the Public Ministry demonstrated for better salaries and working environments, and the Union of Air Traffic Controllers negotiated with the Ministry of Transport for better salaries. A strike by Luanda taxi drivers for more taxi stands, increased fares, and less police harassment had a great social and media impact, although the strikers did not achieve most of their demands. Benguela CSOs hosted so-called Thursday debates to promote themes of social change.
CSOs also engaged in successful lobbying in 2017. For example, a women’s group from Benguela met with the Sixth Commission, the parliamentary sub-committee overseeing health-related issues. At the group’s urging, the Sixth Commission held back the proposed law to criminalize abortion pending further public consultation.

Throughout the year CSOs continued to raise the issue of reforming the restrictive legal environment and, especially, repealing Presidential Decree 74/15. A coalition formed by SOS Habitat, Rede Terra, and the National Counseling Center was among the parties requesting that the Constitutional Court eliminate the decree. They won a successful verdict in the case in July.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3**

CSO service provision was steady in 2017. CSOs continued to help improve the basic services available to Angolan communities in areas such as education, water and sanitation, agriculture, health, and road safety. ADPP completed a USAID-supported, three-year water and sanitation project in Benguela, during which students, teachers, and community activists in 100 primary schools and their adjacent communities were trained in the promotion of personal hygiene and community sanitation. The UN Development Program (UNDP) funded a consortium of five CSOs—Prazedor, Mbakita, Etungafano, Association for Community Development (ADC), and the Association of Seropositive People and Activists in the Fight Against AIDS—to implement an HIV-response project in Cuando Cubango, Huila, Namibe, and Cunene provinces.

CSOs worked with community groups to strengthen their capacities in 2017. For example, with funding from USAID, ADRA and DW continued to provide training on water project management to local administrations and community groups and organized farmers to adopt improved agricultural practices. A community-based malaria project by Core Group and ADPP strengthened communities’ capacity to prevent and treat malaria. Mafiku and other organizations provided services to FAS to help develop municipal profiles and development plans.

Some local organizations such as LPV earn income by selling Angolan handicrafts. CSOs also earn income through contracts for services with the government. For example, Beneficial Christian Action Angola, Prazedor, and OHI have service contracts with municipal and provincial administrations. Some organizations charge for services to recover costs.

CSOs generally provide their services without discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Larger organizations such as ADRA and DW publish yearly reports, which they share with other CSOs.

In 2017 the government showed increased trust in CSOs’ ability to provide services, and CSOs themselves perceived their relationship with the government to be closer in the area of service delivery. For example, the governor of Benguela directed government officials to participate in debates on local developmental issues organized by CSOs. FOJASSIDA continued to partner with the municipal administration of Cazenga to promote community health issues for youth and participated in a weekly program on the government-affiliated Radio Cazenga about gender equality, human rights, and public health. The National Forum on Malaria, which has a membership of approximately 100 CSOs and government entities, continued to meet quarterly in the Ministry of Health to exchange experiences and coordinate activities.
The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Angola did not change in 2017. Few resource centers or libraries offered CSOs opportunities to learn, research, and exchange ideas and information. DW, AJPD, ADRA, Omunga, and Mosaiko are among the few organizations that offer CSOs space to meet and share information.

In addition to the major donors, several other organizations awarded grants to CSOs in 2017. Doctors of Africa CUAMM, an Italian CSO, awarded grants for malaria-related projects to local organizations, including Caritas, Prazedor, and ADPP, with funding from the Global Fund. A fund created by twelve petroleum companies and administered by USAID awarded a grant to a CSO to construct a health center in Benguela to benefit people to be relocated from high-risk areas prone to floods. Petroleum companies also have CSR programs that fund local organizations directly. Local businesses such as UNITEL and Grupo Simples provided funding to ADPP for projects in education and agriculture in 2017.

As the financial crises continued, CSOs developed a better understanding of the benefits of working together in networks and consortiums. CSOs helped other organizations implement projects and develop strategic plans. For instance, Prazedor, an established CSO in Huila, led ADC in Namibe, ASPALSIDA in Huila, and other organizations in jointly implementing a UNDP-funded HIV project.

CSO networks and consortiums also supported their members with training opportunities in 2017. For example, ANASO offered refresher training on project implementation and budget management and organized four regional conferences to develop common positions among members on combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Two networks of CSOs formed in 2016, the Group on Natural Resources Angola and the Group of CSOs for Participatory Budgeting, offered their members training on developing projects and participating in public budgeting processes in 2017. Among several capacity-building events offered by donors, USAID provided training in financial management to representatives of twenty CSOs. As a result of the training, the CSOs were better prepared to advocate effectively for budget policy reform. USAID also provided funding to the Financial Services Volunteer Corps to build the capacity of the Budget Monitoring Group, a CSO consortium working to improve budget transparency through advocacy with government budget authorities at the national level.

In 2017, in contrast to previous years, the Angolan government seemed to regard CSOs as important partners. In July the secretary of state for agriculture and livestock publicly recognized CSOs’ contributions to improved food security, and in August the minister of planning acknowledged that CSOs had an important role to play in improving infant and maternal mortality rates, community sanitation, and malaria prevention. In March FAS invited representatives of CSOs and the public and private sectors to participate in a discussion of community development agencies. The discussion emphasized the link between the work of the agencies and CSOs. In July, when the Ministry of Social Affairs established the Social Solidarity Fund so that people could donate money and used household items to vulnerable people, it delegated responsibility for managing the fund to a CSO, Caritas Angola. Partnerships between CSOs and business continued in 2017 as a business incubator created by Chevron Oil and Unitel helped CSOs gain knowledge in such areas as microfinance and securing small loans for start-up business projects. CSOs participating in the project included DW and Human Action.

During the year CSOs worked with private radio stations, such as Radio Eclésia, Radio Cazenga, Luanda Antenna Commercial, and Radio Despertar; as well as local private newspapers in the provinces, to address issues such as potable water, domestic violence, the political participation of youth, and the role of communities in malaria and HIV prevention.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.4

In 2017 the public image of CSOs in Angola began to improve slowly thanks to the openness and political goodwill of the new government.

The government-controlled Angola News Agency published positive articles about CSOs’ activities across the country. The agency provided considerable coverage of CSOs’ work at the provincial level and usually covered CSO stories if informed in advance. The Jornal de Angola, a widely read daily newspaper, also frequently published stories on CSOs. Overall, CSOs perceived that there was more attention paid by public and private media to their activities during the year because of the positive attitude of the new government.

The government perceived CSOs to be a productive partner in local development in 2017. For example, at an April meeting of the National Forum on Malaria, the secretary of state for public health applauded the work of CSOs and noted that their contributions had substantially reduce the number of cases of the disease. Officials in the new administration continued to recognize CSOs’ contributions. In October the secretary of state for higher education praised the work of CSOs, citing a successful ADPP water project in Benguela. The public was also more interested in the work of CSOs in 2017 and overall viewed them as more transparent and supportive of local community involvement than government agencies. The private sector had a similarly positive view of CSOs, as evidenced in the funding that larger business entities provided for small CSO projects in 2017.

During the year several CSOs continued to publicize their activities on their websites and in social media. ANASO, Mwenho, and other organizations attracted increased numbers of followers on their Facebook and Twitter accounts. CSOs also use local radio and provincial newspapers to publicize their activities. CSOs sought to cooperate with journalists to publicize project launches, visits by donors, and other noteworthy events.

CSOs often have codes of ethics or conduct, and their strategic plans may address their implementation. CSOs share reports about their projects with their international and bilateral partners, relevant ministries, and municipal and provincial administrators.
After seventeen years under a dictatorship, Benin has been a democratic country since 1990. In 2017 President Patrice Talon, who was elected in 2016, fulfilled a campaign promise to propose wide-ranging constitutional reforms, including the establishment of a single six-year presidential term, creation of an independent inspector general’s office, and introduction of a new method for appointing members to the Constitutional Court, as well as the financial reorganization of the country’s political parties. Parliament rejected the proposed reforms in April.

Benin’s economy continues to be dominated by agriculture, particularly cotton. The economy slowed in 2017 because of the recession in Nigeria, its neighbor and main trading partner. Major challenges facing the government included improving public services and living conditions, reducing youth unemployment, and stimulating growth. In April the board of directors of the International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility approved a three-year, $149 million program for Benin to help the country reduce poverty and introduce macro-economic reforms.

Despite many challenges, Beninese civil society continued to be a force for democratic progress in 2017. CSO sustainability did not change significantly in 2017. CSO advocacy and financial viability declined, while improvements were noted in CSOs’ service provision and public image. The legal environment did not change; CSOs continue to be governed by an outdated law, while the authorities continue to restrict freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Organizational capacity and the infrastructure supporting the sector also did not change significantly in 2017.

There is no recent information on the number of CSOs in Benin. In 2015 the Ministry of Institutional Relations reported that there were approximately 6,000 registered organizations, but that only approximately 500 CSOs were up to date in their submission of annual reports and therefore considered active. The sector comprises a wide range of organizations, including non-governmental organizations, development organizations, youth and women’s groups, sports clubs, traditional chiefdoms, unions, and professional organizations.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9

The legal environment for CSOs in Benin did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs continued to experience constraints on their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and were subject to the use of force by security forces during the year.

Fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression and the right to information are guaranteed by Benin’s constitution and laws, and Benin has signed and ratified most regional and international mechanisms guaranteeing respect for human rights and civic freedoms. However, the government has not implemented measures to ensure compliance with these documents and in practice has wide discretion to make subjective decisions about citizens’ exercise of fundamental rights. CSOs are still governed by a law from 1901, which they argue needs to be revised to enhance freedom of association. CSO regulations are also general and do not reflect international mechanisms for protecting fundamental rights.

The process for registering CSOs is lengthy, taking an average of approximately four months. CSOs must first declare their existence to the prefects in the communes in which they are headquartered. They are supposed to receive application receipts within five days, but the process is cumbersome, and the government does not have sufficient resources to issue the receipts in this timeframe. CSOs must also request inclusion in the official bulletin and notify the prefecture authorities of any changes in their articles of association or executive secretariat. In addition, registration officials often require CSOs to use bylaw templates, which go through multiple phases of review and sometimes get lost, discouraging CSOs from registering. For example, All For Peace gave up on the registration process after its bylaws were rejected for no reason.

There are no requirements for capital or a minimum number of founders and no restrictions on CSOs’ objectives, as long as they are lawful and do not disturb the peace or offend public decency.

There were several notable examples of government harassment in 2017, which was worse than in 2016. In particular, the government clamped down on student unions to prevent students from going on strike after the government announced that it would introduce tuition fees for public universities. The government suspended all student unions and used tear gas to disperse hundreds of students at the University of Abomey-Calavi. Police also prohibited a meeting of student association leaders in a private, closed location without legal justification, thereby constraining the students’ freedom of association. Afterwards, the government formulated a draft decree to define guidelines for the operations of student organizations, which recognized students’ right to the freedom of association. Freedom of assembly was also restricted in 2017. For example, a prefect in the Littoral Department prohibited a protest march by journalists following the shutdown of multiple press outlets that were hostile to the government. In addition, undue restrictions on freedom of expression, notably the unwarranted suspension of independent media outlets by the national media regulator, the High Authority for Audiovisual Media and Communication (HAAC), persisted in 2017.

CSOs receive tax exemptions at the government’s discretion. In general, the government grants tax exemptions to CSOs if their income comes from nonprofit activities that are in the public interest. Donations from individual and corporate donors are also tax exempt.

CSOs are allowed to earn income from the provision of non-commercial goods and services. When engaged in income-generating activities, CSOs pay taxes just as private businesses do. Normally, CSOs are not eligible to bid on government contracts. However, the government sometimes offers contracts to CSOs to conduct educational activities and training campaigns. In such cases, the CSOs are subject to more flexible tax treatment, because the services are not commercial.
Lawyers are available, but CSOs generally lack the financial means to secure their services. On rare occasions, lawyers provide pro bono services in human rights related cases involving CSOs, such as detention of human rights defenders.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2017. However, in 2017, many CSOs received support from international partners. As foreign donors increasingly assess CSOs’ organizational capacity before providing funding, this indicates that these CSOs have adequate organizational capacities. In addition, this funding gives CSOs the opportunity to strengthen their operations.

Active CSOs have a positive impact on their target audiences in many areas, including health, water, and sanitation. CSOs continued to identify potential constituents and actively sought to develop relationships with them during 2017. However, these attempts were not always successful. When the government launched a defamation campaign against CSOs, portraying them as politically motivated or implementing foreign agendas, beneficiaries questioned CSOs’ independence and integrity and no longer collaborated with them.

CSOs are often created to take advantage of funding opportunities rather than to address important issues or meet public needs. CSOs tend to work on very short-term projects and often change the areas in which they work in response to funding opportunities. CSOs increasingly prepare strategic plans as donors increasingly demand such plans to verify that the CSOs’ plans are in line with their own priorities and to monitor the CSO’s activities over a longer period. For example, the European Union (EU) requires activity reports for the past three years as part of its funding process. Donors also increasingly provide their CSO partners with the necessary technical expertise to support the development of such plans.

Although CSOs’ organizational documents require management bodies, these bodies vary greatly from one organization to the next. For example, while some CSOs may have a board of directors, an executive committee, and a management team, others have more basic management structures. Some CSOs suffer from a lack of clarity as to the respective roles of the board of directors and the staff. In 2017 there were many cases in which staff did not follow their organizational bylaws and internal regulations or did not submit reports to the general meeting or the board.

CSOs hire and lay off staff depending on the needs of individual projects. Very few CSOs retain permanent, salaried staff outside of project time frames. Permanent employees are paid very low salaries. Most CSOs do not routinely provide training for staff or have policies for replacing or promoting staff. Volunteers are CSOs’ primary human resource outside of funded projects, but most volunteers are relatively unqualified.

CSOs rarely upgrade their computers and office equipment, which is usually obtained from external partners.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2017, with many CSOs, particularly in rural areas, ceasing their activities during the year due to a lack of funds. Few CSOs can fund their own operations, although CSOs in some sectors, including rural organizations and rural women’s cooperatives, generate their own resources, primarily by selling products, raising funds from their members, and collecting membership fees.
Foreign donors, including USAID, EU, the World Bank, Germany’s Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and the United Nations Development Program, continue to be a significant source of funding for some CSOs, primarily large CSOs based in the capital city that are focused on donor funding priorities, such as good governance, women and youth empowerment, and civil society capacity building. No data is available on the overall level of foreign funding for the sector.

Most donors focus their funding on CSOs’ activities and do not support administrative costs. One exception to this rule is the French embassy’s Civil Society Support Fund South (FASCS), which allows grant recipients to use up to 10 percent of grant funds to cover administrative costs. Most foreign support is short-term and project-based, which allows CSOs to implement activities but also makes them financially vulnerable over the longer term. When such funding dries up, a CSO can shrink or become inactive altogether. This was especially a problem in rural areas in 2017. Also, foreign donors tend to prefer to fund larger CSOs with demonstrated track records in their areas of intervention. For example, the EU’s 2014-17 roadmap of support to civil society emphasized strengthening well-established CSOs such as the Civil Society House (MdSC). Smaller CSOs, on the other hand, struggle to access such support.

The government awards sub-contracts to large CSOs with good reputations, mostly for agriculture-related projects. For example, the Platform of Civil Society Actors in Benin (PASCiB) has a partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide services to farmers.

Local funding is scarce and emanates mostly from foundations such as Rotary. Membership dues are difficult to collect and insufficient to meet CSOs’ operating expenses. Private sector engagement remains limited.

CSOs that work in agriculture or micro-lending or that sell products have greater financial stability, although their long-term survival is still a challenge.

Few CSOs have financial systems, conduct independent audits, or produce annual reports with financial statements, despite the fact that these are required to gain and maintain donors’ trust.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

CSOs’ advocacy capacity deteriorated in 2017 as a result of the government’s repression of freedoms of expression and assembly.

Decision makers are increasingly aware of CSOs’ advocacy activities. However, aside from conditions set by certain development partners, such as the EU, USAID, and the international non-profit SNV Netherlands Development Organization, there is no requirement for the government to involve CSOs in public policy formulation or implementation. At the national level, some ministries, including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Youth and Sports, and Ministry of Agriculture, ask CSOs to participate in periodic reviews of their action plans and take steps to inform CSOs about their activities. However, since 2016, when the government dissolved the tripartite framework for consultation between the government, CSOs, and donors, there have been fewer opportunities for CSOs to collaborate with the government.
Despite this, CSOs continue to work on advocacy, both individually and in coalitions. A number of CSO coalitions engaged in successful advocacy in 2017. The Platform of CSOs in Benin, for example, focused on the use of public funds in the election process. As part of its social accountability and advocacy roles, the platform also called on the Ministries of Justice and Water to take action in a corruption case involving a 2014 project to improve Benin’s water supplies, which caused the Netherlands to suspend its aid after millions of dollars were discovered to be missing. The Coalition for the Right to Access Public Information, which includes the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP) – Benin, advocated for a law on access to public information. The Benin Advocacy Coalition on Eminent Domain advocated for universal access to drinking water and farmers’ access to quality seeds. Finally, Social Watch Benin presented a paper to the National Assembly’s Finance Committee in the run-up to the review of the state budget in November 2017. Social Watch Benin also engaged in advocacy efforts aimed at reducing corruption in the country through the national media in 2017. The success of these efforts was limited, however, as the government continued to downplay large-scale corruption cases involving high-ranking government officials. Many CSOs, including Social Change Benin (CSB), Action Group for Progress and Peace-Benin (GAPP-Benin), Dimension Sociale, Action of Christians for the Abolition of Torture Benin (ACAT Benin), and the Platform of CSOs in Benin, submitted alternative reports to the Universal Periodic Review of Benin’s human rights record in 2017.

CSOs in Benin are not very comfortable with the concept of lobbying, and their influence on the law-making process is limited. Most CSOs are focused on advocacy instead, including small-scale demonstrations and media coverage.

CSOs in Benin are aware of the limits of the 1901 law governing CSOs and the need to update it and in 2017, CSOs urged the government to accelerate its review and adopt a law reflecting the rights of civil society. For several years GAPP, with support from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), has led efforts to reform the law. A draft framework law on freedoms of association, expression, and assembly was developed in 2012 through a broad consultative process involving several CSOs, including the Human Rights Institute and the Association of Women Lawyers in Benin, and submitted to the Parliament’s Commission on Laws. Among other changes, the draft proposes that if the government does not respond to an association’s initial application within ninety days, the association would be considered formed, and the government would have to go before a judge to invalidate this. The draft also suggested that the government no longer be able to prohibit an association’s activities without going before a judge. However, government officials have not responded favorably to the draft law, which was still with Parliament for review at the end of the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs’ service provision improved slightly in 2017. CSOs continue to play a major role in providing basic social services. In recent years CSOs have increased and diversified the services they offer to meet the growing need for basic social services and complement service delivery by the government. The central government’s inability to provide for the public’s basic needs makes it necessary for CSOs to fill the void.

According to evaluations by external donors such as the World Bank, CSOs’ services meet communities’ needs. However, a lack of cooperation between CSOs and the central government can cause a duplication of efforts. Local authorities in municipalities and mayors’ offices have better relationships with CSOs when it comes to implementing development plans. Cooperation between municipalities and CSOs often results in progress in areas such as environmental protection, waste management, and basic urban sanitation. However, CSOs and the public do not always coordinate their agendas, which can limit
the impact of some activities. For example, in the municipality of Ndali in Wénou, CSOs dug wells in a location where the local people did not want them, and as a result, the wells are not used. The same is true of many markets built in villages.

CSOs provide services not only to their own members but to the broader public without discrimination. Most CSOs provide goods and services, including medications and the construction of classrooms, dispensaries, and maternity wards, free of charge.

Although not common, a few CSOs have cooperative relationships with government agencies. For example, twelve national CSOs and twelve representatives from citizen participation units in twelve border towns work together with local and government authorities on peace, border crisis management, community development, and collaboration with stakeholders in neighboring countries. Their goals include the prevention of cross-border crimes and the spread of HIV/AIDS and the protection of human rights and gender parity. In addition, since 2014 the Beninese Association for Integrated Border Management has supported income generation by women’s organizations by offering capacity-building training with the support of the government. In 2017 this training focused on teaching women in the municipality of Karimama on techniques for using an improved Chorkor oven for smoking, preserving, and storing fish. The government is highly selective of the CSOs to which it will provide financial and technical support, therefore receiving such support is considered a recognition of the quality of CSOs’ work in the field.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change significantly in 2017. The only resource centers in Benin are the Center for Legal Documentation and Information and MdSC, which is supported by the EU and other European donors. Organizations such as MdSC and the Center for the Promotion of Civil Society provide training and technical support to CSOs at the national level on such topics as proposal writing, organizational development, and advocacy. In general, CSOs in Benin take advantage of these services.

Grantmaking organizations are limited, as donor funding is usually routed directly to beneficiary organizations without the use of intermediaries.

There is no umbrella organization in Benin that serves the interests or expresses the needs of the CSO sector as a whole. However, CSOs share information and work together toward common goals, such as elections and citizen oversight.

Basic CSO management training is available in the capital and second-tier cities upon request. The training covers topics such as the participation of CSOs in political and policy dialogues, organizational and project management, social accountability, and fundraising. Available training meets local CSOs’ needs. There are local trainers with expertise in CSO management. Materials are not available in Benin’s native languages.

Some CSOs partner with the private sector, the government, and the media. International partners sometimes require these partnerships, and CSOs are generally aware that they are necessary to optimize their work. Some CSOs partner with the government and private sector on international development programs conducted by foreign donors. For example, the World Bank’s project on Public Investment Management and Governance Support involved the Ministry of Planning and a number of CSOs. The Benin Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Family Planning worked with the Benin Network of Journalists (AJCSB) to raise awareness of family planning throughout the country in 2017. In September 2017 in Grand Popo, the Benin Environment and Education Society and Eco-Benin, with financial support from GIZ, organized events to enhance CSO-private sector dialogue on biodiversity, the role of the private sector in managing natural resources and land restoration, and ways in which CSOs could engage with the private sector to foster environmental protection.
The public image of CSOs improved in 2017. CSOs receive favorable media coverage at the local and national levels on television and radio and in print media. Since the media do not always see a difference between public service announcements and advertising, CSOs must pay for all media coverage, which means that organizations with significant financial resources, such as the Association to Combat Racism, Ethnocentrism, and Regionalism (ALCRER), WANEP, and Social Watch, obtain more coverage than those that are unable to pay.

The public has a positive perception of CSOs, their advocacy activities, and their services. Public distrust of CSOs decreased in 2017 following the end of the elections.

The private sector and local governments have generally positive perceptions of CSOs and appreciate their role as oversight bodies and knowledge brokers. Business and government representatives frequently attend CSO events. However, government perceptions can be negative of CSOs that are highly critical of the government’s work in areas such as human rights and the management of funds.

CSOs are increasingly present on social media platform, such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. Some CSOs have signed partnership agreements with press outlets to improve their visibility. Other organizations provide trainings for journalists related to their work. For example, in November 2017, under the auspices of the Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy and the University of Abomey-Calavi, journalists who were AJCSB members participated in training sessions on the financial capacity of independent media outlets.

CSOs in Benin do not have codes of conduct or ethics or a self-regulatory body. CSOs regularly produce annual reports, reporting mostly on activities, which are generally published online.
Botswana continued to enjoy multi-party democracy in 2017. With the end of his second term approaching in 2019, President Ian Khama began preparations to hand over his office to the vice president, who will stand for election in accordance with historical practice. During the year the government launched two national planning instruments: Vision 2036, which provides a roadmap for progress in core economic, social, environmental, and governance areas, and the National Development Plan (NDP) 11, which focuses on inclusive growth through sustainable job creation and poverty eradication. Vision 2036 recognizes the key role of the CSO sector in driving national development. In contrast, NDP 11 is silent about civil society and states only that the government intends to improve citizen engagement, without mentioning the specific programs and indicators involved in achieving this goal. Moreover, NDP 11 discusses only governmental mechanisms for realizing the plan and ignores the contributions of CSOs, despite the emphasis on a strong partnership between the government, CSOs, and the private sector in the government’s NGO Policy of 2012. CSO representatives took part in working groups that helped develop both documents.

Botswana continued to be one of the world’s fastest growing economies in 2017. According to Focus Economics, the country’s GDP growth rate increased from 4.3 percent in 2016 to 5 percent in 2017. The growth was attributed in part to increased foreign reserves from diamond sales, reduced government expenditures, and a sharp rebound in the retail trade, hotel, and restaurant sectors.

Private media had a troubled relationship with the government in 2017, particularly if they criticized the ruling party or the government. For example, three journalists from the INK Center for Investigative Journalism were arrested as they investigated the alleged misuse of government resources for the construction of a private residence for the president in Mosu. Several Botswana Defense Force officers reportedly intercepted the journalists as they were trespassing on the president’s property, pinned them to the ground at gunpoint, and detained them. The journalists were later released without charges. As the relationship between the government and private media grew worse, the latter were often denied access to government events and information. In addition, advertising in private media continued to be cut, forcing most media to retrench staff.
The overall sustainability of Botswana’s CSO sector declined in 2017, mainly because of worsening legal and financial environments and cutbacks in advocacy. The legal environment deteriorated because of difficulties registering organizations that work with key populations and implementation of a restrictive whistleblower law that does not permit disclosures of impropriety to the media. CSOs’ financial viability weakened with the closure or downsizing of several foreign funding programs, and advocacy declined as CSOs held back out of a fear of jeopardizing their government funding. Other dimensions of sustainability remained more or less unchanged from the previous year.

The aggregate number of registered CSOs in 2017 was not readily available from the Registrar of Societies, which registers all CSOs. In a 2016 mapping of Batswana CSOs by the European Union (EU), the number of organizations operating in the country was estimated to be more than 7,000. Between April and December 2017, seventy-one organizations (fifty-seven associations, six burial societies, seven churches, and one football club) were de-registered because of legal noncompliance (usually a failure to file annual returns). The Registrar of Societies still uses a manual records system and therefore comparative data from preceding years is not readily available.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.0

The overall legal environment for CSOs deteriorated in 2017, mainly because of difficulties with registration of organizations that work with key populations and the implementation of a restrictive whistleblower law.

CSOs continued to register under the Societies Act, Companies Act, or Deeds Registry Act with the Registrar of Societies, which is located in the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration, and Gender Affairs. Several organizations working with key populations were denied registration in 2017, despite a court order permitting the organization Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals of Botswana (LeGaBiBo) to register in 2016. For example, the Registrar of Societies refused to register Sisonke, an organization that provides services to sex workers, unless it changed its mandate or produced a court order. The registrar also refused to register the Pilot Matambo Center for Men’s Health and advised it to remove a mandate in its constitution involving the health needs of male sex workers who have sex with men. Both organizations refused to comply with the registrar’s demands to amend their mandates and decided to pursue legal action, although, like most organizations, they lack the financial resources to pay for legal services.

The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Council, comprised of government, private-sector, and CSO representatives, was established in November 2012 to provide advice to the minister of nationality, immigration, and gender affairs regarding CSO issues. The NGO Council is responsible for implementation of the NGO Policy, which was revised by the parliament in 2012 but has not been fully implemented because of the limited capacity of its secretariat. In 2017 the NGO Council finalized its strategic framework and operational plan, which address key issues such as CSO-government partnerships, CSO resource mobilization, budget allocations, improvements in CSO capacity, and ways to strengthen the council itself.

CSOs are generally free to operate within the confines of the Societies Act and other legislation. However, certain laws are somewhat restrictive. For example, the Whistleblowers Act of 2016 limits disclosures of impropriety to a specific list of persons and institutions. The list excludes all media, evidently because the government believes that private media, which it does not control, are unreliable and may not protect whistleblowers’ identities in accordance with the law.
In 2017, to guard against money laundering, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime continued to monitor the flow of funding from foreign sponsors to CSOs. Freedom of information legislation has been pending since a draft bill was rejected by the parliament in 2012.

In 2017 CSOs continued to experience limited freedom to engage in public protests and marches. Although they must obtain permission from the police to hold such events, the requirement is usually viewed as pro forma. However, in 2017 the NGO Council alleged that the Botswana police refused to grant it permission to hold peaceful public marches. Some observers believe this may have happened because the board of the NGO Council includes CSO representatives and is often confused with the Botswana Council of NGOs (BOCONGO), since they have similar names.

The Income Tax Act of 1995 exempts CSOs from value-added tax on funds used for the public interest. CSOs are required to apply for tax exemptions to the Commissioner General of the Botswana Unified Revenue Services, but most CSOs are unaware of their right to exemptions or of the procedures for claiming refunds.

CSOs may pursue income-generating activities provided they use the funds generated to advance their organizational objectives. In principle, CSOs are allowed to bid on government contracts, but in practice, information on tenders is largely unavailable. In 2017 some CSOs had memoranda of agreement with government ministries to provide essential services at local and district levels. The contracts were not awarded on a competitive basis, and they covered only the cost of services, excluding overhead costs.

CSOs may pursue legal action if they believe that they have been subject to unfair treatment, harassment, or intimidation by the government. However, they rarely do so, since such action may make it difficult for them to obtain government funding. Local lawyers are familiar with CSOs’ legal issues, but organizations usually struggle to pay their fees. Pro bono legal aid services are sometimes available from individual law firms. The requirement introduced in 2016 that lawyers practice only in law firms has had a negative impact on the legal advocacy of CSOs. For example, Sisonke, LeGaBiBo, and the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and HIV/AIDS (BONELA) can no longer rely on the services of BONELA’s in-house legal expert. By the end of the year, Sisonke had yet to find a lawyer to take up its registration case before the High Court on a pro bono basis.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2**

The organizational capacity of Batswana CSOs did not change in 2017. CSOs continued to involve targeted constituencies and beneficiaries in their work so that they could address their needs and interests. For example, recognizing its limited success in constituency building, Childline Botswana engaged communities and district-level CSOs in countrywide consultations to explore ways to work together to improve the reach of Childline’s services.

The majority of CSOs have clear missions. However, community-based organizations (CBOs) often struggle to formalize their missions in writing because of the limited capacity of their staffs. In 2017 some CSOs changed their missions to reflect new donor priorities. For instance, the Botswana Network for AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO) changed its programming focus from HIV alone to HIV integrated with other health issues to qualify for funding from the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Most CBOs and some umbrella bodies, such as the Botswana Community-Based Organizations Network (BOCOBONET), a large umbrella organization of CBOs working on environmental issues, continued to struggle to define their strategic directions in 2017, mainly because of limited funding and a lack of expertise. However, larger CSOs continued to
recognize that strategic planning is a critical component of organizational development. For instance, BOCONGO finalized a strategic plan, embarked on a rebranding process, and elected a new board of directors in an effort to overcome internal conflicts, which had received negative media attention in 2016. With the support of several donors, BOCONGO’s transformation included reorganizing its district-level structures, which enhanced its ability to meet the needs of its members.

Most CSOs have governance structures such as boards of directors. However, the majority of organizations lack internal governance policies and procedures. In 2017, as in preceding years, several organizations, including major national CSOs, struggled with governance issues, including personality conflicts and confusion over the roles of the boards and the staff. For example, BOCONGO was destabilized by factionalism among board and staff members, while BOCOBONET contended with internal conflicts and financial constraints, which rendered it unable to hold an annual general meeting, thereby compromising its compliance with regulatory requirements. The Botswana National Youth Council, which had been challenged by governance problems in preceding years, was shut down by the government in 2017 because of alleged mismanagement and governance shortcomings. Other CSOs, predominantly faith-based organizations, also continued to experience internal conflicts related to personal scandals and fights over resources. In 2017 the Ministry of Nationality, Immigration, and Gender Affairs launched a national arbitration council to help CSOs resolve their internal conflicts.

Funding challenges undermined CSOs’ ability to retain staff in 2017. Contracts, job descriptions, and payroll and personnel systems remained undeveloped in newer CSOs. Some organizations with less funding, such as CBOs and newer CSOs, relied on interns and volunteers to deliver programs, which proved problematic, since the interns and volunteers tended to turn over rapidly when they found paying jobs. Most volunteers were absorbed by Ipelegeng, a government initiative that provides short-term employment on development projects. Employment opportunities with Ipelegeng have greatly affected CSOs’ ability to recruit and retain volunteers.

Most CSOs do not have access to Internet services despite their expansion throughout the country. Well-established CSOs, including BOCONGO, BONASO, Botswana Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (BONEPWA), and Tepelopele, continued to relocate to cheaper offices in 2017 because of their shrinking budgets. The relocations sometimes led to erratic Internet access and disrupted fax and telephone services. About fifteen CSOs lost their offices when the youth center in Gaborone West closed in 2017. Although these organizations rented offices at the center at reasonable rates and had contributed to structural improvements, they were not consulted before the center closed. By law CSOs are guaranteed access to land on which to build infrastructure such as offices. But in practice it is very difficult for them to acquire the land, as bidding processes are competitive, and organizations must present technical land management plans, which they usually do not have the in-house capacity to produce or the funding to outsource.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial viability continued to decline in 2017 as several funding sources either closed or shrank. For example, the EU’s Empowerment of Non-State Actors program closed in December 2017, forcing twenty-seven CSOs to suspend an array of programs. Before closing, in a significant initiative, the EU awarded medium-sized grants totaling BWP 4,136,074 (approximately $420,000) to nine organizations for projects on women’s empowerment, the environment, orphans and vulnerable children, and arts and culture. Although changes in donor priorities forced some CSOs to change their missions, funding at previous levels was not always guaranteed. For instance, even after BONASO refocused its programming from HIV alone to HIV integrated with other health issues, its funding from PEPFAR and the Global Fund was lower than in preceding years.

While advocacy organizations must rely on external donors, especially if they focus on democratic governance, funding from government sources is available to CSOs working in service delivery. Government contracts are project based, short term, and do not cover overhead or administrative costs. In 2017 the government continued to award funding to CSOs for services in such areas as health (particularly HIV response), gender mainstreaming, disabilities, and environmental protection.
For example, the government awarded grants for HIV prevention services to Tebelopele, BONEPWA, Botswana Christian AIDS Intervention Program (BOCAIP), Botswana Retired Nurses Society, Center for Youth of Hope, Botswana Business Coalition on AIDS, Ngamiland Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (NCONGO), Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA), and Men for Health. The government also awarded grants to LeGaBiBo, BONELA, Nkaikela Youth Group, Madikwe Support Group, Thusang Bana Center, Mabogo a a Thebana, and Rena le Seabe for programs addressing the sexual health of key and vulnerable populations. As in previous years, CSOs do not consider the government funding process to be open and transparent. However, in November 2017 the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development distributed new policy guidelines for government support for CSOs, which are expected to promote a standardized process for funding CSOs and improve transparency and accountability on both sides.

Local philanthropy in Botswana is very limited and consists mostly of direct donations of items such as blankets and activities such as building houses or installing taps. Since CSO-private sector partnerships are not well developed, CSOs find it difficult to raise funds from private-sector sources, particularly as there is no legal framework or tax incentive that encourages the private sector to donate. In addition, businesses are reluctant to support organizations that may attract government disapproval, such as private media or organizations engaged in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual (LGBT) issues. Companies such as FNB and Stanbic Bank have their own foundations or corporate responsibility programs, which implement programs directly or fund CSOs to work on programs aligned with their corporate interests. For example, in 2017 limited private-sector funding for CSOs included grants from the FNB Foundation totaling more than BWP 2.5 million (approximately $255,000) for orphanages and houses for the poor and destitute.

Although long-term sustainability is a central concern, most organizations do not have dedicated fundraising departments. In 2017 membership organizations continued to grapple with unpaid dues and declining interest in their services. The laws governing CSOs allow them to implement revenue-generating projects, but most CSOs are unaware of this possibility or have poor business models. In 2017 BOFWA was able to generate much-needed income for operational costs by subletting office space and providing paid training services to government and private-sector groups.

Most organizations have sound financial management systems. However, professional financial management services are too costly for many smaller CSOs. For this reason, some organizations did not undertake financial audits in 2017 and were unable to submit financial reports to their stakeholders and sponsors.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy through advocacy declined in 2017. In general, CSOs were reluctant to be seen as critical of the government, and few Batswana CSOs engaged in advocacy involving human rights and governance, because they feared that it would jeopardize their ability to obtain government funding. Only organizations such as LeGaBiBo, Rainbow Identity, Ditshwanelo, Sisonke, and BONELA, which engage with (LGBT) communities and sex workers and do not receive government funding, felt free to advocate on issues considered controversial and even to litigate against the government.

CSOs continued to take part in national and local planning and policymaking forums, such as the working group developing the NDP 11 performance and monitoring framework. CSO umbrella organizations and the NGO Council have legally mandated representation on national steering committees dealing with issues such as human trafficking.
In 2017 CSOs participated in discussions with government and development partners about planning and monitoring basic social service delivery. In general, government-funded CSOs participating in these forums, such as BOFWA and BONEPWA, tended to refrain from criticizing the government for fear of losing their funding.

Among the more prominent advocacy efforts in 2017 was the #IShallNotForget campaign, which protested the sexual exploitation of minors. As part of the campaign, BONELA hosted meetings of children’s rights organizations to build consensus on raising the age of consent. After many CSOs and activists engaged on the issue, it was taken up by parliament in 2017 and was still being debated at the end of the year. BONELA also provided government officials and members of parliament with policy briefs on issues affecting key and vulnerable populations. Other CSOs, such as BOCONGO and NCONGO, contributed to the analysis of developmental issues through symposiums, panel discussions, conferences, and other forums.

Trade unions continued to lobby the government to restructure public services, review salaries, and preserve their bargaining council. In April 2017, salary negotiations collapsed when the government pulled out of the bargaining council after querying whether the Botswana Federation for Public Sector Trade Unions was legally able to take part in the council, since it had failed to submit audited membership figures.

In 2017 the government continued to allocate resources to the NGO Council to implement initiatives aimed at improving government-CSO collaboration. The council gained credibility as it facilitated CSOs’ access to government policymaking and planning and began to develop a CSO fund. In November the council hosted workshops to raise CSOs’ awareness of the legal and regulatory framework governing the sector, garner ideas for its improvement, and encourage organizations to be more conscious of compliance standards. Key issues raised by CSOs in these discussions included the increasing number of de-registrations, which result largely from organizations’ failure to comply with regulatory requirements, particularly the submission of annual returns.

During the year BOCONGO sought to revise its strategy for resolving a conflict with the NGO Council about their overlapping missions, which had been a problem in the previous year.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8

Despite declining funding in 2017, CSOs continued to provide goods and services in health, education, relief, housing, water, poverty eradication, climate change, and other areas. Batswana CSOs sometimes offer services not yet offered by government. For example, Tshidilo Rehabilitation Center, Motswedi Rehabilitation Center, and Pudulogong Center for the Blind run schools for children and people with disabilities, while the Tebelopele Testing Center pioneered voluntary HIV counseling and testing. CSOs’ service provision is funded both by foreign donors through project-based grants and by special funds under government ministries. In 2017 CSOs working on sexual health issues could not fully implement their programs because of supply chain management problems at government facilities, particularly in the North-West District, which resulted in a lack of condoms.

The goods and services provided by CSOs reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities. CSOs aspire to help realize the goal embedded in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals of providing 30 percent of services to rural and hard-to-reach communities. CSOs provide services to all members of needy communities without discrimination. For example, community trusts in the Okavango area drilled boreholes to supply water to all community members, and trusts in the Chobe enclave drilled a borehole to alleviate the area’s water shortage.
Because most service-providing CSOs target beneficiaries who are economically disadvantaged, cost recovery is not typically built into their projects. As a modest cost-recovery measure, the Tlamelong Rehabilitation Center run by the Botswana Red Cross Society charges a small fee to admit learners with disabilities, although otherwise most parents depend on social welfare programs to pay for their children’s care.

The government acknowledged the value of CSOs in the provision and monitoring of basic social services in its public statements and practices in 2017. For instance, some CSOs continued to have long-term memoranda of understanding with the government to provide essential services, and CSO representatives participated in various NDP 11 oversight committees, national development thematic working groups, and sector-specific steering committees. CSOs also provided monitoring reports on basic services through structures such as district and urban planning committees. Botswana’s Vision 2036 recognizes that CSOs play a key role in driving national development and that a more robust approach to sustainability can be achieved only with an enabling environment for the CSO sector. The NGO Council aims to ensure that CSOs are included in all critical forums addressing national development and benefit from improved and consistent resource allocation through a CSO fund.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs did not change appreciably in 2017. Batswana CSOs are not served by stand-alone resource centers. Among the few local grantmaking organizations is the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships (ACHAP), which receives funding from the Global Fund to sub-grant to local CSOs, particularly those involved in removing legal barriers to HIV services.

Batswana CSOs self-organize according to their areas of focus and regularly network to build productive relationships. For example, in 2017 Childline launched a national effort to develop relationships with other CSOs to mainstream children’s issues, and umbrella organizations such as BOCONGO and NGONGO and networks such as Kgalagadi South NGOs and Ghanzi Network of CSOs (GNoCs) continued to share information and participate in joint planning and advocacy initiatives. However, umbrella bodies contended with a decline in organizational capacity during the year, mainly because of reduced foreign funding. BOCONGO and BOCAIP, for example, had to scale down their operations, including district-level offices, staff, and capacity-building activities for members.

In 2017 the EU’s Empowerment of Non-State Actors program sought to enhance the resilience and sustainability of forty-three CSO grantees beyond the end of the program by providing training on governance, resource mobilization, strategic planning, advocacy, and Botswana’s national development policy frameworks. Participating CSOs included Camphill, Khama Rhino Sanctuary, Phikwe Theater, Cheetah Conservation, BirdLife Botswana, Window of Hope, and the Trust for Okavango Cultural and Development Initiatives. Through ACHAP and with funding from the Global Fund, Kagisano Women’s Shelter conducted several trainings for organizations in the North-West District on topics ranging from strategic and financial management to resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation. Capacity building by umbrella organizations dwindled because of diminishing resources and the lack of funding earmarked for that purpose.

In 2017 CSOs worked in partnership with the government to deliver essential services. For example, GNoCs worked with district registration offices to help register children and elderly persons who live in hard-to-reach areas and had never been entered into the national register.
Through the Local Economic Development Framework, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development worked with the business sector and CSOs to strengthen local economies and create jobs. The NGO Council held its annual National Stakeholder Forum, which was attended by government officials and other partners, who discussed key issues affecting the sector and identified new priorities for collaboration.

CSOs’ relationship with the private sector in 2017 focused on one-off corporate donations. However, in response to a request to set up a fund for development work, the private sector indicated that corporate funding for CSOs could be mobilized through Business Botswana if organizations were better coordinated and showed stronger capacity and accountability. The private sector encouraged CSOs to self-organize to overcome their fragmentation and come up with a strategic approach to tapping into corporate sponsorships.

CSOs’ partnerships with the media, particularly private media, improved slightly in 2017. For example, several radio stations, such as GABZ FM and Duma FM, offered special packages to CSOs to increase the visibility of their projects at a reduced cost.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

The public image of CSOs did not change in 2017. The state media tended to cover CSOs’ events only if high-level government officials attended, while the private media usually attended CSO events only in urban areas where they had reporters available. Media coverage during the year was mixed. For example, umbrella CSOs continued to suffer from negative coverage because of their internal conflicts, and human rights organizations that criticized the government on issues such as the rights of sexual minorities and sex workers and the sexual and reproductive rights of prison inmates were also subject to negative coverage. Positive coverage was usually offered to CSOs working in partnership with the government to provide essential services in areas such as HIV/AIDS, disabilities, and rehabilitation.

Both the public and the government tend to view CSOs as entities that compete among themselves and lack the capacity to mobilize resources. The private sector sees CSOs as poorly coordinated but in 2017 indicated it was interested in working with them if they could become more accountable and adopt a more strategic approach. Business-sector representatives suggested that if they were better coordinated, CSOs would be able to encourage dialogue on private-sector financing for the CSO sector in the High-Level Consultative Committee, which is chaired by the state president.

CSOs are increasingly aware of the importance of promoting a good public image, and established organizations address public relations in their strategic plans. In 2017 BOCONGO embarked on a campaign to improve its image and regain public confidence after negative media coverage of its internal conflicts. The organization rebranded itself, launched a new website, and partnered with private media institutions, particularly radio.
At a workshop in 2017 stakeholders indicated that BOCONGO’s image had been positively transformed. Other CSOs utilized social media, radio, television, and newspapers to promote their services and improve their image. For example, NCONGO used WhatsApp and Facebook to share information with its members and the public about events such as the Ngamiland Human Rights Conference and district dialogue forums organized by the NGO Council. The NGO Council used television and radio programs to engage stakeholders and explain its mandate.

Although CSOs developed a code of ethics in 2001, the code has yet to be implemented. It is generally believed that BOCONGO and other umbrella organizations should lead the effort, but this has not happened because of their declining capacities. Several CSOs, such as the Kalahari Conservation Society and Humana People to People, published annual reports in 2017. But many CSOs fail to publish annual reports because of limited resources, poor technical capacity, or internal conflicts.
In 2017 Burkina Faso continued its return to democracy after the political transition of 2015. Important institutions such as the presidency, National Assembly, and municipal councils were re-established and operated normally. Outside of a few municipalities experiencing tumultuous elections, political life remained fairly calm, and partisan disputes were confined largely to major political institutions, such as the National Assembly. In December, a draft constitution was presented to the president for approval. This draft constitution contained provisions aimed at protecting human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as gender equality, and the independence of the justice system.

Terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso were on the rise in 2017. In previous years most acts of violent extremism were confined to northern Burkina Faso, but in August a café in the capital city, Ouagadougou, was the target of a violent attack. Northern Burkina Faso remained vulnerable, and Burkinabe troops were repeatedly attacked by armed groups. There were also numerous terrorist incidents in the East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, and some armed groups committed human rights abuses. The ongoing insecurity limited CSOs’ mobility and ability to operate during the year.

While Burkina Faso’s macroeconomic performance was satisfactory in 2017, a slowdown in economic activity affected small and medium-sized businesses, middle-income households, and the informal sector. Significant labor unrest led to strikes, work stoppages, and organized workers’ sit-ins. The government pledged to improve working conditions and eventually raised the salaries of several categories of civil servants. The government’s National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES) was finalized at the end of 2016 and began to be implemented in 2017. The plan calls for strong, sustainable, and inclusive growth based on structural transformation of the economy. The government launched the Emergency Program for the Sahel in 2017. The $835 million program aims to respond to the political and social challenges that have resulted from fundamentalism and terrorism by supporting socio-economic development, public security and defense, and local governance and infrastructure.
With a decrease in the number of demonstrations since the transition in 2015, CSOs resumed their traditional role of providing development assistance and holding the government to account. CSO sustainability was stable and there were no significant changes reported in any dimension.

In 2017 CSOs continued to work in a wide variety of sectors and in every region of the country, with a particularly strong presence in urban areas. Most CSOs in Burkina Faso are unregistered and operate informally at a minimal level of activity, which the legal system allows. In addition, there were approximately 15,700 registered CSOs in 2016. The CSO Office in the General Directorate of Public Freedoms of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, which is in charge of public freedoms, including CSOs, did not make data available about the number of CSOs registered in 2017.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

The legal environment for CSOs was stable in 2017. Burkina Faso’s constitution guarantees freedoms of association, opinion, expression, and the press, as well as the right to information. CSOs are governed mainly by Law 064-2015/CNT of 2015 on freedom of association, which governs associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and unions. In comparison to associations, NGOs tend to have more stable organizations, sign conventions with the state, work with foreign CSOs, and benefit from tax exemptions. Most NGOs are headquartered outside of Burkina Faso. They include branches of large international organizations such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, and the Red Cross. In-country associations that subsequently acquire NGO status by signing conventions with the government are referred to as national NGOs.

It is relatively easy to form a CSO, and few administrative procedures or documents are required. Within fifteen days of its formation a new organization must submit a declaration certifying its existence along with a payment of CFA 15,000 (approximately $27) to the ministry in charge of public freedoms, which serves as a single point of contact for CSOs. Local CSOs may submit declarations to local authorities. The authorities issue a receipt of acknowledgement within two months of the declaration’s filing date. The CSO’s leaders are then required to publish the receipt of acknowledgement in the official journal within two months of its date of issuance.

The CSO legal framework has some limitations. For example, the requirement that CSOs prove their legal status with registration receipts impinges on their freedom of association. Furthermore, what seems to be a system of registration by declaration in fact involves authorization by the state, since Law 064 states that an association must be recognized by the government to be legally valid. Moreover, the ministry in charge of public freedoms is allowed by law to undertake an “investigation of morality” to ensure that a CSO’s objectives do not violate the public order. Importantly, the regulations for implementing Law 064 have yet to be adopted, which may limit the law’s scope, since certain aspects of the law have yet to be clarified.

On June 27, 2017, the National Assembly adopted Law 039/2017AN for the protection of human rights defenders. While this is a significant step forward, CSOs remain concerned that the law fails to acknowledge the specific risks faced by women human rights defenders in the course of their work.

CSOs generally organize and operate freely and without meddling or intervention from government entities. Under Law 064 political or administrative authorities may not directly interfere in CSOs’ operations, overtly pressure CSOs to take particular political positions, or arbitrarily dissolve CSOs for political reasons. The law stipulates that if a CSO’s activities violate the public order, the organization may be suspended for up to three months. If the CSO continues to undertake such activities, its final dissolution may be ordered by a decree from the Council of Ministers with the approval of the minister in charge of public freedoms.
CSOs that receive funding from the state budget are required to submit annual budgets, accounts, and financial reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, ministry in charge of public freedoms, and line ministries. A failure to submit these reports may result in the suspension of funding.

CSOs are fairly free to criticize the government’s actions, although some activists have been taken to court and sentenced for commentary that is critical of the government. For example, in December 2016 activist Naím Touré was held for questioning following his Facebook post mentioning the case of a military prison detainee. In 2017 Touré was taken to court for alleged defamation and ordered to pay a fine.

Tax exemptions are available only to NGOs, associations, and organizations recognized as benefiting the public good (ARUP). A CSO that has operated for at least five years may apply for ARUP status with the ministry in charge of public freedoms. ARUP status is granted by decree by the Council of Ministers at the proposal of the minister in charge of public freedoms.

Corporations do not receive deductions for donations to CSOs. CSOs may respond to calls for bids and compete for certain government contracts in areas such as education and health. They compete under the same tax conditions as private companies.

A number of lawyers in Burkina Faso provide free legal services to CSOs. The majority of lawyers with knowledge of CSO law are located in major cities. Legal services for CSOs in rural areas are scarce.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2017. Few CSOs—primarily those that receive funding, goods, and services from public entities—have sufficient funding and capacity to sustain their operations.

A small number of CSOs with adequate funding and capacity have strong relationships with their constituencies. For example, the Burkina Faso Association of Women Jurists (AFJB), which provides legal assistance to women, and Pugsada, which provides services to child brides and sexually abused girls, follow a demand-driven approach to determine the most pressing needs of women and girls and identify activities to help them. Their services range from awareness raising and advocacy to training on women’s rights.

CSOs’ bylaws must specify their missions and geographic scope. Only international NGOs and a few well-established national NGOs, such as the National Network Against Corruption (RENLAC), have sufficient organizational and planning capacity to ensure an ongoing, structured presence in their sectors of activity. These organizations implement projects outlined in their action plans, often with funding from foreign partners. Funding constraints cause the majority of CSOs to operate informally, with limited internal management structures. They generally do not have long-term strategic plans and instead pursue short-term, ad hoc objectives based on available funding.

Only highly structured NGOs and associations with significant, sustainable funding have administrative and financial manuals that set forth operating procedures. These organizations often also have separate internal bodies, such as boards of directors and executive secretariats. Their management tools and structures usually go hand-in-hand. Smaller CSOs lack the resources to define their management structures or draft procedures to guide their operations.

CSOs find it difficult to retain staff because of their financial instability. Funding for salaries is limited, and the majority of CSOs survive thanks to the leadership of a few individuals working within very limited budgets. The technical staff of most CSOs have other jobs and serve as volunteers for their organizations.
The majority of CSOs do not have their own offices, equipment, or activity spaces and meet wherever they can. Few organizations have the financial resources to purchase and maintain modern equipment, even though it could dramatically improve their efficiency. All CSOs have access to mobile phones, but few have stable Internet connections because of the fairly high cost.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2017. Almost all CSOs operate with funding from foreign donors, which was largely stable during the year. The primary donors include the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), United States, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. Germany’s Agency for International Cooperation invests in decentralization; UN Development Program (UNDP) supports programs in governance; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and Danish International Development Agency fund gender and human rights-related projects; UN High Commissioner for Refugees focuses on shelter; and UN World Food Program combats malnutrition. The EU allocated EUR 6.5 million (approximately $7.6 million) in humanitarian aid to Burkina Faso in 2017. Funding is generally offered through calls for projects or direct agreements. Donors' interest in specific areas does not always align with the goals of the CSOs that they fund.

Local funding for CSOs is scarce. There is no government funding systematically available for civil society, and there is no line item in the national budget for CSOs. Central government entities sometimes offer contracts to CSOs, but these are generally for fairly small amounts. For example, RENLAC receives governmental support for certain activities and its annual publication on corruption. CSOs’ funding relationships with the private sector are mostly informal. Although some corporate social responsibility programs exist, the taxation system does not encourage corporate sponsorships, since donations to CSOs are not deductible.

Few CSOs are able to sustain their operations or fund their expenses through membership dues. CSOs that are not funded by international donors are most often supported by personal donations from their leaders or small groups of other individuals. For example, several wealthy families have established CSOs to advance philanthropy in the country.

The vast majority of CSOs lack the ability and resources to pursue income-generating activities such as selling products. In addition, the taxation system does not offer exemptions to most CSOs and thus not does not stimulate large-scale revenue-generating projects. However, CSOs in the country’s interior generate some funding through various activities. For example, Action for the Promotion of Local Initiatives in Kaya, VARENA in Diebougou, and Nodde Notte in Dori process and sell raw products such as honey, soap, and moringa. CSOs that receive any kind of funding are contractually required to conduct financial audits, and they generally do so. They usually have financial management systems that meet recognized standards. Few CSOs publish their financial statements. One exception is the Permanent Secretariat of Non-Governmental Organizations (SPONG), which since 2016 has published its financial statements on its website after obtaining donors’ approval.
CSO advocacy did not change in 2017. Only well-structured CSOs with strategic plans and funding for significant periods are able to advocate effectively. The majority of CSOs operate informally, which generally means that they do not have the substantial resources required to develop compelling arguments based on reliable data and real-world examples. In addition, there is a good deal of inertia among CSOs, and few of them conduct media blitzes on governance issues. Advocacy CSOs continue to use social networks, especially Facebook, which has made some activists into Internet celebrities. In 2017 some CSOs alerted the public and the government about urgent situations and encouraged action. On October 8, 2017, for example, the Alliance for Homeland Defense (ADP) and the Pan-African Citizen Convergence (CCP) issued a statement denouncing Burkina Faso’s move away from democracy.

Government ministries and CSOs work together through dialogues focused on the government’s yearly activities. CSOs and political parties communicate frequently, particularly on topics in which CSOs’ areas of focus align with political parties’ agendas. For example, the association Le Tocsin has advocated for years for Burkinabe expatriates to be allowed to vote, and the government has promised to include this issue on the agenda for the 2020 elections. In 2017 RENLAC, the Center for Democratic Governance (CGD), and the Center for Information, Training, and Budget Studies cooperated with the government and monitored its activities, including sectoral policies of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the annual budget, and the distribution of funds at the regional level. CSOs were also active in consultative frameworks at the regional and provincial levels. The extent of their involvement in regional councils varies depending on council leadership.

CSOs often organize their advocacy efforts in groups and through umbrella organizations, which have greater capacity because of the number of organizations participating in them. For example, in 2017 a monitoring committee of four CSOs that work with the Ministry of Health raised concerns about the quality of health services, particularly for patients purchasing goods that should be provided for free.

Unfortunately, state-sponsored harassment of CSO members has led most CSOs to limit their work denouncing human rights abuses and violations of democratic reform processes. In 2017 members of the National Union of Civil Administrators, Secretaries, and Administrative Assistants claimed that the government sanctioned a number of their leaders for taking part in peaceful protests against “appointments of convenience” in the decentralized administration.

Lobbying is common at the municipal level. Although CSOs historically have not had the right to speak in municipal council sessions, they now seek to voice their concerns in these forums. For example, through social accountability programs supported by international donors such as the World Bank, CSOs participate in council sessions focused on the creation of community development plans.

CSOs are aware that a more favorable legal and regulatory environment could improve their viability and effectiveness, but their structural and financial constraints usually keep them from advocating for such reforms. However, in 2017 SPONG successfully pushed the authorities to roll back their plans to tax NGOs and force them to prove that 10 percent of their budgets come from their own resources, which would have been problematic because the vast majority of NGOs depend entirely on donor funding and have no resources of their own. In its 2017 submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review of Burkina Faso, the Burkinabe Coalition of Human Rights Defenders underscored the attention urgently needed to unsatisfactory provisions in Law 039/2017AN on the protection of human rights defenders.
CSOs’ service provision did not change in 2017. Services tend to be provided by associations and NGOs that are well structured and have significant financial resources. There are two main categories of CSOs providing services. Charitable organizations provide food and other services to the poor and their constituents. In some remote areas they are vitally important, because they are the only providers of basic social services addressing needs related to health, education, and water. International CSOs such as Catholic Relief Services also belong to this category. Human rights organizations provide legal and court assistance and public education. Organizations such as AFJB, Burkinabe Movement of Human and Peoples’ Rights (MBDHP), and the Burkinabe Coalition of Human Rights Defenders advise people whose rights have been violated and refer them to public human rights institutions such as the Association of Women Jurists. They may also pay attorneys to represent people in courts. Education and public awareness campaigns are probably the most common type of CSO activity, and CSOs often conduct campaigns on health and development topics, such as circumcision and forced marriage.

CSOs use participatory approaches to identify the needs and priorities of their target groups and communities and take these into account when designing their services. Although CSOs do not keep many statistics on the effectiveness of their services, their activities are important for promoting solidarity and citizenship. International CSOs often partner with local organizations, which have intricate knowledge of the needs of local communities.

In areas affected by terrorist attacks, CSOs’ activities have been greatly restricted or even stopped entirely by the security risks their workers face. Since 2015 many international NGOs, including the Red Cross, Oxfam, and Save the Children, have withdrawn from areas affected by terrorism.

CSOs provide their goods and services free of charge, since their costs are covered by donors.

Some CSOs distribute publications on topics such as sustainable development and the conditions needed for accelerated economic growth. CSOs generally do not charge for their publications.

The government recognizes CSOs’ role in service provision in its statements and practices. For example, in June 2017, during sessions of a government-civil society conference supported by UNDP, the government noted the indispensable contribution of CSOs to the implementation of the PNDES and the delivery of services to vulnerable communities.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable in 2017.

CSOs such as CGD, SPONG, Center for Monitoring and Citizen Analysis of Public Policy (CDCAP), and African Institute for Economic and Social Development Burkina Faso (INADES) serve as resource centers. These organizations have received substantial funding in recent years, and their activities and research serve both the public and CSOs, especially in the area of advocacy. In 2017, for example, CDCAP presented research on gender equity and local governance, which included statistical data deemed useful by the Association of Women Jurists.

Organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and Diakonia act as financial and technical intermediaries between donors and CSOs. NDI generally funds pro-democracy activities, while Diakonia supports many types of CSO projects in the areas of human rights, good governance, and economic and social rights.

CSOs sometimes come together in umbrella organizations, networks, and coalitions, to optimize their activities and share information. Two long-standing, prominent coalitions are SPONG and RENLAC. SPONG sends its member organizations information on developments and public policies affecting CSOs, among other topics.

CDCAP, CGD, SPONG, INADES, and many other organizations have staff members who are experienced in training CSOs. Some Burkinabe CSOs receive foreign donor support to train local organizations in topics such as nonprofit governance. But in general, such opportunities are limited despite the pressing need for them. Some training is offered in the local language. For example, INADES, assisted by CDCAP, offered training in the Mossi language on citizen monitoring of public policies and advocacy.

Intersectoral partnerships take place mainly between CSOs and the media. For example, the Présimètre network has a partnership with Radio Télévision Burkina Faso to broadcast a program on government accountability. CSOs partnered with the government on the preparatory phase of the World Bank’s Burkina-Faso eGovernment project in 2017, which seeks to improve the provision of information and e-services to agricultural and rural areas. CSOs and government officials also worked together to prepare birth certificates for rural women and educate the public about vaccination campaigns. RENLAC and the Ministry of Security released an annual report on corruption at a public event in September 2017. CSOs enjoy few partnerships with the private sector.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.4

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2017. CSOs easily obtain media coverage of their activities, and larger CSOs, such as MBDHP, CGD, AFJB, CDCAP, RENLAC, and ADP, continued to receive good media coverage in 2017. The media are generally open to involving CSOs in their programs, although sometimes the authorities seem to interfere in this cooperation. For example, in 2017 the Ministry of Communication and Relations with Parliament interfered in the choice of guests for a Radio Télé Burkina show, after which a journalist from the station denounced the ministry’s actions.

The public generally supports CSOs, perceiving them as working tirelessly to deliver social services, including in insecure areas. In recent years many citizens have turned to CSOs, particularly organizations without partisan affiliations, to serve as mediators with the government and soothe the political climate. Some CSOs continue to speak on timely political topics.
The relationship between civil society and the government was sometimes turbulent in 2017, especially when organizations such as unions made demands. For example, after negotiations between the government and the National Coordination Initiative of Education Unions (CNSE) fell apart at the end of 2017, CNSE organized a series of strikes. While the government generally complies with the law that assures CSOs’ freedom of association, government officials may use hidden forms of influence to harm CSOs, such as refusing to send representatives to CSOs’ activities, breaking contracts, and contacting donors in a way that is intended to discourage them from funding CSOs that the government disfavors.

The private sector’s perception of CSOs is mixed, but most companies tend not to work with local CSOs. However, some private sector stakeholders in the mining industry have cooperated with CSOs to formalize corporate social responsibility programs in the country.

Burkinabé CSOs adopted a code of conduct in 2010. They must adopt internal regulations at the time of formation, which they find important to comply with for the sake of resource mobilization. CSOs that receive funding are obligated to produce annual reports, but these are rarely published.
In 2017 the political situation in Burundi remained tense, although it was less tumultuous than in the previous year. In 2015 President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term contributed to an opposition backlash and divisions in the ruling party. A failed coup in May 2015 and low-scale violent conflict between the government and armed opposition groups deepened the crisis. The government responded by restricting freedoms of expression and assembly. Human rights groups and the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Burundi reported that security forces and others carried out unlawful killings, disappearances, torture, rape, and arbitrary arrests and detentions. Throughout 2017 the East African Community’s Inter-Burundian Dialogue process, mediated by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni and facilitated by former Tanzanian president William Mkapa, failed to yield a political compromise, and Burundi’s political situation remained fragile. Many civil society, media, and political leaders remained in exile outside of the country.

With elections on the horizon in 2020, President Pierre Nkurunziza appointed a national commission to draft amendments to the 2005 constitution. In November 2017 the commission submitted proposed amendments, which would, among other things, restore the post of prime minister; reduce the number of vice presidents from two to one; reduce the number of parliamentary votes needed to pass legislation; and lengthen the term of the president from five to seven years, with a limit of two consecutive terms. However, President Nkurunziza, who was already serving his third term in 2017, would be allowed to serve two additional terms. The president launched a campaign to promote the constitutional reform and scheduled a referendum on the constitution for May 17, 2018.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, between 2015 and 2017 more than 420,000 Burundians fled to neighboring countries because of the political situation. Furthermore, within Burundi approximately 55,000 people were displaced. In 2017 Burundian refugees began to be repatriated from Tanzania, with assisting international CSOs trying to ensure that all returns were voluntary.

In addition to these political and humanitarian issues, Burundi continued to be plagued by an economic recession in 2017, accompanied by fuel shortages and declining food production as the result of ongoing climate shocks.
The overall sustainability of CSOs in Burundi worsened in 2017. The legal environment grew less enabling with the promulgation of two pieces of restrictive legislation: Law 1/01, which provides a general framework for cooperation between the government and foreign CSOs, and Law 1/02, which offers a comprehensive framework for nonprofit associations. Advocacy declined as restrictions on CSOs’ activities intensified, and CSOs’ public image grew worse because of negative media coverage and rhetoric by the government. Declining financial resources weakened CSOs’ organizational capacity, financial viability, and service provision. The sectoral infrastructure was the only dimension of CSO sustainability that did not show deterioration in 2017.

According to data from the Ministry of Interior and Patriotic Training, the creation of new associations in 2017 increased the total number of CSOs from approximately 7,000 to 10,000. The reason for the dramatic increase in CSOs is unknown. The number of active CSOs remains small. At the community level, there are countless informal organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

The legal environment for Burundian CSOs grew worse in 2017. The legal framework was already prohibitive, with the government taking an excessively repressive approach to controlling CSOs. These tendencies were strengthened with the passage of two new laws in 2017: Law 1/01 of January 23, 2017, which amends Law 1/011 of 1999 (itself amending Decree Law 1/033 of 1990) and provides a general framework for cooperation between the Republic of Burundi and foreign CSOs, and Law 1/02 of January 27, 2017, which replaces Decree Law 1/11 of 1992 and provides a comprehensive framework for nonprofit associations. Key concerns about Law 1/01 include severe limitations on the independence of foreign CSOs, a lack of clarity about accreditation and registration procedures, excessive auditing and reporting requirements, and intrusive regulation of foreign CSOs’ hiring, management, and budgeting practices. Law 1/02 requires that CSOs’ registration be renewed every two years and that all CSO activities be endorsed by the government; places limits on unregistered associations; gives the government broad discretion to monitor and evaluate CSOs; and does not provide for an independent judicial appeals process. Law 1/02 also requires foreign currency accounts to be opened at the Central Bank of the Republic of Burundi. Although implementing regulations under Law 1/02 had not been signed by the end of 2017, all CSOs governed by the law had to comply with its requirements by November 27, 2017.

Law 1/02 governs the process through which CSOs can obtain legal status. CSOs that plan to operate in one or more municipalities in a single province register by declaring their existence to the municipal administration. CSOs working in more than one province, as well as collective associations and foreign national associations, must be accredited by the Ministry of Interior and Patriotic Training. There is no fee for completing registration at the municipal level or with the ministry. Organizations must re-register every two years via a simple written request. CSOs focused on human rights may have a more difficult time registering or re-registering than other organizations because of the government’s distrust of them, especially if they are perceived as being against the government or if they took part in protests against President Nkurunziza’s third term in 2015.

Although the law does not limit the scope of CSOs’ activities, it does give the government significant authority over CSOs’ work. CSOs must obtain advance permission from the Ministry of Interior and Patriotic Training before carrying out planned activities. By March 31 of each year CSOs must submit activity reports for the previous year to the line ministries that oversee them.
Any CSO that does not submit an annual report for more than two years is subject to suspension. The Administrative Court may also dissolve CSOs for failing to submit annual reports. Organizations may appeal the court’s decision, but a favorable outcome is unlikely because of the government’s interference with the judiciary. CSOs can also be suspended for other grounds such as “disturbing public order and state security.” In 2017 approximately ten CSOs that had been suspended in 2015 and 2016 on such grounds were able to resume activities after investigations into the allegations against them concluded. On the other hand, the Burundian League of Human Rights (ITEKA) and the Forum for Civil Society Strengthening (FORSC) were removed from the registry in 2017 after unsuccessfully appealing the court’s orders to dissolve them. The Minister of Interior maintained that the two organizations had tarnished the image of the country and sowed division in the population. After the associations were dissolved, some of their leaders continued to work in exile from other countries.

The central government sometimes meddles in CSOs’ activities, and CSOs are deeply concerned by the tendency of some government officials to abuse their authority in this regard. For example, local authorities sometimes restrict a CSO’s operations by requiring a government representative to participate in its activities and have access to its documents. In 2017 a government employee unilaterally assigned an intern to work at a CSO. CSOs are not free to debate certain subjects publicly or speak critically about the government. Although Law 1/28 of December 5, 2013, allows public demonstrations and assemblies, the right to assembly seems to be protected only for organizations that support the government. In June 2017 members of the organization Words and Action for the Awakening of Consciousness and the Evolution of Minds (PARCEM), which works on good governance, human rights, and corruption, were arbitrarily arrested by security forces in Muramvya Province during a public workshop on suspicions that they were inciting young people to revolt against the government’s authority.

CSOs do not receive tax exemptions or deductions on income from grants, donations, or income-generating activities. Like all other entities, they must pay income tax, professional compensation tax, and value-added tax. Individual donors and corporations may negotiate tax deductions with the government on a case-by-case basis.

CSOs are legally authorized to earn money through the provision of goods and services. CSOs are allowed to bid on contracts issued by technical and financial partners as well as government contracts if they have the required skills and capacities. However, in 2017, as the ongoing crisis caused the government to focus on containing the violence and foreign donors decreased their funding, the government did not issue contracts to CSOs. CSOs may organize fundraising campaigns and accept funds from foreign donors provided the funds go through the Central Bank of Burundi.

Under Law 1/02 accredited CSOs may request recognition as public benefit organizations if they have at least five years’ experience in areas listed in the law, including good governance, the environment, protection of vulnerable groups, peace promotion, and emergency crisis response. Public benefit status provides for tax and customs benefits.

As in previous years, a small number of lawyers practicing in the capital city of Bujumbura provide pro bono legal services to CSOs. In addition, several attorneys have opened offices in the more remote provinces, are informed about laws related to CSOs, and provide counseling and legal assistance to CSOs as needed.
CSOs’ missions are clearly stated in their bylaws, and CSOs generally consider their missions when making decisions. A growing number of CSOs—usually larger organizations located in the capital—have strategic plans to identify their objectives and priorities. Strategic plans also serve as fundraising tools, since foreign donors often ask to see them when CSOs are applying for funds. The results and indicators frameworks of the plans help CSOs monitor and evaluate their work. However, because of a lack of resources, CSOs often have trouble implementing their plans and honoring the commitments in them. Smaller CSOs usually do not have long-term plans, since they are more focused on meeting their short-term needs.

Law 1/02 of January 27, 2017, and organizational bylaws set out requirements for CSOs’ internal governing bodies, general assembly meetings, the need for a head office, and so forth. Bylaws usually define the governing bodies’ responsibilities. Typically, the executive committee functions as a board of directors, while the oversight committee ensures that assets are managed properly and that internal and external audits are conducted. These entities report to the general assembly. Organizations are supposed to hold statutory meetings regularly, but their frequency varies according to organizational and financial resources.

CSOs with funding from technical and financial partners generally have internal regulations and administrative and financial procedures manuals to guide their operations, since donors usually require these documents before signing funding agreements. Some organizations have conflict-of-interest guidelines. In practice, only large CSOs and those with public benefit status are able to adhere to internal procedures. Smaller organizations often do not comply with them, since they struggle to sustain their operations in the short term.

Few CSOs have the financial resources to hire permanent staff. In 2017 CSOs’ deteriorating financial viability caused some organizations, including the Network of Journalists for Sustainable Human Development, to all but stop working or to lay off staff. CSOs that have paid staff must comply with Burundi’s labor code and offer employment contracts describing staff members’ roles and method of payment. In the face of reduced funding, CSOs increasingly use volunteers for some activities. CSOs that have enough funding outsource professional services when needed.

As new information technologies make inroads in all areas of life, CSOs increasingly have access to technology. Most CSOs have at least one computer, a printer, and Internet access. CSOs commonly use e-mail to send documents and reports. CSOs sometimes use the Internet to seek out partners and compete for funding opportunities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2017. Foreign donors continued to be CSOs’ primary source of funding, and CSOs remained in a precarious financial situation, since many foreign partners have withdrawn or reduced their level of support. The European Union continued to provide some funding through its project Strengthening CSOs to Increase Their Contribution to the Governance Process and Development, which is implemented by a consortium composed of Care International, ActionAid Burundi, and Oxfam Novib. Other foreign CSOs and bilateral development agencies also offered funding. For example, Cordaid provides support for access to legal services and the Belgian NGO 11.11.11 supports governance and rule of law initiatives, while the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation supports decentralization and local development. However, the level of this support falls far below CSOs’ needs.

CSOs do not have access to a wide range of funding sources, as there are practically no local sources of funding or other support. The government provides some grants to CSOs, but these grants are very limited in number and size and the selection process for recipient CSOs is unclear.
Only a few CSOs working in the health sector receive support from the government to improve the quality of health services. There are no corporate sponsorship or corporate social responsibility programs benefitting CSOs in Burundi. Because Burundi is one of the world’s poorest countries, communities cannot financially sustain CSOs. It is also uncommon for CSOs to receive non-financial support. CSOs are not visibly committed to educating their members about their financial needs and receive very few contributions from their members. Organizations seldom engage in public fundraising efforts, although several CSOs fundraise door to door.

Some CSOs use the Internet to identify potential partners and donors and propose projects. The National Endowment for Democracy issues online calls for bids every three months.

Very few organizations receive income from selling products and services. Any income raised in this way is insignificant. It is not yet common for CSOs to sign contracts with the government or businesses.

Only organizations that receive funding from technical and financial partners such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have solid financial management systems, including administrative and financial procedural manuals, and conduct independent financial audits, since they are donor requirements.

In accordance with Law 1/02, CSOs must submit annual technical and financial reports for approval to the Ministry of the Interior by March 31 of the following year, as well as to their line ministries. Members and partners are able to access CSOs’ various reports. However, some organizations do not fully comply with transparent management standards or voluntarily agree to conduct external financial audits.

ADVOCACY: 5.0

CSO advocacy declined in 2017 as the government intensified restrictions on CSOs, particularly those that it saw as critical of its activities. The government was particularly distrustful of organizations that promoted human rights or combated corruption and embezzlement. For example, a member of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), which was deregistered in 2016, was arrested on charges of undermining state security in 2017. Another human rights activist from Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture was arrested and imprisoned. Other CSO staff feared arrest or were unable to obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior to organize roundtable discussions or conduct other activities on sensitive topics, such as human rights and budget transparency.

Advocacy is difficult because there are practically no direct channels for communication or collaboration between CSOs and the government. Law 1/02 envisions a framework for discussion between CSOs and the government, but it was not formalized during the year. Municipal law allows CSOs to attend and make proposals at municipal council discussions, but in practice CSOs have limited access to these meetings.

Despite these constraints, an advocacy campaign took place in 2017 that aimed at ensuring youth participation in the inter-Burundian dialogue. Youth participating in the dialogue recommended that the dialogue’s conclusions include points addressing the government’s security crackdowns and limitations on CSOs’ operating space.

In an effort to strengthen advocacy by Burundian CSOs, organizations participating in the Strategic Partnership Program on Lobbying and Advocacy, launched in late 2016 with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, worked with their communities to identify advocacy topics and organize inclusive advocacy efforts. Foreign CSOs involved in the program, such as Cordaid, organized training on advocacy and lobbying for CSO leaders.
CSOs taking part in the program included the Association for Repatriated Women of Burundi (AFRABU), Association of Women Journalists of Burundi, and the Network of Youth Organizations in Action for Peace, Reconciliation and Development.

CSOs are aware that the lack of an appropriate legal framework hinders their effectiveness and sustainability. During infrequent meetings with the government, CSOs clearly pointed out the gaps and constraints in the laws, especially for CSOs working on human rights. In 2017 CSOs pushed for an improved law on cooperatives that would facilitate the creation of cooperatives. Although not all of the items they requested were included in Law 1/12 of June 28, 2017, on cooperative corporations, CSOs were involved in formulating the law.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

CSOs’ service provision declined in 2017, as CSOs—particularly those that work on community development—were less able to provide services because of reduced donor funding.

CSOs provide a variety of services in health, education, community development, environmental protection, conflict resolution, and assistance to orphans, the disabled, the elderly, people living with AIDS, and victims of rape and natural disasters. CSOs such as AFRABU, the Council for Education and Development (COPED), and the Burundi Red Cross work to benefit refugees.

CSOs identify the needs of their target groups through participatory approaches. For the most part, they engage in direct consultations with communities in the areas targeted for interventions. CSOs also align their activities with municipal community development plans, which they also help prepare for projects funded by international organizations and agencies such as the World Bank.

CSOs do not limit their projects to their members but extend the full range of their services to larger communities. CSOs generally share thematic studies on priority areas for development, such as access to healthcare, free of charge with government authorities, other organizations, and training and research institutions. CSOs offer their services without discrimination of any kind.

CSOs do not engage in cost recovery or consider it a priority. They offer their services free of charge, since they usually work with the neediest groups, from whom the possibility of generating revenues is limited.

Organizations engaged in serving vulnerable populations and local development usually have good relationships with government authorities at the central and local levels.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8

The infrastructure for the CSO sector did not change in 2017. There are no intermediary support organizations or CSO resource centers in Burundi, although several organizations, including the Network of Youth Organizations in Action for Peace, Reconciliation, and Development help build the capacity of network members and staff by offering training in lobbying, advocacy, fundraising, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, and other areas. Cyber cafes exist throughout the country, which CSOs use to access the Internet and to receive training on basic software. Community foundations do not exist in Burundi.

CSOs share some information through meetings, workshops, and forums as well as networks, coalitions, platforms, and collectives. Prominent CSO networks include the Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, Women and Peace Network, Bafashebige Coalition, and Youth Network for Active Non-Violence. Umbrella organizations working toward common goals include Support to Integral Development and Solidarity on the Hills (ADISCO), which focuses on rural development and solidarity; Association of Catholic Jurists of Burundi, which addresses the country’s legal developments and legal profession; and Observatory for Government Action (OAG), which monitors government projects. There are no national committees that defend CSOs’ interests, and cooperation is often not productive because of the lack of a formal framework for discussion, partnership, or collaboration.

Local trainers have expertise in CSO management. The European Union’s 2014 NGO20 program for Burundi offers training to build CSOs’ internal management capacity. Participating organizations include the National Association for Support of HIV-Positive and AIDS Patients (ANSS) in Gitega. International CSOs still working in Burundi such as Cordaid offered specialized training on lobbying and advocacy, monitoring and evaluation, computer security, and adult education in 2017. To ensure maximum benefit from these trainings, the minister of the interior determined that the trainings would be offered in Burundi’s Kirundi language so that people who do not speak French could participate.

Many associations work in partnership and sign collaboration agreements with government entities. For example, Twitezimbere collaborates with the local government on local development; the Council for Education and Development collaborates with government entities on health, education, emergencies, and the production and processing of agricultural products; ANSS Burundi offers services to people living with HIV/AIDS in collaboration with the Ministries of Health and Education; Seruka Center, which serves survivors of rape and sexual violence, collaborates with the ministries responsible for health and gender; and OAG and the Ministry of Justice are collaborating on an access to justice project. Some CSOs also work in partnership with the private sector. For example, associations in the agricultural sector procure agricultural inputs from companies for distribution. CSOs produce radio shows in cooperation with media outlets to raise public awareness about issues ranging from political developments to basic social services and rights.
The public image of CSOs worsened in 2017, mostly because of negative perceptions by the government and negative coverage in the media. Although the media and CSOs made efforts to collaborate during the year, CSOs did not receive positive coverage, because the media are dominated by the central government and primarily cover government-organized activities. An exception is meetings, seminars, and fairs organized by CSOs, which receive “advertorial” coverage that is paid for by CSOs.

The public’s perception of CSOs is lukewarm. The public does not sufficiently understand the concept of CSOs or their roles, rights, and responsibilities. Furthermore, CSOs are perceived as close to either the government or the opposition, which affects perceptions of their motives for interventions. Some people perceive civil society narrowly, as only composed of human rights organizations.

Some representatives of local and central governments have a negative image of civil society and distrust CSOs, especially those that are involved in human rights or criticize the central government. Organizations working in other sectors are more trusted. The private sector has no fixed opinion of civil society but tends to perceive CSOs as competitors for international funding, since they have strong relationships with local populations and vulnerable groups.

CSOs raise awareness of their activities through seminars and meetings, as well as the media. CSOs sometimes conclude contracts with media for this purpose. CSOs also have websites and social networks to publicize their accomplishments and improve their public image.

Some CSOs have codes of ethics and administrative and financial procedural manuals to strengthen their self-regulation and transparency. All CSOs are required to submit annual reports to the Ministry of the Interior and line ministries. Some donors also require CSOs to submit annual reports. Some organizations publish their annual reports on their websites, if they have them.
Côte d’Ivoire was beset by numerous difficulties in 2017. Soldiers mutinied in January and May to demand bonuses and back pay. After they blockaded roads and seized Bouaké, the country’s second largest city, for several days, the Côte d’Ivoire government agreed to make payments to induce them to return to their barracks. In January the country was paralyzed by a strike by 180,000 civil servants and government workers demanding salary increases and better retirement conditions. The government negotiated with the main labor union and eventually agreed to meet most of its demands. The country was also hit by several acts of terrorism in 2017, underscoring the volatility of the security environment. Meanwhile, the Ivorian economy declined as the price of cacao, the country’s primary source of revenue, dropped on world markets in late 2016.

In late 2016 Côte d’Ivoire promulgated a new constitution, which establishes the post of vice president and a bicameral parliament. The constitution also explicitly highlights the contribution of civil society to “the social, cultural, and economic development of the nation.”

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire officially ended on June 30, 2017. Two days later, Côte d’Ivoire was elected to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2018–19. An Ivorian was also elected to the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) under the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights.

During the year Côte d’Ivoire made notable progress in complying with international human rights commitments, although there were also several incidents of repression. In February Law No. 2014-388 on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Defenders was strengthened with the approval of a decree addressing implementation of the law. The government also delayed indefinitely a parliamentary vote on a new press law, which media groups had criticized for stipulating harsh penalties for vaguely defined media offenses. However, journalists continued to be regular targets of harassment and detention. In February the police used tear gas and rubber bullets to suppress a peaceful demonstration by cacao producers, who were demanding increases in the prices paid for their crops.
Overall CSO sustainability in Côte d’Ivoire did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs were financially more fragile with the departure of several key donors, and advocacy weakened. The sector’s public image was damaged by the negative reputations of some organizations as self-interested and politicized. However, CSO service provision strengthened as some CSOs expanded their services. CSOs’ legal environment, organizational capacity, and sectoral infrastructure remained unchanged.

There are no reliable, up-to-date, comprehensive data on the number or types of CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change significantly in 2017, although Article 26 of the new constitution formally recognizes CSOs for the first time. CSOs are governed by Law No. 60-315 on Associations, which has not changed since it was passed in 1960. The law makes no distinction among various types of organizations. Under the law a simple declaration is sufficient to form a CSO. An organization may acquire formal legal status by submitting its statement to the Ministry of Interior, which issues a legal document known as a “proof of filing.” The Ministry of Interior has denied requests for formal status from organizations that work on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender; intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ) issues, arguing that Article 4 of the law states that “any association focused on an illegal cause or purpose that is an affront to public decency… is invalid, and has no effect.” In addition, in 2017 the application of SOS Exclusion, which defends and promotes human rights, democracy, and gender, was rejected with the explanation that discrimination no longer exists in Côte d’Ivoire. The government also sometimes imposes discretionary extralegal demands before approving legal status, including requirements that organizations open their head offices to visits by investigators, pay excessive fees for the investigators’ travel expenses, and complete “morality surveys.” These requirements, combined with slow processing, act as roadblocks to obtaining the proof of filing and cause most CSOs to continue to operate on the basis of the simple statement, which gives them provisional legal status. For example, Lesbian Life Association of Côte d’Ivoire (LLACI) and Alternative Côte d’Ivoire choose to operate without formal legal status. However, provisional status can pose problems for CSOs requesting funding from the government or foreign donors. CSOs are not protected against dissolution by the central government under the 1960 law.

CSOs work in a relatively open climate. The Law on Associations states that CSOs and their representatives may freely carry out activities specified in their organizational documents, and their scope of activities may extend to all issues of national or international interest except as limited by the Law on Associations or their nonprofit purposes. CSOs are not legally subject to oversight by a governmental authority, with the exception of CSOs working on human rights, which, under Decree No. 2017-121, must submit annual reports to the ministry that oversees them. Despite this requirement, no CSO has been formally questioned for failing to file an annual report. CSOs may dispute the central government’s decisions in court under the complaint mechanisms available by law.

In 2017 the authorities restricted the right of free expression, free association, and peaceful assembly when they suppressed a demonstration by the National Agricultural Union for Progress in Côte d’Ivoire against the dramatic drop in cacao prices. Journalists continued to be targets of harassment. For example, several journalists were detained because they had published information about the use of the head of state’s sovereign budget to resolve the military mutiny, which stirred concerns about efforts by the President’s Office to camouflage its use of state funds.

The legal framework does not require CSOs to pay income taxes, although they are still subject to value-added tax (VAT). Individuals may receive tax deductions for donations to organizations that have a humanitarian purpose.
However, decisions to grant tax deductions are made on a case-by-case basis by the Revenue Authority after a long and scrupulous procedure that can last up to two years.

There is no law prohibiting CSOs from receiving funds through the provision of goods and services. To be eligible to bid on government contracts CSOs must be recognized as contributing to the public good. Although there are no official statistics available, very few organizations achieve this status, since it involves an arduous application process and must be approved by a decree issued by the Ministerial Council before final approval by the minister of interior. The best-known organizations that have obtained status as contributing to the public good include the Ivoirian Association for the Welfare of Children and Women, Association for Supporting Health and Urban Self-Promotion (ASAPSU), and Children of Africa. CSOs may solicit funds from the public through galas, concerts, exhibitions, and similar events.

No attorneys in Côte d’Ivoire specialize in CSO law. CSOs in the capital can access high-quality general legal advice, but such services are generally lacking in secondary cities. Local attorneys who are CSO members are gaining knowledge of CSO law and forging collaborations with other professionals and foreign bar associations. For example, the Association of Women Lawyers of Côte d’Ivoire, Action for the Protection of Human Rights, Ivoirian League of Human Rights, and Ivoirian Movement for Human Rights pursue ongoing initiatives with Lawyers Without Borders Canada and Lawyers Without Borders France.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1
CSOs’ organizational capacity remained unchanged in 2017.

During the year, CSOs made efforts to develop stronger relationships with local constituencies and local authorities, including by building coalitions to address issues such as statelessness, illegal migration, sustainable development, and access to justice for vulnerable populations, including people with disabilities, women, and children.

Ivoirian CSOs have specific missions related to the purposes for which they were founded. A growing number of CSOs, including the General Workers’ Union of Côte d’Ivoire, National Association of Professional Agricultural Workers of Côte d’Ivoire (ANOPACI), and union organizations such as Dignity and Humanity, rely on strategic plans to carry out their missions. Some CSOs, however, realign their plans of actions to fit proposals for funding or calls for bids. CSOs and technical and financial partners use monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to help them track realization of their plans.

The law requires CSOs to have internal management structures that differentiate between the board and the staff. Funding partners generally require CSOs to have boards. Some boards operate in an open and transparent manner, but most board members serve in multiple roles, including as members of executive bodies or audit committees of the same organizations. Organizational policies ostensibly require organizations to produce regular audits and technical and financial reports and adhere to procedural manuals covering accounting, financial, and administrative procedures. However, these are not always adhered to in practice. Misunderstandings of policies and procedures can lead to conflicts of interest. For example, after its general assembly, two people claimed the role of coordinator of the Civil Society Convention (CSCI). Such conflicts are resolved either informally or through the legal system.
Most people working with CSOs in 2017 were unpaid volunteers. Some CSOs compensated staff members for specific duties, such as administrative assistance or accounting. Staff members are usually hired through help-wanted postings, although volunteers are sometimes brought on as paid staff if the organization has sufficient funding. Staff members are usually offered clearly defined job descriptions. CSOs use professional services when their cost is included in project budgets.

CSOs do not usually have the resources to modernize their office equipment, with the exception of some networks and coalitions, such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding–Côte d’Ivoire, Group of Ivoirian Actors for Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire (RAIDH), and ASAPSU. Several organizations received computers, equipment, and vehicles from foreign organizations in 2017. For example, the Organization of Active Women in Côte d’Ivoire received office equipment from the U.S. organization Search for Common Ground. Many organizations do not have Internet access, especially those in the interior of the country where Internet services are poor. CSOs with Internet access, such as the Ivoirian Coalition of Human Rights Defenders (CIDDH), Women’s Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire, and ANOPACI, increasingly use social media tools.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2

The financial viability of Ivoirian CSOs worsened in 2017 with the departure of several key donors, most notably the UN peacekeeping operation on the completion of its mandate. Some of the peacekeeping mission’s partners such as Search for Common Ground also departed, leaving CSOs financially destabilized.

The majority of funds for CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire continue to come from foreign donors, such as the European Union (EU) (which for the most part works through technical partners such as UNICEF), the French Development Agency, World Bank, and African Development Bank. CSOs continued to receive donor funding for projects addressing donors’ priorities, which in 2017 included illegal immigration, statelessness, and human trafficking.

The share of support that Ivoirian CSOs receive as donations from individuals, government entities, businesses, and foundations is marginal. The central government regularly supports a small number of CSOs, such as SAS Center, Association Servir, and the Red Cross of Côte d’Ivoire, all of which have official recognition as contributing to the public good. Otherwise, government entities point to other national priorities as an excuse for withholding financial support from CSOs. Businesses do not feel obliged to fund CSOs, although several foundations with direct ties to businesses and celebrities, including the Kalou, Drogba, MTN, Orange, and MOOV foundations, provide in-kind support, such as food and equipment for schools, orphanages, and hospitals. CSOs sometimes request unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid organizations to provide support for local communities, since those organizations have large constituency bases.

All CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire have members from which they are required by law to collect dues. However, dues account for only a tiny portion of overall funding for CSOs. Some organizations such as the Christian Center for the Rehabilitation of Marginalized People try to collect funds from individuals during religious events or through telephone calls, but these contributions fall far below needed amounts. Servir and the Women of Salem organize galas and open houses to generate funds. The use of social media for resource mobilization is not very well developed in Côte d’Ivoire, although some CSOs use their websites to try to collect money from their supporters.
While there is no law preventing CSOs from earning money from the provision of goods and services, CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire do not have a strong culture of self-financing. In addition, the government sometimes cites Article 1 of the Law on Associations, which specifies that associations may not have for-profit purposes, to prevent CSOs from winning contracts other than for social-mobilization activities such as awareness raising. Nevertheless, the organization Cavoequiva has created an entity that sells gas, and the Ivoirian Network of Persons Living with HIV/AIDS rents out stores. Other CSOs have also created social enterprises, but most organizations find it easier to solicit in-kind donations such as labor to support their activities.

CSOs rarely have specialized financial departments and instead use the services of external providers, especially if they enter into large projects with the government or foreign donors. Large CSOs have accounting procedure manuals and conduct independent audits. In general, the practice of conducting audits is growing, although many CSOs struggle to afford them. CSOs do not publish financial reports.

**ADVOCACY: 4.7**

Advocacy deteriorated in 2017, with CSOs failing to respond meaningfully to significant events in the country, including the ritual sacrifice of children, the decision to increase the cost of electricity, and the implementation of a ban on plastic bags.

CSOs and government representatives work together in several formal entities, including the Anacarde Cotton Council, Public Service Observatory, High Commission for Transportation, Ivoirian Traffic Observatory, weighing centers requested by the Economic Community of West African States, and African Peer Evaluation Mechanism. In 2017 CSOs and the government cooperated on the creation of universal health coverage and the country’s Open Government Partnership action plan, which was approved in March. Under the action plan, CSOs will play an active consultative and oversight role in realizing national objectives.

CSO public policy initiatives exist but are rare. Efforts by CSOs in 2017 included a campaign supported by the International Center for Transitional Justice to obtain redress for victims of the post-election violence. Although this campaign made noticeable progress, the group is still far from realizing a fluid working relationship with the central government. Awareness-raising campaigns in 2017 addressed illegal immigration by young people and the kidnapping of children for sacrificial purposes. A campaign led by the Ivorian Tobacco-Free Dream pushed for implementation of a law that bans smoking in public places. As prices for export products such as cacao and coffee fell, the National Agricultural Union for Progress in Côte d’Ivoire worked to increase the purchase of coffee from producers. These actions, led by groups such as Environment Action, were often successful thanks to their reliance on social networks and occasional street demonstrations.

CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire do not conduct many lobbying actions, although many CSOs have close affiliations with political parties and politicians. CSOs such as the Platform for Civil Society Organizations for Elections in Côte d’Ivoire (POECI) participate in the electoral process.

The broader CSO community is aware that a reformed legal and regulatory framework could improve its effectiveness and sustainability. A project to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for CSOs began under the former government through the EU-sponsored Non-State Actors’ Leadership and Initiatives (LIANE) project.
A document discussing a draft law, known as the LIANE File, was submitted to the government several years ago, but the change in leadership at the Ministry of the Interior and the end of the LIANE project in late 2015 seem to have stalled the project. With the start of LIANE 2 in 2018, CSOs hope to revisit this issue.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.6

Service provision by CSOs was slightly better in 2017, as several CSOs expanded their social service delivery. However, the insecurity caused by militia attacks and the lack of a serious reconciliation policy continues to weaken the ability of CSOs to operate freely.

CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire offer a diverse range of services in areas such as health, education, humanitarian assistance, water, solar energy, and housing. CSOs such as ASAPSU in Saint Camille are well known for providing health services to the poorest populations. Habitat for Humanity provides decent housing in rural communities, while the Ivoirian Observatory for the Protection of Natural Resources works on issues related to the environment, good governance, and self-sufficiency. Through advocacy and public awareness-raising programs, CSOs work on several issues affecting street children, including access to education and healthcare, violence and abuse, and exploitation and trafficking. Some CSOs have a tendency to over-diversify the services that they offer, thereby diluting their expertise in one focus area.

CSOs' services reflect community needs and priorities, especially in health, education, and economic development. The majority of CSOs determine needs based on their observations within communities while taking into account the National Development Plan, supported by the UN Sustainable Development Goals, sectoral programs, and participatory analysis of the country's population. Some organizations also conduct field surveys to assess target groups' needs. When requested, CSOs gather data during their interventions to submit to the government for national reports on governmental programs. In 2017 Alliance Côte d'Ivoire completed a training of trainers in Pikro to enhance CSOs' capacity to administer surveys to assess patients' satisfaction with health services within the framework of the government's performance-based financing for health centers.

CSOs provide very few goods and services to people other than their own members because of funding constraints. In general, CSOs' goods and services are provided without regard to sexual orientation, ethnic group, gender, or race.

CSOs' services are generally provided free of charge, as they are funded by partners outside of the beneficiary communities.

The government acknowledges the value of CSOs in providing and monitoring social services. For example, the government thanked RAIDH after it wrote a report on the removal of populations on Mount Péko. Each year the government also provides support to some CSOs for projects in education, health, rural land ownership, and the environment.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: **5.4**

Sectoral infrastructure remained unchanged in 2017. CERAP, a university institution that provides training on such topics as project setup, conflict management, human rights, and human resources, is one of the few intermediate support organizations (ISOs) in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2015, through the LIANE project, CERAP created other ISOs in Bouaké, Bondoukou, Korhogo, San-Pedro, and Man, which continued to function in 2017. According to a 2017 evaluation of the needs and challenges that CSOs face in their work, ISOs are considered to meet the expectations of local CSOs, particularly in terms of institutional capacity-building programs.

Local foundations with ties to celebrities and businesses exist but do not offer grants to CSOs. Re-granting of donor funding is not common, but occasionally coalitions of CSOs re-grant such funds to local CBOs for delivery of specific services to local populations.

Information sharing takes place among organizations involved in topic-specific platforms, networks, and coalitions. For example, CIDDH is a coalition of twelve NGOs that seeks to protect human rights defenders. There is no unifying committee or organization through which the CSO sector can express common interests.

CERAP, UNESCO, African Center for Management and Manager Training, and many private companies offer training in Abidjan in such areas as organizational and project management, conflict management, and human rights. CERAP has endeavored to build CSOs’ capacities by mobilizing international donor expertise, and in 2017 RAIDH offered capacity building to many local CSOs on topics such as income-generating activities, AIDS prevention, health promotion, illiteracy, teenage pregnancy, and reconciliation. Local trainers who specialize in CSO management are available, but training materials are not always available in local languages.

CSOs work in partnership with local businesses, governments, and the media to reach common objectives. For example, at the request of partners such as the World Bank, the government involves CSOs in carrying out development projects related to gender, HIV/AIDS, children’s rights, and women’s rights. CSOs also cooperate with the media. For example, the Network for Action on Small Arms in West Africa has trained a group of journalists to report on the issue of trafficking in light arms.

PUBLIC IMAGE: **5.1**

The CSO sector’s public image deteriorated in 2017, largely because of the government’s worsening perceptions of CSOs as a result of their continuing work in areas such as social accountability and the monitoring of government activities.

CSOs receive media coverage but must pay for it. The coverage is not balanced and usually depends on the priorities of the media outlets, especially as some outlets are biased towards certain political parties. State media remains firmly under the control of the government, but there is an abundance of private media that openly criticize the government. State media outlets focus on CSO activities supportive of the government, while opposition media outlets cover the activities of CSOs that are critical of government policies. Opposition media remain subject to threats and pressure from the government.

The public, private sector, and government all have negative opinions of CSOs. Although there are no surveys that confirm this, the public seems to see CSOs as implicitly driven by political affiliations, which causes people to circumvent CSOs and instead use social networks to make themselves heard.
The private sector generally has an unfavorable impression of CSOs because of their role in raising awareness among workers and in the public about human rights and labor issues. In the government, perceptions of CSOs, especially advocacy organizations, are relatively poor, and they deteriorated further in 2017. Unless CSOs work with the government on service delivery to local populations, government officials are wary of CSOs. Some foreign CSOs also no longer trust Ivorian CSOs and believe that they are unprofessional and lack adequate capacity. As a result, international CSOs prefer increasingly to implement projects without relying directly on the services of local CSOs.

Some CSOs use traditional media channels such as the written press and television to raise public awareness of their work and areas of focus. In 2017 CSOs made concerted efforts to cement their working relationships with traditional media outlets. For example, SOS Exclusion conducted an educational campaign on human trafficking and the Civil Society Forum of West Africa (FOSCAO) organized an educational campaign on illegal immigration, both of which were featured on television. CSOs have succeeded in forging relationships with journalists by creating topic-specific groups in areas such as human rights and environmental management, so that journalists can tap into CSOs when they need commentary for television programs or radio interviews. In 2017 journalists worked with human rights groups such as the Collective of Victims of Côte d’Ivoire to investigate crimes committed during the 2010–11 post-election crisis.

There is no general code of ethics for the CSO sector. However, sector-specific codes of ethics have been issued by groups such as the Journalistic Freedom, Ethics, and Conduct Observatory, which is a self-regulating body for the written press in Côte d’Ivoire. Article 13 of the Law on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Defenders says that “human rights defenders are obliged to report annually on their activities to the minister responsible for human rights.” Despite this provision, very few organizations have filed reports with the ministry since the enactment of the law in 2014, with the exception of end-of-project reports that donors typically require.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continued to be plagued by political violence and government repression in 2017. In December 2016 pro-government and opposition leaders engaged in a dialogue under the auspices of the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO). However, the dialogue was not fully inclusive and therefore ended shortly after it began. A second dialogue was initiated a short time later, which included representatives of the opposition and civil society who had been excluded from the first dialogue. This dialogue led to the signing of an accord on December 31, 2016, in which the parties agreed to install an interim government and hold elections by the end of 2017, at which time President Joseph Kabila, in accordance with the constitution, would step down. The accord’s signatories continued to engage in dialogue, and the accord was partially implemented during the first few months of 2017. However, political unrest intensified as doubts grew that Kabila was truly committed to stepping down before a third term. The dialogue eventually fell apart when Kabila formed a controversial transitional government in April 2017 and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) failed to schedule the elections as agreed. In November 2017 CENI finally announced that elections would take place in December 2018 and began to enroll voters and order supplies required for the elections.

Many violent mass demonstrations took place in 2017. Unrest in Kasai, which had begun in 2016 when security forces killed a local chief, grew into a humanitarian crisis entailing casualties and the destruction of villages. Some reports suggest that more than 3,000 people were killed in the Kasai region in the course of the year. Countrywide mass demonstrations against a third term for the president were violently suppressed by law enforcement and resulted in the arbitrary arrest and detention of members of the opposition.

The DRC remained one of the poorest countries in the world in 2017. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the DRC had more than four million internally displaced persons in 2017, half of which were displaced during the year. The DRC’s economy deteriorated dramatically amid uncertainty about the elections and persistent corruption, particularly in the mining industry. For example, according to the professional services company KPMG, GDP growth dropped below 3 percent, while the inflation...
rate increased more than 40 percent in 2017. The government requested foreign financial support in July, but the country’s deteriorating security and tense political situation discouraged donor assistance and foreign investment.

Overall CSOs sustainability did not change in 2017. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated because of a significant drop in donor support, but advocacy improved as CSOs increasingly influenced public policies in various sectors and promoted a revised mining code, which was passed in early 2018. CSOs’ legal environment, organizational capacity, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image remained steady during the year.

The number of applications to register grew from 25,987 in 2016 to more than 30,000 in 2017. This growth reflects a high degree of CSO activism in response to the country’s political instability. There are many types of organizations in the DRC, including groups focused on development, humanitarian aid, and human rights, as well as unions and religious-affiliated institutions.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

CSOs’ legal environment did not change significantly in 2017. The 2006 Constitution and Law No. 004/2001 of July 20, 2001, which governs associations, protect freedoms of association and expression. Implementing regulations for Law 004/2001 have never been issued.

Articles 7, 10, and 11 of Law 004/2001 establish specific rules for forming and governing associations. In practice, however, these processes are cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming. CSOs outside the capital face even larger challenges to registration because they must travel to Kinshasa to submit their applications. CSOs register with the Second Department of the Ministry of Justice, which, before it will grant legal status, requires CSOs to pay for effectiveness studies probing their viability and work history. Some organizations also obtain authorizations to operate from the line ministries responsible for their areas of activity. CSOs that promote and defend human rights, democracy, or transparency or fight corruption may experience a more difficult or slower registration process. Law 004/2001 protects CSOs from dissolution without advance notice or for political purposes.

Most CSOs operate with a receipt, called an F92, which proves that they have submitted their applications. An F92 is valid for six months, during which time the ministry is supposed to review the CSO’s application. According to Law 004/2001, if no refusal is provided within this six-month period, the organization may continue to operate. In 2017 the Ministry of Justice continued to prohibit the Second Department from issuing F92s to in-country or foreign nonprofit associations with religious affiliations. This prohibition remained in effect through the end of the year.

In the second half of 2017, a draft amendment to Law 004/2001 was introduced, which would reduce the validity of an F92 from six to three months. In addition, according to the amendment, an organization that does not receive authorization by the end of this period must cease operations, which is a complete turnaround from the current law. CSOs strenuously objected to these proposals.

Law 004/2001 sets clear oversight policies, but these are rarely followed. For example, CSOs are supposed to inform the Ministry of Justice about planned activities, projects, and financial resources and send activity reports to the Ministry of Planning and their line ministries. In practice, however, only large-scale organizations comply with this cumbersome requirement, and smaller CSOs that lack the capacity to do so continue to operate unnoticed. Smaller CSOs typically comply with administrative requirements to a minimal degree.

The law allows CSOs to work freely, discuss any issues relating to the community’s well-being, and participate in public demonstrations. However, the intelligence services, police, and other government entities sometimes
harass CSOs that defend human rights and democracy and fight corruption, such as the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights, Human Rights Research Institute, and Voice of the Voiceless. In 2017 many demonstrations by these CSOs were violently suppressed or prohibited and staff members of human rights and pro-democracy CSOs were detained while planning or engaging in peaceful protests. For example, in July CSOs led by Struggle for Change and Collective Action of Civil Society organized protests in cities around the country to mark what was supposed to have been the end of voter registration and to demand that CENI publish an electoral calendar. Human Rights Watch reported that at least 128 people were arrested. In October a police officer and seven civilians were reportedly killed in Goma after protesters clashed with police during a general strike organized by a coalition of forty-eight CSOs calling for President Kabila’s departure from office. In December the Catholic Church organized peaceful protests calling for the implementation of the December 2016 agreement. State security forces responded with force, firing teargas, rubber bullets, and, in some cases, live ammunition, at times directly into church compounds.

During 2017 two draft laws were pending in the National Assembly that, if passed, could severely constrain CSO operations. A draft law on human rights defenders could put civil society members in danger by requiring that their organizations provide the government with membership lists, financial disclosures, and annual reports. A separate draft law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and nonprofits would force local CSOs to declare funding levels to the government, severely restrict the operations of foreign CSOs, and give the government sweeping power to dissolve local organizations that create “political trouble” or criticize its actions. The laws were passed in their original form by the Senate but then altered by the National Assembly in 2017.

Law 004/2001 specifies CSOs’ eligibility for tax exemptions. However, the process for obtaining exemptions is laborious, and many CSOs do not have the capacity to pursue them. In 2017 the Ministry of Planning received 102 exemption applications and responded positively to eighty-four, forty-seven of which were from foreign CSOs. Individual and corporate donors do not receive tax deductions.

CSOs may earn income from providing goods and services. All legally registered CSOs may bid on government contracts at the national and local levels. However, in practice very few CSOs win contracts, because it is difficult for them to fulfill the bidding requirements, complete the proposals, and understand the complex procurement guidelines. CSOs are free to conduct fundraising campaigns, but it is rare for them to do so given their organizational and technical constraints. CSOs are free to receive funds from foreign donors. All legally recognized CSOs may take legal action against any decision that harms them. Many attorneys, mostly in Kinshasa, are knowledgeable about the laws concerning nonprofit associations, but very few CSOs can afford to pay for their services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2017. CSOs, particularly those engaged in conflict situations, continue to have limited organizational capacities.

Religious associations usually have well-established constituencies, but the majority of CSOs do not have established local constituencies that support their activities. CSOs typically identify a problem to solve first and then identify a target group of beneficiaries. They often encourage local leaders to support their activities.

CSOs are required by law to identify their missions clearly in their bylaws and internal regulations. In most cases, larger CSOs have strategic plans setting forth their visions and missions, objectives, activities, and expected results. These plans allow them to obtain donor support for short-, medium-, and long-term activities. Larger CSOs usually succeed in fulfilling their missions and strategic plans, while small CSOs often do not have the technical or financial capabilities to do so. CSOs’ projects generally include performance indicators as well as monitoring and evaluation tools.

Under Law 004/2001, each CSO’s bylaws must specify its internal governing bodies and their division of responsibilities. These bodies include the general assembly, board of directors, executive committee, and oversight committee. In theory, the general assembly sets strategic direction and approves reports; the board of directors
tracks the implementation of organizational strategy and ensures that the CSO operates properly; the executive committee manages the organization on a day-to-day basis; and the oversight committee verifies that the accounts are correct and operations are transparent. In practice, however, these entities function only in large CSOs such as the Confederation of Congolese Unions. Smaller CSOs lack the financial and administrative capacity to maintain such structures. Similarly, only large CSOs have manuals setting forth administrative and financial procedures to guide their operations, as well as codes of ethics or conduct to protect themselves against conflicts of interest.

CSOs that receive donor support are able to maintain paid staff—generally, an executive director, program director, finance manager, and logistics manager. Staff members often receive donor-funded training related to specific projects. Staff growth is supported through “learning by doing” or training by the executive director based on good practices acquired in the field. In accordance with the Labor Code, larger CSOs have internal policies on hiring, job descriptions, compensation, and social security benefits, which are set forth in employment contracts. Smaller CSOs mostly offer ad hoc compensation within the framework of funded projects. There is not a very strong culture of volunteerism in the DRC, and only religiously affiliated CSOs such as the Triumphant Faith Evangelical Center successfully recruit volunteers. Because of their high cost, only larger CSOs use the services of accountants, technology specialists, attorneys, and other professionals.

Some CSOs are able to upgrade their computers, phones, and other office equipment with project funding from donors. In major cities it is easy for CSOs to access the Internet as long as they have donor funding to pay for it. Large CSOs are starting to use modern technology, such as the Internet and social media, to store information about their activities and share it with the public.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7**

CSOs’ financial situation grew worse in 2017 because of a significant drop in donor support. Most CSOs depend on foreign funding from outside of the DRC, since local support is meager and difficult to access. Foreign funding continued to be diverse in 2017, with various international organizations, embassies, and foreign aid agencies such as Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) supporting CSOs’ activities. Significant amounts of foreign funding were directed toward the humanitarian crises in Kasai, where, for example, Caritas worked with local CSOs to provide displaced populations with emergency shelters and goods. Funds are generally funneled through international CSOs, the Central Office of Coordination (BCECO), or DRC Social Fund (FSRDC). Several large CSOs such as the National Center for Development and Citizen Participation (CENADEP) have multiple sources of external funding. However, the level of foreign funding available to local CSOs decreased in 2017. For example, BTC began funding projects through Belgian CSOs rather than local organizations.

Some CSOs receive grants from the central or local government to implement projects such as the construction and renovation of basic infrastructure. Government institutions such as BCECO, FSRDC, Ministry of Planning, and National Fund for the Promotion of Basic Social Services sign contracts with CSOs, which are ostensibly selected according to specific criteria. However, gray areas in the application process allow the government to use its discretion in selecting grantees, which in 2017 were primarily organizations with a track record of serving the government’s interests. Although all legally registered CSOs may bid on government contracts, very few do so because they have a hard time following the opaque procurement guidelines and complex administrative procedures.
In 2017 some CSOs continued to benefit from corporate sponsorships from companies such as Bralima, Vodacom, and Airtel for activities to benefit local communities. Most CSOs do not seek financial or in-kind support from their communities, either because they have relatively low memberships or their activities are not well understood. Membership dues are generally low and collected irregularly. In general, only religiously affiliated CSOs obtain support from communities through evangelical campaigns, sports activities, and fundraising campaigns. Large CSOs sometimes use social media for fundraising, but even these efforts are limited, since life in the DRC is precarious and the humanitarian crisis has increased poverty throughout the country.

To generate funding, some CSOs, such as Caritas Congo and the African Institute for Social and Economic Development (INADES), earn revenue by renting meeting rooms and vehicles, providing lodging, offering consulting services, or running restaurants. Other CSOs organize fee-based public trainings or sell food, handmade clothing, or bags. They may also create social enterprises.

Few CSOs have solid financial management systems, because they lack the resources to hire qualified financial staff. CSOs’ access to professional financial management services is possible only with financial support for this purpose from partners. CSOs that receive donor support are subject to independent audits and produce reports, including financial statements, which they send to their donors and members. Smaller CSOs that are not recipients of external funding tend to avoid audits because of resource constraints.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2017. Article 37 of the 2006 Constitution requires decision makers to collaborate with CSOs, and many frameworks for interaction between the government and CSOs exist at both the national and provincial levels. For example, the Ministry of Planning hosts topic-specific groups that include CSOs along with technical and financial partners. The national executive committee of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) brings together representatives of the government, CSOs, and mining companies to review extractive industry policies on hydrocarbons. The Observatory of Natural Resources took part in consultations on the mining code in 2017. In an important development, a large number of CSOs engaged in all phases of the civic engagement portion of the national dialogue that took place at the beginning of 2017. Their contributions ranged from consultations with the government to the submission of recommendations for policy reform. On an informal level, the government organizes public discussions and debates that allow CSOs to express their views.

In 2017 CSOs participated in the monitoring and evaluation of governmental policies and actions, both individually and through topic-specific coalitions. For example, the Episcopal Commission of Justice and Peace advocated on issues related to human rights and the documentation of political violence, and the Congolese Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH) monitored the government’s human rights violations in 2017.
especially in southern Kasai. CSOs often work with community organizations and platforms at the local, provincial, and national levels to communicate their views and get a sense of the public’s expectations concerning social, security, economic, and humanitarian issues.

CSOs actively campaigned for a favorable legal framework in 2017. For many years the CSO community has asked the government to adopt regulations to implement Law 004/2001, and they pushed especially hard for its implementation during the national dialogue in the first half of 2017. During the year the CSO sector also organized mobilization activities, media statements, and petitions against proposed legal amendments that they considered detrimental to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs provide a diverse range of services in areas such as education, health, sanitation, agriculture, the environment, and the construction of infrastructure, such as agricultural service roads and health centers. In 2017 a significant portion of services, including those offered by World Vision International, focused on the massive humanitarian crisis unfolding in the central Kasai. The quality of services provided by CSOs dropped slightly in 2017, largely because there were fewer resources available, including for organizations operating in conflict areas.

CSOs generally try to meet their target communities’ needs. To determine beneficiaries’ priorities, CSOs conduct social perception analyses, community consultations, surveys, and participatory action research. However, foreign donors that fund local CSOs often determine the scope and geographical location of their activities, which means that CSO services do not always meet their target groups’ needs and priorities.

The services provided by CSOs are accessible to everyone without discrimination and benefit both CSOs’ members and the larger community. Some CSOs produce publications that they share free of charge or at a low cost with government authorities, technical and financial partners, universities, and research centers. For example, Mamas for Africa distributed a publication on sexual violence in 2017.

CSOs do not always recover their costs. The amounts that they charge are minimal compared to market rates, and they tend not to gather information about market demand or their targets’ abilities to pay.

The government recognizes the value of CSOs’ services and accordingly engages them as service providers in a variety of projects, including building or renovating roads, sanitation systems, and schools. In 2017 the country’s political tensions prompted the government to enhance its communication with CSOs by acknowledging their vital role in cementing trust between the public and the state. The government’s appreciation was particularly apparent in the role it attributed to CSOs in the national dialogue during the first part of the year.
**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs did not change in 2017. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as the African Institute for Socio-Economic Development and Center for the Study of Social Action, provide CSOs with services ranging from access to technology and information to capacity building and training materials. ISOs are present in urban as well as rural areas. In major cities, several organizations have created longstanding resource centers to help CSOs to access information and communications technologies, including social media. For example, CENADEP provides computers and free Internet access to CBOs and other stakeholders and hosts a library with books and other documents. These centers meet the needs of local organizations and are also open to local residents. However, in rural areas the centers are sometimes impaired by a lack of electricity and other infrastructure. These centers are largely funded by foreign donors, although some also charge minimal fees for the services they provide.

Community foundations are underdeveloped in the DRC and very few mobilize local resources. Some ISOs, such as CENADEP and the Diobass Platform in Kivu, reallocate donors’ funds to local organizations.

CSOs very often work cooperatively through topic-specific networks and coalitions to promote joint interests. For example, the Civil Society Coalition of the Kimberley Process promotes the mission of the Kimberley Process, a global commitment to removing conflict diamonds from the global supply chain.

Some local CSOs with organizational management capacity offer training to other CSOs. Specialized training is sometimes available on such topics as strategic management, accounting, financial management, project lifecycle, volunteer management, and advocacy. In 2017 INADES provided training on project management. Some training and educational guides are available in local languages, but most training is offered in French.

CSOs work in collaboration with the private sector, the government, and the media. For example, in 2017 the government, assisted by the World Bank, collaborated with CSOs to prepare the Systematic Country Diagnostic and Country Partnership Framework to identify constraints preventing the country from reaching its full economic potential. The various parties involved in the EITI Executive Committee increasingly understand the importance of partnering with CSOs and have put in place mechanisms for sharing information. Some CSOs have begun to enhance transparency in the management of natural resources funding by communicating through traditional channels such as radio, because of limited Internet connectivity.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

The public image of CSOs did not change significantly in 2017. In general, the media do not have a positive view of CSOs, because they believe that some organizations work in their own self-interest. However, media coverage is available to CSOs and is usually beneficial insofar as it allows CSOs to reach a broad audience. CSOs must pay for coverage in newspapers and radio stations. They usually issue public-service announcements, which cost less than commercials. Some CSOs have created community radio stations to broadcast information at the local level at no cost. International media also sometimes cover the activities of CSOs.

Members of the public usually have a positive perception of CSOs when they benefit from their activities. However, the public is poorly informed about CSOs’ work, and segments of the population that are not beneficiaries feel that CSOs exist only to promote their own interests.

Businesses and local governments are starting to trust CSOs and the information they provide and to collaborate with them to enhance service delivery and public policies. However, the private sector and the government...
continue to oppose human rights CSOs because of their staunch denouncements of the government and companies.

CSOs organize educational and media campaigns to project a positive image to the public. Working with international partners, organizations such as Ambassadors Against Tuberculosis and the association Femme Plus enhanced their media skills and built web platforms in 2017. In general, CSOs’ use of social media is nascent and has not reached an optimal level, mainly because of the government’s control of the Internet and social media sites. CSOs also work with journalists to encourage objective coverage of their activities.

Large CSOs are aware of their responsibilities and have codes of ethics to regulate organizational attitudes and behaviors, especially regarding transparency in resource management. They regularly publish annual, financial, and audit reports, which they send to members, partners, and government entities. Smaller CSOs also have codes of ethics, usually only to meet the government’s administrative requirements.
The political unrest in the Oromiya and Amhara regions of Ethiopia that started in 2015 continued throughout 2017. In August the parliament lifted the state of emergency imposed in late 2016, which had entailed mass detentions, arrests on politically motivated charges, restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly, and a loss of Internet access throughout the country. A short time later, protests broke out again in the Oromiya and Amhara regional states as young people demanded political and economic reforms and respect for human rights. The unrest escalated into a border dispute between Oromiya and Ethiopian Somali regional states, which displaced more than 800,000 people, mostly Oromo. Because of conflict and food insecurity, more than 8.5 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance by the middle of 2017, according to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The UN high commissioner for human rights visited Ethiopia in May 2017 to assess the country’s human rights situation. After meeting with the prime minister, other senior government officials, political party leaders, and CSO representatives, the commissioner expressed concerns about the laws and policies used to repress freedoms of association, expression, and assembly in Ethiopia, including the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP), the main law governing CSOs. He also urged the government to release political prisoners. As part of a political reform process, the ruling party agreed to negotiate with the opposition on amending various laws, including the CSP, Anti-Terrorism Law, Political Parties Registration Proclamation, and Media Law. The inclusion of the CSP on the agenda was an important milestone for civil society, and CSO representatives were among the stakeholders nominated to observe the negotiations, which were ongoing at the end of the year.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2017. During the year CSOs successfully pursued a number of efforts to strengthen the legal framework for their work. CSO advocacy also improved as the sector communicated its concerns directly to high-level government officials and submitted proposals for amending the laws. However, severe funding shortfalls and legal restrictions on CSOs’ operations constricted their organizational capacity and institutional growth. There was no change in the funding environment, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, or public image of CSOs.
The Charities and Societies Agency (CSA), the main oversight body for the sector, reported that there were 3,260 registered CSOs as of 2017, including 433 foreign charities, 447 Ethiopian societies, 2,211 Ethiopian residents’ charities, 118 Ethiopian charities, and 51 consortiums or networks. There are doubts about the accuracy of these figures. While they include CSOs registered in the two administrative cities, Addis and Diredawa, they do not reflect the number of CSOs registered at only the regional level in any of the nine regional states. Furthermore, they indicate only the total number of registered CSOs without accounting for any decrease resulting from the closure of organizations during the year:

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

The legal environment for Ethiopian CSOs improved in 2017, as the government showed a new willingness to amend the laws governing CSOs, and a new tax law allowed businesses to deduct contributions to CSOs.

The CSO sector is one of the most regulated sectors in Ethiopia. It is governed by the CSP; the 2009 Charities and Societies Council of Ministers Regulation, which provides for the registration and administration of CSOs; and ten directives issued by the CSA. Trade unions are governed by Labor Proclamation 377/2003. The CSP classifies CSOs as Ethiopian charities and societies, Ethiopian resident charities and societies, or foreign charities and societies. Ethiopian charities and societies are organizations whose members are Ethiopian, are wholly controlled by Ethiopians, and generate at least 90 percent of their funding from local sources. Ethiopian residents’ charities and societies have members who are residents of Ethiopia, and they may receive more than 10 percent of their resources from foreign sources. Foreign charities are CSOs formed under the laws of foreign countries and have foreign members, are controlled by foreigners, or receive funds from foreign sources. Only Ethiopian charities and societies may engage in activities listed in Article 14 (j-n) of the CSP, which includes the advancement of human and democratic rights, the promotion of equality and the rights of the disabled and children, conflict resolution, and the promotion of efficiency in judicial and law enforcement services. In other words, charities and societies raising more than 10 percent of their income from foreign sources may not engage in these activities, and human rights and policy advocacy organizations may not cover more than 10 percent of their budgets from foreign sources of funding. Foreign and local CSOs working in service delivery and development may access foreign funding without limitation.

The 30/70 Directive issued by the CSA classifies a range of expenses, including staff salaries, research, training, and transportation, as administrative in nature and directs that their aggregate cost may not be greater than 30 percent of any organization’s overall budget.

CSO registration is mandatory, and the various laws prescribe burdensome registration requirements. For example, organizations must have a minimum of ten founders, and before seeking to register they must prepare project proposals, obtain approval for projects from line ministries, conclude project agreements with sector administrators, and hire administrative staff (minimally, a director and an accountant). Some organizations, especially those working in human rights, have excessive difficulty with registration. For instance, the Ethiopian Press Council, which was established in September 2016, has been unable to secure registration. The CSA informed the council in April 2017 that it could register only as an association of individual persons and not as collection of media institutions. However, in the past the CSA has registered associations composed of private companies, such as the Solar Energy Development Association, which is an association of importers and producers of solar energy materials.
The law imposes burdensome reporting and accountability requirements on all CSOs, including the need to file multiple reports with members, beneficiaries, line ministries, and the CSA, in addition to donors. The CSA has sweeping, seemingly unlimited supervisory power and sometimes makes arbitrary and inconsistent decisions, which can be politically motivated and contradict relevant laws. For example, while the law recognizes government capacity building as a permissible area of charitable activity, the CSA prohibits CSOs from engaging in this area. There is no specific legal provision that protects CSOs from being dissolved for political reasons. Only CSOs registered as Ethiopian (that is, local) CSOs and receiving funding solely from local sources have the right to file court appeals to administrative decisions by the CSA. Since more than 95 percent of CSOs receive funding from foreign sources, this means that very few organizations have legal recourse against administrative decisions by the government.

Although the laws and their implementation did not change in 2017, after lifting the state of emergency the prime minister met with CSOs, expressed his wish for citizens to participate actively through CSOs, and committed the government to further discussions with CSOs about amending the law. In June 2017 the speaker of the parliament chaired a meeting on the role of CSOs in democratization and the challenges that CSOs face. At the meeting CSOs submitted a proposal identifying thirty-two key areas for legal reform, including the categorization of CSOs, access to foreign and domestic funding, freedom of operations, scope of application of the law, de-concentration of the power held by the CSA, rules for dissolving CSOs, and CSOs’ right of appeal. In December 2017 a comprehensive proposal to amend the CSP was submitted to the government by the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum (ECSF), a national network organization established in 2013 by special permission of the CSA to serve as the ad hoc representative of CSOs in Ethiopia. The government accepted the document positively, and discussions about creating a more enabling environment were ongoing at the end of the year. There was no available evidence that the government implemented its second National Human Rights Action Plan, issued in May 2016, which proposed concrete measures for implementing the government’s international and constitutional human rights commitments, or that the special advisor for political parties and CSOs, appointed by the prime minister in October 2016, achieved anything concrete.

Although CSOs’ relationships with line ministries are generally good, in past years the central government has publicly castigated CSOs as rent seekers and “gap fillers”—that is, organizations that merely fill in gaps in services without serving as true partners in development. However, no such harassment occurred in 2017. According to the law, only registered advocacy organizations, which amount to fewer than 5 percent of CSOs, may engage in public debate and express criticism of the government. Government-affiliated CSOs—particularly trade unions, youth and women’s associations, and other mass-based CSOs—may also take part in public debates but are not known to organize protests, as they are generally established to be pro-government. In practice, the government does not tolerate criticism from any source, including CSOs, and public protests and public assemblies have not been allowed since 2005. In 2017 CSOs were not reported to have participated in mass protest activities. Although there is no legal restriction against doing so, CSOs are also not allowed to engage in partisan activities, and the CSA may issue warning letters to CSOs that it believes violates this restriction.

CSOs are exempt from income tax on grants but must pay tax when buying goods and services. If they engage in business activities to generate income to support their operations, CSOs are subject to the same tax regulations as any for-profit business. In a positive step, the government amended the tax law in 2017 to allow businesses to make deductible donations to CSOs of up to 10 percent of their taxable incomes. The CSA also amended the Directive on Asset Clearance, Transfer, and Liquidation in 2017 to allow CSOs to dispose of certain properties without first serving as true partners in development.

The CSP recognizes the right of CSOs to engage in income-generating activities. However, in 2011 the CSA issued a restrictive directive that is tantamount to denying this right. According to this directive, CSOs’ business activities must relate directly to the activities for which they were registered, and when pursuing business activities CSOs must satisfy the same requirements as profit-making entities, including having a certain amount of initial capital, obtaining business licenses, and paying taxes. In addition, CSOs may not use any generated income to cover administrative expenses. CSOs must obtain permission from the CSA to conduct fundraising campaigns and public collections. Their applications must include extensive documentation and show that the planned fundraising event is a last resort to ensure the organization’s continued existence and operation. Because of these restrictions, few CSOs make efforts to raise funds locally.
A few local lawyers are trained in CSO-related law and can provide quality services to CSOs. However, their numbers are not adequate to serve the needs of the entire sector.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

The impact of the legal framework on the organizational advancement of CSOs worsened in 2017. The CSA’s rule that no more than 30 percent of CSOs’ budgets may be used to cover administrative costs and the classification of operational needs, such as strategic plans and personnel manuals, office equipment, professional services, and staff development, as administrative costs limited CSOs’ investments in these areas. In general, the CSA discourages CSOs from spending on their organizational infrastructure, thereby limiting institutional growth.

Ethiopian CSOs seek to address the needs of their beneficiaries to the extent possible. There is a stringent government requirement that every project must demonstrate an identifiable public benefit. Before implementing projects, some CSOs conduct baseline surveys and needs assessments in which their beneficiaries participate. However, the CSO sector still struggles to build relationships with community members beyond direct beneficiaries. CSOs’ ability to ensure the sustainability of projects by building a sense of community ownership for them is also still weak.

All CSOs are required by law to state their objectives in their organizational statutes or bylaws. However, the majority of CSOs work on short-term projects and lack strategic plans to address longer-term growth. The degree to which CSOs adhere to their organizational objectives and, if they have them, strategic plans is often directed by the availability of funds, which can cause CSOs to pursue projects in areas unrelated to their stated purposes.

The law provides standards for CSO’s internal governance. Each CSO is legally required to have a clearly defined management structure that includes a general assembly of members responsible for major decisions, such as approving the strategic plan, annual budget, activity reports, and appointment of board members; a board of directors, with a minimum of five members, which oversees the activities of the secretariat and reports on them to the general assembly; and a secretariat, which is responsible for day-to-day operations. In practice, some boards are constituted solely to meet legal requirements and are not involved in the actual governance of their organizations. It is common to see executive directors act as king makers and boards as rubber stamps.

Although many laws aim to ensure their transparency and accountability, CSOs are not legally required to have written policies and procedures to guide their operations. Depending on their capacity and scope of operations, CSOs may lack such documents. Written conflict-of-interest policies are sometimes in place at stronger local CSOs or foreign organizations, but they are not common in the majority of Ethiopian CSOs.

Because of the rule that administrative expenses may not amount to more than 30 percent of overall budgets, most CSOs, including foreign organizations, find it challenging to attract and retain paid staff. As employers CSOs are legally required to have payrolls, job descriptions, and contracts, and they often have other human resource tools, such as personnel policies. CSOs are required to have an accountant or auditor on staff. CSOs hire information technology professionals and lawyers only if there is sufficient funding. The culture of volunteering is very weak in the Ethiopian CSO sector, and no specific legal framework provides legal recognition of the services of volunteers or provides a standardized tool for monetarily quantifying their contributions. Among the few leading CSOs benefitting from volunteers is the Ethiopian Family Guidance Association, which reported that it has more than 18,000 volunteers throughout the country in 2017. Otherwise, very few CSOs use volunteers.
The vast majority of CSOs, particularly at the local level, face huge funding constraints and cannot afford to modernize their computers, software, printers, or cell phones. In addition, the purchase and upgrading of equipment are considered administrative costs, which may not exceed 30 percent of the overall budget. Although Internet access is limited and of poor quality, and its cost is considered an administrative expense, a significant number of CSOs use the Internet to share information and correspond by email. However, Internet service in Ethiopia is a government monopoly and over the last three years, following political unrest, has been shut down in large parts of the country.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.5**

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2017. Ethiopian CSOs are highly dependent on foreign funding and greatly affected by shifts in donors’ funding levels and priorities. In addition, some donors often require that organizations be able to absorb relatively large amounts of funding, have stable sources of funding and years of experience, and demonstrate advanced managerial capacity and professional competencies. Most small organizations are unable to fulfill these expectations and therefore do not qualify for such funding. In 2017 the major international donors supporting CSOs included USAID, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, German Corporation for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, and French Development Agency.

CSOs still struggle to diversify their funding base. Raising funds locally is difficult because of legal restrictions on domestic resource mobilization, the country’s poor economy, and a culture that does not encourage donations to CSOs. Aside from limited support for humanitarian purposes, very few private companies support CSOs (although this may change in 2018, when the effect of the new tax law will be felt). CSOs themselves make limited efforts to approach the business sector; Since membership fees are nominal and often do not even cover the cost of rent, most CSOs do not bother to collect them.

The government does not make grants to CSOs, although a few government institutions, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Ministry of Health, implement projects jointly with CSOs using foreign funding. A few exemplary CSOs are trying to diversify their funding sources through community mobilization. For example, in 2017 the Mekedonia Humanitarian Association conducted a successful fundraising campaign through text messaging with the slogan “Donate $3 to Eradicate Homelessness.”

Although the law permits CSOs to engage in business activities, the CSA makes it almost impossible for them to do so. In 2017 the agency amended its directive to allow CSOs to dispose of certain types of old property and spend the proceeds on their activities. Very few organizations operate social enterprises to support their activities.

Legally, CSOs are required to have sound financial management systems. Although administrative costs are supposed to be minimized or avoided, the law requires every organization to have at least an accountant. All CSOs are required to conduct annual independent audits and submit their reports to the CSA, which accredits auditors for this task. Some organizations publish their annual audit reports for public consumption.
ADVOCACY: 6.0

Although advocacy continues to be nearly non-existent, there was an improvement in this dimension in 2017, thanks to the willingness of the government to engage in discussion with CSOs, particularly regarding the legal framework governing the sector.

There are still no formal lines of communication between CSOs and the central government. Before adopting a new law, the federal parliament sometimes announces public hearings and seeks public participation at a community level. However, the role of CSOs in shaping public opinion and setting policy agendas is severely curtailed by the legal framework. Only Ethiopian charities that do not receive foreign funds may work on policy initiatives, and they are very few in number and have limited capacity. There is no evidence that CSOs conducted any advocacy campaign that impacted policy in 2017. For instance, CSOs played no role in organizing or helping to resolve the country’s political unrest. The lifting of the state of emergency did not change CSOs’ ability or efforts to advocate.

In general, there is little awareness about the need for an enabling environment for CSOs within the sector. However, in a new development, there were several instances in 2017 in which CSOs communicated directly with high-level government officials about efforts to create an enabling space for their work. ECSF sought to help create communications channels and serve as a conduit between the government and CSO sector. Although its efforts were rather sporadic and fragmented, ECSF consulted with various stakeholders and mobilized CSOs and experts to prepare detailed proposals to amend the laws governing CSOs. In April CSO representatives working with ECSF met with the prime minister and presented a proposal for amending the legal framework. The prime minister expressed his government’s wish for citizens to participate actively through CSOs in the democratization process and committed the government to further discussions with CSOs through its Center for Democratization and Good Governance, a newly established institution under the Office of the Prime Minister. This meeting was an important landmark and paved the way for ongoing contact. CSOs also met with the deputy prime minister, who reiterated the government’s openness to amending the law. In June the Center for Democratization and Good Governance, in cooperation with the UN Development Program, organized a conference about the role of CSOs and their challenges, which was chaired by the speaker of the parliament. In December ECSF submitted a proposal to the government that identified thirty-two key areas for reform, including the categorization of CSOs, access to foreign and domestic funding, freedom of operations, scope of application of the law, de-concentration of the powers held by the CSA, rules for dissolving CSOs, and CSOs’ right of appeal.

On several occasions the CSA expressed its discontent with CSOs’ approach to amending the law, seemingly viewing it as a challenge to its power. A January 2017 article in the CSA newsletter about the challenges faced by professional associations overlooked the impact of the CSO law on CSOs’ operations. The article acknowledged the lack of office space, equipment, and qualified personnel at most professional associations, but it criticized them for failing to influence the country’s political life, serve as a bridge between the government and the people, or represent the rights and interests of their members. In May the CSA took steps to split or dissolve ECSF in an apparent effort to prevent the forum from advancing its efforts to amend the law. Nevertheless, at a conference in November 2017 on the role of CSOs in building democracy, which was organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Vision Ethiopian Congress for Democracy (VECOD), the CSA deputy director expressed the government’s willingness to amend the law if it had unintended shortcomings.
More than sixty high-level representatives from the government, political parties, media organizations, and civil society attended the event, and CSO representatives heatedly emphasized the negative impact of the law, particularly on human rights organizations.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

CSO service provision was stable in 2017. However, government organs became more open to allowing CSOs to participate in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development projects. Except for the CSA, most government stakeholders are willing to work with CSOs under formal and informal arrangements, and the improvement in their recognition of and support for efforts by the CSO sector is visible.

CSO services are fairly diversified. The CSP lists more than fifteen areas of charitable activity in which CSOs may operate. The vast majority of CSOs focus on health, education, livelihoods, food security, water and sanitation, and agriculture. During 2017 UN implementing partners, including national CSOs such as Mothers and Children Multisectoral Development Organization, offered assistance to 8.5 million people affected by conflict and drought.

CSOs are expected by the government and donors to ensure that their projects reflect the needs of their beneficiaries. Some large organizations/ conduct needs assessments while designing their projects.

The law does not prohibit membership associations from providing goods and services to beneficiaries beyond their members. In practice, however, the CSA interprets the law in a restrictive manner and obliges membership associations to focus only on their own members and to use only their own resources rather than foreign funds for this purpose. A few research-oriented CSOs, such as the Forum for Social Studies (FSS) and the Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, sell their publications on policy issues to the public. CSOs are legally required to provide their goods and services without discriminating on the basis of religion, ethnicity, gender, or other grounds.

Because of legal restrictions, the number of CSOs engaged in economic activities to support their programs is minimal. For example, CSOs may earn money by providing training only if they have licenses as business organizations, and the expectation that they pay per diem and allowances to training participants and guest speakers raises their administrative costs. A small number of CSOs working in service areas such as education and health have established social enterprises, as the demand for such services is high. No human rights organization engages in income-generating activities.

The government’s second five-year Growth and Transformational Plan devoted some space to the role and contribution of CSOs, particularly in service provision. Similarly, the National Human Rights Action Plan, which was adopted in 2016, recognizes the value of CSOs in realizing the plan.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Ethiopia did not change significantly in 2017. No central resource center provides information, technical assistance, and communications technology to the CSO sector as a whole. The Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA) operates a resource center for its members, with a library, Internet access, and other services available free of charge. CCRDA sometimes also offers other services such as training on a cost-recovery basis. International donors supported a few capacity development programs in 2017. The five-year, multi-donor-funded Civil Society Support Program (CSSP) ran from 2011 to 2016 and secured a one-year extension before closing in July 2017. The European Union’s Civil Society Fund II, which aims to increase the role of CSOs in development and democratization, provides grant and non-grant support to increase CSOs’ human, material, and technical capacities.

Ethiopia has no local community foundation that provides support to CSOs by mobilizing local funds. However, the local offices of several international organizations, including Pact, Plan International, and GOAL, support local CSOs by re-granting international donor funds. The CSA discourages such arrangements, claiming that each organization in the funding chain uses as much as 30 percent of funds for its own operations, thereby reducing funding for beneficiaries. The CSA has been pushing ISOs to implement projects directly rather than work through local CSOs.

ECSF serves as the main representative of the CSO sector. Since it was established by special permission of the CSA, it is highly dependent on the agency’s good will. However, in 2017 the CSA expressed its dissatisfaction with the way that the forum was handling the amendment of the law, as described above. About fifty CSO network organizations have been established to share information and collaborate on common objectives. These networks include CCRDA, Network of Ethiopian Women’s Associations, Union of Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations, Malaria Consortium, Consortium of Reproductive Health Associations, and Non-State Actors Coalition. However, as they face legal restrictions on access to and utilization of funding, these networks are growing weaker and struggle to survive.

Ethiopia has capable CSO management trainers. In collaboration with Ambo University, CCRDA offers a special diploma course on CSO management, which is open to its member organizations. CCRDA also launched a program in 2017 in partnership with Addis Ababa University and Jonkoping University in Sweden to offer a one-year certification program in executive community leadership. Applicants to the program are required to pay ETB 35,000 (approximately $1,270) for tuition, with limited scholarships available. Most training materials are in English or Amharic, Ethiopia’s official languages, although more than eighty vernacular and local languages are spoken throughout the country.

CSOs work in partnership with the government, particularly in healthcare. All new CSO projects are supposed to be reviewed by line ministries to confirm that they are compatible with the government’s priorities, whereupon project agreements are signed. The working relationship between the media and CSOs is very weak, as the media seem not to understand the nature of CSOs’ work and have no interest in partnering with them to carry out their watchdog role. Although the private sector extended some support to CSOs for humanitarian purposes in 2017, there was little engagement on strategic issues. In August 2017 ECSF conducted a workshop to raise awareness of the need for strategic partnerships between CSOs and the private sector that go beyond financial support.
The public image of CSOs did not change in 2017. Ethiopian media cover events that are newsworthy or sensational and do not commonly offer analysis or coverage of the activities of CSOs. Most Ethiopian media are commercial and therefore costly, and CSOs cannot usually afford to buy airtime on radio or television. The media distinguish between public service announcements and corporate advertising but do not offer CSOs free airtime. In 2017 Deutsche Welle’s Amharic radio program positively covered the conference on CSOs’ role in democratization hosted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and VECOD. The CSA was not happy with this coverage and, contradicting the broadcast, issued a statement in December arguing that the number of CSOs has increased every year, especially since the adoption of the CSP in 2009.

The public has a generally positive perception of CSOs, but it also has overly high expectations and assumes that CSOs have huge amounts of foreign funding to spend as they wish. This misunderstanding comes about both because of some unethical behavior by CSO representatives and because of the public’s lack of knowledge about CSO operations. In comparison to previous years, the central government’s view of CSOs improved in 2017 as it engaged in dialogue on amending the CSO law and established a special taskforce to review CSOs’ challenges. Government officials generally stopped making negative statements about CSOs during the year. The private sector assumes that CSOs, particularly foreign organizations, have enough money to carry out their activities.

Some CSOs such as CCRDA use media airtime effectively to promote their activities and raise public awareness. CCRDA celebrated NGOs’ Good Practice Day on December 28, 2017, and the president and state minister of health attended some events. The event received good media coverage, including by government media.

Generally, the culture of social media is not well developed in Ethiopia, and very few CSOs use social media in their public outreach strategies, especially given the restrictions on Internet access. The public sometimes criticizes CSOs for not sufficiently promoting themselves through the media and other means.

A code of conduct was formulated and adopted by members of the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Forum in 2016, but there has been no significant effort to popularize or ensure adherence to it. Leading CSOs publish their annual reports in both hard and electronic formats.
The beginning of 2017 was tense in Gabon, as the country was still feeling the negative effects of the post-election crisis. After presidential elections in August 2016 gave the incumbent, Ali Bongo, a narrow victory over his challenger, Gabon descended into violence because of widespread allegations of electoral fraud. In an attempt to resolve the crisis sparked by Bongo's re-election, the government organized the Angondjé National Dialogue between March and May 2017. The dialogue engaged part of the opposition (except for the opposition presidential candidate Jean Ping and some other members of the opposition who boycotted it), as well as nearly 880 CSOs. The dialogue was structured into four parts: opening and closing ceremonies, a phase for civil society, and a phase for political parties. The political parties' thematic sessions focused on discussions of campaign financing and presidential terms, while the civil society sessions focused on civil society-state interactions. At the conclusion of the dialogue, the participants agreed to changes in the way the president is elected, increases in the number of national assembly deputies, redistricting, and new term limits for Constitutional Court judges. At year’s end approval of these resolutions was pending in the parliament.

The election crisis also resulted in an economic slowdown. In the immediate aftermath of the election, many businesses were looted, and others shut down until the political climate was calmer. In addition, waves of layoffs rocked the private and semi-public sectors, exacerbating the social crisis of the past several years.

Gabon’s overall CSO sustainability did not change significantly in 2017. However, the legal environment, which was marked by an increasing number of fundamental human rights violations, deteriorated. Meanwhile, the sector’s public image improved slightly as CSOs increasingly used social media as a communications tool. There were no significant changes in terms of organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, or sectoral infrastructure.

There are no exact statistics on the number of CSOs registered in Gabon. However, according to the Gabonese Network of Organizations and Projects (ROPAGA), there are approximately 1,750 CSOs in the country, not including union organizations or groups.

1Please note that the overall sustainability score was erroneously published as 5.4 in the 2016 CSOSI for Sub-Saharan Africa.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3

The legal environment governing CSOs, which was already quite restrictive, deteriorated slightly in 2017.

Freedom of association and freedom to unionize are enshrined in Gabon’s constitution, and codified in Law 35-62 from 1962, which governs associations, and Law 3-94 from 1994, which created the Republic of Gabon’s Labor Code.

In 2017 CSOs continued to face many roadblocks to registration, including administrative procedures and interference from the central government. According to the law, acquiring legal status requires the submission of a statement to the prefecture or mayor’s office where the CSO is based. However, in 2017 the Ministry of Interior continued to control the granting of legal status to CSOs under Law 35-62. In addition, the turnaround time for receiving final approval is relatively long, and registration decisions are at the discretion of the ministry. Because of the authorities’ views on their work, certain CSOs, such as human rights CSOs that challenge the government’s work, are less likely to receive their final receipts than pro-government CSOs. As of 2017, nearly all new CSOs were operating under provisional authorizations or approvals.

In general, Gabon’s laws clearly establish CSOs’ purpose and roles. But these laws also contain provisions that allow authorities to limit CSOs’ activities. If a CSO violates the scope of authorized activities, the Ministry of Interior and the president have the right to suspend or dissolve it. In February 2017 the Ministry of Interior dissolved the National Convention of Trade Unions in the Education Sector (CONASYSED), Gabon’s union of primary and secondary teachers, claiming that it had disturbed the peace, hindered freedom to work, and engaged in violence. Other unions have also been under the ministry’s scrutiny and threatened with dissolution. Law 35-62 is fairly vague on issues of internal governance and fails to address issues of operations, financing, or taxation.

Echoing the calls of CSOs, in 2017 the national dialogue acknowledged the need to revise Law 35-62 on associations. However, no concrete progress was made in this regard by the end of the year.

The law fails to protect CSOs against government control, harassment by government authorities, or the risk of being dissolved by the central government for arbitrary or political reasons. In 2017, as in 2016, CSOs were subject to government harassment, and activists’ rights and freedoms were violated many times. These violations took various forms, including administrative pressure following union strikes (including the dissolution of CONASYSED) and legal pressure (for example, members of a teachers’ union were questioned and threatened with prison time for disturbing the peace, contempt of a magistrate, and hindering freedom to work). In addition, there was significant abuse by security forces. For example, law enforcement descended on a petroleum facility, arresting and assaulting striking workers. In August security forces arrested activist Hervé Mombo Kinga, charging him with “instigating violence” and “insulting the Head of State.” He spent one and a half months in solitary confinement. CSOs can take legal action to protect their rights or the public’s rights, but many feel that ties between the executive and judicial branches are too tight. Freedom of the press was also challenged during the year. For example, the Echo du Nord newspaper faced a two-month suspension.

Freedom of expression is also enshrined in the constitution for both individuals and entities such as associations. Associations can freely debate issues of public interest and participate in public demonstrations, but when a CSO issues an opinion or takes a position that contradicts that of the central government, it is not immune to retaliation. CSOs must pay value-added tax (VAT) and withhold income tax from employees’ salaries, but they receive other tax exemptions, including from income taxes on contributions and donations.

CSOs in Gabon can raise funds, including from foreign donors, with no restrictions. CSOs can also charge for the goods and services that they provide, but this income must be used to cover the CSO’s operating expenses. CSOs cannot share dividends among their members.
There are still no attorneys who specialize in CSO-related legal issues, so CSOs must use attorneys who specialize in other areas, such as employment law and human rights. Law firms exist only in Libreville and Port-Gentil. CSOs in other areas that need legal services must turn to law firms in these cities.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2017, despite the many organizational development trainings available in Libreville.

Unions are more successful at developing ties and contacts with their bases, because their target groups are clearly defined. This is less true of other forms of CSOs. Some CSOs do not work directly with the groups whose rights and interests they are supposed to promote. For example, many CSOs identify targets for their activities in the country’s interior but spend most of their time in Libreville. As a result, they have no real relationship with their stated target populations.

Gabon’s CSO laws specify that CSOs’ missions must be clearly defined in their bylaws and internal regulations. However, only a few CSOs limit their work to the objectives that they identified when they were created. Other CSOs’ strategies and activities are guided by the funds that are available. Very few CSOs have metrics for monitoring their work or measuring their success. Unions, on the other hand, routinely engage in monitoring and evaluation to evaluate the effectiveness of their activities and facilitate decision making about future activities.

Gabonese laws state that CSOs’ founding documents must specify and assign duties to clearly defined internal management entities with a clear division of responsibilities. While different organizations structure these bodies differently, all CSOs clearly identify decision-making entities such as the ordinary and extraordinary general meetings and boards of directors as their governing bodies. However, many CSOs still rely primarily on a few individuals to guide their work rather than on strong management structures.

Very few CSOs have procedure manuals. However, leading CSOs make an effort to publish technical reports, financial statements, and internal and external audits.

Many CSOs continue to depend primarily on volunteers, because they do not have sufficient resources to hire permanent staff. CSOs that receive project-specific support from international partners hire staff according to project needs. Outside expertise is sought when financial resources are available. Many CSOs prioritize capacity building for their members and technical staff through trainings provided by international partners.

CSOs in Gabon have access to basic supplies, computers, telephones, and multimedia equipment and use relatively expensive mobile Internet connections. Not all CSOs have access to software. Many CSOs take advantage of new projects with international partners to purchase or modernize their equipment. In 2017 more CSOs began using Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter rather than traditional websites to facilitate their operations.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2017. As in past years, Gabon’s CSOs had difficulty raising sufficient funds. CSOs in Gabon rely on various funding sources for their activities. Most funding comes from foreign donors—primarily the European Union (EU), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Germany’s Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), and USAID. This reliance on foreign funding harms CSOs when donors’ priorities change. For example, since 2017 the EU’s sole priority has been job training, an area that few Gabonese CSOs address.
In the past EU funding covered a much broader scope of activities, including health, education, and the environment. This shift has therefore deprived CSOs of an important source of funding. Foreign funding levels did not change significantly in 2017, but CSOs continue to have limited capacity to access these funds.

CSOs have some access to funding from government bodies and the private sector. However, CSOs criticize the fact that these funds primarily go to CSOs allied with the government. While various ministries and government agencies provide some funding to CSOs, local governments generally work directly with communities without directing their support through CSOs because of a lack of trust between the state and certain CSOs. Private-sector support for CSOs focuses primarily on activities in the fields of health, child welfare, urban sanitation, and the environment. No data are available on the scale of support from either the public or private sectors.

The concept of philanthropy is not yet common in Gabon. While philanthropic organizations associated with the president’s family, such as the Amissa Bongo Foundation and the Omar Bongo Foundation, provide some financial support to CSOs, the selection process for these funds is not transparent, and funds tend to go to CSOs that will help the foundations gain favor with local populations. In addition, foundations tend to give money directly to communities.

During the year, unions were critical of the government’s decision to suspend withholding of government workers’ union dues. Other CSOs receive timely funding through legally mandated dues payments from members. Although the total amount of the dues collected is limited, these funds help CSOs sustain their operations. In 2017 CSOs heightened their use of social networks to raise funds for their activities. For example, Dynamique Unitaire launched an awareness and fundraising campaign on social media to support the teachers whose salaries were frozen.

CSOs can earn income by selling products and services, such as diagnostic studies, field surveys, and trainings. This is primarily an option for organizations with expert knowledge of very specific topics, which they can make available to businesses, local governments, and international organizations. However, in some cases this poses a challenge to CSOs’ independence. To maintain a good relationship with its funder, a CSO might, for instance, write a report that does not reflect reality insofar as it presents its funder in a positive light.

In 2017 a growing number of CSOs created agricultural cooperatives and social enterprises, many of which were related to environmental and youth development issues. For example, young people created social enterprises with the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In addition, cooperatives and community forests sell products and help communities exercise their rights to share in the income from these forests.

The quality of CSOs’ financial management systems vary. Few CSOs have sufficient financial resources to hire accountants who can set up functional and transparent management systems. This weakness has sometimes led donors to require that projects with large budgets be handled by international CSOs in northern Gabon with solid financial management systems. Audits are most often conducted by international partners or donors.

**ADVOCACY: 5.0**

CSO advocacy did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs have traditional communication channels with decision makers that allow them to work together on certain projects or activities in both formal and informal partnerships. In addition, development donors and partners prefer a participatory approach to the projects that they fund and sometimes require the government to work with CSOs. The legislative process in Gabon requires public consultation on the content of draft laws before their enactment.
In reality, however, CSOs have had to exert considerable pressure on the authorities to access draft laws, and CSOs’ recommendations are not always taken into account.

In 2017 CSOs were increasingly involved in the reform process, particularly through their involvement in the Angondjé National Inclusive Dialogue, which took place between March and May 2017. Eight hundred eighty associations registered to participate in the dialogue.

Individual CSOs and CSO coalitions conduct educational campaigns to influence public debate, public opinion, and legislation. For example, in September 2017 the Let’s Turn The Page coalition organized an educational campaign on the issues of governance and citizenship in Gabon and other countries. However, the limited financial resources available limit the scope of such campaigns, and therefore very few CSOs organize nationwide campaigns. In addition, it is unclear how effective such campaigns are, in part because CSOs lack the organizational, human, and financial resources to clearly determine and communicate their impact.

CSOs advocate for policies that relate to their specific areas of interest. For example, in 2017 the Gabon Workers’ Union Organization (CGST) took the lead in protesting economically motivated layoffs that struck more than ten companies. By the end of the year, however, the union’s demands had not been met. CSOs join together with other CSOs in topic-specific networks, coalitions, or platforms. Many CSO platforms, including ROPAGA, the Network of Free CSOs for Good Governance (ROLBG), Dynamique Unitaire, and the Free Civil Society platform, continued to be active in 2017.

In 2017 CSOs were somewhat more comfortable with the concept of lobbying, and there were several lobbying successes during the year. For example, the document that would have merged the National Parks Agency into the National Nature Protection Agency and given the new agency expanded authority was defeated, and Olam Gabon’s “zero deforestation” moratorium was signed.

CSOs in Gabon are aware that their sustainability is closely tied to a more favorable legal framework. Since the end of 2016, ROPAGA, with support from the French CSO Agir Ensemble pour les Droits de l’Homme, has advocated for the revision of Law 35-62. This work has focused on capacity building, institutional lobbying, and mobilizing CSOs to participate in the revision process. CSOs also took advantage of the National Dialogue to call for reform of Law 35-62. While this was listed as an outcome of the dialogue, no concrete changes were made to the law in 2017.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

CSOs’ ability to provide services did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs continue to offer basic social services in the areas of education, health, and sanitation. In 2017, for example, the Collective of Natives of Minvoul (CONAMI) donated healthcare supplies to a local hospital and resupplied the infirmary with drugs. CSOs also provide a diverse range of services such as education, training, legal assistance, and medical caravans.

Unions aim their activities at their members and employees in the sectors in which they work. Other CSOs provide goods and services to the public at large without distinction. CSOs frequently adapt their activities to the needs and priorities of their target groups based on field surveys, activity reports, consultations, or requests for support from these groups. However, such tools are not always used, and therefore services are not always relevant. For example, CSOs in the environmental sector do not always use community needs assessment tools such as the Free and Informed Advance Consent (CLIP).
Some CSOs are widely recognized as experts by other actors, and their services are in high demand. For example, Muvissi Environment is noted for its expertise in environmental issues. Such CSOs conduct studies, build skills, and provide other forms of assistance to the public or communities. This expertise allows them to generate limited amounts of revenue and to cover their basic expenses.

CSOs increasingly work with local government bodies, which have a greater appreciation for their work at the community level. They also serve as partners through internationally funded conferences and projects. A notable example in 2017 was the Government of Gabon and World Bank-led Global Wildlife Program (GWP), a $131 million global partnership on wildlife conservation, which includes CSOs as active partners in the in-country implementation of projects related to integrated landscape management and wildlife conservation.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

In 2017 the infrastructure supporting CSOs remained unchanged. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) continue to offer multi-platform support to CSOs, including access to information, capacity building, and financial support. Major foundations, primarily associated with the Bongo family, continued to act as ISOs on the national level. Their services are still focused in the capital and on areas ranging from democracy and civic engagement to resource management. ISOs’ funding sources are unknown, and their distribution of funds is not transparent. Independent civil society platforms also provide support to other CSOs. For example, the Gabon My Land My Right (GMTMD) platform focuses on forestry and land tenure issues, and ROPAGA organized a series of capacity-building workshops for local CSOs in the area of the environment.

Cooperation within the CSO sector increased in 2017. CSOs forming topic-specific groups included ROLBG, which deals with transparency and good governance, and the Free Civil Society Platform.

There are local CSO management trainers, but in 2017 training organizers relied primarily on international expertise. Most CSOs that take advantage of capacity-building opportunities are based in Libreville. CSOs in other locations must travel to Libreville to participate in training opportunities. These trainings meet local CSOs’ needs, which are identified by CSOs themselves. For example, trainings in 2017 focused on areas such as project development, project management, and financial management, which were identified as priority areas in external audits performed in previous years. Training materials are available only in French.
CSOs form both formal and informal partnerships with government entities. In 2017, for example, the Center for Study and Strategic Perspective—Gabon (CEPS—Gabon) formed a partnership with the Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises to promote social enterprise development among youth. In the private sector, the Center for Research on International Development in Africa formed a notable partnership with the multinational corporation Olam Gabon to educate the public about the Gabonese Agricultural Achievements and Initiatives of Committed Nationals (GRAINE) Program 2015–2020, Gabon’s first large-scale agricultural program.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

In 2017 the public image of CSOs improved slightly thanks to CSOs’ increased use of social media, primarily Facebook and WhatsApp. Internet usage in the country continues to increase, and over 47 percent of the population now has Internet access. This has made social media a low-cost way for CSOs to draw attention to their activities, promote their products and services, and thus improve their public image.

Traditional Gabonese media outlets, whether allied with the government or the opposition, portray a positive image of the role of CSOs. However, the scope of coverage varies and is often dependent on a CSO’s connections, the media outlet in question, and the topic to be discussed. Pro-government CSOs receive coverage from all state-run media and some private media, as long as they can pay the coverage fees. Activist CSOs generally receive coverage only from private media that are seen as being allied with the opposition.

The public does not really understand the concept of a CSO but still has a generally positive view of the role of civil society groups and their initiatives. The government and the private sector also have a positive image of the role of CSOs as service providers. They see CSOs as community resources and sources of expertise and reliable information. There were many examples of this in 2017, including CSOs’ participation in the Angondjé National Dialogue, the technical and scientific commission created under the Seed Program, and the national conversation on zero deforestation. However, the government is critical of CSOs that advocate against government policies or are focused on human rights.

In 2017 many CSOs still did not have communications plans to improve their public image or promote their activities. CSOs make an effort to communicate through social media and to build relationships with journalists, but these efforts are still limited. Journalists feel that CSOs are prejudiced against them and that CSOs emphasize direct contact with political entities, thus shutting communication channels down.

Only the largest CSOs attempt to be transparent by publishing technical and financial annual reports and audits. Few CSOs have adopted codes of ethics.
A democratic transition never before experienced in The Gambia began in 2017 after the ousting of the Jammeh dictatorship in December 2016. During the year Gambians enjoyed many new opportunities to exercise their civil liberties. For example, for the first time ever citizens were able to freely and publicly express their opinions about their leaders and government without fear of reprisal, whether at home or in offices, communities, or the media, including social media. As part of the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the Gambian parliament enacted laws in December 2017 to establish a truth commission, a human rights commission, and a commission to write a new constitution. The Gambia also continued to enjoy international goodwill, especially from the European Union (EU), China, and the United States, which provided direct budgetary and development support, investment, and technical assistance to stabilize the new democracy. Many Gambian refugees began voluntarily to return home from Libya with help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization on Migration.

Despite the country’s democratic gains in 2017, several incidents took place that threatened the exercise of civil and political rights. In November 2017 the Supreme Court ruled that the controversial Public Order Act, which human rights and political activists had condemned for years, is constitutional. On several occasions the police denied citizens the right to protest, citing the act. During a protest in the former president’s village of Kanilai, international peacekeeping forces shot and killed a protester. In addition, the country’s significant political changes did not translate into immediate social and economic progress. High levels of poverty, limited social services, and the high cost of living remained major challenges amid persistent incidents of corruption and political patronage.

For Gambian civil society, the year posed both challenges and opportunities. CSOs experienced a new awakening as the emerging democratic space allowed for robust advocacy and policy engagement. Human rights organizations proliferated. At the same time, the new environment placed huge expectations on CSOs to assume a leadership role for which they lacked adequate capacity and experience. During the year CSOs engaged in various efforts to reposition, refocus, and rebrand themselves, so that they could participate effectively in the new Gambia.
Every dimension of CSO sustainability improved in The Gambia in 2017 as a result of the freer political environment. The legal environment grew more enabling as a larger than usual number of CSOs was able to register, including many organizations focused on human rights and governance. CSOs’ organizational capacity was stronger as they became more proactive and better organized, and their financial viability improved thanks to a marked increase in donor funding. Advocacy CSOs that had been largely inactive during the former regime became more vocal, the number of service-providing organizations increased, and the infrastructure supporting CSOs benefitted from the formation of new coalitions. Finally, public perceptions of CSOs improved in tandem with the sector’s increased activity in 2017.

The overall number of CSOs registered in The Gambia in 2017 is unknown but is estimated to have totaled well over 1,000 organizations. During the year the Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO), the main umbrella organization, received about 10 percent more membership applications from new organizations than in the previous year; suggesting robust growth in the sector, especially among advocacy organizations. TANGO’s eighty members range from large organizations and networks to smaller youth and community groups. Informal, community-based organizations (CBOs) are active in rural areas and are mostly focused on women, youth, farming self-help, and cultural activities.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.0

The legal environment for Gambian CSOs improved significantly in 2017. Although the laws and procedures for registering CSOs did not change, the freer political environment allowed a large number of organizations to register. Most newly registered organizations focused on human rights, accountability, corruption, and governance. CSOs continued to register as charitable organizations with the Ministry of Justice under the Companies Act 2013. After two years of operation, CSOs wishing to obtain status as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may register with the NGO Affairs Agency under the NGO Act. The number of NGOs remained small in 2017 since the status conveys no real benefit.

On a practical level, the NGO Act governs all CSOs, not merely NGOs. All CSOs must fulfill certain administrative requirements specified in the act, such as having constitutions and reporting annually to the NGO Affairs Agency. The act gives the government considerable oversight authority, including the power to dissolve an organization if it “undermines” the government or is deemed to have breached a code of conduct included in the act. The law does not provide any form of defense or appeal that would allow affected CSOs to seek redress for the government’s decisions under the act. In practice, the government did not enforce the more draconian provisions of the act in 2017.

For the most part, CSOs experienced limited harassment in 2017. However, certain laws continued to pose potential threats. Laws citing offenses such as “sedition,” “false news,” and “giving false information to a public officer” remained in the books, although they were rarely enforced during the year. In November 2017 the Supreme Court ruled that the controversial Public Order Act, which has been used to prohibit public protests and jail opposition politicians, is constitutional. The law was cited when an informal new youth movement, Occupy Westfield, was denied a permit to protest poor supplies of electricity. The new government promised to reform all laws infringing on democracy, human rights, and public participation, but these reforms did not take place in 2017.

CSOs do not pay tax on income from donors and income-generating activities. CSOs’ local employees pay income tax, but expatriate workers do not. Individuals and corporations may not claim tax deductions for their donations to CSOs.
CSOs may earn income from the sale of goods and services provided the revenues are invested back into services for members or communities. The government offers CSOs a few contracts, usually in specialized areas such as education.

Lawyers are usually familiar with the NGO Act and are generally available to provide high-quality legal advice to CSOs. Several larger CSOs contract with lawyers for legal advice and representation when needed.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity improved in 2017 as the political transition energized them to become more proactive and better organized.

CSOs were more assertive in mobilizing their members and communities to stage protests and other outdoor activities during the year. CSOs concerned about downstream accountability consulted regularly with communities during the planning, implementation, and monitoring of their programs and activities. The most significant constituency-building effort was the emergence of the Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations, which was formed to seek accountability from the former government, including reparations and medical support, for hundreds of victims of torture, rape, enforced disappearance, and summary execution. In April 2017 the center staged massive marches to commemorate the fatal shooting of fourteen students in April 2000 and the violent crackdown on protesters in April 2016, when dozens of Gambians where killed, raped, and tortured.

Most CSOs have strategic plans and follow them. Planning and decision making are informed by an organization’s mission and vision statements, which are included in its constitution. In 2017 ActionAid International The Gambia (AAITG), in partnership with the Network Against Gender-Based Violence (NGBV), helped at least seven small CBOs develop strategic plans, so that they could effectively implement projects with poor and rural farmers.

Most CSOs have clear management structures, including boards of directors providing oversight and terms of reference for staff. CSOs usually have manuals to guide their governance, management, operations, and resolution of conflicts of interest. Some CSOs have policies governing resource use, staff performance, open information, whistleblowing, corruption, sexual harassment, child protection, and other issues.

CSOs usually retain permanent staff. Depending on their size and resources, they may have a full complement of employees, including information technology specialists and accountants, or, if they are less well endowed, only an executive director, one or two program officers, and an accounts clerk. Most staff appointments are project based, and CSOs without project funding are unable to maintain staff. Many CSOs benefit from the work of volunteers, who are usually university students or new graduates engaged for short periods.

Bigger, well-resourced CSOs, especially those with international affiliations, have modern office equipment and tools such as accounting software. However, most CSOs in The Gambia cannot afford to acquire new office equipment. As Internet access grows, more CSOs have Internet services and use social media. In 2017 several CSOs used the Internet effectively to raise funds—for example, by uploading project concept notes to donor platforms and creating websites to inform potential donors about their activities.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1

Although the CSO sector in The Gambia continued to contend with a difficult funding situation in 2017, donor funding for CSOs increased markedly during the year as a result of the political transition. Several new donors, including the International Republican Institute (IRI), Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Embassy of France, and Westminster Foundation for Democracy, offered funding or established offices. Other donors expressed interest in The Gambia but had yet to offer tangible funding by the end of the year.

Most registered CSOs rely on foreign donors for nearly all of their funding. However, many CSOs, especially smaller organizations, find it difficult to meet the requirements imposed by foreign donors. For example, to access EU funds, CSOs must register on the EU’s online portal, which can be challenging because of the quality and volume of data requested. Similarly, to access funds from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, CSOs must meet stringent governance and accountability standards and have past experience in project management.

To overcome management deficits and qualify for funding, some smaller CSOs form partnerships among themselves or, more often, with larger CSOs.

Although CSOs have access to diverse sources of funding, obtaining funding from local sources remained a challenge in 2017, and many CSOs continued to fundraise locally with little success. A few local foundations provide goods, services, facilities, and funding directly to communities but do not fund CSOs. Corporate funding for CSOs is minimal, since most companies prefer to support local communities and public institutions directly. Any corporate funding available to CSOs in 2017 was limited, ad hoc, and focused on individual activities rather than programs or projects. For example, Guaranty Trust Bank provided funding so that TANGO board chair could attend a Senegalo-Gambian business forum in Dakar. Some CSOs—mainly formal organizations with the means to build infrastructure such as schools, clinics, or hand pumps—obtained a great deal of in-kind support from their communities and constituents, including volunteer labor, land, and building materials.

CSOs did not raise significant funding from income-generating activities in 2017. Some organizations, such as the National Women Farmers’ Association, Gambia Women’s Finance Association (GAWFA), Agency for the Development of Women and Children, The Gambia (ADWAC), and Trust Agency for Rural Development, earned income from selling garden produce and seeds, renting and selling items such as chairs and farm implements, or providing revolving loans to community members. TANGO and the Young Men’s Christian Association hired out conference facilities that they own. These efforts were mainly aimed at cost recovery or raising enough revenue to increase the volume of the goods and services that they provide to constituents, communities, and members. Although some membership-based CSOs require members to pay subscription fees, these are rarely paid.

Local businesses do not offer contracts to CSOs. CSOs do not usually compete for government contracts, although a few CSOs, such as Future In Our Hands and Education for All Network (EFAnet), have obtained government contracts to build schools and train teachers, respectively.

Larger, more established CSOs have computerized financial management systems and conduct both internal and external audits, which they make available to the public. Smaller organizations keep their accounts manually and usually do not conduct audits, since they are expensive, especially if performed by external auditors. CSOs feel accountable to their donors and as a condition of funding must usually provide them with periodic activity and financial reports. CSOs sometimes also report about their activities and finances to other entities, such as TANGO, if they are members, or the NGO Affairs Agency, if they are registered as NGOs with the agency.
ADVOCACY: 4.7

Because of the long period of limited political space under the previous regime, Gambian CSOs did not consider advocacy an option before 2017. However, with their newfound freedoms, advocacy CSOs that had been largely inactive during the former regime became more vocal about public policies and more exacting about holding public institutions to account. In addition, the number of new advocacy groups skyrocketed during the year. They were particularly focused on areas that had been dominated by the previous administration for political gain, such as women, girls, youth, and the disabled. The number of CSOs working on environmental issues also increased significantly.

Direct access by CSOs to local and central governments is a longstanding practice in The Gambia. CSO representatives are invited to sit on government committees, where they freely share their opinions, including their critical views of government positions and policies. For example, Child Protection Alliance (CPA) sits on the board of the National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons at the Ministry of Justice, and TANGO is the vice chair of the National Social Protection Steering Committee under the Department of Social Welfare. CSOs have direct access to the National Assembly and occasionally engage with lawmakers in their oversight function. For example, in December 2017 Gambian CSOs convened a breakfast meeting with members of parliament to discuss the national budget. The meeting aimed at helping National Assembly members better understand the processes of budget formulation and monitoring.

CSO campaigns successfully forced the government to rescind certain decisions and actions in 2017. For example, after a public outcry from CSOs and other stakeholders, the government withdrew its bill for a constitutional amendment that would have set a new age limit for the vice president. CSOs were instrumental in compelling the government to adhere to the rule of law and investigate human rights violations committed by the previous regime. For example, the April 10 and 11 Memorial Foundation submitted a petition to the minister of justice calling for an investigation into the massacre of students by security forces in 2000. Similarly, the Solo Sandeng Foundation staged a march to demand justice for an activist slain in April 2016, and the Victims Center held meetings with the president and vice president to demand investigations into human rights violations over the years. The Gambia Center for Victims of Human Rights Violations conducted a nationwide tour to sensitize communities about transitional justice. CSOs also pressured the government to address pressing waste management issues.

In other advocacy efforts in 2017, youth groups protested in front of the parliament building and called unsuccessfully for the resignation of members of parliament because of their poor handling of the December 2016 political impasse after the former president refused to step down. After CSOs demanded better services from public institutions and challenged the government on corruption, political patronage, and the politicization of the civil service, the government responded with several public statements. In July the vice president of the Gambia Bar Association published an article on the role of the bar in the new Gambia, in which she raised pertinent issues about the new government’s abuse of power. Green Up Gambia, a youth environmental association, mobilized communities in Manjai and Bakoteh to protest the huge Bakoteh dumpsite, which was releasing dangerous fumes into nearby settlements. The protest led to the temporary suspension of dumping at the site. Other CSOs organized protests against a Chinese fishmeal company in the coastal towns of Gunjur and Kartong, which resulted in the temporary closure of the facility and a court case against the company filed by the National Environment Agency.
There was almost no lobbying conducted by CSOs in 2017, and CSOs did not influence the parliament in effecting legal reforms.

In 2017 CSOs did not attempt to review or reform the NGO Act, which remains in effect but is not fully enforced. Although some CSOs remained concerned about the act, many organizations are not fully aware of its provisions. CSOs expect to be included in the constitutional review commission slated to be established in 2018 and will probably demand provisions that open up more space for their activities.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

CSOs’ service provision improved in 2017 as new organizations emerged and the new government publicly recognized the role of CSOs.

CSOs provide services in a wide variety of fields, from social goods and services to capacity building and awareness raising on policy and development issues. In 2017, as in previous years, CSOs continued to provide goods and services that addressed the dire needs of individuals and communities. These services mainly focused on education and support to farmers.

CSOs are closer to communities than the government and usually involve community members in the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects. For example, AAITG, ADWAC, and United Purpose organize participatory rural assessments, which involve communities in the evaluation of interventions. CSOs also conduct research or rely on studies by other agencies, including the government, to determine the needs and challenges of the communities that they serve.

CSOs target various beneficiaries, including individuals, members, and communities. In 2017 many CSOs emerged or arrived from elsewhere, including Penny Appeal, a British charity, which provides support to orphans. Since arriving in The Gambia in 2013, OneSight has opened offices throughout the country to provide vision care and other support to communities. CSOs do not discriminate in their provision of goods and services. However, some CSOs serve specific sub-sectors, such as young or rural women, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV/AIDS, farmers, or sex workers.

CSOs usually provide goods and services free of charge. Some CSOs seek to recover costs by, for example, charging for educational or healthcare services. For example, the Gambia Family Planning Association charges clients for services, and GAWFA operates credit schemes that provide loans to members with minimal interest.

The government continued to have high regard for service-providing CSOs. In 2017 the president and government ministers acknowledged the contribution of CSOs to national development in various public statements. In her inaugural address in November, the new vice president recognized the role of CSOs and expressed the government’s desire to continue to partner with them.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2

The sectoral infrastructure improved in 2017 as new coalitions were formed and CSOs engaged in joint programming. There are no CSO resource centers in The Gambia, other than several informal centers operated by CSOs, which usually offer informational materials or serve as meeting places. For information and research CSOs rely mostly on the Internet or a small number of libraries at institutions of higher learning that are open to users other than students and faculty.

There are no intermediary support organizations in The Gambia. The few local foundations operating in the country do not offer grants to CSOs, but some embassies as well as IRI provide small grants.

CSOs enjoy many productive partnerships among themselves. Existing networks and coalitions, such as CPA, NGBV, Gender Action Team, and TANGO, were joined in 2017 by many new coalitions, including several focused on the environment. Some coalitions are formal and require membership applications, but others, such as the Gunjur Environment Movement, Right to Know Campaign, and Constitution for Change, are informal and ad hoc and have both individual and organizational members. Many of the informal coalitions are active on social media. In addition, CSOs sometimes engage in joint programming. For example, AAITG, United Purpose, and Catholic Relief Services cooperated on programs to address a food crisis affecting more than 10,000 families in early 2017. There is a high rate of information sharing among CSOs, and networks share information periodically with their members.

There are no dedicated training institutes for CSOs in The Gambia. For the most part, CSOs take responsibility for building their own capacities and conducting research to obtain needed information. Public and private training institutes offer training to CSOs upon request.

CSOs partner with the government and, to a lesser extent, the private sector and media. For example, CSOs routinely work with ministries and local governments to combat harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation and early and forced marriages. They also work together to combat corruption and promote human rights. The quality of CSOs’ partnerships with the media improved in 2017. For example, in December 2017 the Gambia Press Union, in collaboration with CSOs, launched a freedom of information campaign, which aimed to promote new laws to protect citizens’ right to know and access public information. Business and CSO partnerships have yet to evolve to any significant level, although there are several cordial working relationships, as between TANGO and the Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

CSOs enjoyed favorable media coverage in 2017. The national television channel and several radio stations broadcast programs on CSOs’ work, including *The Gambia We Want* talk show on West Coast Radio, *Civil Society Hour* on Deggo FM Radio, and *Perspective and Gambia Today* current affairs shows on Gambia Radio and Television Services. Other radio stations featured talk shows with civil society leaders and activists, and newspapers published news stories about CSO activities.

Public perceptions of CSOs improved in 2017, thanks to the sector’s increased activity. The public responded positively to CSOs’ calls for protest actions and formed high expectations for CSOs’ role in formulating policies and holding the government to account. At the same time, CSOs were criticized for their toothless behavior under the previous regime, especially their silence and seeming indifference to human rights abuses, corruption, and abuses of power.
In contrast to the previous administration, the new government as well as the private sector had highly positive views of CSOs in 2017. Various government statements attest to this new view, including expressions of appreciation for CSOs’ work by the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, and sports, which were shared when CSOs leaders paid courtesy calls on them in 2017. Mobile phone companies, banks, real estate developers, and other companies sought to engage with CSOs during the year, mainly to expand their client base, although they sometimes provided resources on an ad hoc basis.

CSOs operate social media outlets and buy radio airtime for talk shows to showcase their work. They usually invite journalists to attend and cover their events. Many CSOs host websites and produce banners, t-shirts, and brochures to promote their images or increase understanding of their areas of interest. Some CSOs issue quarterly newsletters, which are shared widely.

Individual organizations, including Peace Ambassadors—The Gambia, West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP)—The Gambia, and EFAnet, have statements of values, principles, and standards in their constitutions or policy manuals. Some networks, such as CAP and NGBV, have codes of conduct or ethics, which their members largely respect. Many larger, well-endowed organizations have financial and procurement manuals and asset registers to further strengthen accountability, and they usually share their annual and financial reports with partners and beneficiaries.
In 2017 Ghana once again demonstrated its commitment to the consolidation of democratic governance. Following successful presidential and parliamentary elections in late 2016, the year began with the transfer of power from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). This was the third time that the country had witnessed a smooth transfer of power since returning to democratic rule in 1992. The new government initiated far-reaching policy reforms to promote decentralization, including a decision to allow metropolitan municipal and district chief executives to be elected rather than appointed by the president. The government also brought up the long-languishing Right to Information Bill for consideration by parliament. Another positive development was the introduction of free secondary school for all students, which the new president had promised during his campaign.

Reversing the economic turmoil of 2016, the year 2017 recorded marked improvement in Ghana’s macroeconomic stability. Overall public debt decreased, and several marginal increases in fuel prices did not cause huge inflationary pressures, as in previous years. The new government agreed with the Extended Credit Facility of the International Monetary Fund to prolong its arrangement until 2019, which should further strengthen the Ghanaian economy. By the end of the year, the Ghana Statistical Services estimated GDP growth at 8.5 percent, compared to 3.7 percent in 2016. The labor unrest of the previous year died down, although trainee nurses protested to demand that the new government fulfill its election promise to give them jobs and restore their training allowances.

Several developments marred Ghana’s positive trajectory in 2017. An internal dispute at the Electoral Commission rendered it unable to carry out activities, such as the registration of first-time voters, meetings with political parties, and, importantly, meetings of its own commissioners. Vigilante groups aligned with the NPP attacked some state and non-state institutions. Their attacks included the invasion of a high court in Kumasi to free members who were standing trial, the destruction of state property, the manhandling of the president’s Ashanti regional security coordinator, and the forced closure of national health insurance offices. Corruption, which had been a major election issue, continued to dominate public discussion in 2017, and allegations of malfeasance were leveled against officials of both the previous and new governments.
Among the most serious cases were accusations of bribery and corruption during the vetting of a candidate for a ministerial position and in the sale of contaminated fuel. For many citizens, the high rate of armed robbery remained an urgent concern.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2017. Service provision improved as several organizations pursued new initiatives to promote better service delivery in the health sector. Advocacy CSOs engaged effectively with the new government and contributed to the establishment of a Ministry on Sanitation and Water Resources and a nationwide ban on illegal mining. CSOs’ legal environment and public image remained favorable, and their organizational capacity and the sectoral infrastructure were stable. As in previous years, CSOs’ financial viability remained the weakest dimension of CSO sustainability.

Data from the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) indicates that by the end of 2017, a total of 7,851 organizations were registered, representing an increase of 15 percent over 2016. Many of the new registrations probably reflect the DSW’s effort to alert organizations of the need to formalize their activities to comply with anti-money laundering laws. During the year, 3,813 registered organizations renewed their operating permits with the DSW.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

The legal environment for Ghanaian CSOs remained favorable in 2017. CSOs continued to register as not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) limited by guarantee under the Company Code of 1963 (Act 179). Registration continued to be fairly easy, with organizations registering first with the Registrar General’s Department and then with the DSW, which has oversight responsibility for NPOs. The registration process clearly stipulates the objectives for which CSOs may be established. There was no attempt to create a separate law for CSOs during the year.

CSOs operate freely and are able to debate, oppose, and offer constructive criticism of government policies without fear of clampdowns. In 2017 the tolerant atmosphere contributed to the emergence of new CSOs throughout the country. The government usually does not harass CSOs, although the DSW requests that NPOs renew their operating certificates annually to comply with regulations and clamps down on organizations that operate illegally. Several CSOs that failed to honor statutory tax obligations, such as payment of workers’ social security benefits and withholding taxes, were taken to court in 2017.

CSOs are eligible for tax exemptions as long as they submit the required documentation and have renewed operating permits. However, many organizations do not take advantage of this opportunity, since it involves compliance with rules of operation that most CSOs, especially smaller organizations, do not observe. Grants and other funds received by CSOs are non-taxable, but CSOs are required to pay other statutory taxes, such as pay-as-you-earn and social security taxes for employees and indirect taxes on goods and services.

CSOs may earn income through the provision of services. They may also compete for government contracts, which mostly go to large urban CSOs for consultancy services in areas such as research and policymaking and to smaller service-providing organizations for construction and other infrastructure development.

Since there is no CSO-specific law in Ghana, no lawyers specialize in CSO issues. CSOs use the services of general legal practitioners and specialists in company law. Urban organizations are more likely than rural CSOs to be able to afford the cost of legal services.
CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2017. CSOs continued to have targeted beneficiaries who serve as their core constituencies, and their activities were largely driven by the issues and needs of their constituencies and the communities in which they work. For instance, before and after the 2016 elections, corruption in public life was a concern for many people, and CSOs addressing this problem received widespread support. Similarly, in some farming communities CSOs were at the forefront of pushing the government to confront illegal mining, since it contributed to the loss of farmlands and livelihoods for rural dwellers.

CSOs usually have clearly stated mission and vision statements to guide their activities. Strategic plans have become a major donor requirement. For example, grantees of the country’s main funding mechanism, Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR–Ghana), are usually well-established urban organizations with strategic plans. Most smaller organizations do not have the capacity to develop or implement rigorous strategic plans.

Large urban CSOs have strong internal management structures, and their boards of directors provide the kind of oversight that is expected with good corporate governance. Smaller and rural CSOs usually have weak boards that do not perform in line with best practices. Overall, the decisions made by CSO boards are mainly for internal use by management and staff rather than for public information. Their activities usually focus on reviewing projects and annual work plans, fundraising, communications, and image branding.

The ability of CSOs to maintain permanent staff continues to be a major challenge for both small and large organizations. CSOs prefer to hire professional staff, and large and sometimes medium-sized organizations have information technology and financial specialists. However, because most available funding is short term and project based, organizations find it increasingly difficult to attract and retain quality staff. As a result, staff turnover at all types of organizations is high. CSOs tend to use interns and volunteers as support staff to provide routine administrative and project support, usually on a short-term basis.

Most CSOs have modern equipment, such as computers, printers, and scanners. Urban organizations often operate from well-furnished offices, while rural organizations tend to have small offices with limited furnishings. Internet access is not a problem in most urban areas and some rural communities.

The financial viability of CSOs in Ghana continues to be the weakest dimension of sustainability. Funding is difficult to access, and nearly all CSOs look for multiple sources of funding, including untapped local sources. Most available funding supports short-term activities only. In 2017, as in most post-election years, donor funding for CSOs fell as election-related projects ended. In addition, donors were hesitant to offer new funding during the long period of political transition, as there was lack of clarity on government policies. CSOs that did not secure funds in advance of the post-election period endured a financial drought and had to intensify their efforts to raise funds for new projects. Generally, funding for CSOs' projects ranged from small grants of $1,000 to $30,000 to larger grants of $200,000 to $500,000. The small grants were usually for projects of one to six months’ duration while the larger grants were for multi-year projects.

CSOs in Ghana remain dependent on foreign funding. STAR–Ghana awards grants financed by pooled funds from the European Union, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and Danish International Development
Agency. Other donors include USAID, Oxfam IBIS, United Nations, World Bank, Australian Aid, Netherlands Development Organization, and the Canadian government. Their funding supports a wide range of sectors, including health, education, water and sanitation, governance, and anti-corruption.

There is no clear policy to encourage local support for the CSO sector, and local sources of philanthropy are limited. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs are slowly evolving, with telecommunications companies and banks taking the lead. Their programs usually offer only small amounts of funding for projects in areas that the businesses choose, typically with a promotional and branding purpose. For instance, the telecommunications companies MTN, Vodafone, and Tigo operate CSR projects in health, education, and water provision, but their grants are usually small compared to those offered by STAR−Ghana.

CSOs’ fundraising efforts are usually focused on foreign sources of support rather than local communities. CSOs are rarely able to secure substantial financial support from their constituencies, which are often poor or marginalized. However, they sometimes provide in-kind support. For example, under the USAID WASH for Health project implemented by Global Communities, poor households receive free latrine components and provide labor to dig the pits and materials to build the structures around them. Except for CSOs that provide services, CSOs do not commonly earn much income from their activities. Urban research and advocacy organizations often find it difficult to generate funding, since most communities do not have the financial resources to pay for the cost of research. Regional associations and membership organizations such as the Local Governance Network are also not very successful at raising funds, since interest in network-based activities is dwindling. Social enterprises are not common, although there are a few at the local level. Online fundraising and crowd sourcing have not gained ground in Ghana and are not often utilized by CSOs.

Most CSOs have sound financial management practices and are transparent to the extent required by law. For example, most CSOs file annual tax returns. Organizations that receive grants from donors are expected to have good financial systems and provide financial reports. Community-based organizations and groups working at the grassroots level have less stringent financial management systems. Both large and small CSOs increasingly conduct regular audits.

## ADVOCACY: 3.5

Advocacy is the strongest dimension of sustainability for Ghanaian CSOs. The government generally recognizes the contributions of advocacy CSOs and engages with them at all levels. For instance, the new president met with CSO leaders twice in 2017 to discuss his policy proposals and the role that CSOs could play. The meeting gave CSOs the opportunity to outline their policy priorities, the most important of which was passage of the Right to Information Bill, which was finally approved by the cabinet in 2018. Advocacy activities by CSOs in the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sector contributed to the establishment of the new Ministry on Sanitation and Water Resources in 2017. The Alliance for WASH Advocacy, a coalition of CSOs and CSO networks,
called on the minister to establish a sanitation fund. Other advocacy CSOs similarly engaged sector ministers on issues of specific concern. The CSO Platform on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) successfully lobbied the government to include some of its members in the national technical team for SDG implementation. At the local level, several newly elected officials met with CSOs to discuss collaboration. CSOs continued to participate in the government's budgeting process at all levels.

Broad-based advocacy coalitions were also active in 2017. In response to a public outcry over water pollution and the destruction of the environment by illegal mining, a media-led coalition of CSOs organized public forums and awareness-raising activities to successfully mobilize public support. A CSO coalition composed of Wass Association of Communities Affected by Mining, Center For Public Interest Law, ClientEarth, Tropenbous, and several other organizations also emerged to protest the damaging activities. The campaign was one of the year's major advocacy efforts, and it elicited a swift response from the government, which imposed a nationwide ban on illegal mining and established a joint police and military task force to arrest perpetrators. The Ghana Integrity Initiative, Center for Democratic Development (CDD)–Ghana, and Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition led a campaign focused on allegations of possible bribery involving members of parliament and the National Lotteries Authority. CSOs also investigated cases of alleged public corruption involving bulk oil storage, a software scandal at the Social Security and National Insurance Trust, and inflated contracts for waste management. As a result of these advocacy activities, the government was compelled to set up committees to investigate the allegations. In the post-election phase, as militant supporters of the new government engaged in lawless activities, CSOs across all sectors called on government to stop them. Organizations such as People's Dialogue, Ghana Federation of the Urban Poor, and Ghana Homeless Federation emerged as strong advocates for the poor and vulnerable in slum communities, especially in Accra. Some advocacy organizations became inactive because they did not have funded projects during the year. For instance, organizations that had received STAR-Ghana funding for elections, including the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Foundation for Sustainable Development in Africa, and United Civil Society Organizations for National Development, did not receive funding for activities beyond the first quarter of 2017, when their elections projects ended.

Lobbying is not a well-understood concept in Ghana, mainly because it is not well defined in the law and can easily be interpreted as bribery. In 2017 CSOs in the anti-corruption sector reviewed and successfully campaigned for passage of the Office of Special Prosecutor Bill, which established a government office to investigate public and private-sector corruption.

During the year there was no effort by CSOs to campaign for the reform of laws and regulations governing the sector.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

Ghanaian CSOs' service provision improved modestly in 2017. CSOs continued to provide services in diverse areas, including education, health, youth, women, people with disabilities, governance, water and sanitation, human rights, and the environment. Two major new initiatives emerged as CSOs responded to community needs in 2017. Hope for Future Generation, Society for Women and AIDS in Africa, Cliegold, West Africa AIDS Foundation, and other organizations spearheaded the establishment of a non-state actors charter to support the development of a sustainable and quality healthcare system. In addition, BasicNeeds–Ghana initiated a program on mental health targeting 800 traditional healers and prayer camp managers with training on best practices in
managing mental illness, which is a major challenge for the public healthcare system. These initiatives illustrate the ways in which new initiatives from CSOs promoted better service delivery in the health sector.

In 2017 CSOs continued to provide goods and services to recipients beyond their memberships. For example, research publications are usually produced as tools for sensitization and distributed free of charge. In 2017 Social Enterprise Development (SEND) Ghana produced a report on the implementation of the government’s free school uniform program, and the Imani Center for Policy and Education reported on national health insurance reform and the new government’s first year in office. CSOs do not discriminate in their operations, although their activities have targeted or defined beneficiaries.

CSOs do not typically charge fees for their activities, and in general cost recovery is limited. A small proportion of CSOs are able to recover some of their costs. For instance, CSOs providing environmental sanitation services as part of the Community-Led Total Sanitation Program, which is funded by international CSOs and agencies, including the World Bank, the Nordic Development Fund, and World Vision, charge households a percentage of the cost of latrines before they are constructed.

The government recognizes the role of CSOs in supporting service delivery across all sectors. For instance, based on SEND Ghana’s monitoring of the benefits of free uniforms for school children, the government instructed local authorities to ensure that communities participated in the production of the uniforms in 2017. In addition, the government charged the Ghana Education Service with developing guidelines for implementing the program throughout the country.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

The infrastructure supporting CSOs did not change in 2017. The West Africa Civil Society Institute is the most important resource center offering capacity-building training to local CSOs. The center earns some revenue from fees paid by participants and receives foreign funding to support its operations. The Accra-based African Women’s Development Fund operates a resource center for CSOs focused on gender issues. Most CSOs outside of Accra do not have access to resource centers and depend on their networks for information.

STAR–Ghana is the most important local grantmaking organization in the country. In 2017 STAR–Ghana issued calls for proposals for projects involving anti-corruption and women’s and gender issues. STAR–Ghana awarded grants totaling more than GHS 9.5 million (approximately $2 million) to twenty-three organizations, including Human Rights Advocacy Center, Basic Needs, International Federation of Women Lawyers, Network for Women’s Rights in Ghana, and Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition. Their projects focused on such topics as gender-based violence, the rights of the mentally disabled, and women’s right to access land. STAR–Ghana also continued to provide strategic capacity building to its grantees. Oxfam IBIS provided grants to CSO partners in specific locations, particularly the northern part of the country, for advocacy activities promoting citizen participation in local governance.

Coalitions promoting the interests of the CSO sector remain weak. Because of the competitive funding situation, information sharing and cooperation among CSOs is not well developed or institutionalized. The absence of a national platform for CSOs makes it difficult for them to work together, and there is little long-term funding allocated for coalition activities. An exception is sectoral coalitions, such as those working on anti-corruption and women’s rights, which strive to speak with one voice and therefore engage to some degree in information sharing and coordination. For instance, the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition mobilizes CSOs in
the education sector and represents them during the national education sector annual review meetings with the government.

A few organizations offer training to CSOs on proposal writing, project and financial management, fund raising, monitoring and evaluation, and similar topics. In addition to the West Africa Civil Society Institute, public and private tertiary institutions, such as the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Adult Education Center at the University of Ghana–Legon, and Participatory Development Associates, offer training, usually for a fee. Training materials are not available in local languages.

CSOs have good partnerships with the government and media, which allow them to make many contributions to shaping public discourse on various topics. For instance, in 2017 Reach for Change collaborated with the Ministry of Finance to organize a dialogue with twenty organizations on ways in which CSR programs could drive achievement of the SDGs. Cooperation with the media in 2017 included live broadcasts of a major annual lecture on accountable government organized by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and a lecture by the president of Switzerland. CSO-private sector partnerships are not strong.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0

CSOs’ public image did not change in 2017. Their activities continued to be well publicized in the media, and the coverage was usually positive. For instance, CDD organized major public policy dialogues and roundtable discussions that were covered by live radio broadcasts. Media Foundation for West Africa was featured in live broadcasts on radio and TV. Smaller organizations outside of Accra usually garner less coverage because their activities are not regarded as major news events.

Public perceptions of CSOs remained positive at both the national and local levels in 2017. On the national level, CSOs are generally well received as advocates for communities and a check on the government. At the grassroots level, CSOs are mainly understood as offering philanthropic support to communities that lack local funding. The government’s view of CSOs is also positive, especially as it recognizes the important role of CSOs in shaping and implementing its policy decisions. The business sector has a positive view of the work of CSOs, but the two sides have not been able to establish a sustained and mutually beneficial relationship.

Most CSOs publicize their activities through both mainstream and social media. Larger and urban CSOs, such as IDEG, CDD, and the Africa Center for Energy Policy, have good working relationships with individual journalists, which ensures regular coverage of their work. They tend also to have public relations and communications units to support their branding, promotional, and social media activities. Most small and rural CSOs do not have websites.

There is still a vacuum when it comes to a code of ethics for Ghanaian CSOs. Since the Ghana Association of Private Voluntary Organizations in Development wound down some years ago, attempts to form a CSO platform that could coordinate and monitor members’ activities have not been successful. The publication of annual reports remains mostly limited to urban and large CSOs, although smaller organizations are starting to produce them as well.
In late 2016 a dialogue between the president’s office and the opposition in Guinea resulted in agreements to hold municipal and community elections, revise the municipal and election codes, and compensate victims of the 2013 violence, including members of the Organized Group of Businessmen and Union of Free Radio and Television of Guinea. However, in 2017 the social climate deteriorated as plans to hold local elections, which had not taken place since 2005, were delayed until early 2018. The postponement spurred peaceful marches, divisions in the opposition, and replacement of the chair of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), the entity responsible for organizing elections. Other decisions from the dialogue, including revisions of the election and municipal codes, were implemented. Although some political parties criticized provisions of the election code that cover methods for selecting neighborhood and district officials, the codes were approved by the National Assembly and promulgated by the president. Civil society participated effectively in the dialogue and legal reforms. In preparation for the 2018 local elections, the National Council of Civil Society Organizations of Guinea (CNOSCG) advocated for compliance with the 30 percent quota for women candidates for municipal elections, both by reaching out directly to political parties and organizing public awareness campaigns.

Overall CSO sustainability improved in 2017, with positive developments noted in all dimensions. In 2017 the European Union (EU)’s Civil Society Support Program (PASOC) continued to strengthen CSOs’ organizational structures and relationships with beneficiaries. Civil society participated in numerous political dialogues during the year about topics such as the National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES), the post-Ebola re-launch strategy, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, many advocacy CSO platforms were, rightly or wrongly, accused of partisanship, which dramatically reduced their potential for success in influencing decision making and helping design and implement public policies.

According to PASOC, which counted and categorized all of Guinea’s CSOs in 2017, there were 1,014 CSOs in the country, including: 941 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 5 labor unions, 2 CSO collectives, 4 CSO forums, 11 federations, 12 platforms, and 39 networks. Most organizations are located in the capital city of Conakry. CSOs work in many socio-economic areas, including human rights, environmental protection, local development, education, health, and democratic governance.
Legal Environment: 5.2

The legal environment for CSOs improved slightly in 2017. Although the laws that govern CSOs did not change, CSOs were able to operate more openly and the registration process improved somewhat.

Guinea’s constitution and laws guarantee the freedom of association and expression. CSOs are governed by Law L/2005/013/AN on NGOs and labor unions, Law L/2005/14/AN on associations and cooperatives, and the Labor Code.

With the exception of unions, CSOs must be approved either by a ministerial decree or, at the local level, by governors and prefects before they can operate. These decrees are valid for three years and can be renewed by filing activity reports and paying a fee. All domestic CSOs are subject to the same registration requirements: they must submit an application along with certain documents such as their bylaws and internal regulations, as well as minutes from their general assembly meeting. These requirements do not apply to international CSOs, which must sign founding agreements with the government. The office of the Service for the Regulation and Promotion of NGOs and Association Movements (SERPROMA) in the Ministry of Administration and Territorial Decentralization (MATD), governors, and prefects are responsible for issuing acknowledgements of receipt, which are valid for six months as provisional legal documents and may be renewed one time. As MATD is generally delayed in approving registration requests, there is some flexibility in applying these laws. For example, CNOSCG and the Convergence of Youth for Peace and Democracy both worked with acknowledgements of receipt that were renewed for three years before registration requests were approved. The process of obtaining legal status for CSOs improved somewhat in 2017, with applications being processed more quickly than in the previous year.

CSOs’ activities are not limited in scope. CSOs’ purposes are determined in their legal documents, including bylaws, internal regulations, and legal authorizations. Article 11 of Law L/2005/013/AN requires CSOs to submit activity reports, budgets, accounting statements, and financial reports to MATD on an annual basis. To date no penalties have been imposed on CSOs that did not file reports.

CSOs have the right to legal recourse and may dispute government decisions that go against applicable laws. In general, CSOs in Guinea function freely, although organizations that do not comply with the law are subject to sanctions, including the suspension or cancellation of their approval decrees. CSOs are able to organize and participate in public debates. No CSO was harassed because of its advocacy or other activities in 2017, and no CSO was dissolved for political or arbitrary reasons.

Article 10 of the constitution guarantees the right to assembly, but this right is often restricted in practice. Assemblies held without prior notification, a requirement under Guinean law, are considered unauthorized and are often violently dispersed. The law permits local authorities to cancel a demonstration or meeting if they believe it poses a threat to public order. Authorities may also hold event organizers criminally liable if violence or destruction of property ensues. In 2017, however, CSOs generally were not subject to restrictions to their freedom of assembly. For example, CNOSCG organized a peace caravan in the capital with no interference from the authorities.

Article 30 of Law L/2005/013/AN grants tax exemptions, such as on customs taxes on imported goods and equipment, and other tax advantages to CSOs based on their stated activities. Grants from financial partners are tax exempt. Corporations donating to CSOs benefit from tax deductions with government approval.

Cooperatives and economic interest groups that earn profits may earn income from their services, but organizations registered under Law L/2005/013/AN cannot. CSOs may apply for contracts with the central and local government if they meet the criteria stated in the calls for bids.
CSOs are authorized to conduct fundraising campaigns for victims of natural disaster; the poor; and other disadvantaged persons, and may receive donor funding without restrictions on focus areas, as long as they respect the contract’s clauses and the country’s laws.

National organizations of attorneys, such as The Same Rights For All, give competent legal advice to CSOs. These attorneys are generally based in the capital but work at the local level when needed. There was no documented case in which CSOs needed attorneys in 2017.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7**

The organizational capacity of CSOs improved in 2017 as a result of capacity-building projects and programs supported by technical and financial partners. In particular, PASOC, a large-scale, EU-funded program that seeks to strengthen CSOs’ participation in public life in Guinea, helped CSOs implement activities and strengthen their organizational structures, relationships with beneficiaries, planning capabilities, and ability to mobilize funds.

Most CSOs use participatory community processes to identify projects and form partnerships with their target groups and potential beneficiaries. For many CSOs, these initiatives are made possible with funding from technical and financial partners.

The vast majority of CSOs define their missions clearly in legal documents, including their bylaws and internal regulations. Some CSOs use strategic planning to aid in their decision making and they may develop multi-year strategic plans. These plans generally include monitoring and evaluation and sustainability mechanisms, with objectively verifiable indicators to measure success. For example, organizations such as the African Training Center for Development (CENAFOD), the Alliance for the Promotion of Governance and Local Initiatives (AGIL), and the Friends of the World Club all developed strategic plans in 2017. The implementation of strategic plans depends on the availability of donor funding.

The laws specify CSO governance bodies, including the general assembly, board of directors, and auditor. CSOs themselves determine how these entities operate within the framework of their internal regulations and organizational structures. CSOs that work with international institutions are subject to audits and periodic evaluations, backed up by contractually required reports and auditors’ recommendations to improve their operations. Many CSOs have administrative and accounting manuals that clearly define rules for managing staff and accounts. However, CSOs rarely have processes to manage conflicts of interest.

Very few CSOs are able to maintain permanent paid staff from one year to the next. Exceptions include CENAFOD, Coalition of Girls and Women of Guinea (COFFIG), National Coalition of Guinea for Women’s Rights and Citizenship, and Guinean Association of Independent Press Publishers, which have well-established human resource structures and funding.

Although organizations that receive international funding are able to apply some of their funding to professional development, most CSOs do not have sufficient funds for professional development of their staff. Reliance on volunteers and interns is limited since they are not generally available.

Foreign CSOs and large CSOs with steady funding streams have the resources to maintain well-equipped offices while others struggle to cover the costs of office space. CSOs purchase office equipment through projects funded by technical and financial partners; very few CSOs can afford to upgrade their office equipment with their own financial resources. Mobile phones, computers, and Internet access are now within reach of most CSOs.
In some cases, organizations rely on equipment such as smart phones that belongs to individuals rather than the CSOs. CSOs use social media tools such as Facebook, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, and Snapchat to facilitate their activities. Bloggers’ organizations, such as the Guinean Bloggers’ Association, have also emerged.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

Guinean CSOs’ financial viability improved slightly in 2017. With the end of the Ebola epidemic, 2017 saw the progressive return of funding for projects such as PASOC and the National Program of Communes of Convergence (PNACC), which is funded by the government and UNICEF.

Guinean CSOs do not have their own sustainable sources of funding. Nearly all of their funding comes through projects supported by bilateral or multilateral development agencies. CSOs receive limited support directly from foreign donors. Instead, donors tend to fund international organizations with offices in Guinea, such as Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Amplify Change, National Democratic Institute, and RTI International, which in turn fund local CSOs. Funded projects can have a regional or national scope.

CSOs do not receive grant support from the Guinean government, but the government signs some service contracts with CSOs. For example, in 2017 some local CSOs won government contracts under the government’s road safety awareness program and program to clean drainage ditches and public spaces. The government also funded educational programs during its citizenship week organized by the Ministry of National Unity and Citizenship.

Donations from local foundations and individuals are very rare. Among the few foundations that give grants to CSOs are the Kerfalla Perkins Camara Foundation (a local foundation), Rio Tinto Foundation (an international foundation that works in mining areas), Orange Foundation (the international telephone company’s foundation), Foundation to Promote Maternal and Child Health (founded by First Lady Djènè Condé Kaba), Karamba Diaby Foundation, and Hirondelle Foundation. In April 2017 the Ministry of Mining issued a policy letter covering corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the mining sector, which requires mining companies to undertake certain social activities to benefit local populations through certain CSOs.

Municipalities that need to build infrastructure are often supported by associations of people from those municipalities that raise funds for such projects, often focused on the Guinean diaspora. CSOs infrequently use new technologies to raise funds.

Some CSOs raise small amounts of money by selling services and products. For example, in 2017 the Tinkisso-Antenna acquired a license to market chlorine and hygiene products to stop water-related diseases, and the Cooperative for the Production of Shea and Honey (COPROCAM) in Dabola raised small amounts by selling natural products from honey and shea butter.

When CSOs receive funds through grants and contracts, they are subject to rigorous oversight and capacity building by their donors, including audits, narrative and financial reports, and institutional processes to improve CSOs’ internal performance. Some CSOs have strengthened their financial management systems through capacity-building activities and have put into place internal monitoring and oversight methods, as well as administrative and financial procedural manuals. For example, PASOC supported the efforts of organizations such as COFFIG and the National Council for CSOs for Democracy and Development in Guinea (CNOSC/DDG) to develop their administrative and financial management procedures manuals.
ADVOCACY: 5.0

CSO advocacy improved in 2017 as many CSOs participated in processes to reform and revise Guinea’s laws, including the decentralized municipal code and the electoral code.

CSOs have access to formal mechanisms to cooperate and communicate with national and local decision makers. National and local government entities acknowledge the value that CSOs add by inviting them to participate in commissions and other decision-making entities seeking to find solutions to issues of public interest. For example, the 2017 local municipal code states that civil society must participate in four municipal council sessions each year. In addition, CNOSCG has been a member of the commission for dialogue between the president’s office and the opposition since 2016. Civil society is also a member of the national commission responsible for EITI through the NGO Publish What You Pay. CSO representatives on these bodies are usually appointed by the government based on suggestions from grassroots entities.

Individual CSOs and CSO coalitions conduct advocacy campaigns to influence public debate, public opinion, and legislation, with mixed results. For example, in 2017 CNOSCG organized an educational and advocacy campaign to speed up municipal and community elections; the campaign was aimed at the government, members of the National Assembly, and political parties. Within the framework of the Health for All project, several CSOs, including the Guinean Medical Fraternity and Network of Mutuals of Fouta Djalon, led advocacy efforts to expand health insurance coverage and access to health services.

The concept of lobbying is not new to Guinean CSOs. Most CSOs in coalitions or platforms engage in lobbying work focused on clear, specific topics aimed at improving or rethinking a social situation. In 2017 CSOs intensively lobbied the National Assembly about the municipal and election codes. For example, the Guinean Association for Transparency lobbied for the reform of Article 109 of the election code, which governs the eligibility of independent candidates to run in national, local, and legislative elections. While independent candidates were allowed at the local level, they are still not eligible to run in the national elections.

The broader CSO community is largely unaware of the importance of a favorable legal and regulatory framework to improving CSOs’ effectiveness and sustainability.

SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

CSO service provision improved in 2017 thanks to an increase in donor funding.

CSOs provide services throughout the country in a wide range of areas, including health, education, water and sanitation, the environment, child protection, human rights, governance, agriculture, animal herding, gender equality, and conflict prevention and management. In all regions, CSOs work to empower women and vulnerable groups and create income-generating activities. There is a general discomfort and uneasiness surrounding discussions of sexual orientation in Guinea, both in public and in private, and CSOs generally avoid the issue. However, some CSOs address female genital mutilation and sexually transmitted diseases.

CSOs respond to community needs and problems, which they generally identify through participatory and inclusive processes involving the beneficiaries. CSOs also refer to local development plans and the PNDES to identify community needs. CSOs then prepare projects according to these needs and carry them out in a participatory manner; using internal and external evaluations to identify CSOs’ and beneficiaries’ contributions.
This leads to regional differentiations in service delivery. For example, in Maritime Guinea there is a dire need for services related to human development areas such as education, and therefore there are more CSO services in these areas. In Middle Guinea and Forested Guinea, the Federation of Farmers in Fouta Djallon and the Guinean Center for Entrepreneurship support improved living conditions for farmers and their families by strengthening the autonomy of family farms with support from the EU. Discrimination of any type is formally prohibited in the provision of services.

CSOs have access to funding through service contracts. Guinea’s laws on CSOs allow them to enter into partnership agreements with institutions, government entities, or other development partners. The increase in such partnerships for service delivery in 2017 was due mainly to CSOs’ intensive responses to calls for bids and the increase in donor funding opportunities. In 2017, for example, OSIWA issued a call for bids on civic education, and UNICEF issued a call for bids focused on community health services.

At the national and local levels, CSOs form productive partnerships with government entities, specifically focused on setting up and implementing projects, providing assistance, and monitoring and evaluating performance. However, while the government is aware of the role of CSOs in delivering basic social services, state agencies view CSOs as competitors when it comes to implementing foreign donor-funded projects. As a requirement imposed by financial donors, CSOs are often included in large-scale projects such as those funded by the World Bank. For example, in 2017 the World Bank Group partnered with MATD and local CSOs on the Third Village Community Support Project to strengthen the local government financing systems and improve service delivery in rural communes. The project included capacity building for sustainable local governance and community participation.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.5**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs’ work in Guinea improved slightly in 2017.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers serving CSO are now within reach of the majority of CSOs in large and medium-size cities in Guinea. Resource centers aimed at CSOs include the Local Information Center, Community Center for Development and Education, Center for Youth Understanding and Counseling, Community Center for Reading and Awareness, and Civic and Electoral Education Center. ISOs and resource centers sometimes charge for services such as photocopying, phone cards, book rental, and Internet access. Centers struggle to meet the needs of local CSOs because of the volatility of their funding sources.

Grassroots CSOs at the local level have trouble accessing support entities and resource centers, most of which are based in the capital and in second-tier cities. In part because of a scarcity of resources, ISOs generally do not provide grants from locally raised funds or re-grant international donor funds.
CSOs have many opportunities to share information through forums, presentations, and meetings. Platforms that defend CSOs’ interests include CNOSCG, National Platform of Citizens United for Development, National CSO Support Coalition, and CNOSC/DDG. These platforms provide frameworks for member CSOs to cooperate, discuss topics related to common goals, and find solutions. CSOs’ use of phones, the Internet, and computer-based tools has facilitated this development.

In 2017 training opportunities for CSOs focused on topics ranging from resource mobilization to project design and management. The EU’s PASOC project continued to provide technical assistance to strengthen CSOs’ internal management capacities, their cooperation with each other and with other sectors, and their role in local governance and social accountability. Certified and qualified trainers work at the national and local levels and have documented expertise in a wide range of areas. In rare cases, outside experts are hired for specific trainings, and technical and financial partners sometimes bring in experienced consultants for high-level trainings. Paying for these trainers remains a challenge for local and even national CSOs.

Several CSOs worked in partnerships with the government and the private sector in 2017. For example, the Friends of the World Club worked in partnership with the Guinea Bauxite Corporation and Global Alumina Corporation to improve transparency in the mining sector. AGIL cooperated with the Expanded Program on Immunization under the Ministry of Health to improve routine immunization.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.7

The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2017 thanks to increased media coverage of their work. CSOs and foreign technical and financial partners have made a concerted effort to increase the visibility of community-focused actions through media coverage. For example, the Coalition of Non-State Actors in Guinea (CANEG) received media coverage of the education and awareness activities about local governance and peace in 2017.

However, media coverage is rarely free, and CSOs have to pay to ensure coverage. CSOs are able to get media coverage at the national and local levels and in both public and private media. The media generally provide positive analysis of CSOs’ role in national development.

The public has a positive view of CSOs’ role in communities and their participation in the local development process. Guinean CSOs have proven their legitimacy by delivering services in areas often neglected by public authorities, primarily those related to social development and citizen empowerment. CSOs continued to visibly promote their role in mitigating conflicts in Guinea.

The government and the private sector generally view CSOs positively because they design and implement policies in sectors such as education, health, and the environment, as well as community projects. For example, in 2017 the government entrusted CSOs with leading a campaign to raise public awareness about road safety.

CSOs use a variety of tools, including brochures, calendars, t-shirts, posters, websites, and Facebook, to make their activities visible.

To meet the requirements of good governance, CSOs have developed tools over the past few years, such as the CSO code of ethics and CSO code of professional practice. These tools are maintained and promoted by SERPROMA, the entity responsible for overseeing NGOs and associations in Guinea. CSOs produce activity reports for their funders. Although Law L/2005/013/AN is very clear about the need to submit activity reports to the government as well, CSOs do not always comply with this requirement, and the government does not take action against CSOs that fail to submit reports.
Tense general elections accompanied by significant civil unrest marked the year 2017 in Kenya. Following polling in August, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) announced that the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, had won a second term. The opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, alleged fraud and other major violations in the electoral process and filed suit with the Supreme Court to contest the election results. Violent pro-opposition demonstrations erupted in Kisumu, Mombasa, and other opposition strongholds, and at least sixty-seven people were killed, according to Human Rights Watch. The court nullified the vote, and new elections were scheduled for October, in which Odinga declined to participate, pointing out that the IEBC had yet to reform the voting system. Kenyatta was again declared winner and was sworn in as president on November 28.

During the election period, CSOs engaged in voter education, election monitoring, and initiatives to maintain peace. Their activities focused on both national and county-level elections. New activist groups emerged that used social media effectively to mobilize the public. Overall, CSOs adopted a more confrontational approach than during past elections to holding the IEBC and the government to account. The government responded with overt hostility and increased its harassment and intimidation of CSOs during the year. Al-Shabaab attacks in Lamu and North Eastern Province in 2017 contributed to a general climate of tension and unrest, and the government closely scrutinized CSOs’ financial transactions in an effort to curb financing for terrorism.

Kenya’s economy slowed down in 2017. The country’s prolonged drought escalated food insecurity and strained hydropower resources, causing energy prices to shoot up. Business activity was subdued as credit became tighter and prolonged uncertainty surrounded the elections. Inflation reached 10 percent, its highest point in five years. For CSOs the year was difficult, and overall CSO sustainability declined. The legal environment deteriorated significantly as the government responded vigorously to CSOs’ involvement in the elections. CSOs’ service provision and sectoral infrastructure were weaker because of inadequate funding, and their public image suffered as they became caught up in the political tensions dividing the country. However, apart from the elections, advocacy CSOs worked effectively with the government, especially on the county level, and their advocacy efforts improved.
The sector’s organizational capacity was stable. Although the funding environment remained poor and forced many CSOs to deviate from their mandates in the search for funding, CSOs’ financial viability was also unchanged. According to a statement in the 2016 auditor general’s report, there were more than 10,000 registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a distinct legal form, in all of Kenya’s forty-seven counties in 2016. CSOs may also register as societies or companies limited by guarantee. More recent or extensive information about the overall number of CSOs is not available.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.4**

In 2017 the legal environment for CSOs worsened significantly. Negative profiling and state harassment of CSOs increased, especially during the elections. The government was particularly harsh in dealing with organizations engaged in electoral governance and civic voter education or that it viewed as pro-opposition if they expressed concerns about the way in which the elections were conducted.

In 2017 CSOs continued to register mainly under the NGO Coordination Act of 1990, Societies Act of 2012, or Companies Act of 2015. CSOs may also register as other forms of organizations. For example, in 2017 some groups found it preferable to register as community-based organizations (CBOs) with the Ministry of East African Community, Labor, and Social Protection, since such organizations do not need to provide the government with a list of members and are not required to prepare annual reports. Several groups based in Nairobi registered as county-level residential associations under the Nairobi City County Community and Neighborhood Association Engagement Act of 2016. In general, however, most organizations register as NGOs since they are unaware of other registration possibilities. CSOs not registered as NGOs are still subject to scrutiny and harassment by the NGO Coordination Board, the state body responsible for regulating organizations registered as NGOs. In 2017, with the elections approaching, the government more closely scrutinized CSOs seeking to register. The registration of organizations perceived as troublesome or as promoting Islamic radicalization sometimes took much longer than that of other organizations.

In 2017 little progress was made on implementing the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act, which was signed into law in 2013. The act has never been implemented, because the government has not issued a date for its commencement, despite two court orders ordering it to do so. The law would create a more enabling legal environment for NGOs by encouraging them to maintain high standards of governance and management through effective self-regulation, the establishment of an independent regulator, a more transparent registration process, and required government support to NGOs in various ways.

A number of CSOs continued to experience harassment after the elections. For example, the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited, in which the government is the majority shareholder, disconnected electricity to the Katiba Institute, thereby ensuring that the organization was unable to meet the deadline for filing a petition challenging the presidential election results. According to a 2017 report on the elections by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, security forces raided the offices of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), which fosters human rights and democratic values, and AfricoG, which monitors governance and public ethics. The government accused the organizations of defaulting on tax remittances. The NGO Board accused two other organizations contesting the elections, Kura Yangu Sauti Yangu and We the People, of having illegal bank accounts and attempted to ban their operations.
After the Supreme Court nullified the presidential election results, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the International Development Law Organization (IDLO), an intergovernmental organization that promotes the rule of law through constitutional and judicial reform, of exercising undue influence over the judiciary. The ministry suspended its host country agreement with IDLO and lobbied fourteen countries to cut ties with the organization. However, IDLO continued to operate in Kenya during the year. In addition, the government continued to scrutinize CSOs' financial transactions, mainly in an effort to curb the financing of terrorist-related activities in the face of ongoing Al-Shabaab attacks in North Eastern Province and Lamu County. CSOs were not directly targeted as a result of the government's anti-terrorist security operations.

CSOs may apply for tax exemptions by filing applications with the cabinet secretary for National Treasury through the NGO Board. However, this process requires them to open their financial records to a high level of scrutiny, which entails a heavy administrative burden and therefore deters many organizations. CSOs working in humanitarian areas such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and maternal and children's health are often able to obtain tax exemptions on imports of medicine and equipment related to their work. Donor organizations are usually granted exemptions on duties for medications, and CSOs working in the agricultural sector sometimes also obtain tax exemptions.

CSOs are able to seek legal redress in court, but most organizations lack legal capacity and do not have sufficient funding to hire lawyers. Some lawyers offer pro bono services. For example, Trust Law, a program of the Thomas Reuters Foundation, provided CSOs with free legal support about registration and human resources in 2017. Lawyers are usually careful about taking up CSO cases because of the high reputational risk to which they may be exposed.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY:** 4.0

CSOs' organizational capacity was unchanged in 2017. Constituency building improved as like-minded organizations established networks and coalitions, at times with the help of donors, to identify beneficiaries for their services and map out the government agencies responsible for relevant issues. For example, the Institute for Social Accountability (TISA) worked with residents' associations in Nairobi to mobilize citizens to undertake social accountability initiatives on environmental protection and management and budgeting. Community-Based Development Services partnered with the Constitution and Reform Education Consortium to raise the awareness of CBOs in Embu County of the PBO Act and the ways in which compliance with it could promote high standards of organizational governance, transparency, and accountability.

Established and better-organized CSOs have strategic plans defining organizational goals, missions, and objectives. However, realizing the plans can be challenging because of continuing changes in donors' priorities and funding levels. Most grants are for short-term, project-oriented work, which prevents many organizations from focusing on their institutional goals and development. In addition, in 2017 many CSOs felt pressured to undertake election-related activities, which were relatively well funded but pushed CSOs away from strategies involving other thematic areas. Some CSOs deviated from their original missions to compete for funding for non-election-related activities of interest to donors. For example, the Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI) expanded its focus to include county revenue enhancement, since little funding was available for trade issues, traditionally its main area of activity.

Although donors increasingly emphasize monitoring and evaluation as critical project components, many CSOs do not regard them as important undertakings. Results-based planning is particularly challenging for organizations engaged in policy work, since their projects are tied to policy makers' decisions and do not always manifest direct results. It is also often difficult to attribute policy-related results to the work of a single CSO, since many organizations focus on the same issues at the same time.

Internal governance structures exist in writing, but in many organizations board members do not have time to provide advice. Some board members face conflict-of-interest situations by owning consultancy firms that compete for funding with the CSOs on whose boards they sit. CSOs often have human resource and procurement manuals, but they may not adhere to them.
Staffing in CSOs is directly tied to funding. Some organizations find it difficult to maintain quality staff, because they must hire employees on a short-term basis, which leads to high turnover. Some CSOs keep staff on contract and pay them on a quarterly basis, which allows them to circumvent labor laws requiring that they hire persons working on contracts on a full-time basis after three months. Other organizations believe that so many people are desperate for jobs that they can simply replace their paid staff with lower-paid interns and volunteers. However, once they have joined organizations, many volunteers realize that their remuneration is not commensurate with the work they are expected to perform. The internal politics of leadership succession is also a frequent challenge, especially in organizations suffering from founder syndrome. Some individuals have obtained leadership positions based on friendships, even though they may not be well suited for the job.

CSOs’ digital capacities improved in 2017, as evidenced in their increased reliance on social media and web-based information dissemination. Many policy organizations used the Internet, especially social media, to communicate about their work. Service-providing organizations also used social media platforms, particularly Facebook and Twitter, to disseminate information about their services and engage with target audiences. Some donors provide CSOs with laptops to implement projects, but the equipment usually remains donors’ property and must be returned to them when the projects end.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7

CSOs’ funding difficulties persisted in 2017. Financial support for most CSOs came from the same foreign donors as in 2016, including USAID, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the Embassy of Sweden. In recent years these donors have supported many projects related to devolution, and there continued to be substantial funding for county-level activities in 2017. In addition, since 2017 was an election year, considerable funding was available for election related-activities, such as voter education. Most CSOs were able to obtain only short-term funding, which usually lasts about one year. Longer-term funding was difficult to secure, although some donors, including Diakonia and DFID, continued to support their established partners’ projects at the county level.

Philanthropic institutions and local giving provide a small but growing portion of financial support to CSOs. The Yetu Initiative, a joint project of the Aga Khan Foundation and USAID, has helped develop local philanthropy in Kenya, including by partnering with a local enterprise to offer an online platform for CSOs to raise funds. Yetu supported launch campaigns on the platform by twenty-three CSOs in 2017. By September these campaigns had resulted in more than 4,500 contributions and had leveraged more than $720,000 in online giving and documented offline giving and in-kind contributions. Funding from corporations such as Safaricom was available for CSOs working in water and education. Organizations addressing urgent community needs were able to access drugs for cancer treatment from multinational companies. CSOs offering other types of health services obtained donations from pharmaceutical companies. A few organizations, including the Kenya Community Development Foundation, were able to raise funds from both individuals and corporate donors in 2017.

Parliamentary funds to combat drug abuse were available to CSOs through the National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse. The National Government Affirmative Fund, which focuses on public education, treatment, and rehabilitation, funded the Asumbi Treatment and Rehabilitation Center in Karen and Eden Village Treatment and Rehabilitation Center in Nairobi, which operated projects in community outreach, applied research, policy and advocacy, and life skills for youth and children.
With overall donor funding scarce, organizations sought other ways to raise resources. Pambazuka News targeted membership fees, although they were difficult to collect as members increasingly questioned the benefits of membership. The Kenya Alliance of Residents Association charged both members and non-members to attend its forums and roundtables. Other CSOs explored new and innovative ways of raising additional resources. For example, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) pursued a business model focused on consultancies, and EcoNews Africa adopted a strategy of relying on service contracts. CSOs are legally required to hire audit firms to undertake independent financial audits. Organizations registered under the NGO Act must submit annual financial statements to the NGO Board. In response to donor requests, many organizations, including IEA, TI, KHRC, Institute of Public Finance, ActionAid Kenya, and Oxfam International, are developing more rigorous financial management systems and adhering more conscientiously to procurement procedures and financial reporting requirements.

**ADVOCACY 3.1**

Although the relationship between CSOs and the national government was tense in 2017, overall CSO advocacy improved in areas unrelated to the elections, such as health and education. As the process of county-level government decision making improved in 2017, the lines of communication between the government and CSOs were also, on average, more effective. Moreover, CSOs working on county-level policy issues became more professional in their approach and had a better understanding of the technical aspects of policy formulation and dialogue. For example, CSOs in Elgeyo Marakwet County, which was selected to take part in the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2016, engaged with the county government more easily after a county complaints and compliments committee composed of senior government officials and CSO representatives was established in 2017. TISA competently represented CSOs in the Nairobi County Budget and Economic Forum, which discusses the county budget and other economic issues. IEA, Center for Transformational Leadership, and Center for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance developed a citizen report card on service delivery in youth polytechnic schools in Nakuru County. They shared their findings and policy recommendations with government officials, who took up a number of the recommendations. Transparency International (TI) Kenya continued to participate in the budgeting process at the county level. CSO-government relations tend to be largely informal.

Several CSO advocacy efforts focused on the elections in 2017. The former chairman of the Law Society of Kenya sued the government for publicizing its achievements under the hashtags #GoKDelivers and #JubileeDelivers, arguing that the government misused public resources to campaign for the Jubilee Party. This effort resulted in a permanent injunction on advertising by the government during the election period. The Katiba Institute litigated effectively to have sections of the Elections Act and County Governments Act, which set stringent requirements on the recall of members of parliament and county assemblies, declared unconstitutional. The Katiba Institute also filed a related case to learn the number and cost of the government’s advertisements, but the case was unsuccessful. Kura Yangu Sauti Yangu organized street demonstrations to petition the director of public prosecution to investigate the improper conduct of IEBC officials, and TI organized an integrity walk against corruption. The Wanjiku Revolution movement castigated the police for bias in dealing with election-related security issues and campaigned against police brutality, corruption, and electoral injustice on social media. Numerous bloggers took to social media to criticize the government and the Jubilee Party on election-related matters, which led to the arrest or harassment of several individuals.
In other advocacy activity in 2017, the Grassroots Development Initiatives Foundation—Kenya (GRADIF−K) implemented projects to promote citizens’ engagement in community development projects and the management of public expenditures in Central, Eastern, Rift Valley, and Coast regions. Oxfam International engaged in research and advocacy to strengthen county governments’ own-source revenue enhancement. The initiative included a strong communications component involving state and non-state actors, but progress in building effective strategies for revenue enhancement was slow. TISA and the Center for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance filed a suit contesting the legality of the Constituency Development Fund, a public fund meant to support grassroots and community development. They argued that the way in which the fund is administered digresses from the principles of public finance, division of revenue, and division of functions of national and county governments. The appeals court threw out the case on a technicality, but in January 2018 it was taken up by the Supreme Court. Coal ni Sumu campaigned against the government’s decision to establish a coal plant in Lamu under the slogan #deCOALonize Kenya.

Many policy organizations, including TI, IEA, Kenya Community Development Foundation, and Youth Agenda, used social media to implement their advocacy work. For example, TI developed the “Action For Transparency” or A4T mobile app to enable users to report the mismanagement of funds in selected primary schools and health institutions in Nairobi. In 2017 TI recorded 609 downloads of the app and eighty-one cases reported through it. IEA’s blog “How TI-Supported Work in Kenya May Trigger Commitment to Open Government at Sub-National Level?” recorded more than 11,000 hits in the year after its posting in September 2017.

Although the donor community emphasizes the importance of lobbying, CSOs remain uncertain about what it means and are wary of using the word. Nevertheless, several CSOs engaged in effective lobbying in 2017. For example, the Institute for Law and Environmental Governance (ILEG) worked on health legislation in Baringo and Nairobi counties, and AfricoG partnered with TI to advocate successfully for the Public Audit Act to apply to the military.

Advocacy for the reform of laws affecting CSOs remained a challenge in 2017. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)−Kenya Section continued to advocate for implementation of the PBO Act, but the government did not gazette the commencement of the act, as ordered by the High Court in 2016 and 2017. During the elections CSOs met with presidential candidates, who signed pledges promising to pursue commencement of the act.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5

Service provision by CSOs declined in 2017, mainly because donors shifted their already limited funding to election-related activities. The CSO service-providing sector is generally diversified, with areas of focus ranging from health and development to trade, governance, and climate change. However, during the election period, CSOs such as the Center for Human Rights and Civic Education in Mwingi County and Redo Kenya in Bungoma County engaged in more civic and voter education projects than usual, while IDLO provided technical assistance to develop the capacity of the judiciary to improve access to justice in areas such as electoral dispute resolution and gender issues. Donors also emphasized projects involving public finance in 2017, such as budget monitoring analysis. In addition, international CSOs such as ACTED, Oxfam International, Concern Worldwide, and Care International provided support to drought-affected communities in northern Kenya, and ActionAid Kenya operated legal aid clinics offering an array of legal services to residents of informal settlements in Nairobi.

Much of the work undertaken by CSOs in 2017 responded to community needs. For example, county-based CSOs undertook social accountability initiatives in partnership with members of local communities. As they
developed community scorecards and social audits, CSOs helped local communities identify their needs, which community members then expressed in meetings with public service providers and policy makers to improve service delivery. One such effort took place in Junda Mombasa County, where Kwacha Afrika helped communities exact greater accountability in the provision of water services through the development of community scorecards. Redo Kenya implemented projects to mobilize communities in Bungoma County, so they could participate in county budgeting processes.

Some CSO programs and activities target specific audiences, but CSOs generally do not discriminate regarding the recipients of their services. In 2017 ILEG, for instance, distributed publications and offered free training on climate-related activities to opinion leaders in Kwale County. These leaders were then expected to train others in their communities. Other CSOs also provided free training to the public on devolution, participation in budgeting, and social accountability, although the provision of these services was somewhat hampered by the election environment. The audience for reports on international trade developed by APRI was limited by funding constraints.

Most CSOs do not engage in cost recovery, because donors fund their projects. Government recognition of CSOs’ work was mixed in 2017. County governments acknowledged the role of CSOs in mobilizing local communities to participate in planning and budgeting forums. Their appreciation of CSOs’ efforts to improve service delivery and resource management led to a growing number of partnerships and better access by CSOs to government documents. However, the degree of appreciation for CSOs’ work varied from county to county. While Elgeyo Marakwet County was receptive to CSOs and even joined the OGP, Uasin Gishu County was less appreciative of CSOs’ work unless the organizations were already known or locally based. At the national level, the government showed its appreciation for the information-generating role of IEA by incorporating the organization into the national trade negotiations committee.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.7**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs declined in 2017, largely because donors’ focus on the general elections pushed CSOs away from sharing information in their traditional areas of expertise. For example, IEA produced information related to the elections rather than budgeting, its usual main area of research.

In 2017 organizations shared information both through resource centers and one on one. Most new information focused on the elections. Resource centers such as the Uraia Center provided CSOs with materials from IEA, including copies of the constitution, laws on devolution, and reports on public participation in devolved governance. Because of funding shifts, the Consumer Unity Trust Society’s Nairobi Resource Center disseminated less information on trade than in previous years and focused instead on smallholder farming activities and climate change.

A number of intermediary support organizations supported CSOs in 2017. Uraia Trust used funding from DFID, USAID, Embassy of Netherlands, Embassy of Finland, and other donors to support other CSOs’ projects on accountability, gender mainstreaming, and civic education. Diakonia and Forum Syd provided funding to local partners, such as KHRC, Inuka Kenya Trust, and Christian Impact Mission, for projects on governance, health, water, education, and sanitation. With funding from a consortium of funders, including USAID, DANIDA, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Africa Economic Research Consortium provided financial support to research organizations for a national dialogue on economic issues.
Several CSOs continued to provide training to Kenyan CSOs in 2017. The Yetu Initiative commenced a community philanthropy “bootcamp” program that strengthened innovative skills in engaging with local philanthropies through coaching, mentoring, and peer learning. Fifteen organizations took part in the program in 2017, including Youth Banner, Federation of Deaf Women, and Nairobits Trust. Training materials are usually available only in English.

Coalitions continued to be prominent, and a number of new coalitions took shape in 2017 to offer their members a common voice for greater impact. They included the CSO Reference Group, Kura Yangu Sauti Yangu, Parliamentary Initiative Network, Devolution Forum, Non-Communicable Disease Alliance, and Police Reform Working Group. CSOs also worked with other like-minded entities such as CBOs to realize savings on projects through joint activities. For example, the international CSO ACORD cooperated with the Peace and Rights Program of the Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya to launch campaigns with CSOs in Bungoma County aimed at changing voter attitudes towards women’s leadership.

Intersectoral partnerships also continued to be formed in 2017. For example, CSOs collaborated with county governments on social accountability initiatives, such as the community scorecard developed by Rural Women Peace Link in Uasin Gishu County. The Kenya Data Network partnered with the National Transport Safety Authority on a campaign to promote safe driving. Organizations undertaking election-related work, such as the Matatu Owners Association, worked with the media to serve as a general source of public information. Internews offered training to journalists on health issues, and the Kenya Correspondents Association trained correspondents on in-depth, issue-based journalism and the handling of threats to journalists during the elections. CSO partnerships with the private sector included TISA’s cooperation with Safaricom on a text messaging service for its project Jihusishe, which mobilizes citizens to participate in governance processes. IEA worked with the Nairobi Securities Exchange on a study of diversity management and pluralism in Kenya’s private sector. CSOs and private sector representatives also engaged in discussions aimed at finding a common voice on taxation.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

The public image of CSOs declined in 2017 because of the partisan orientation of the media. During the election period, the media invited CSO representatives to talk about issues related to governance, accountability, and electoral justice. However, CSO participation became more problematic as the political temperature rose. Some panelists who worked for CSOs were seen as lacking objectivity. For example, NTV’s AM Live show hosted experts from civil society, but their opinions about electoral justice were as diverse as their number. At the same time, some media were themselves politicized or politically biased and tended to work only with CSOs that shared their political views. For example, KTN and NTV tended to host CSO representatives sharing the same political leaning. Media coverage of street protests led by CSOs was minimal, particularly on television, since the government threatened to close stations that covered protests and opposition rallies.

Public perceptions of CSOs usually depended on political orientation. The public saw CSOs that implemented governance and elections-related programs as either pro- or anti-government and reacted accordingly. For example, AfricoG, Katiba Institute, KHRC, and ICJ-Kenya Section were viewed as anti-government, because they questioned the electoral process, while organizations that did not raise concerns, such as the Elections Observation Group, were generally viewed as pro-government.
Some CSOs that addressed issues of transparency and accountability in the elections, including the Katiba Institute, KHRC, and TI, were themselves perceived as transparent and accountable. Beneficiary communities had positive views of CSOs providing services in health, education, and water.

Government and business perceptions of CSOs in 2017 depended largely on whether their interests were seen as aligned. For example, the County of Nairobi viewed TISA as a partner following their cooperation on solid waste management, which is important to both the government and the business community. On the other hand, the executive branch viewed IDLO as anti-government because of its support for research into the elections, although IDLO supported the judiciary with technical training and other capacity building. As in previous years, private-sector entities, such as the Kenya Private Sector Alliance and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, viewed CSOs as partners, particularly if they advocated on issues of interest to business, such as taxation and the removal of trade barriers.

In a new development in 2017, CSOs effectively used community radio stations, such as Ghetto Radio and Radio Maisha, which broadcast in local languages, to educate voters and advocate for peace. They also used community radio stations that are not part of mainstream media to address other issues of public interest. For example, working with community radio stations, TISA disseminated information on its solid waste management initiatives to local audiences. With the support of the Yetu Initiative, several CSOs identified a strategic use for newspapers, television, and radio to engage with local audiences and worked with local media providers to implement community campaigns.

Since the elections were the main focus of CSOs in 2017, efforts to improve transparency and accountability and develop a code of ethics for the CSO sector were minimal during the year.
The presidential and legislative elections of 2017 were a turning point for Liberia. After two rounds of voting, George Weah of the Congress for Democratic Change Party was elected in late December to replace Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was the first president since 1971 to complete a full term in office. The handover of power in early 2018 marked Liberia’s first peaceful transition of power since 1944. The public had high hopes that the new president would eradicate the country’s entrenched culture of corruption and revitalize the economy. The elections were of paramount importance to CSOs, since most of their funding and programs during the year focused on civic education and the election process.

Liberia’s economy showed signs of modest recovery in 2017. Gross domestic product growth was estimated at 2.5 percent, following negative growth in 2016. According to the World Bank, the recovery was driven largely by the improved performance of the mining sector. Increased medical training and more equipment continued to improve healthcare in the wake of the Ebola outbreak in 2014, which took nearly five thousand lives. The improved medical services were especially helpful during an outbreak of meningococcal disease in May.

The overall sustainability of Liberian CSOs did not change in 2017. The legal framework deteriorated because of barriers to registration for organizations focused on lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) issues. All other dimensions were stable. CSO advocacy and service provision were effective, public support for CSOs was strong, and CSOs enjoyed many training opportunities and other forms of support. However, CSOs’ financial situation remained dire.

The Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the main regulatory body for CSOs, accredited 121 new CSOs and renewed the accreditation of 191 CSOs in 2017, for a total of 312 accredited organizations, compared to 1,041 organizations in 2016. The steep decline in the number of accredited organizations may have been due in part to CSOs’ failure to renew their accreditation in 2017, since individuals and businesses tend to be lax in meeting statutory obligations during election years, as well as weak enforcement by the regulatory body. Community-based organizations (CBOs) and informal groups are not included in these numbers.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

The legal framework for CSOs in Liberia declined in 2017, mainly because of the government’s refusal to register some organizations involved in LGBTI issues. The Liberian constitution guarantees freedoms of speech, association, assembly, movement, and other civic and political rights. Other key documents, such as the National Gender Policy (2009) and National Youth Policy (2012-17), emphasize the role of civil society. CSOs register at the Liberia Business Registry, are then accredited by the NGO Coordination Unit, and subsequently register with the government ministries or agencies with oversight responsibility for the areas in which they will work. CSOs must renew their accreditation every four years.

In an ongoing trend, the registration process was hindered in 2017, principally by bureaucratic red tape. The government announced a plan to open service centers in Liberia’s fifteen counties during the year. The service centers are intended to offer a variety of services, including birth certificates, business and vehicle registrations, driver’s licenses, and CSO registration. However, most of the centers were still not operating by the end of the year. As a result, government functions remained centralized at the NGO Coordination Unit in Monrovia, where limited resources, including the lack of a functioning operating system, slowed down the processing of accreditation applications.

The Liberia Business Registry reports that in 2017 it received an unprecedented number of applications to register organizations working on LGBTI issues. Some of these organizations were allowed to register if their main activities were in fields other than LGBTI advocacy, while the Lesbian and Gay Association of Liberia (LEGAL) was allowed to register using its acronym only. However, several organizations, including the Transgender Network of Liberia (TNoL), were barred from registering on the grounds that they focused on activities that are not allowed under Liberian law. This barrier to registration has existed for years, but it is becoming more evident as the number of new organizations seeking to work on LGBTI issues grows. In response to the denials of registration, LEGAL and other CSOs argued that the laws are discriminatory and affect organizations working to gain legal recognition for minority groups.

The government and the National Civil Society Council of Liberia (NCSCL), which serves as the main umbrella organization for CSOs, concluded the Government of Liberia (GOL)-CSO Accord in 2016. The agreement expresses support for transparency and cooperation between the two sectors. NCSCL is responsible for ensuring that all CSOs are registered and accredited and for updating a directory of CSOs every two years to show organizations’ areas of specialization, with links to sector ministries and agencies. Implementation of the accord proved to be challenging in 2017, as most organizations failed to cooperate with the NCSCL, and the government was not supportive of its efforts.

CSOs are free to criticize the government and advocate on behalf of politically unpopular causes. CSOs may also engage in legislative activities, such as helping draft laws or urging the government to adopt certain policies.

Under the Amendment to the Revenue Code of Liberia Act (2000), charitable and nonprofit organizations registered with the Ministry of Finance are exempt from taxes. However, a registered organization that engages in activities inconsistent with its charitable purpose or receives income from business activities is subject to tax on income from those activities. The code requires CSOs to pay a withholding tax on staff wages and salaries. CSOs that award contracts of more than LRD 100,000 (approximately $745) must pay a withholding tax of 10 percent. The code also provides that renters of buildings, including CSOs, must pay 10 percent of their rents to the government. There are no special taxes imposed on funding from abroad.
CSOs may legally earn income from the provision of services, provided any incidental profit is applied to organizational activities. CSOs may compete for government contracts at both the local and national levels. They may also engage in fundraising activities.

At present no lawyers specialize in CSO law in Liberia. Lawyers trained in general law assist CSOs throughout the country.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2017. The public continued to be supportive of CSO activities in their communities, and CSOs worked with diverse groups to build and develop strong ties with constituencies in 2017. For example, in Todee and Careysburg districts in rural Montserrado, community members provided labor and materials for the construction of hand pumps, bridges, and palaver meeting huts as part of a project implemented by the Lawrence Morris Foundation. In Grand Gedeh and River Gee counties, the organization Catalyst organized community members into groups that rotated among farms to provide needed labor. However, CSOs’ efforts to involve local constituents in their projects are sometimes obstructed by barriers such as bad roads and the exploitation of farmers by middlemen and buyers.

All CSOs have clearly defined missions in their statutes. However, only large national CSOs tend to be engaged in strategic planning, usually because their donors and sponsors require it. While larger CSOs such as New Africa Research Development Agency (NARDA) follow their missions and strategic plans, other organizations often stray into unrelated areas in their search for funding.

Most CSOs have a management structure headed by an executive director, who reports to a board of trustees. The board usually addresses governance issues, while management runs the organization. Some well-established CSOs, such as NARDA, the Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia (CENTAL), and the Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL), have written policies to guide their operations. Other CSOs have management structures that may not be fully functional. For example, a previously leading CSO established in the early 1990s has maintained an organogram that continues to depict departments that are no longer relevant to its current activities. Most CSOs do not have conflict-of-interest policies.

Most CSOs do not have permanent staff. Project-based donor funding allows organizations to hire staff for the duration of funded projects, and staff salaries may be paid irregularly or not at all during periods without grants. In addition, most CSOs are unable to compensate employees adequately. To deal with this deficit, less well-off CSOs sometimes partner with larger organizations that have the resources to sustain joint projects. For example, Stop AIDS in Liberia (SAIL), a local advocacy group, cooperated with Population Services International, an international CSO, to implement a project helping people living with HIV/AIDS. Volunteerism is common in Liberia, and most CSOs rely to some extent on volunteers and interns.

Many CSOs do not have sufficient funding to engage professional services. The few organizations that utilize accountants, information technology specialists, and lawyers sometimes have difficulty paying for their services because of limited funds.

Well-established CSOs, such as CHAL, NARDA, and Liberia Media Center (LMC), have modern offices and communications equipment. The Internet is available in Monrovia and most county capitals, but otherwise Internet connectivity is usually weak and unreliable. Organizations lacking sufficient funding or based outside of major cities do not use the Internet or social media.
CSOs in Liberia rely almost exclusively on foreign support. In 2017 CSOs continued to face serious financial constraints. Since it was an election year, most donor funding was directed to election-related activities, such as voter awareness, registration, and education. After the elections some organizations, such as the Network for Professionals in Support of Building Order and Lofa United for 2017, which had abandoned their core functions to devote energy and staff to funded election-related activities, virtually ceased to exist. In addition, donors withheld funding after the elections because they were uncertain about the direction that the new government would take. Key donors such as USAID, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and the European Union used this time to reassess their support for CSOs. Some donors turned to supporting CBOs, grassroots organizations, and informal groups, which they believed engaged more directly with local communities. In addition to funding projects in such areas as the allocation and disbursement of county and social funds (USAID and SIDA) and the rule of law (UNDP), donors offered these locally based groups institutional capacity development so that their support could better reach targeted beneficiaries. CSOs that ran projects for more than one donor continued to have sustainable operations, but organizations that relied on a single donor, such as the Liberian Women Empowerment Network, had to cut programs. Some CSOs became dormant as they searched for new funding.

CSOs rely on the development of project proposals to generate funding. International CSOs with robust internal systems usually have an advantage over local CSOs in the competition for donor funding. In 2017, when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria discovered that not all of the funding provided to SAIL had been used by the end of the year, it transferred the unused portion to an international CSO instead of using it to build SAIL’s capacity. SAIL eventually had to suspend its operations because it lacked funding.

CSOs sometimes raise limited amounts of support from local sources. Few CSOs have the ability to mobilize funding from their constituents, but they can often count on non-monetary support from volunteers and local communities. For example, communities in Lofa and Nimba contributed gravel, sand, and water for the construction of culverts, which was part of a feeder road project implemented by Lofa Integrated Development Association.

Membership organizations, such as the Teachers Union, Transport Union, and the Liberia National Union of Motorcyclists, collect dues from their members. It is not common for CSOs to raise funds through the Internet, since even the most sophisticated CSOs lack the necessary technical skills, and smaller organizations lack both skills and the funds needed to pay for equipment and subscriptions.

The government rarely provides grants or contracts to CSOs. When it does provide funding, the sums are usually insignificant. Exceptionally, the Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) implemented infrastructure projects in all seventy-three electoral districts in the country with funding from the national legislature. However, the process by which these projects were awarded to LACE was not open and transparent. Small amounts of corporate funding are sometimes available to CSOs. For example, as part of its corporate social responsibility program, Orange Liberia provides funding to healthcare organizations for projects involving women and children, education, and empowerment.

Financial management skills in CSOs are still limited, mainly because a lack of funding prevents organizations from employing fully qualified staff. Most CSOs try to operate in a transparent manner by producing financial reports. Few organizations conduct external audits. There are indications that corruption exists in the CSO sector, but it does not appear to be widespread.
ADVOCACY: 3.7

CSO advocacy efforts continued to be strong in 2017. CSO-government collaboration focuses on a range of issues and takes place on both formal and informal levels. In 2017 CSOs helped draft two planning documents, the Agenda for Transformation and Liberia Rising 2030, both of which emphasize the contribution of CSOs as “agents of change” to national reform and development efforts. Other important instances of cooperation included the joint work of the Coalition for Transparency and Accountability in Education and the Ministry of Education on educational reform, and the collaboration of the Civil Society Working Group on Land Rights Reform, Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy, and Liberia Land Authority on land reform.

Liberian CSOs freely address issues of public concern. For example, Patriotic Entrepreneurs of Liberia organized a protest action in Monrovia to demand a reduction in taxes and a more favorable exchange rate between the U.S. and Liberian dollars. The protest, which stopped traffic and forced businesses to close, ended with an agreement by the government to lower customs tariffs significantly. CSOs called on the government to implement a code of conduct among candidates vying for public office in the 2017 elections. Although the code of conduct was adopted, violators successfully challenged it in court, rendering it ineffective. An executive order abolishing the practice of female genital mutilation, which was signed by the president in 2018, was the result of a tremendous advocacy effort by a coalition of people living with HIV/AIDS in 2017. On the local level, CSOs working in the education sector in Lofa, Bong, and Grand Gedeh counties developed a results-based strategy to advocate for improved classroom teaching and learning outputs. CENTAL’s Integrity Club at the University of Liberia conducted a four-day anti-corruption awareness campaign in Grand Bassa and Bong counties, which encouraged police officers, petty traders, students, and teachers to commit to an honest living and sign an “integrity pledge.”

CSOs worked with the national legislature on several bills that were passed in 2017. The Liberia Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Consortium, consisting of Action Against Hunger, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, Tearfund, and WaterAid, played an active role in formulating and ensuring passage of the WASH Commission Act, which established the National Water Supply and Sanitation Commission, an autonomous regulatory agency responsible for the WASH sector. CSOs also worked on the Local Government Bill to decentralize governance and the Land Rights Bill to delineate categories of land ownership. Another important issue in 2017 was a reduction in the number of political parties. A coalition that included Naymote Partners for Democratic Development, Pentecostal Mission Unlimited, Liberia Media for Democracy Initiatives, Institute for Research and Democratic Development, and SAIL recommended to the Senate that the number of parties be changed to “at least four,” rather than “just four,” as was proposed during the constitutional review process in 2014. The coalition requested that the Senate forward its final decision on the issue to the House of Representatives, which may refer the matter to a nationwide referendum in 2018.

In 2017 NCSCL and several individual organizations sought unsuccessfully to improve the regulatory framework for CSOs by establishing guidelines for regulating their operations. Most CSOs did not join in the effort and instead relied on the terms and conditions of the GOL-CSO Accord, even though the accord was not popular. Some CSOs have begun to distance themselves from NCSCL because they do not see the council as playing a helpful role.
SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4

Service provision by CSOs was stable in 2017. CSOs worked in many key areas in which government services were weak or non-existent, such as health, education, food security, and WASH. For example, We-Care Foundation supported teachers and schools in Margibi, Lofa, and River Gee counties, and CHAL worked in WASH, health, and education in various locations. In 2017 CSOs’ election-related services included education for first-time voters and peace building in local communities.

CSOs’ services reflect the needs of their constituents. The needs are usually determined by assessments or opinion polls. For example, Jhpiego, an international organization that provides training in healthcare, performed an assessment of nursing schools before conducting its interventions.

Membership associations often provide goods and services to individuals beyond their members without discrimination. For example, CENTAL’s 2017 research reports on education, land, and the transparency of the mining and other extractive sectors were intended for public consumption. Similarly, CENTAL’s scorecards on the National Legislature alerted the public to the activities (or lack of activity) of individual lawmakers.

Few CSOs recover the cost of services by charging fees. Most umbrella organizations allow members to use their facilities free of charge, and only the Young Men’s Christian Association charges for use of its auditorium.

The government recognizes the roles and contributions of CSOs on both the national and community levels. For example, in 2017 the National Election Commission publicly acknowledged the efforts of the LMC and Search for Common Ground to inform the electorate about election matters. The government gave special recognition to the Deepening Democracy Coalition for its televised presidential debates.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2017. Resource centers are located at the head offices of most umbrella organizations and offer training, access to information, and communications support. For example, NCSCL operates a resource center for its members, and NARDA operates resource centers in Monrovia and Lofa, Sinoe, Bong, Bassa, and Nimba counties, which are free of charge to member organizations and open for a token fee to non-members. LMC works with international organizations to provide training to community radio stations.

Several organizations re-grant donor funding for programs in local communities. For example, Development Alternatives Incorporated, which implements USAID’s Liberia Accountability and Voice Initiative (LAVI), a five-year project to strengthen CSOs’ capacity to advocate for and monitor policy and accountability reforms, provides sub-grants to local CSOs. In 2017 LAVI supported ActionAid Liberia and the Natural Resource Management Coalition, which is composed of eight CSOs.
Two umbrella organizations, NARDA and Development Education Network—Liberia (DEN−L), provided sub-grants to their members.

CSOs cooperate and share information through networks and coalitions as well as informal channels. Coalition building and networking increased in 2017, thanks largely to donors’ encouragement. For example, LMC, CENTAL, Liberia Women Media Action Committee, Press Union of Liberia, and Center for Media Studies and Peace Building formed the Deepening Democracy Coalition to support the electoral process. With funding from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, the coalition hosted debates, monitored media, tracked campaign promises, and provided media access to candidates and electorates. The Coalition for Transparency and Accountability in Education worked in collaboration with the Center for Transparency and Accountability in Liberia, Liberian Education for All Technical Committee, Liberia Economic Journalists Association, Federation of Liberian Youth, and Liberia Institute of Certified Public Accountants to support programs in education and other areas.

Liberian CSOs enjoy many training opportunities with capable trainers. International donors support most training programs, which often use local trainers. In 2017, for example, CSOs throughout the country received training in voter education and community peace building, which was funded by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Carter Center, National Democratic Institute, and other foreign organizations. NARDA conducted several workshops for its members on civic education for first-time voters, and the Carter Center organized training on peaceful elections and civic education. NARDA and DEN−L also provided regular training to their members in secondary cities on management and service delivery, LAVI helped build the capacity of CSOs working in advocacy on the county level, and the International Rescue Committee organized training in strategic planning for SAIL and other CSOs in the health sector. Most training was in English.

Several intersectoral partnerships were active in 2017. The Ministry of Health partnered with Plan International Liberia to distribute insecticide-treated nets for malaria prevention to more than 930,000 households, including in hard-to-reach areas. Living Water International received government and donor funding to drill wells throughout the country as part of the government’s development agenda. Under the GOL-CSO Accord, the government and CSOs took part in an annual National Partnership Summit to foster joint planning and the development of CSOs’ capacities. An emerging partnership between civil society and media is evident in the designation of space for CSOs in local media. A column on farming in the Daily Observer newspaper, for instance, features CSOs’ work in agriculture and food security.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2017. CSOs typically enjoy coverage in the public and private media, but insufficient resources can hinder their coverage, as it is usually available on a paid basis only. In 2017 Last Mile, a CSO in the health sector, paid for billboards and articles in print and electronic media to publicize its campaign on immunization, which garnered an unusual amount of attention. Both national and local community radios stations cover CSO service delivery, often describing it as complementary to government development efforts.

Public perceptions of CSOs have changed over the years. Formerly, the general perception of CSOs was that they were first responders to emergencies or entities with vast resources, for which they were often not accountable.
Now, as a result of recent work by advocacy organizations, CSOs are perceived more often as partners in development with the government or advocates on behalf of local communities. Beneficiary populations such as those located near oil palm concessions in Grand Cape Mount, Bomi, and other counties see CSOs as offering a voice to the voiceless. In 2017 CSOs working on election-related activities were seen as offering services to voters rather than as supporting political parties.

The government’s perception of CSOs is largely positive, except when CSOs are critical of the government’s actions, as happened during the 2017 elections, when the government failed to enforce the code of conduct for state officials. Most private-sector entities regard CSOs as reliable business clients. They are aware that CSOs must often contend with emergencies requiring immediate interventions, such as disease and conflict, and they strive to ensure that CSOs have access to commercially available supplies.

CSOs raise awareness about their activities through radio talk shows and live community programs, including dramatic performances and dances. Except for larger organizations such as CENTAL, CSOs have yet to explore social media as an effective means of public outreach.

CSOs have not adopted their own codes of ethics and rely on the GOL-CSO Accord to monitor their operations. Under the accord, a CSO code of ethics consistent with the National Code of Conduct for public officials and employees was supposed to be adopted by all organizations represented by NCSCL. However, this did not happen in 2017. The NGO Coordination Unit requires CSOs to provide annual reports before accreditation is renewed, but CSOs do not commonly distribute these reports publicly.
Madagascar’s socio-economic situation worsened in 2017 as a result of a pneumonic plague epidemic, severe weather events, inflation, and depreciation of the local currency. According to the World Bank, severe drought appears to have affected 1.14 million people in Madagascar during the year; while Tropical Cyclone Enawo, which hit the country in March 2017, caused losses of some $400 million, or nearly 4 percent of the country’s GDP. The agricultural sector, which serves as the main source of income for more than 80 percent of the population, was the most affected. More than three-quarters of households continued to live in extreme poverty.

Corruption continued to be a major problem in Madagascar in 2017. During the year, the Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (BIANCO) received 3,390 complaints, including 959 that could be investigated. After investigations, 175 cases were transferred to the courts, 251 people were detained, and 164 people were released on bail.

The year 2017 again saw human rights violations. According to Amnesty International, the criminal justice system continued to be used to harass, intimidate, and restrict the freedom of expression of human rights defenders and journalists, particularly those working on environmental issues and anti-corruption efforts. There were also instances in which freedom of assembly was challenged. Notably, the government instituted a one-month ban on public protests in June, ostensibly to protect public order during National Day celebrations. Likewise, in July the police prefect stopped a protest planned by the Movement for Freedom of Expression (MLE) to mark the first anniversary of the passage of the problematic new Code of Media Communication.

In September 2017 the current president, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, expressed his support for amendments to the constitution that would change the way elections were organized. CSOs including the Observatory of Public Life (SeFaFi), National Experts’ Group (GEN), National Elections Observation Committee (KMF-CNOE), Development and Ethics Club (CDE), Malagasy Miara-Mandroso, Aron’ny Demokrasia (MAMIMAD), Bongolava Analysis and Reflection Circle (CRAB), and Mamiko ny taniko released a joint declaration opposing the initiative, arguing that the proposed amendments would impede rivals to the incumbent and require a lengthy amendment process and public referendum, which would delay the presidential elections already scheduled for late 2018.
The idea of a constitutional referendum ahead of the presidential election was subsequently abandoned. Overall CSO sustainability in Madagascar was stable in 2017. The legal environment deteriorated as a result of arbitrary decisions by the authorities and state-sponsored harassment. At the same time, improvements were recorded in several dimensions. Advocacy improved as some organizations began to work in coalitions, and the sectoral infrastructure similarly improved with the formation of coalitions and intersectoral partnerships. Likewise, CSOs’ public image was boosted by their recognition of the importance of good public relations. CSOs’ organizational capacity, service provision, and financial viability were unchanged in 2017.

There are seven categories of CSOs in Madagascar: associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), unions, foundations, cooperatives, savings and loan groups, and religious or cultural associations. These types include both formal and informal groups and may range from community and neighborhood organizations to women’s and youth groups and professional associations. According to the most recent census on the number of CSOs presented in a 2012 European Union (EU) report, there were approximately 15,000 CSOs in Madagascar that year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment in which CSOs work worsened in 2017, as the state continued to harass CSOs and restrict advocacy and other activities perceived as working against the state’s interests.

Each category of CSO is governed by a different law. For example, associations are governed by Order 60-133 from 1960, primarily inspired by the basic French law of July 1, 1901, in effect in Madagascar during the colonial period; NGOs by Law 96-030 from 1997; foundations by Law 95-028 from 1995; and cooperatives by Law 99-004 from 1999.

The process for registering a CSO as well as the time to process applications vary depending on the governing law. Many CSOs operate informally or with a simple declaration receipt, either because they lack interest in complying with the law or do not understand the registration process. Another impediment is the distance of administrative offices from CSOs’ locations, which forces CSO representatives to travel long distances to complete administrative procedures. Legally, informal CSOs are not authorized to handle funds, so in practice they work with third-party service providers or legally constituted associations to benefit from donors’ programs. Government officials indiscriminately apply the laws, rulings, and decrees that govern CSO registration, because they are free to assess and interpret these texts as they wish. For example, government officials rejected the registration of a non-partisan, non-ideological youth organization simply because its mission was political education, which they perceived as equivalent to political activity. They justified the rejection by stating that “the law states that an association must be apolitical.”

Reporting requirements are ambiguous and not clearly spelled out in any law. CSOs registered as associations do not have any activity reporting requirements. However, at the beginning of the year, the prime minister, who chairs the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Drug Prevention, emphasized that all associations that work in drug prevention must submit a regular activity report or have their approvals withdrawn.

Theoretically, the only restrictions on CSOs’ activities are stipulations in the constitution that they must respect other people’s rights and freedoms and preserve the country’s public order, national dignity, and security. In practice, CSOs are not protected from arbitrary government decisions.
For example, in 2017, officials in the Ministry of Youth and Sports opposed the Youth Observatory’s use of the national youth policy monitoring mechanism and restricted the observatory’s operations, despite the fact that they were in accordance with the law. A similar situation occurred when the police prefect issued a memorandum dissolving the union of the University of Antananarivo’s administrative personnel after the union escalated its demands for labor rights. A CSO may be removed from the official registry or have its approval withdrawn based on a simple administrative decision that it threatens public order, public security, or national unity.

State harassment of CSOs continued in 2017, making it more difficult for CSOs to address sensitive topics, such as corruption, embezzlement, and the abuse of power, or criticize the government. The central government and its branches often take a dim view of civil society and wrongly conflate it with the opposition. For example, when the Youth Observatory issued an opinion on pilot youth projects, the central government accused it of being against the ruling party. Open houses planned by an informal group, the Union Platform in Toamasina, did not take place, despite municipal and regional authorizations, after the police prefect commanded his forces to intervene and order the platform to vacate the premises. In July, after a commentator on the private Viva television network parodied the head of state, he was pursued by law enforcement and had to flee his home under the threat of arrest. In addition, the president’s interference in the judicial system discourages CSOs from taking legal action.

The lack of a clear legal framework for the CSO sector makes tax exemptions uncertain, and legal provisions are often subject to subjective interpretation by the authorities. Only CSOs that have been recognized as benefiting the public are exempt from taxes and can receive subsidies under the Public Investment Program, which includes all projects and programs in the production, business, and administrative sectors that the central government intends to implement during a given time period. Some NGOs have been denied public benefit status even though they operate in the humanitarian assistance field. Only gifts to foundations from individuals and legal entities are tax deductible.

Attorneys are familiar with the legal context for CSOs and the areas in which they work. Some attorneys help CSOs draft legal arguments for their claims or help them find solutions to problems their members face. For example, CSOs working in rural areas often face questions related to land ownership. CSOs can also receive legal support from Trano Aro Zo, an organization that operates legal clinics.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change significantly in 2017. More CSOs worked to enhance their organizational structures and internal management, but a culture of transparency and accountability still struggled to take hold.

An increasing number of CSOs used participatory approaches to identify the priorities and needs of their target groups in 2017. For example, the Department for the Development of the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (SAF/-FJKM), with support from the National Office of Risk and Disaster Management, consulted directly with vulnerable communities in developing its risk and disaster-reduction strategies. As part of this effort, 10,000 community volunteers were trained to educate the public on preventive measures such as dredging. The Union Platform garnered additional support by conducting workplace visits to motivate employees to engage in the creation of programs. This dialogue led to the creation of the Alliance for Industrialization, which brings together workers’ unions, business owners, and experts from...
the Madagascar Economists’ Think Tank. Only a small number of organizations that have regular funding sources or are members of coalitions have strategic plans. One example is BIMTT, a network of rural training institutions. In 2017, as part of the Mikolo project, which focuses on reducing maternal, infant, and child morbidity and mortality, BIMTT helped its beneficiary NGOs by supporting an organizational capacity self-evaluation and the preparation of institutional development plans. As a result of trickle-down training in recent years, smaller associations have also started to set priorities and create reference documents such as bylaws, internal regulations, and action plans. Large coalitions and unions as well as foreign donor-sponsored programs continued to offer capacity-building sessions on strategic planning in 2017. The number of participants in these capacity-building programs, however, remained relatively small compared to the overall number of CSOs in Madagascar. The NGO Ny Sahy (Those Who Dare) issued training certifications only to CSOs that submitted their strategic plans and annual work plans.

Given their funding difficulties, some organizations deviate from their strategic plans when funding opportunities arise. An exception to this trend was SAF FJKM, which in 2017 declined an offer of funding to implement a program that did not align with its strategic focus. CSOs lack monitoring mechanisms and therefore find it difficult to evaluate the impact of their work.

In general, associations’ only written documents are bylaws and internal procedures, but even these do not always exist. When they do, they are usually copied from templates provided by CSO registration offices. Thus CSOs often function without separate entities for deliberation, execution, and oversight. Frequently, a chairperson handles everything, not out of a desire to seize power but because other people are unwilling to become involved without being paid. Internal regulations do not clearly state penalties for conflicts of interest. However, some bylaws and internal regulations specify that roles may not be combined, which forces CSO members who join the government or are appointed to high-level positions to make a choice.

The quality of CSOs’ human resources depends largely on their available funding. CSOs usually have trouble setting up functional human resources management policies, because only a tiny portion of project funding—usually between 3 to 7 percent, according to CSOs that participate in projects funded by technical and financial partners—can be used for administrative expenses. CSOs depend largely on volunteers, the number of which grows each year. Because of funding constraints, CSOs generally keep permanent staff to a bare minimum. Consultants are hired when necessary.

Throughout the country, most CSOs have access to and use modern technologies, such as mobile phones and Facebook. CSOs exchange information via Facebook, and the major CSOs also use blogs, web-based audio, and video broadcasts and websites. The modernization of office equipment, such as computers, software, printers, scanners, and projectors, depends on CSOs’ available funding, which is generally project based.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2**

In 2017 CSOs’ financial viability did not change significantly. CSOs in Madagascar continued to have limited access to funding and face significant long-term funding difficulties. Processes to manage financial resources and operations remained ineffective.

In the face of significant financial constraints, CSOs attempt to diversify their revenue sources. The law authorizes them to generate revenue from their activities, raise funds, and receive donations from outside of Madagascar. CSOs can also respond to government calls for bids. However, they are highly dependent on external funding, especially for activities in health, education, natural resources, and governance.

In 2017 the level of foreign funding available for programs related to the agricultural sector, water, food security, and the environment declined. Associations continued to benefit from funding under the EU’s Dinika program, a EUR10 million (approximately $11.6 million) program that supports Malagasy civil society and aims to promote good governance at the local and national levels. In other sectors the level of financial support from such donors as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, IndustriALL Global Union, Gavi, Civil Society Constituency, and Catholic Relief Services remained stable. The International Organisation of La Francophonie began funding various projects in 2017, such as a project the Federation of Women and Development Associations’ (FAFED) ran to empower women and provide career training for vulnerable young girls. Some CSOs rely on microfinance institutions to fund development projects. For example,
small associations in the Atsinanana region rely on such funding for their revenue-generating activities. CSOs also depend on contributions from individuals (for example, elected officials, ministers, high-profile individuals, and those who have moved abroad), the private sector (companies, foundations, and service clubs), and, to a lesser extent, the public sector (the central government and other public entities). Although the percentage that such sources contribute to CSOs’ overall budgets depends on the size, type, and focus of the CSOs, the public sector’s contributions are much larger than those from the private sector. For example, SAF/FJKM receives funding via associated projects and entities, such as the National Office of Nutrition (ONN), Development Intervention Fund (FID), and National Coordination Unit for Economic Recovery and Social Action Projects (CCEPREAS).

As in previous years, major businesses, particularly in the industrial, financial, mining, and mobile phone sectors, supported CSOs’ activities as part of their corporate social responsibility initiatives. Individual contributions are more likely to go to small associations, as when parents donate money or goods to parent-teacher organizations. CSOs also have begun to raise funds using information and communication tools such as Facebook. For example, in 2017 the Ino Maresaka Tamatave (IMT) organization used Facebook in partnership with the Malagasy diaspora in France (IMT-France) to raise a significant amount of money for various social welfare projects, such as renovating and equipping health centers and schools.

Income from products and services rounds out CSOs’ budgets. Although the government rarely enters into service contracts with CSOs, in 2017 Youth First signed a contract with the Ministry of Youth and Sports to provide training in youth centers throughout the country, and BIMTT received funding from the central government to train and educate rural communities. Ny Sahy signed contracts with the managers of several Catholic schools to educate students about the dangers of drugs and cigarettes and signed similar contracts with Protestant churches to conduct a series of trainings. Cooperatives in eastern Madagascar won corporate fruit and spice supply contracts. The law allows CSOs to operate social enterprises, but they are not very common, and there are fewer than ten social enterprises in the country. One social enterprise is Nutri’zaza, created by the CSO Professionals for Fair Development (GRET), which fights chronic malnutrition in children through its “hotelin-jazakely” network of local nutrition centers.

CSOs’ financial management systems did not change significantly in 2017, although some CSOs have strengthened their systems to increase their chances of qualifying for external funding. CSOs do not routinely publish annual reports or financial statements or undergo audits. Annual and financial reports are often prepared only to comply with donors’ requirements. Professional financial management services exist, but their cost is out of CSOs’ reach. For example, CSOs report that the cost of a financial audit can amount to 30 percent of their total funding.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

Advocacy efforts began to increase in 2017. CSOs mobilized to coordinate and amplify their advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the country’s decision-making bodies.

There was improved collaboration between civil society and local and central government entities in 2017. Examples of formal collaboration include the prime minister’s strategic dialogue group on thematic development areas such as corruption, which brings together the government, technical and financial partners, and CSOs. In 2017 this group focused on the draft law on recovery of illicit gains, as well as reforms to prevent money laundering and funding of terrorism. Work sessions with staff from the Ministry of Finance and Budget on the preparation of the 2018 finance law also included CSOs, such as the Citizens and Citizens Organizations.
Collective (CCOC) and the Madagascar Network for Transparency and Social Accountability (RTRSM)—which includes some forty associations—in the spirit of informal cooperation. The prime minister and CSO platforms such as the Citizens’ Movement for the Defense of Common Interests and Goods (ROHY) discussed reform of electoral laws, including provisions on campaign financing and access to media, as well as the role of CSOs in ensuring that elections are free and transparent. CSOs were also involved in writing land management texts. The Platform of Associations for the Education of Malagasy Adolescents (ASAMA) continued its effort to promote the inclusion of Sustainable Development Goals in the national policy agenda by collaborating with the authorities.

CSOs’ advocacy efforts have been more and more successful. Approximately twenty CSOs, including CCOC, CDE, the NGO SAHA, Transparency International Initiative Madagascar, SeFaFi, and the Voahary Gasy Alliance (AVG), pushed for greater equity in the award of public contracts. Their initiative led to the creation of the Independent Public Contracts Observatory. After civil society criticized the ruling party’s attempts to amend the constitution, the idea of a constitutional referendum ahead of the presidential election was abandoned. With support from the CSOs Vona Soamahamanina, MLE, and the Collective for the Defense of Malagasy Lands (TANY), villagers in Soamahamanina successfully halted a gold-mining project led by a Chinese company. The Youth Observatory’s effort to update the national youth policy was successful, and the observatory was granted legal authority to oversee the monitoring mechanism that was put into place. Advocacy by Transparency International Initiative Madagascar, BIANCO, and AVG resulted in a written commitment from four ministers to manage natural resources in a transparent manner.

More and more CSOs are receptive to the idea of lobbying. The promulgation of Law No. 2016-038 granting Malagasy citizenship to children born to Malagasy mothers and foreign fathers was a major victory for CSOs focused on human rights, including the National Council of Women of Madagascar. The laborers’ union helped prepare a law on industrial development in Madagascar, which was approved in 2017. Lobbying by CSOs such as the National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH) resulted in language about abortion being removed from a draft law on reproductive health and family planning that was submitted to parliament in June 2017. CSOs such as the Advisory Group on Tobacco Control succeeded in having a law that would have relaxed tobacco imports struck from parliament’s agenda. In addition, unions have been involved in preparing a new Social Security Code, which is still in the government’s hands.

CSOs are aware that the lack of an appropriate legal framework hinders their effectiveness and sustainability and are working together to revise the current laws affecting CSOs. One result of this collaboration is the ongoing development of a proposed law to grant CSOs public benefit status.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

Service provision by CSOs remained generally the same as in the previous year. CSOs work in nearly every sector, from basic social services to women’s empowerment, environmental protection, and governance.

When designing their services, CSOs strive to take into account the needs of their target groups and communities, and they are very responsive to urgent needs, including during natural disasters. For example, following Tropical Cyclone Enawo, the Madagascar Red Cross mobilized 1,000 of its volunteers in the eight hardest-hit regions to provide first aid and temporary shelters, and quickly evaluate needs. The affected locations received 2,300 shelter kits to rebuild houses in the days following the storm. CSOs use participatory approaches, including interviews with beneficiaries, to determine local priorities and conducted beneficiary surveys to assess
the impact of projects. CSOs refer to published studies as well as official statistics and field surveys to inform their knowledge of the needs of different target groups. They maintain databases on their activities and the areas in which they work.

Goods and services provided by CSOs generally benefit the entire community without distinction, usually in line with donor requirements.

CSOs such as SeFaFi sell their publications in bookstores. CSOs also earn income by renting their equipment and facilities and providing services such as medical care and consulting. Nationwide social protection programs such as Vatsin’Ankohonana (‘’safety nets’’) take their inspiration from longstanding approaches used by NGOs associated with the Protestant, Lutheran, and Catholic churches.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3**

Sectoral infrastructure improved slightly in 2017. CSOs had access to several resource centers, including BIMTT, National Coalition for Environmental Advocacy, Center for Technical and Economic Information, and Center for Exchange, Documentation, and Inter-Institutional Information. Their areas of intervention continued to focus on resource mobilization and strategic management. Resource centers also opened outside the capital to accommodate the needs of CSOs. For example, in 2017 the Tuléar resource center opened in southern Madagascar.

Local community foundations and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) funded by both local sources and international donors provide financial support to CSOs. For example, the Madagascar Foundation for Protected Areas and Biodiversity raises money from the government and international donors such as the French Development Agency and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The revenue generated is used to finance organizations such as Beautiful Future.

CSOs work in coalitions to improve their access to information and funding. Notable coalitions and platforms include the Children’s Civil Society Platform, ROHY, Civil Society Alliance to Improve Nutrition (HINA), AVG, MIHARI network, National Council of CSOs, and Coalition of Land Advocates. In 2017 two major union platforms, the Madagascar Workers’ Conference and SSM, formed the union movement Randrambaoo Sendikaly.

CSOs have access to a variety of training opportunities, mostly supported by international partners such as Conservation International. For example, in 2017 the Youth Observatory provided fifteen youth associations with training on citizen leadership, association management, monitoring and evaluation, and organizational and institutional development. SAFI-FJKM offers eight food safety trainings to its partners each year. BIMTT offers training to CSOs in rural areas on topics such as resource mobilization and strategic management. In Madagascar there are experts in various areas who can meet CSOs’ training needs, and technical and financial partners sometimes include these experts alongside foreign experts on training panels and in capacity-building programs. CSOs in the capital and provincial seats have easier access to training than...
those in second-tier cities. Training is conducted in Malagasy and French and sometimes in local dialects.

CSOs increasingly create intersectoral partnerships. For example, after four ministers signed a commitment to preserve biodiversity in 2017, a regional network of government branches, Madagascar National Parks, and WWF, along with CSOs in the Atsimo Andrefana Regional CSO Platform, met in May to develop action plans to address corruption and the illegal use of natural resources in southwestern Madagascar. Thirty-nine companies have joined the Private Sector Humanitarian Platform, which was launched in 2014 at the initiative of the mobile phone company TELMA Foundation. In the context of repairing houses destroyed by Cyclone Enawo, Care International asked the platform to help supply tool kits for 130 families in the city of Antalaha. CSOs that work with land ownership and environmental issues are pleased that the government provided them with toll-free numbers to report complaints. In 2017 the Ministry of Mining and Petroleum and the Chamber of Mining of Madagascar collaborated with CSOs such as the Organization on Extractive Industries to evaluate the effects of the new mining code on the local populations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

The public image of CSOs improved slightly in 2017. CSOs that work directly with local populations, particularly those that provide basic social services in rural areas, receive positive coverage in the media. CSOs’ advocacy issues and efforts are often lead items in newspapers and on television stations, but the coverage is mixed depending on the media source. Media outlets that are critical of the ruling party are more likely to cover CSOs’ work if it supports their political agenda. Regional radio stations often give extensive coverage to CSOs’ community activities. Most media distinguish between public-service announcements, which are generally broadcast free of charge, and paid corporate advertising.

The public appreciates CSOs’ analyses of major current events. Likewise, CSOs that focus on day-to-day activities, defend the public interest such as by denouncing government failures, or otherwise focus on issues of concern to households and municipalities are well regarded by the public. On the other hand, the public takes a dim view of CSO members that use organizations as springboards to high-level government jobs or political positions.

The central government has a much greater appreciation of CSOs that work on social issues than those that work on policy advocacy or social accountability. The same is true of the private sector, which works alongside civil society to an increasing degree. For example, the mobile phone company AIRTEL Madagascar supports the association Sekoliny marenina Madagasikara (SMM-ADSF) with fundraising and material donations to its school for the deaf and hard of hearing.

CSOs no longer minimize the importance of public relations. They are expanding their presence in various areas, publicizing the result of their activities, maintaining good relationships with journalists for better media coverage, and using social media, mostly Facebook, to raise public awareness. For example, Land Tenure Solidarity uses these methods to educate the public about issues affecting the environment.

Most larger CSOs publish annual reports, and some medium-sized and small CSOs have also started to comply with this requirement to be more competitive for funding. Certain CSOs are beginning to create ethics frameworks or at least statements of values, following in the footsteps of Randrambo Sendikaly’s statement of values and SAF/-FJKM’s code of ethics.
Malawi remained one of the poorest countries in the world in 2017. The economy remained weak as the government struggled to recover from the plunder of the Cashgate years, in which millions of dollars were stolen from government accounts over a ten-year period. After international donors withdrew funding because of the scandal, only the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have resumed budgetary support to the Malawian government, setting conditions such as a reduction in government spending. Other traditional donors have switched to financing projects directly or through CSOs, increasing the government’s hostility toward the CSO sector.

Despite a strong national anti-corruption strategy and increasing pressure from civil society, widespread corruption persisted in 2017. Malawi dropped from 120th to 122nd place of 175 countries surveyed in the Transparency International 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index. Trials related to the 2013 Cashgate scandal continued at a slow pace because of a lack of funds and capacity. Another scandal known as Maizegate erupted in late 2016 with the discovery of a large, irregular shipment of maize from Zambia. The incident led to the sacking and trial of the minister of agriculture in 2017. He was eventually acquitted of all charges in 2018.

As civil society raised concerns about government accountability while these scandals unfolded, the government claimed in turn that CSOs were not accountable and must be more tightly regulated. The government drafted a Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Amendment Bill to amend the NGO Act and worked on an NGO Policy in 2017.

Overall CSO sustainability remained constant in 2017. The funding environment deteriorated, and many organizations struggled to access funds. Public perceptions of CSOs grew more negative in response to mixed media coverage and divisions among CSOs. Other dimensions of CSO sustainability were stable.
The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Board, the main government body responsible for overseeing CSOs, did not publish new statistics about the size of the sector in 2017. There are believed to be about 260 NGOs registered with the NGO Board and 526 organizations registered with the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations of Malawi (CONGOMA), the umbrella body for NGOs, in 2017. In addition, Malawi has thousands of community-based organizations (CBOs).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

The legal environment for Malawian CSOs remained the same in 2017.

Under the 2001 NGO Act, the main legislation governing NGOs, it is illegal for unregistered organizations to operate. The registration process remained cumbersome. CSOs wishing to register as NGOs must apply to the Office of the Registrar General, which refers the applications to the minister of justice for approval. Thereafter CSOs must register with both the NGO Board and CONGOMA. Some NGOs have alleged that the registration of organizations focused on governance often takes longer than that of other organizations. CSOs focused on controversial issues such as the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people faced unwarranted hurdles to registration. CBOs register with their district councils and the Social Welfare Department of the Ministry of Gender, Women and Child Development. They do not usually face problems with registration. The cost of registration was approximately $340 for all CSOs.

In December 2017 the government substantially increased the fees that CSOs pay to the NGO Board. The new fees were to go into effect in January 2018. The NGO Board indicated that the reason for the increased fees was CSOs’ failure to account for a considerable portion of their funding and the need to institute tracking mechanisms to enhance accountability. The Center for the Development of People (CEDEP) and other CSOs argued that the new fees were actually meant to shrink the space for civil society ahead of the 2019 general elections, in which CSOs working on governance are expected to watch the government closely.

The government continued to work on a new NGO policy in 2017 and in April drafted an NGO Amendment Bill to amend the NGO Act. Provisions of the bill, such as its expansion of the definition of the term “NGO” to include CBOs, were deeply concerning to civil society. CSOs also resisted proposed provisions that would eliminate CONGOMA’s consultative role in the registration, oversight, and coordination of CSOs and would leave those responsibilities entirely with the government-appointed NGO Board. CSOs see the NGO Board as more politicized and prefer to work through CONGOMA.

The Access to Information (ATI) Act, which CSOs generally support, was signed into law by the president in February 2017 but was not operationalized during the year.

Service-providing and government-affiliated organizations operate without interference. Advocacy organizations not affiliated with the government complained of harassment if their activities were deemed to oppose the government or its policies. CSOs have the right to assemble but must submit advance notification through local governments and provide surety that they will be responsible for any damage resulting from protests. The government may deny CSOs the right to demonstrate or disrupt their demonstrations if the authorities do not like the themes or the protests oppose government policy. For example, in 2017, in the presence of unresponsive police forces, young people affiliated with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party sought to intimidate and stop demonstrators supporting the so-called 50+1 proposal, which would change the electoral law to require the president to be elected by 50 percent plus one of votes cast. Although there is no relevant legal provision, CSOs may be dissolved if their activities are considered treasonous or likely to incite violence against the government.
The government took no action to dissolve any CSOs in 2017.

The government taxes CSOs like any other nationally registered entities. They must file tax returns with the Malawi Revenue Authority and comply with the Taxation Act unless otherwise authorized. CSOs previously benefitted from a tax exemption of about 50 percent when procuring materials to be used for their work, but the government cancelled this benefit in 2017 after it found that some CSOs abused the privilege by importing personal items. A few commodities, such as relief food supplies and medical equipment, remained exempt from import duties provided CSOs applied for authorization from the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning, and Development. However, the process for obtaining exemptions was long and uncertain.

While CSOs are not barred from competing for government contracts, CSOs believe that these contracts usually go to organizations that support the government. CSOs may earn income from the provision of goods and services and fundraising.

Although there are no specialists in CSO law in Malawi, high-quality legal expertise is available from lawyers trained in general constitutional law. Few lawyers are willing to provide their services pro bono. In 2017 several CSOs obtained legal advice to file injunctions against proposed legislation and government activities.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was stable in 2017. More CSOs are using a bottom-up approach to building relationships with constituencies. Youth Net and Counseling (YONECO), Gender GCN, and most other organizations conduct baseline surveys and hold meetings with communities before introducing new projects. Applications for project funding must usually cite sourced information about community needs, which allows beneficiaries to serve as the origin of project concepts. In 2017 larger established organizations were usually able to complete project activities and deliver promised outcomes, such as school buildings, latrines, educational materials, and increased school enrolments, to their constituencies.

CSOs in Malawi must have clearly defined missions as a requirement of registration. However, mission fulfillment is not always enforced, in part because most CSOs have weak boards. CSOs often report that they have strategic plans but find it increasingly difficult to realize them because of donors’ changing priorities. In fact, few organizations are concerned with strategic planning and instead seek funding for activities outside of their missions so that they do not have to scale down their operations. For example, the Center for Alternatives for Victimized Women and Children and Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC) previously focused on gender and human rights but recently diversified into other areas, including minority rights and water and sanitation.

International and larger domestic CSOs tend to have clearly defined management structures, but these are often blurred in small or local organizations. Larger domestic CSOs, such as the Association of People Living with Albinism (APAM) and Malawi Economic Justice Network, as well as faith-based organizations (FBOs), usually have functioning boards, which meet occasionally. Nevertheless, it is common for the executive directors to wield the main decision-making role. In smaller CSOs boards typically do not function. CSOs often have written procedures but do not necessarily follow them.

Staff turnover continued to be a problem for many CSOs in 2017. Technical experts are very transient, and most of them are hired on a contractual basis for the span of specific projects. Most CSOs do not send their permanent staff for training, although a few organizations, such as YONECO and Girl Effect, offer some of their employees short-term or degree training. CSO staff usually attend short symposiums funded by international CSOs.
Intermittent power supplies make Malawi a difficult environment in which to operate. Power-dependent services such as the Internet are extremely unreliable, and only the largest CSOs can afford to use alternate power sources such as generators. Many CSOs do not have modern offices and equipment and rely instead on Internet cafes and personal telephones.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

Malawian CSOs' financial viability deteriorated in 2017. While established CSOs and FBOs, such as the Zam Zam Foundation and Catholic Development Commission in Malawi, remained financially secure thanks to the continued trust of their donors, other local CSOs struggled to secure funding, often because they had lost their focus or their donors’ confidence. CSOs’ lack of accountability and the inconclusive results of many of their projects prompted some international CSOs to shift funding to CBOs in the belief that they are closer to communities, retain very little of the funding for themselves, and are better able to deliver on programming goals.

CSOs in Malawi continue to depend heavily on donor funding. In 2017 donor funding levels remained approximately the same as in the previous year. Major donors included the United Nations (UN) Development Program, UN Population Fund, UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), USAID, United Kingdom’s Department For International Development, German Technical Cooperation Agency, Norwegian Church Aid, and U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

Local CSOs struggle to secure diversified funding. The Tilitonse Foundation, which was originally a fund formed by multiple donors to promote social accountability, became a local foundation in 2017. Tilitonse advertised its first funding cycle towards the end of 2017 and required CSOs to submit applications for review before inviting them to develop project proposals. Tilitonse did not issue grants in 2017. Tight credit caused some businesses that support CSOs, such as banks, telecommunications companies, and petroleum companies, to scale down their corporate social responsibility programs, which tend to focus on activities such as the construction of schools and boreholes.

Although in the past CSOs commonly raised funds from the public, today the public perceives many CSOs as the personal projects of their leaders, and very few people support CSOs’ fundraising efforts.

CSOs may compete for government contracts. The government usually awards contracts to CSOs for work in civic education and food distribution. CSOs have alleged that the government rewards CSOs with funding in exchange for supporting its positions and interfering with the activities of other CSOs.

Some CSOs generate revenue by marketing services and products. For example, Banja La Mtsozolo (BLM), which is partly funded by Marie Stopes International, generates funding by charging for some reproductive services, such as the treatment of sexually transmitted infections. CSOs also earn income by operating radio stations, as in the case of YONECO and Livingstonia Church and Society, or orphanages, as in the case of SOS. The Consumer Association of Malawi (CAMA) generates income through consulting services.

Accountability has been a concern with some CSOs. In particular, small “briefcase” organizations lacking offices or physical addresses typically do not have defined and functioning management procedures and do not report on their activities. In 2017 financial problems arose when some organizations were unable to account fully for their grants from donors. For example, several CSOs and CBOs failed to account for their use of funds for a governance project supported by Tilitonse Fund and faced bankruptcy when they had to pay back part of their grants. Because of ongoing problems, in 2016 the NGO Board required CSOs to submit annual audited financial reports.
In 2017 CSOs vehemently resisted this demand, because they were concerned about the government’s intended use of their financial information. They argued that they are accountable to their donors rather than the NGO Board and cannot afford auditing services because of their expense, which is not covered by donor funding. The issue was still unresolved at the end of the year.

ADVOCACY: 4.6

CSO advocacy was more or less unchanged in 2017. Advocacy organizations continued to find it difficult to coordinate their activities and build constituencies. As a result, some activities were poorly attended or called off. The government and CSOs cooperate on a few policy issues. For example, the Farmers Union of Malawi and Civil Society Agriculture Network work with the Agricultural Research and Extension Trust on agricultural policy. At the same time, the government funded several organizations to voice positions opposing CSOs’ advocacy campaigns on the 50+1 proposal and ATI Act in 2017. The state-owned media dampened public support for these campaigns by confusing the public into believing that any criticism of government policies would weaken the constitution.

In general, a lack of funding and organizational capacity undermines CSOs’ attempts to coordinate activities. However, several CSO coalitions worked together on advocacy issues in 2017. Youth and Society (YAS), Church and Society, Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC), and Public Affairs Committee (PAC) formed networks to unite the sector in holding the government to account on corruption. They also protested, albeit unsuccessfully, the appointment of an inspector general of police accused of taking part in the 2011 killing of a student activist. The Media Institute of Southern Africa-Malawi, NGO Gender Coordination Network (NGOGCN), Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN), and Civil Society Agricultural Network continued to collaborate on investigating government policies that they believe contradict constitutional limits on presidential power. The Federation of Disability Organizations in Malawi continued to work on disabilities, although it barely commented on the persecution suffered by albinos in 2017. CSOs organized some protests, such as demonstrations against the 50 +1 proposal for presidential elections. However, when representatives of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) attended the protests, the public viewed the events as political in nature and stayed away.

In 2017 CSOs lobbied for changes in several bills, including the Elections Bill and a bill on presidential immunity. PAC, APAM, and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace continued to lobby parliament to enact laws protecting people with albinism, but progress on this issue was slow.

In 2017 CSOs protested the elimination of CONGOMA’s consultative role as proposed by the NGO Amendment Bill and succeeded in having the bill sent to the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee for review. CONGOMA filed a court case challenging the government’s proposed annual membership fee for CSOs, which was still pending at the end of the year.
CSO service provision did not change in 2017. International donors provided considerable funding for CSOs to work in areas such as healthcare, education, agriculture, and care for the elderly. However, given the high number of CSOs, competition for such funding was fierce, and many service-providing CSOs were unable to obtain funding during the year. The struggle for funding made it difficult for CSOs to cooperate, and their services were often duplicative. For example, there were overlapping projects on girls’ education and sexual and reproductive health, because CSOs refused to work together, fearing it would mean an end to employment and income at individual organizations. While international CSOs with greater capacity received the lion’s share of donor funding for “hard” services in health, education, and humanitarian relief, Malawian CSOs received funding for activities in “soft” areas, such as empowerment, civic education, and local governance. For example, Towvirane in Mzimba continued to bring young mothers back to school, and BLM and APAM provided glasses, sunscreen, and hats to albinos. Very few local CSOs, other than the Family Planning Association of Malawi, provided family planning and reproductive health services in 2017. Some international CSOs incorporated local CBOs into their service-providing activities.

As a result of concerns about CSOs’ insufficient consultation with communities, donors began to require that CSOs include communities in project system analyses in 2017. Donors now urge CSOs to conduct baseline surveys, hold project meetings with communities, and present their findings for approval to district executive committees, which monitor projects through monitoring and evaluation offices. These committees have approved many projects in youth empowerment, gender, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and the environment, but they resist projects involving the rights of LGBTs, either because they do not reflect community needs or are regarded as immoral. Civil servants often request that CSOs pay them or cover their allowances in exchange for attending their presentations of project results to district executive committees.

CSOs often provide goods and services that benefit individuals beyond their own members. For example, membership organizations such as Rotary, Rocket Men, and Lions Club constructed shelters in hospitals, donated drugs and equipment to hospitals, and donated food and sanitary products to communities in 2017. CSOs usually provide goods and services without discrimination. However, in 2017 some FBOs seemed inclined to discriminate on the basis of religion. In addition, beneficiary communities may themselves discriminate against individuals on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or religion.

CSOs do not normally seek to recover costs, since they are covered by project funding. Some CSOs generate funding from the sale of products and services. For example, BLM earns income by charging for the treatment of sexually transmitted infections, and CAMA generates income from consulting services.

In 2017 the government acknowledged the services provided by CSOs, especially international organizations such as the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, Zam Zam Foundation, and other FBOs. These organizations usually performed services that complemented the government’s own activities, such as distributing food and constructing schools. They were praised during government rallies and in the government-controlled media, and government ministers sometimes attended their handover ceremonies to show their appreciation.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6

The infrastructure supporting CSOs was stable in 2017.

There are few CSO resource centers in Malawi. Resource centers operating in 2017 included those hosted by NGO GCN, HRCC, and the Malawi Human Rights Commission, which offered books for borrowing, free newspapers, and Internet services. No new centers were established in 2017.

Tilitonse changed from a fund to local foundation and issued a call for concepts but did not issue grants in 2017. Because of accountability issues, the National AIDS Commission no longer receives funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and therefore no longer funds CSOs.

Malawian CSOs usually do not share information widely or coordinate their activities. However, in 2017 CSOs that were not affiliated with the government began to work together more readily. CONGOMA supported this effort by, for example, organizing discussion forums. Outside of CONGOMA, most networks are sector specific. They usually help members by publicizing funding opportunities, offering legal support, and organizing discussions, meetings, and advocacy forums.

Donors such as UNICEF, USAID, and the government offered some training to CSOs in 2017. Counterpart International’s Supporting the Efforts of Partners program helped build the organizational capacity of twenty-seven large and medium-sized Malawian organizations. CSO directors sometimes take part in training outside of the country.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.2

In 2017 the public image of CSOs worsened as the government-controlled broadcast media fueled negative public perceptions of CSOs and CSOs themselves struggled to articulate their impact.

As in previous years, media coverage of Malawian CSOs tended to be of three types. Pro-government CSOs enjoyed positive media coverage from state-based media; CSOs that were not pro-government enjoyed positive coverage from private media; and CSOs whose positions were unclear enjoyed positive coverage from all media, especially when they paid for press conferences. In 2017 state-controlled media sometimes castigated CSOs that were not pro-government in an attempt to refute any positive coverage they had received on private media. For example, state- and party-owned television and radio stations such as Galaxy FM criticized CSOs for organizing protests. The state-controlled media also publicized statements by pro-government CSOs that were intended to counter the messages of non-partisan CSOs. For example, pro-government CSOs were quoted in the state-controlled media as criticizing HRCC and CEDEP after they advocated for LGBT rights. CSO coalitions, such as HRDC, MESN, CEDEP, YAS, and Church and Society, held the government to account by organizing press conferences on corruption and similar issues. They were often supported in their efforts by private media, including Blantyre Newspapers, Nation Publications, Zodiak FM, and Capital FM. In 2017 several newspapers reported that certain CSOs pay journalists to report positively about their projects to ensure that their donors have a positive impression.

Public perceptions of CSOs were more negative in 2017. Since government-controlled broadcast media have wide coverage, are accessible by rural populations having a high rate of illiteracy, and, unlike private media, air in all of the country’s major languages, the public is easily swayed by the propaganda that the government broadcasts.
State-owned media dampened popular support for CSOs by convincing the public that any criticism of the government’s policies would weaken the constitution. When PAC and other CSOs suspended a demonstration calling for limits on the powers of the president, an end to frequent power outages, and amendments to the Elections Bill, people were furious and stayed away from the other demonstrations that they organized. The public also avoided CSO events at which the MCP was present, since it regarded them as political. CSOs’ payments to journalists in exchange for positive publicity dismayed the public as well.

It is rare for the central and local governments publicly to express positive perceptions of non-partisan CSOs if they are not supportive of government activities. In 2017 service-providing CSOs were more likely than advocacy organizations to be perceived positively. For example, the government favorably mentioned that international CSOs provided tangible services, such as drilling boreholes and constructing school buildings, but it publicly targeted CAMA because of its stance on Malawi’s deteriorating standard of living. The private sector’s view of CSOs is vague and unclear, but businesses do not usually express positive opinions of CSOs, since they are reluctant to displease the government, their biggest customer.

Few CSOs in Malawi have websites. Some organizations use social media to publicize their activities.

CSOs debated the need for self-regulation in 2017. Some organizations called for functioning boards, while others maintained that with donor funding tied to specific requirements, no further regulation was necessary.
Security continued to be a major issue in Mali in 2017, as armed conflicts that started in January 2012 in the north of the country continued to simmer. During the year there was an increasing number of attacks by Islamist groups allied with Al-Qaeda, and many areas remained under the control of jihadists and armed gangs. Government forces responded to these attacks with counter-terrorism operations, which often resulted in arbitrary arrests, executions, torture, and other ill treatment. The security situation hindered CSOs’ abilities to organize activities and provide services in parts of the country.

In a bid to lay the foundation for a final settlement of the country’s separatist conflict and foster reconciliation, the Conference of National Understanding was held in Bamako from March 27 to April 2, 2017. Although some contingents, including opposition political parties and armed groups, initially refused to participate, they ended up attending the conference in response to advocacy by civil society. Ultimately, the final report from the conference noted the participation of 1,078 participants representing every region in the country. Approximately 400 of the participants were CSO representatives. However, the conference fell short of its goal of adopting a national charter for peace, unity, and reconciliation. The conference’s results were hindered by flawed preparations and a general lack of commitment to inclusiveness by the two coalitions of armed groups that were signatories to the 2015 peace agreement, the Coordination for Azawad Movements and the Platform.

Another important event during the year was the attempt to organize a referendum on constitutional changes that would give the president additional powers, create new regions, and recognize the Tuareg’s ethnic homeland in the north of the country. Civil society and opposition political parties expressed concerns with greater powers for the president, including the authority to nominate one third of the senate and remove the prime minister at will. The referendum was originally scheduled for July but was postponed in late June with no new date set. Thousands of Malians took to the streets in mid-July to protest the referendum.

Local and regional council elections were unable to be held in fifty-nine municipalities in 2016 because of the absence of state representatives and an inability to guarantee security in these areas. The elections were rescheduled for 2017 but then were further postponed until April 2018 amidst security concerns following attacks by armed groups.
Mali undertook institutional reforms in 2017 to strengthen the capacities of transitional councils in two new regions in the north, Ménaka and Taoudéni, and create functioning regional development agencies in all regions. Work continued on demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, security sector reform, and operational capacity building for the armed forces and security forces. Through the National Civil Society Council (CNSC), CSOs participated in various advisory committees engaged in the work of regional development agencies and security sector reform.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2017. The only dimension in which any change was noted was advocacy, which improved as CSOs cooperated with various government entities, played a key role in suspending the constitutional referendum to ensure the country’s stability, advocated to bring all sides together at the Conference of National Understanding, and formed coalitions on such issues as combating corruption, food rights, and nutritional security.

In 2017 Mali had 1,450 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are associations that have signed official framework agreements with the government. This number includes 120 foreign NGOs and 1,330 domestic NGOs. The number of informal associations is unknown, and no estimates are available.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The legal environment governing the CSO sector did not change significantly in 2017.

Law 04-038 of 2004 continues to be the main law governing associations and NGOs. Foundations also operate, but no law governed their activities until August 25, 2017, when Mali’s National Assembly approved Law 2017-049 on foundations. Article 1 of this law states that a foundation is a private, not-for-profit entity created by one or more donors to pursue projects of general interest.

According to Law 04-038, associations may form and operate at will without prior authorization or declaration. However, they have legal status only if they publicly declare their formation. In practice, there are no major barriers to obtaining authorizations. As a result of the country’s security challenges and the rise in jihadism, background checks, which used to be acquired fairly quickly, now take longer to complete, and CSOs sometimes have difficulty finding government representatives to conduct the checks.

Associations may become NGOs by signing framework agreements with the government only after they have operated for three years, as documented by annual reports, minutes of meetings of management entities, and certified copies of financial statements. These agreements set forth both sides’ obligations, including clearly defined reporting requirements and tax exemptions for NGOs. Associations without framework agreements are not required to produce annual reports but are encouraged to do so anyway, since they must submit three years of reports when applying for NGO status. The reports are due by the end of March each year. Of the country’s 1,450 NGOs, only ninety-one had filed reports covering their activities in 2017 by the end of February 2018. On average, 400 to 500 CSOs file activity reports each year.

Law 04-038 is silent about the rules for associations’ internal governance, including general assemblies, boards, and secretariats. CSOs define these structures and systems in their bylaws and internal regulations. The law does not limit the scope, location, or manner of CSOs’ activities.

CSOs are generally able to operate without state interference. Articles 4 and 11 of Law 04-038 of 2004 state clearly that CSOs operate at will and may not be dissolved for political or arbitrary reason. The law specifies that national, regional, and local governments should monitor CSOs, but in practice this does not happen.
Only NGOs with framework agreements receive certain exemptions from customs duties and value-added tax on materials, supplies, and equipment needed to carry out their funded projects. The legal framework does not address tax deductions for donors making donations to CSOs.

CSOs may receive tax-exempt revenue from services such as research. NGOs may also bid on government contracts at the local and national levels. NGOs are not subject to the same taxes on contracts as consulting firms and private services, which creates the perception of unfair competition. CSOs are allowed to receive funds from foreign donors.

There are no attorneys in the country trained on laws governing CSOs. However, the Malian Human Rights Association (AMDH) trains attorneys to defend private citizens. Some CSOs, such as the DEME SO law clinic and the Mali Jurists’ Association, also train paralegals who serve as a source of legal information for CSOs. The leaders of CSO collectives at the national and local levels also provide legal assistance to CSOs, but they have varying levels of knowledge. Legal advice is also available outside of the CSO sector, but CSOs have limited funds to pay for these services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity was steady in 2017. Some CSOs demonstrated enhanced capacities to form support groups, mobilize constituents, and adapt their internal management structures to focus more on societal priorities, ranging from constitutional reforms to the national dialogues.

Nearly all NGOs state in their framework agreements that they work in all sectors and regions so as to be eligible for all funding opportunities. Nevertheless, CSOs strive to align their work with the needs of their target communities, such as with diagnostic and baseline studies and surveys to ensure that their work is effective. Most CSOs are not in the habit of developing strategic and operational plans because of limited and fluctuating financial resources. Instead of taking a population’s needs into account and proposing solutions to benefit them, CSOs simply respond to requests for proposals from international CSOs. This tendency has reduced the number of CSOs with projects addressing community needs, thereby harming their credibility with local populations. Donors’ current practice of funding consortia led by international CSOs does not promote the development of local organizations.

The law requires NGOs to report annually to the government about their activities and use of funds. Agreements with donors generally also require annual reports. In practice, smaller CSOs with limited financial and organization capacities, especially if they do not receive donor funding, are not able to meet these requirements.

In most cases, CSOs’ bylaws, internal regulations, and procedural manuals specify internal structures and management tools and clearly distinguish between the responsibilities of boards of directors, monitoring committees, and staff. In practice, CSOs often apply these principles inadequately. In a few CSOs, boards are dominated by a single individual, which hinders organizational transparency. In general, while CSOs’ policymaking entities, such as boards of directors and oversight committees, supervise entities that manage operations, their policy directives are often undermined by concrete funding opportunities, which instead drive CSOs’ activities.

Although CSOs are faced with limited financial resources, they increasingly engage in internal and external management audits to increase their credibility. To support their bids on various contracts, CSOs must create activity, financial, and audit reports and prove their legal status, relevant experience, and logistical and organizational capabilities.
CSOs engage staff to implement their programs. Staff are generally employed on a short-term contractual basis or part-time. Because of a high turnover rate, CSOs rarely invest in training staff members. Although Mali’s economic situation makes it very difficult to find motivated volunteers, NGOs often use volunteers to work on projects or fill gaps in their organizations. Other CSOs use volunteers less frequently. Volunteers do not always stay with organizations or provide high-quality services.

In general, CSOs’ office equipment and access to the Internet, including social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, are adequate. However, since CSOs suffer from a critical lack of institutional funding, they cannot pay for services seen as luxuries, such as high-speed Internet access and state-of-the-art computers. CSOs find it increasingly difficult to upgrade their office equipment, as their international partners, which receive the majority of donor funds, authorize them to spend only small amounts on overhead costs. Institutional support sometimes takes the form of supplies and equipment such as computers and motorbikes. When projects are finished, these items may be transferred to local partners to strengthen their institutional capacity but are sometimes taken back by the international CSOs overseeing the programs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

CSOs’ financial viability did not change in 2017. In general, NGOs continued to rely on funding from foreign donors, with the vast majority serving as subcontractors for international CSOs. CSOs receive insignificant amounts of money for management and administrative expenses, which limits their ability to self-fund or upgrade supplies and equipment.

Foreign funding levels remained roughly the same as in 2016. Donors such as Australian Aid, United Nations agencies, and the European Union (EU) made new funding available for programs supporting peace and reconciliation in 2017. For example, the EU gave EUR 615 million (approximately $700 million) to support the government’s 2014–20 National Indicative Program. This funding focuses on state reform, the consolidation of rule of law, rural development, food security, education, and transportation to create the conditions for lasting peace. CSOs are eligible for funding under this program. CSOs continue to be highly dependent on foreign support for humanitarian emergencies, especially as ongoing security concerns make it difficult for donors to conduct field visits or grant funding for development activities. The criteria included in donors’ calls for bids tend to favor organizations with greater capacity and resources. As a result, foreign funding is generally funneled through international organizations based in donor countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Germany. Domestic CSOs are largely relegated to second-tier status and play an implementation role. Because domestic CSOs are so dependent on foreign funding, they are ready to fill any role suggested by international partners when consortia are being formed.

Local funding sources are few, and fundraising efforts at the national or local level are not fruitful. CSOs rarely receive funding from the central or local governments. Such funding opportunities are usually found within the framework of donor-funded national-level projects and focus on training, information sharing, awareness building, social mobilization, and project evaluations. For example, in 2017 the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants Project for Mali, a World Bank-funded project with the Ministry of Economy and Finance that supports the re-integration of demobilized ex-combatants into local communities, engaged CSOs to provide orientation, counseling, and skills training for ex-combatants.

Local communities that benefit from CSOs’ services rarely contribute funds to their initiatives. However, some former residents’ associations contribute to activities in their villages, including initiatives to build and equip health centers and schools and construct drinking water wells. The private sector was not a significant source of financial support to CSOs in 2017.
All CSO members pay dues, which are usually not sufficient to ensure proper operations. CSOs sometimes generate revenue by offering services on a paid basis, and they may also obtain service contracts from donors for training, studies, surveys, or evaluations. For example, in 2017 the Dutch Directorate-General for European Cooperation awarded a contract to the Malian Association of Awakening to Sustainable Development to work on food security in Kifoso commune, including providing training to commune leaders.

The majority of Malian CSOs have financial management systems and administrative, financial, and accounting procedure manuals. Many CSOs conduct internal account audits and publish financial reports, which they submit to the government in accordance with Law 04-038. However, only larger NGOs engage professionals to conduct annual external audits, a practice that strengthens their credibility.

**ADVOCACY: 3.6**

Advocacy improved slightly in 2017 as CSOs played an important role in addressing urgent national issues. CSOs cooperate with local and central governments by participating in various entities, including the Central Office for the Prevention of Illicit Enrichment and the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. The Reconciliation Commission’s regional and local branches rely heavily on information from civil society, especially human rights NGOs. For example, AMDH investigates human rights violations and collects testimony from victims, which it shares with the Reconciliation Commission. In 2017 the Budget Monitoring Group, a CSO network, continued to prepare citizens’ budgets and distribute them in various regions. CSOs also continued to participate in the evaluation framework for public finance management.

CSOs such as CNSC and the Antè a bana network made recommendations on some major issues in Mali in 2017. CSOs played a key role in suspending the constitutional referendum to ensure the country’s stability and advocated to bring all sides together at the Conference of National Understanding. The conference was attended by more than 1,000 representatives of the government, political opposition, armed groups, and civil society. Although 400 civil society representatives participated in the conference, not all CSOs that wished to participate were invited. Advocacy initiatives related to the dialogue process, especially the distribution of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, remained tentative.

Forty CSOs formed the National Anti-Corruption Coalition in 2017. The coalition conducted and shared the results of a study on preventing corruption in Mali and intends to conduct similar anti-corruption advocacy initiatives in the future. Other new coalitions focused on such issues as food rights and nutritional security formed in 2017 at both the national and regional levels.

CSOs are very comfortable with lobbying and created a specific entity, the Advocacy and Lobbying Network, for this purpose. In May 2017 the network organized training on corruption for media professionals and CSO representatives and launched a national campaign to denounce corruption. CNSC successfully advocated for food and nutrition security to be addressed in Article 17 of the draft constitutional revision law in 2017.

CSOs did not engage in any initiatives aimed at promoting a more favorable legal framework in 2017, including the passage of Law 2017-049 governing foundations.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7

The range of goods and services offered by CSOs did not change in 2017. Security risks continued to be a significant obstacle to access by CSO workers. Despite the unfavorable conditions, CSOs continued to provide basic social services, including infrastructure and consulting related to drinking water, hygiene, sanitation, education, health, energy, and food and nutritional security. CSOs also offered capacity-building services and support services for revenue-generating activities.

In 2017 CSOs helped some government-built schools and health centers continue operating, as they can work in places the government is unable to reach. CSOs’ goods and services generally benefit the public at large.

International CSOs continued to collaborate with local NGOs. The number of international organizations active in Mali has decreased, but along with UN agencies they remain the most active organizations in humanitarian assistance and development. Their activities are well received by other CSOs, the authorities, and the public because of their enhanced technical and operational capabilities, their experience in the aid sector, and especially, their reliance on local organizations, which are selected according to rigorous criteria.

The central, regional, and local governments and the public recognize CSOs’ contributions, although their appreciation rarely translates into financial support. Local populations sometimes perceive CSOs as funding entities, which limits their ability to recover costs.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6

The infrastructure supporting the sector did not change significantly in 2017.

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers provide CSOs with information and training services. Training focuses on such issues as humanitarian standards, information management, advocacy, child protection, democratic governance, and response to natural disasters. These organizations utilize new information technologies, such as websites, portals, and social networks, to foster information exchange. ISOs receive most of their financing from foreign donors, including the World Bank and the EU.

International organizations run many programs that provide financial support to domestic CSOs, including a program to build communities’ abilities to resist violent extremism, funded by the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund; a program to strengthen food and nutrition security, funded by the Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation; the Selected Integrative Reading Activity and Food For Education programs, funded by USAID; and programs on education, nutrition, and other topics run by various clusters of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Many other programs are funded by French, Belgian, Swiss, Swedish, Norwegian, German, Danish, and other bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies. A few domestic CSOs, including the Malian Child Welfare Project of the Sahel, Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel, and Malian Association for the Protection and Development of the Environment in the Sahel, have sufficient skill and managerial capacity to award sub-grants to other local CSOs.

Cooperation in the CSO sector intensified in 2017. CSOs increasingly worked together in networks and coalitions on national objectives, such as social cohesion and peace promotion. Two major CSO players were CNSC and the Forum of Civil Society Organizations, whose topic-specific groups focused on education, health and population, natural resource management, and institutional support. The events of 2017, including opposition to the referendum on revising the constitution and Mali’s Conference of National
Understanding, led to a number of new centers of civil society activity. For example, networks such as Antè a bana united the vast majority of CSOs against revising the constitution.

CSOs have access to technical capacity-building resources throughout the country, especially on-the-job training. However, the few trainings aimed specifically at CSOs usually require payment, and CSOs rarely have the funds needed to train many of their members. Training entities such as the National Institute of Training of Social Workers are concentrated in the capital, and very few are located elsewhere.

CSOs partner both formally and informally with public entities such as universities and research institutes in agro-economics, health, education, hydraulics, and other areas. For example, the Malian Association for Food Security and Sovereignty collaborates on agro-economics topics with the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, the Rural Economy Institute, and the University of Ségou.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

The public image of CSOs did not change in 2017. Successful advocacy on national unity topics, such as the constitutional reforms and CSOs’ participation in the Conference of National Understanding, bolstered positive perceptions of CSOs. The image of CSOs was also supported by their delivery of basic services and humanitarian assistance in crisis situations, particularly in areas where the government is not present.

In general, CSOs receive favorable media coverage. CSOs are able to obtain coverage of their activities throughout the country but must pay for it. Media coverage of their activities in the field has decreased, because the unsafe circumstances make it very dangerous for the media to travel outside of the capital.

The public has a positive perception of CSOs, especially their advocacy work on national issues such as corruption, food insecurity, and governance. However, outside of the capital the visibility of CSOs’ activities remains relatively low, except among local populations that benefit directly from CSOs’ interventions.

The government appreciates CSOs because their services complement its own. Partners in the government continue to stress the value of CSOs’ work in providing services and food aid to displaced persons. The private sector still widely perceives CSOs as sources of funding and even competitors, in the rare cases in which CSOs conduct revenue-generating activities or compete for government procurements.

Given the low rate of Internet penetration in Mali, CSOs rely mostly on traditional channels, including criers, theatres, and skits, rather than social media for public outreach.

CSOs have adopted and instituted codes of ethics, which are often a prerequisite to receiving foreign funding. NGOs with framework agreements are legally required to file annual activity and financial reports with the Ministry for Regional Administration and its regional branches.
Mozambique faced an uncertain future in 2017. After a truce agreement was reached in December 2016 between the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), the country’s years-long military conflict gave way to relative tranquility. Negotiations between the two sides culminated in a meeting between the president and the leader of RENAMO in August. However, by the end of the year a final agreement had yet to be reached, and most observers did not expect the peace to be permanent. The October assassination of the mayor of Nampula, who was a member of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), the third largest party, raised many questions, and FRELIMO and MDM traded accusations of murder. In the same month, the country confronted a new threat in the form of attacks by Islamic extremists in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, which led to the deaths of sixteen people, including several security forces.

After the discovery of $2 billion of hidden debt in 2015 and 2016, Mozambique continued to experience economic turmoil in 2017. Responding to pressure from civil society and the international community, the government undertook an international forensic audit but failed to release the complete audit results or prosecute the individuals at the center of the scandal. After the government defaulted on paying back loans to investors, international donors and the International Monetary Fund froze their support. Meanwhile, multinational companies continued to take advantage of numerous waivers to exploit Mozambique’s natural resources, with little or no benefit for local communities.

Civil society struggled amid the complex challenges facing the country in 2017. CSOs’ legal environment deteriorated as organizations that took a critical stance toward the government were harassed with threats and intimidation. CSOs found it increasingly difficult to access financial resources, which put smaller organizations at risk. Nevertheless, CSOs’ organizational capacity improved thanks to well-targeted technical assistance, which became possible after the halt in hostilities. CSOs’ service provision, advocacy, and public image, as well as the sectoral infrastructure, were stable during the year.
No official up-to-date statistics are available about the number of CSOs in Mozambique. The Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation estimates that there are about 10,000 formal and informal organizations, with a possible increase in new organizations in 2017 offset by the closure of other organizations, mainly because of a lack of funds.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

The legal environment for Mozambican CSOs deteriorated in 2017 as the government stepped up measures against organizations that took a critical stance.

All CSOs register as associations under the Associations Law 8/91. CSOs may acquire legal status at the national level from the Ministry of Justice, at the provincial level from provincial governors, and at the district level from district administrators. Organizations are usually able to begin working before completing the registration process. However, this flexibility is often extended only to organizations whose activities complement those of the government. Advocacy organizations that reveal “anti-government tendencies” may be told to stop their activities or experience deliberate delays in their registrations. For example, in 2017 the Mozambican Citizens Platform in Zambézia started its registration process at the same time as four other organizations with a more pro-government orientation. The registrations of the other organizations were approved within two weeks, but the platform’s registration took more than two months. In the course of the registration process, the registry recommended that the platform change the scope of its mandate from governance to activities that would complement those of the government. Although the platform refused to comply, its registration was eventually approved. Another example of differential treatment by the authorities is the case of the Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMBDA), which has been waiting ten years for approval of its registration application.

CSO registration is also costly. New organizations must publish their constitutions in the official government publication, *Boletim de República*, and the cost of publication can be a barrier for many organizations. The Mozambican Association for the Support of Women and Girls, a province-based CSO, reported that it was required to pay MZN 29,075 (approximately $500) to publish in the bulletin, an amount that be would out of the reach of most local CSOs. CSOs must also hire lawyers to verify their constitutions prior to publication, which most organizations also cannot afford. As a result, the majority of CSOs at the local level do not complete the registration process, which makes them ineligible for funding from donors that consider registration a pre-requisite.

The Associations Law 8/91 is generally favorable to CSO operations. One potentially problematic provision allows the government to close or suspend CSOs that are unable to prove that their members actively participate, but this provision remains unimplemented. However, the government interfered in CSOs’ internal operations in other ways in 2017. In a deliberate strategy to undermine the Association of Friends Born in Namaacha in Maputo Province, the local government enticed key staff away from the association with jobs offering better salaries and working conditions. The Center for Public Integrity (CIP), Observatory for Rural Development (OMR), Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), and other organizations that address corruption, the national debt, and other issues that pose difficulties for the government continued to be harassed and verbally threatened in 2017. On the local level, CSOs accused anonymously of being enemies of the state were mistrusted by local authorities.
The Network of Associations in Cahora Bassa, based in Chitima District in Tete Province, was urged to change the focus of its work after the district government made it clear that monitoring and advocacy focused on issues of governance were not tasks for civil society. The Cultural Association for Sustainable Development was required to justify the need to bring together a large number of people for consultations, despite the fact that this activity is within its mandate and a right under the Mozambican constitution and laws governing CSOs. CSOs do not pay taxes on donations from individual or corporate donors. A limited number of organizations such as the Foundation for Community Development (FDC) benefit from tax exemptions by registering as public utility organizations. However, this status is difficult to obtain because of the cumbersome approval process, and fewer than 1 percent of CSOs have acquired it.

The CSO law permits organizations to earn income, but only a few well-established CSOs such as N’weti do so. A small group of organizations benefit from government contracts.

Local lawyers with experience in CSO-related law are available in the capital and provinces but are out of the financial reach of most CSOs. Organizations at the district and community levels complain that the free legal advice offered by the Institute of Sponsorship and Legal Assistance (IPAJ), a state institution, is sometimes denied to CSOs, since the IPAJ believes that they have sufficient funds of their own to pay for lawyers. The IPAJ’s services are also not of the quality that CSOs require.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

The organizational capacity of Mozambican CSOs improved in 2017. Despite a decline in donor funding, the suspension of the military conflict provided a more secure work environment and opened up the possibility for CSOs to receive technical assistance from cooperating partners. MASC, Concern, and numerous other international organizations hosted ongoing technical assistance and training programs, which helped raise the overall capacity of Mozambican CSOs during the year. Grantees benefitting from these programs were better able to identify the areas in which they should work, the scale of the problems they should address, and the challenges posed by the contexts in which they operate. For example, after receiving training, the National Human Rights Program in Sofala Province carried out a desktop study and baseline assessment that showed that the natural resource problems that it focused on were not as bad as originally thought. The organization therefore decided to suspend its activities in this area and focus on other issues. Similarly, the Mozambican Association of Judges received support in restructuring its systems, procedures, and staffing, and the Association of Secondary School Students in Mozambique (AESMO) was helped in developing a proposal for a project to combat sexual harassment in secondary schools, which was supported by various donors. Ophenta in Nampula and Association Voice of Zambézia also received technical support in structuring their organizations, so that they could complete the registration process and become fully operational.

Organizations often lack a permanent presence in their target communities, which can limit the impact of their work, because their programming goals are not community priorities. In contrast, village development organizations in locations such as Cabo Delgado Province are locally led initiatives and typically involve communities in mapping out their priorities from the outset. Community members are then trained to mobilize the community and lobby local government officials for assistance. Through a combination of community self-help and local government funding, this approach often results in the resolution of various problems facing local communities, such as the lack of water pumps in Mocímboa de Praia in Cabo Delgado Province.
Larger CSOs, such as Forum Mulher, Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust, and Governance and Development Institute, are able to develop strategic and operational plans, thanks to sufficient internal expertise and the availability of small amounts of funding to hire technical support for the final planning phase. International grant makers such as those working under the Actions for Inclusive and Responsible Governance (AGIR) II program, an initiative of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, require strategic plans as a prerequisite for funding and often offer potential partners technical support for the planning process. However, smaller provincial and district-based CSOs, such as those belonging to the Inhambane Provincial Forum (FOPROI), lack funding to develop strategic plans. They are also wary of being boxed into certain areas of work, preferring instead to remain open to all funding opportunities. As a result of their lack of long-term strategies, these organizations often respond to calls for proposals without considering their missions and visions.

Most CSOs have basic internal management systems and procedures. These structures are usually required by donors, and although most CSOs already have them in place before obtaining donor funding, they may not observe them in practice. For example, in smaller organizations, governing bodies—particularly the fiscal council, which has an internal auditing function—are generally weak. A division of responsibilities between the governing bodies and the executive staff is not always evident.

CSOs usually offer contracts to staff in accordance with Mozambican law, but they do not always make required payments of taxes and social security. The drop in funding in 2017, which was particularly hard for CSOs at the provincial and district levels, led smaller members of FOPROI to turn to part-time operations or temporarily close their doors, since they were unable to retain full-time staff. As these CSOs waited for grants to resume operations, staff turnover increased. CSOs such as the Estamos Association in Niassa Province increasingly used university students as volunteers. This was a win-win situation, since CSOs gained human resources while students gained valuable job experience. Professional staff such as accountants, information technology managers, and lawyers remain unaffordable for the majority of CSOs.

Mozambique is technologically well advanced, and CSOs at the national and provincial levels have access to modern equipment, including computers, copiers, and scanners. At the district and community levels, CSOs’ equipment is outdated or, especially in the case of cell phones and computers, the personal property of staff. Internet access continues to improve, although there are still many districts with weak signals. Given Mozambicans’ pervasive reliance on cell phones, CSOs mostly use WhatsApp and Facebook to communicate and disseminate information about their work.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2**

CSOs’ funding situation declined in 2017. The vast majority of CSOs’ financial resources come from outside the country. During the year the funding cycles of a number of major programs, including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the European Union’s Support Program for Non-State Actors (PAANE I), came to an end, and their new funding cycles had yet to begin. In addition, the Danish International Development Agency wound down operations in anticipation of the forthcoming closure of the Danish Embassy in Mozambique. Other major governance programs, such as the Citizen Engagement Program, funded by UK Aid and Irish Aid, and the Democratic Governance Support Program (Diálogo), funded by the UK’s Department for International Development, were in their final full year of operations. Their impending closures contributed to significant reductions in the level of available funding, especially for smaller CSOs at the provincial and district levels.
In a common arrangement, CSOs such as the Zambézia Voice Association in Tete and Roots of Citizenship in Maputo depend on a single donor, which provides short-term, one- to two-year grants that offer only limited support for organizational costs and little or none for organizational development. Other small organizations such as the Association of Secondary School Students of Mozambique benefit from a few donors and receive material and equipment from larger national CSOs on an ad hoc basis. Only large, well-established CSOs such as N’weti receive basket funding from a small network of donors. Basket funding includes support for core costs, organizational development, and the implementation of longer-term strategic plans, but it does not reach more than 1 percent of all CSOs, and most of these are based in Maputo. Many donors require completed registration as a condition for funding.

Mozambique has few sources of local philanthropy. The idea of local philanthropy is still very new, and CSOs receive little financial support from individuals or local communities. Beneficiary communities believe that CSOs are already equipped with adequate financial and material resources and that they therefore do not need to contribute anything other than volunteer labor. CSOs themselves make little effort to encourage their members or the public to contribute to their programs. Exceptionally, the Mozambican Red Cross is usually able to raise funds from the public during emergencies such as floods and droughts through campaigns in print and broadcast media.

The Associations Law 8/91 permits organizations to earn income. However, with the exception of well-established CSOs such as N’weti, very few organizations do so because of negligible experience in income generation and a lack of funds for investment. CSOs obtain minimal revenue from the sale of services and products or rent, and membership CSOs obtain little income from their members, since the majority of them fail to pay their dues. Alternative models of income generation, such as social enterprises and income bonds, are rare. Government and business support for CSOs remains extremely limited, although a small group of organizations have benefited from government contracts. For example, in partnership with the government, Estamos Association in Niassa is helping communities register their land.

As a result of multiple training programs and technical support from their partners, many CSOs have sound financial management systems. Nearly all CSOs, including Friend Support Foundation in Tete and Union of Peasants and Associations in Niassa, use basic spreadsheets for their accounting. Full accounting software is used only by the largest national CSOs, which account for fewer than 5 percent of organizations. However, transparency is not optimal, since only very large national CSOs have the means to carry out independent financial audits and publish and distribute annual reports and financial statements to audiences beyond their donors.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

Advocacy by Mozambican CSOs was stable in 2017. Several programs, including Counterpart’s Civic Partnership for Good Governance in Mozambique, have supported the development of organizational and staff advocacy capacity and helped CSOs contribute successfully to policy formation over the last two years. In 2017, as CSOs at the national level continued to work on critical issues, including political and military conflicts and the debt crisis, they adopted a more proactive approach to providing ideas and suggesting solutions. The government and political parties responded positively to the new approach and especially welcomed CSOs’ suggestions for decentralization and demilitarization. While neither issue has been resolved, discussions between CSOs and the government were positive steps toward realizing a more important role for civil society in Mozambique. Most cooperation between CSOs and the government remained ad hoc, but a new initiative, the Mozambique Citizens Observatory, was launched in 2017 to establish institutional links between CSOs and the parliament.
The initiative aims to ensure that CSOs participate regularly in discussions of laws and monitor the performance of deputies and parliamentary commissions.

Some research institutions became more involved in lobbying and advocacy in 2017. For example, OMR established direct lines of communication to the president’s office and its line ministry so that it could propose alternative methods of agricultural development. OMR promoted its work by hosting workshops and seminars, meeting formally and informally with government officials, and making presentations in the written and broadcast media. At the local level, the Sucesso Association in Manica Province worked with the local government, particularly district health services, to fight corruption in local maternity wards. Their work together was so successful that it is being replicated in other districts in the province. Another noteworthy effort was the work of Civil Society Forum for Child Rights in Mozambique (ROSC), a group of organizations focused on preventing child marriage. ROSC and the Institute for Research in Health and Population presented statistical analysis at workshops attended by provincial government officials in Nampula and other provinces. The workshops demonstrated to some CSOs that they were prioritizing the wrong districts and helped them identify other districts more in need of interventions. ROSC also met with members of parliament and representatives of the national government to discuss reform of family law. Notably few organizations at the provincial level campaigned actively on debt or corruption issues in 2017.

CSOs collaborated with the Ministry of Justice to revise the CSO law during the year. The draft law presented by the ministry in early 2017 attempted to bring together various pieces of legislation, including the Associations Law 8/91 and the law on international non-governmental organizations. However, CSOs at both the provincial and national levels criticized countrywide consultations on the law as inadequate. Organizations also complained that the draft law is poorly written, will be impossible to implement, and contains many contradictions. The CSO platform Juntos, which seeks to support CSO sustainability, submitted a request to the Supreme Court to have the proposed law declared unconstitutional.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs in Mozambique continued to offer a diversity of interventions and services in 2017, with the emphasis on health, education, water and sanitation, and natural and mineral resources.

Although CSOs’ services are partially guided by donors’ interests, some CSOs also consult with local communities. For example, the Center for Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building (CESC) uses citizens’ scorecards to help communities determine their priorities. This approach, carried out in collaboration with local governments, has brought about changes at the community level, including greater community participation in the management of the government fund that supports schools. Some CSOs use baseline assessments to ensure that their projects are community priorities and respond to real needs. But this approach is still the exception, in part because many CSOs lack the expertise to carry out such work and have little to no contact with local universities, which could supply technical support and guidance.

CSO services benefit not only their own members but also the larger communities and districts in which they work. Official forums and platforms, such as the Forum of Community Radios and the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection, offer space in which CSOs can share the results of their work. The Juntos platform offers opportunities for sharing experiences among a small but growing number of CSOs. CSOs work without discriminating on the basis of race or ethnicity. However, the fight for gender equality is still in its infancy in Mozambique, and CSOs’ activities at the community level continue to be dominated by men.
The sale of services and use of social enterprise models are still rare among Mozambican CSOs. In general, they lack the funds and creativity needed to set up such initiatives, because they are so donor dependent.

CSOs are generally well received by local governments as long as they do not work on sensitive issues, such as corruption or debt. For example, the president of the municipal council in Boane thanked the Brotar Association for its contribution to the participatory budgeting process that took place in the municipality for the first time in 2017. The organization monitored service provision and provided advocacy support.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

Intermediate support organizations and resource centers do not exist in Mozambique. Most CSOs have access to information, technology, training, and technical assistance through their donors, other CSOs, or international partners. These resources, while important, are not sufficient to meet CSOs’ needs.

The main local grantmaking organizations active in 2017 included FDC, MASC Foundation, and, under the AGIR II program, Diakonia, Oxam Ibis, Oxfam Novib, and We Effect. These organizations re-grant international donor funds, primarily through calls for proposals.

Largely because of a push from donors, CSOs increasingly understand that working together in consortiums is the most effective and secure way to carry out advocacy work. In addition collaborating through registered thematic and provincial forums, CSOs improved their exchange of information and cooperation through consortiums in 2017. For example, Vote for Mozambique and Electoral Observation, which emerged during the year to work on issues related to the 2018 elections, sought to avoid overlap in their activities and shared information on election processes. MASC Foundation supported twenty-five informal consortiums, which benefited not only from funding but also from extensive training in political-economic analysis, power mapping, advocacy campaigns, and baseline assessments. Formal networks such as Forum Mulher, Child Network, and Platform for the Marginalized continued to work effectively in their respective areas. No one forum unites all of Mozambican CSOs’ interests. The CSO platform Juntos has a nationwide mandate but its membership is small at only twenty organizations.

As in previous years, the lack of funding meant that few smaller organizations engaged in capacity-building efforts, other than the short courses in project design, financial management, and internal governance offered by international partners to their grantees. However, larger, well-established CSOs benefited from a number of training opportunities. For example, the MASC Foundation offered training in advocacy to sixty-two grantee organizations in 2017. MASC has adopted a learning-by-doing approach, which includes mentoring and monitoring in addition to classroom training. The same approach has been implemented by the AGIR II program, which offers training in strategic planning to help CSOs gradually build up their internal capacity prior to receiving large grants. Most training is carried out in Portuguese. Few materials are available in local languages, because participants are usually not able to read them.

There is limited understanding among CSOs of the advantages of working with the private sector and government. However, the Innovation Space at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, which became fully functional in 2017, offers a unique example of collaboration between civil society, academia, the private sector, and the government. The Innovation Space is a civil society entity that provides a facility in which Mozambican technology students can design and test their ideas, with support from the MASC Foundation. CSOs also collaborate with the media, although this area, too, is still in its infancy.
Leading CSO representatives have agreements with media outlets, such as Savana, Mozambique Channel, and Soico TV, to serve as political commentators.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6**

The media generally portrays CSOs in a positive light. In particular, the independent media is usually positive about CSOs’ work. Organizations engaged in advocacy on decentralization, for example, usually receive positive coverage. The government-influenced Jornal Notícias and Television of Mozambique often report somewhat negatively about CSOs’ interventions, and even the private media provide negative coverage of CSOs’ internal challenges. At the local level, CSOs often work through community radio stations. The media in Niassa and Nampula provinces provided wide-scale coverage of roundtable debates on early marriage and childhood pregnancy in 2017. District-level coverage can be positive, although CSOs must often provide journalists with logistical support such as transportation. CSOs’ success in working with the media often depends as much on their staffs’ abilities to network with local journalists as on the media’s interest in collaboration.

CSOs are not well understood by the public, which tends to see them either as private enterprises or as well-resourced agents of international agencies. As a result, the public has little sense of ownership for CSOs’ work. Even community radio stations, which in theory serve local interests, get little direct support from local communities.

The government has a mixed view of CSOs. Organizations that work on controversial issues such as corruption are seen as troublesome, while those working in service provision are viewed favorably, since they are considered to contribute to the government’s work. The business sector has a largely negative perception of CSOs, especially those that work on natural and mineral resources, since they consider them overprotective of citizens’ rights and unaware of the work of companies and their division of responsibilities with local governments.

Advocacy organizations often share their work through interviews in the written media, participation in televised debates, and presentation of their findings and recommendations at workshops and public debates, which government and parliamentary officials sometimes attend. Other CSOs do very little to promote their public image. They seem to lack understanding of the advantages of publicizing their work, as well the skills needed to interact effectively with journalists to gain coverage without paying high fees. A notable exception is the Mozambican Red Cross, which during a tropical cyclone in 2017 raised emergency funds and materials through television, radio, and newspaper notices. In addition, before beginning a project to monitor corruption in health centers, the Sucesso Association in Manica engaged in lobbying and cultural activities to create a favorable environment for its work. Many CSOs use social media, especially WhatsApp, to communicate with the public, since they already use it in their private lives.

A CSO code of conduct was created by a group of CSOs in 2015, but adherence to it is still minimal. Few CSOs are aware of its existence, and little has been done to publicize it. CSOs are usually transparent in reporting to their members and donors but do not make the same volume of information available to the public or in the media, in part because of the high cost. Even larger CSOs, such as CESC and IESE, which function in a democratic and transparent manner, report in detail to their members and donors but do not publish their reports in the media. Most CSOs post limited financial information on their websites.
Two main issues dominated Namibia’s political arena in 2017: land reform and the national congress of the ruling party, Swapo. The government withdrew its land reform bill from parliament at the beginning of the year to allow for further consultations and a national land conference. The conference was eventually postponed until 2018 after civil society groups complained that the government was behind in its preparations for a gathering of such importance. Meanwhile, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) emerged, led by former Swapo Deputy Minister Bernardus Swartbooi, and put the contentious issues of ancestral land claims, land expropriation, and corruption in the government’s resettlement scheme on the political agenda. At the Swapo party congress in November, President Hage Geingob confirmed his control of both the ruling party and the government after easily beating his rivals following a fractious campaign. Opposition parties remained weak and fragmented, and the main opposition group, the Popular Democratic Movement (PDM), had only five seats in the ninety-six-member National Assembly.

Despite its status as an upper middle-income country, Namibia remains one of the world’s most unequal countries, with vast income disparities between the rich and the poor. Since 2015 the government has faced a serious fiscal crisis, and the national economy remained in recession in 2017. According to the 2016 Labor Force Survey, which offers the most recent data, unemployment was at 34 percent, with significantly higher rates among youth. Many infrastructure projects were halted or postponed in 2017, and several thousand construction workers lost their jobs. The United Nations reported in 2017 that 29 percent of the Namibian population was undernourished and 30 percent of children under five suffered from stunted growth. In the face of these challenges, the government focused its Fifth National Development Plan, adopted in 2017, on economic progress, social transformation, environmental sustainability, and good governance. In developing the plan, the government consulted with CSOs, but the final document failed to spell out a clear role for civil society.

The sustainability of Namibian civil society declined in 2017. The legal environment deteriorated as the government failed to reform a draconian research law, increased restrictions on work visas for foreign experts, and failed to repeal the apartheid-era Protection of Information Act. The president verbally attacked CSOs, claiming that they were led by failed politicians who simply want to undermine the ruling party.
The financial viability of CSOs worsened significantly as foreign donors continued to withdraw. CSOs’ organizational capacity, service provision, and infrastructure also declined as a result of deepening financial problems. Despite these challenges, advocacy by CSOs gained in prominence, thanks in part to an increase in lobbying on access to information and whistleblower protection and the emergence of the social movement LPM. CSOs’ public image did not change in 2017.

In 2015 the Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) reported that 568 CSOs existed in Namibia. Of these only about 10 percent were strong, established organizations. Approximately half of them worked in the field of healthcare and HIV/AIDS, while 10 percent were active in economic and social justice, democracy, governance, and human rights. Since 2015 there has been no formal survey of civil society to establish the overall number of CSOs or identify the sectors in which they work. However, at the end of 2017 the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) identified sixty active CSOs in the Windhoek area able to contribute to consultations involving the African Peer Review Mechanism. The largest sectors were democracy and human rights, labor (including trade unions), and healthcare and HIV/AIDS. There appear to be few active CSOs outside the capital, although no survey has been undertaken to confirm this.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.5**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated in 2017, as the government failed to withdraw or amend Namibia’s draconian research law, increased restrictions on work visas for foreign experts, and failed to repeal the apartheid-era Protection of Information Act.

CSOs in Namibia may register as trusts with the Master of the High Court or as companies not for gain with the Business and Intellectual Property Authority. Alternatively, they may operate as voluntary associations, which do not need to register with a government agency but must have written constitutions. CSOs conducting certain public welfare activities and requesting donations from the government or the public must also register either as welfare organizations with the Ministry of Health Services or as educational institutions with the Ministry of Education. Most CSOs operate as voluntary associations, since they are subject to fewer regulatory requirements. CSOs may also constitute themselves informally, although this can make fundraising difficult if they fail to comply with legally prescribed financial controls. CSOs based outside the capital often find it difficult to register, since they must travel to Windhoek to deal with the relevant government bodies.

In 2017 several CSOs complained that their work was impeded by difficulties and delays in obtaining works visas for specialized foreign staff, even if it was clear that such skills were not available in Namibia. Similar delays affected the private sector.

During the year the newly established oversight body for research, the National Commission on Research Science and Technology, pressured researchers and academics to register their research activities under the Research, Science, and Technology Act of 2004, which requires all organizations and individuals engaged in research to apply for permits for their projects. In 2016 IPPR, Legal Assistance Center (LAC), and *The Namibian* newspaper filed suit with the High Court to have parts of the law struck down as unconstitutional. The case dragged on in 2017 and remained undecided at the end of the year. The government offered to pursue a negotiated settlement, but the amendments to the law suggested by government as part of the settlement were not acceptable to the organizations bringing the legal action.
The president launched a strong verbal attack on civil society at a Swapo rally in the southern town of Keetmanshoop in March 2017. He claimed that CSOs were led by “failed politicians” trying to act like the opposition. This was an isolated incident, and it was not clear what prompted the attack. However, the speech raised concerns among CSOs, since it came from the head of state. The continued existence of the 1982 Protection of Information Act was also of concern to CSOs in 2017, because they feared it could be used to restrict freedom of expression and possibly target CSOs and the media. Although the law was not actively implemented during the year, CSOs in the Access to Information in Namibia (ACTION) coalition, an umbrella group of governance and human rights organizations, continued to campaign for a new access to information law.

According to the Income Tax Act of 1981 as amended, ecclesiastical, charitable, and educational institutions of a public character, whether or not supported wholly or partly by grants from the public revenue, are exempt from income tax. Individual and corporate donors receive tax deductions only on donations to CSOs registered as welfare organizations or educational institutions.

CSOs are legally able to earn income by providing goods and services and through government contracts. However, aside from welfare organizations, CSOs find it difficult to obtain government funding, and most government contracts go to private companies. There are no legal limitations on the ability of CSOs to obtain funding from foreign sources.

Legal advice from private practitioners is available to CSOs in the capital, but it can be costly. Only LAC provides legal assistance to CSOs on a pro bono basis. It is difficult for CSOs outside of Windhoek to obtain legal advice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1**

The organizational capacity of CSOs deteriorated in 2017, mainly because of the closure of capacity-building organizations and constraints caused by persistent funding problems. Several leading capacity-building organizations were either defunct or temporarily inactive in 2017. For example, the main umbrella body for CSOs, the Namibian Non-Governmental Organizations Forum (NANGOF) Trust, has been mostly dormant since its funding wound down in 2016, and thus it did not offer capacity-building support in 2017. Similarly, the training program on CSO management offered by the Namibia Institute for Democracy came to a halt when the institute temporarily closed during the year. Compounding this difficulty was the tendency of donors and international CSOs to overlook the needs of Namibian CSOs for capacity-building support. For example, some international organizations competed for funds against domestic organizations and organized activities in the areas in which established Namibian CSOs already operated, effectively undermining their work. Since these international organizations receive technical support and funding for overhead costs from their head offices, they are better resourced than local CSOs and thus more credible to donors. As a result, Namibian CSOs must increasingly rely on funding for short-term projects, which usually does not include allowances for operating expenses such as rent and utilities. The net result for Namibian CSOs is unreliable incomes, staffing uncertainties, and management and oversight problems.

In previous years Namibian CSOs often failed to engage deeply with indigenous constituencies and lacked grassroots support. In 2017 this trend seemed to change course with the emergence of the LPM in the southern part of the country. The grassroots movement united youth activists and members of marginalized communities to bring attention to land issues, which are a highly emotional topic in Namibia. The Affirmative Repositioning (AR) movement, which was prominent in urban land and housing issues in 2016, was less influential in 2017.
Although most CSOs are centered in Windhoek, organizations such as the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia established low-cost housing schemes for thousands of residents in other areas, including the Otjozondjupa, Erongo, and Karas regions.

Because of the general lack of funding, Namibian CSOs increasingly operated in an ad hoc manner and did not undertake longer-term strategic planning in 2017. Many organizations focused on dealing with the next crisis or finding the next paycheck rather than planning ahead. This approach was reinforced by CSOs’ widespread lack of permanent staff and inconsistent governance by their boards. The absence of a functioning umbrella organization and effective sector-specific bodies also undermined CSOs’ strategic planning efforts. In the past, larger, well-endowed CSOs, particularly in the healthcare sector, provided guidance on strategic planning to smaller, regionally based CSOs. However, such programs have been cut back or stopped because of a lack of funding, and organizations now work in isolation, with staffs that usually do not have sufficient experience or training to undertake strategic planning.

Trusts and companies not for profit must establish trustees or boards of directors. Most CSO boards cannot afford to pay sitting fees to board members, which makes it difficult for them to attract experienced and committed board members. In addition, board members often fail to attend meetings and serve in name only, causing their organizations to struggle to meet basic governance standards. At the same time, donors have posed more stringent requirements for governance and monitoring and evaluation, thereby putting more pressure on under-resourced CSO staff. The lack of core funding and a reliance on short-term or part-time staff limit the capacity of many organizations to develop formal management policies.

Many CSOs found it difficult to secure and retain experienced staff in 2017. In the face of uncertain funding, even health-sector organizations, which were once regarded as the most securely funded CSOs, began to complain that their capacity to employ workers on full-time, long-term contracts was reduced. CSOs getting by with part-time or temporary staff struggled to meet the demands of donors for complex risk assessments, log frames, plans, and other documents needed for their applications and reports on larger grants. CSOs reported that they had to focus resources on employing administrative staff to ensure that donor demands were met, thereby reducing the funding available for their core work. Volunteers were secured on an ad hoc basis rather than through a formal system that could offer useful experience followed by employment.

Many CSOs struggled to maintain offices and up-to-date technology because of their lack of funds in 2017. Few CSOs use the Internet successfully, broadcast live events, regularly update their websites, or have large followings on social media, in part because only one-third of Namibians use the Internet, according to the website Internet World Stats.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

The financial viability of CSOs in Namibia worsened significantly in 2017. Most CSOs depend on funding from foreign donors, which continued to withdraw during the year. The Norwegian government decided to no longer fund Namibian CSOs’ projects, while the Embassy of Finland, a long-time supporter of civil society, indicated that available funding would be considerably reduced. Although there is no clear data on the overall amounts and purposes of donor aid for the Namibian CSO sector, work in the areas of human rights, democracy, and governance seemed to be hardest hit by funding shortfalls. Long-standing CSOs such as the Namibia Institute for Democracy either closed down or became dormant in 2017 because of a lack of funds. Although the largest share of support still went to the health sector, primarily services related to HIV/AIDS, this sector was also under financial pressure during the year. For example, while funding from the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) remained constant, support
The 2017 CSO Sustainability Index for Namibia has gradually dwindled and by 2018 is expected to be at one-third of its level in 2015-17. Over the past decade, almost all international donors in Namibia have turned their focus to project funding and offer very limited core support for rent, utilities, salaries, and other administrative costs. Compounding the challenge for local CSOs is their inability to complete the complex and demanding grant applications introduced by some of the more significant donors still active in Namibia, such as the European Union (EU).

Namibian CSOs have few alternatives to donor aid, and there is a general sense of pessimism about future funding prospects. A culture of philanthropy does not yet exist in Namibia. The country has very few member-based CSOs, and those that do exist tend to draw their members from the poorest communities, who cannot afford to pay regular fees. The government tends to fund only welfare organizations and is itself facing a fiscal crisis. The private sector is generally too risk averse to support human rights or anti-corruption work and often prefers to retain good relations with the government by supporting “safe” projects linked to the government through the National Road Safety Council, National Commission on Research Science and Technology, or similar bodies. Although private-sector companies sometimes offer limited support to CSOs, in particular for environmental work, they often find it difficult to identify reliable CSO partners for their corporate social responsibility programs and so operate their own initiatives instead.

CSOs often do not have the capacity to raise funds, since they lack the necessary administrative staff. A few organizations sell products or have commercial arms such as consultancy businesses that subsidize their nonprofit work. For example, in 2017 IPPR marketed the newest edition of its Guide to the Namibian Economy to generate income to cover overhead costs.

More established CSOs that still receive funding from the few donors left in Namibia usually have effective financial management systems. However, the inability of many organizations to afford permanent and full-time staff has undermined sound financial management practices. Very few CSOs publish annual reports or detailed financial statements.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

CSO advocacy in Namibia is often limited in scope and overlooks many important issues. To some extent there has been a downturn in the activities of governance and democracy CSOs in recent years, as donors have shifted funding away from these areas after Namibia scored relatively well on several key governance indicators, such as the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Nevertheless, CSO advocacy made progress in 2017 and scored several significant victories, including changes in the Whistleblower Protection Act and renewed attention to land issues.

The government seems to take a haphazard approach to consulting civil society on laws and policies. In 2017 CSOs were sometimes asked to comment on key issues, such as the Black Economic Empowerment Policy, but at other times consultation was non-existent or, at best, ad hoc. CSOs continued to have trouble accessing government representatives, mainly because many politicians and top officials do not understand the concept of civil society advocacy. For example, the Ministry of Urban and Rural Development ignored IPPR’s repeated requests for a meeting to discuss housing policy. Ironically, the same ministry later sent a deputy minister to launch IPPR’s research study on the same topic.

Advocacy campaigns are typically conducted by relatively small groups without a national reach or grassroots base. They are frequently hampered by a lack of funds or staff. However, in a significant development in 2017, the LPM emerged from a grouping of youth activists and marginalized communities concerned about rural land issues. The LPM’s activities included rallies and community meetings, and they prompted the government to consider holding a national land conference to review policy options. The influence of the AR movement, formed by disillusioned members of the Swapo Party Youth League in 2014 to demand access to urban land at affordable prices, waned in 2017 as its calls for rent control made little headway. Both the AR and the LPM resembled social movements more than traditional CSOs, and there were indications that at some point they may enter politics more formally as parties seeking to challenge the SWAPO government. Meanwhile, the youth activists leading these groups seemed to feel that a confrontational approach was necessary. They sometimes indulged in abusive
discourse aimed at their opponents, which had the potential of undermining the broader credibility of civil society, especially as, in response, the authorities often became defensive or simply ignored the main issues being raised.

Although Internet use in Namibia is limited, single-issue environmental campaigns with access to computers and smartphones successfully used social media to mobilize support and educate the public. One such campaign was conducted by residents of the coastal town of Swakopmund, whose protests helped prevent a mining company from engaging in the controversial practice of extracting phosphate from the seabed. Calls by environmental activists for restrictions or a ban on the use of plastic bags also gained momentum. Several groups continued to work towards longer-term social and cultural changes. For example, Outright campaigned for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex rights, and the Women’s Leadership Center advocated against harmful cultural practices in the northeastern Zambezi region. Otherwise, few CSOs possess the necessary communications expertise to mount successful campaigns or use digital tools.

In lobbying activity, the ACTION coalition succeeded in persuading the parliament to make changes in the Whistleblower Protection Bill to ensure that the draft law was more in line with best practices. ACTION continued to encourage the government to draft a progressive access to information bill in 2017, but progress was slow as the government raised security issues involving access to information. ACTION also advocated for changes in cyber-security and broadband policies. CSOs outside of Windhoek reported frustration with lobbying local politicians, since they seemed to engage with civil society mainly to boost their reputations rather than commit to real change.

Efforts to introduce a civic organizations partnership policy and registration law in Namibia have been stalled since 2005. A draft policy exists, which recognizes the need for collective responses to development challenges and articulates a framework for CSO-government cooperation. Although agreeing in principle with the policy’s objectives, Namibian CSOs have refused to support it because of concerns about certain repressive elements. The policy has not been discussed for many years, and in 2017 neither the government nor civil society showed interest in re-opening negotiations about it. Some observers consider CSOs’ passive approach risky, since the government could seize the initiative to introduce controls that would not be welcomed by many CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**

CSOs in Namibia offered more limited services in 2017 because of diminishing funding and the government’s reluctance to involve civil society in its service provision. CSOs’ involvement in health care, Namibian civil society’s main area of activity, was reduced because of lower levels of funding, especially from the Global Fund. The cutbacks particularly affected services in remote areas and for vulnerable groups such as transgender women. After the health sector, the strongest service-providing CSO sector works on environmental and conservation issues. For example, the Namibia Nature Foundation operates a range of sustainable development projects countrywide, and the Desert Research Foundation of Namibia undertakes activities involving energy, land, water, and knowledge management, especially in rural communities. Organizations working in this area were less affected by funding cuts, since they have been more successful in gaining private-sector support.

Most active CSOs are based in Windhoek, which can restrict their ability to provide services in far-flung areas. The Shack Dwellers Federation is a rare example of a successful service-providing Namibian CSO with strong community roots. The organization is based in Windhoek but has 20,400 members organized into 605 savings schemes countrywide. As a result of its ability to provide low-cost housing, the federation has been able to
leverage government contributions, thereby enabling its member groups to secure land and build homes for several thousand families.

Some CSOs provide educational and analytical services. For example, IPPR seeks to raise public awareness about the national budget, proposed laws, and anti-corruption strategies through presentations, discussions, and coverage in social and traditional media. The ACTION coalition holds regular community workshops to identify local needs for access to information.

No CSO is known to recover costs at a significant level by providing services for a fee. Charging for services remains problematic in Namibia, since the recipients of services are often among the country’s poorest populations.

The government often overlooks the role that civil society could play in service provision. Although CSOs believe that they are better connected to communities than remote government departments, they have done little to argue the case that they can provide more efficient, more effective services. While the government acknowledges civil society as a partner in its Fifth National Development Plan adopted in 2017, the plan does not spell out what this partnership means in practical terms or commit to definite programs. The lack of progress on a civic organizations partnership policy suggests that there is little current thinking from either the government or CSOs about how civil society could play a greater role in the government’s service provision.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Namibia weakened in 2017. The country’s only resource center was operated by the Hanns Seidel Foundation, a German political foundation, which used its building in central Windhoek to house several partner CSOs, including IPPR and the Economic Association of Namibia (EAN), under the rubric “House of Democracy.” These CSOs were able to cut costs by sharing meeting rooms, while the foundation covered utility and security expenses.

No ISO supported Namibian civil society in 2017. Several donors, such as the Embassy of Finland, provided training for their grantees, but such opportunities were not sector wide and therefore their impact was limited. No other capacity-building training was offered to CSOs during the year.

The umbrella body for CSOs, NANGOF Trust, closed its office at the end of 2016 when support from the European Development Fund ended. Although several components of the trust continued to operate, it was basically dormant in 2017. The Civil Society Foundation of Namibia, set up in 2013 to offer training and funding to grassroots organizations, shut down at the same time, also because its funding from the EU ended. The Namibia Institute for Democracy, which usually offers training to CSOs, entered a period of dormancy in 2017 because of funding shortfalls.

As a result of these developments, CSOs operated largely on their own in 2017, without the support of outside structures or services. Organizations working in healthcare continued to cooperate under the auspices of the
Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations, which offered technical support to its members. Governance-related groups cooperated through the ACTION coalition, which organized workshops on access to information and freedom of expression.

Civil society partnerships with other sectors were very limited in 2017, as CSOs tended to operate in survival mode or focus on their core functions because of limited funding.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

CSOs’ public image remained unchanged in 2017. Namibia’s lively print media and state and private broadcasters were generally keen to ask CSOs for comments on political, economic, and social issues. A handful of civil society activists made themselves available as commentators on public issues, including researchers from IPPR and EAN, who were interviewed regularly by print and electronic media. In addition, the media often covered civil society events, such as workshops, conferences, and publication launches. It was more difficult for CSOs to persuade the media to cover their projects and activities, and sometimes the media expected service-providing CSOs to pay for coverage. Overall, the coverage was generally positive, although the financial challenges that forced the closure of the secretariat of the NANGOF Trust drew some negative coverage. Since few journalists understood the sustainability issues faced by CSOs, there was little meaningful analysis of the role of CSOs in Namibian society and the challenges that they face.

The public perception of CSOs appeared to be improving in 2017. According to an Afrobarometer survey carried out in November 2017, more than 50 percent of Namibians think that CSOs have more freedom to speak out and criticize the government than in previous years. The government’s view of civil society has been somewhat negative since 2014, when many CSOs banded together to oppose constitutional changes. In 2017 the president’s attack on CSO leaders as “failed politicians” suggested that the government remained frustrated over criticism from CSOs. Nevertheless, accusations by politicians and government officials that CSOs push “foreign agendas” or are fronts for imperialism became less common, although these suspicions probably remained under the surface with some individuals.

While the private sector seemed somewhat more willing on the whole to engage with civil society in 2017, there were few points of direct contact between CSOs and the business community, such as joint events or joint studies.

Many CSOs lack clear communication strategies. Generally, CSOs are not proactive at raising awareness about their activities and rarely reach out to journalists or editors to seek positive coverage or offer opinion articles. Only a handful of CSOs use the Internet successfully, have large followings on social media, broadcast live events, and regularly update their websites. For example, in 2017 the ACTION coalition and its leading members used social media to seek changes in the Whistleblower Protection law, while the AR and the LPM effectively used Twitter to convey their message. Otherwise, despite the evidence of growing social media use among Namibian youth, very few CSOs use social media to communicate, even though it is more cost effective than developing websites.

With no functioning umbrella body and very few training organizations, there has been no concerted effort to improve the ethical conduct of CSOs. Namibia has had its own corporate governance code since 2014, but there is little evidence that the boards of directors of nonprofit companies use it as a guide. CSOs often lack transparency and fail to publish regular annual reports with financial statements.
CSO sustainability in Niger improved slightly in 2017, despite the persistence of security threats, a deteriorating humanitarian situation, and tensions between civil society and the government. CSOs’ financial viability was stronger as organizations enjoyed many funding opportunities and explored diverse ways to support their activities. Service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image also improved. CSO advocacy deteriorated as the sector had only haphazard communications channels with the government and was largely unable to mobilize the public to influence the political agenda. Although the legal framework did not change, laws on freedom of expression and association continue to be violated. Organizational capacity did not change significantly.

Conflicts between the government and civil society persisted throughout the year, focused primarily on a draft finance law that would impose new tax burdens on households, and students’ demands for better living and study conditions. Many demonstrations took place and many people, including several CSO leaders, were arbitrarily arrested and prosecuted for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association. Security forces sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators, one of whom was killed in April.

In March 2017 the government declared a state of emergency after insurgent groups, including Boko Haram, unleashed armed attacks in the Diffa, Tillabéry, and North Tahoua regions. In the same month, more than seven hundred members of Boko Haram went on trial in Niger. Boko Haram continued to engage in armed attacks primarily in the Diffa region. Entire villages have been forced to relocate, leaving their livestock and agricultural land behind. In addition, the government banned pepper farming and fishing—the major sources of income for the local population—on Lake Chad in 2015, as the number of attacks surged; while the ban on pepper farming was lifted in late 2017, the ban on fishing remained in place. These developments have exacerbated poverty in the country and made it difficult for people and goods to move freely.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in the country continued to deteriorate in 2017. A large portion of Niger’s population lives below the poverty line. In addition, refugees and migrants transiting the country during the year suffered serious abuses, including kidnapping, beatings, and extortion.
The government, supported by the international community, attempted to mitigate the impact of the crisis with a $40 million emergency plan to address immediate humanitarian needs.

Trust in Niger’s governmental institutions is low. In 2017 the government’s credibility was undermined by the failure of its agricultural campaign to meet the expectations of farmers, who make up more than 80 percent of the country’s population. At a December meeting in Paris, Niger’s international financial partners committed to supporting an ambitious development program, known as the Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES 2017–21). With total funding pledges amounting to $23 billion, the plan seeks to ensure the country’s democratic transition, economic modernization, and cultural renaissance. CSOs called for the establishment of public accountability mechanisms to strengthen public governance and ensure that the funds are not wasted.

The Ministry of Primary Education, Literacy, Promotion of National Languages, and Civic Education announced a plan to evaluate teachers, whom some people blame for the drop in achievement levels of Niger’s students. Many teachers do not have any professional training and may only hold a high school diploma, which is sometimes obtained fraudulently. In addition, many teachers are hired on a contractual basis and are paid less than the permanent employees who teach the same classes. These issues have sparked many demonstrations by students and teachers alike. The evaluation was boycotted by nearly 50 percent of the more than 60,000 teachers targeted and triggered nationwide demonstrations.

In 2016 there were about 3,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations in Niger. According to the Ministry of the Interior, ninety-nine new CSOs were formed in 2017. This number includes all categories of CSOs recognized under Law 84-49 of 1984 on associations, including youth associations, community groups, and more formal NGOs. According to the law in Niger, NGOs are apolitical, non-profit organizations created at the initiative of individuals or entities that are independent from the state; they are motivated by a spirit of volunteerism that they use to benefit others by supporting development through social and economic activities. NGOs do not have the right to defend their members’ interests, while associations can defend their members’ material and moral interests.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

There were no major changes in CSOs’ legal environment in 2017. All CSOs, except for informal entities known as fadas, are governed by Law 84-49. Some CSOs believe that Law 84-49, which lists certain categories of CSOs that are authorized to operate, conflicts with the 2010 constitution, which leaves the door open for all forms of associations.

CSOs that have a nationwide scope or want to work in multiple regions must register at the national level with the Ministry of Interior. Other CSOs submit their paperwork to the local prefecture or mayor’s office. The ministry can take months to approve a CSO’s registration request, but a provisional authorization allows a CSO to operate if the ministry has not responded within three months. Some religiously affiliated CSOs have difficulty getting their registration documents approved because the government fears that they may pose a risk of religious extremism.

There are also local, informal associations, including fadas (groups of young people), which do not register and are not governed by the law. Fadas must, however, acquire local recognition and an authorization from the municipal or regional government.
Law 84-49 places few operating requirements on CSOs. Organizations must file annual activity and financial reports and action plans with the Ministries of Interior and Communal Development. If a CSO fails to file an activity report for two years, legal sanctions may be applied, including suspension of its authorization to operate. In practice, only a small number of CSOs submit their reports to the authorities, and few, if any, are subjected to sanctions.

In 2017 the Ministries of the Interior and of Community Planning and Development declared their intent to “clean up” the CSO sector by dissolving organizations that were deviating from the goals identified in their approved bylaws and internal regulations. Although no CSOs were dissolved for this reason in 2017, CSOs fear that the government may take advantage of such a cleanup to attack organizations that have called for more freedom and greater government transparency. The law offers CSOs some recourse for challenging decisions by the government, but the process is lengthy, and many CSOs hesitate to do so for fear of incurring the government’s wrath.

Even though the constitution gives many freedoms to CSOs, CSOs feel that they are sometimes harassed and mistreated by national and local government entities. For example, their approval process may be put on hold, public debates prohibited, and differences of opinion with the government not tolerated in discussions on radio, television, and social media. In spring 2017, after the secretary general of the Union of Taxi Drivers denounced corruption in the judicial system on social media, he was charged with attempting to influence a judicial investigation. In May a member of the Association for Democracy and Human Rights (AANDH) was sentenced to prison for criticizing the authorities on Facebook. In July forty-three members of the teachers’ union, the Union of Contractual Agents and Officials of Basic Education (SYNACEB), were convicted of disrupting public safety and inciting a riot while boycotting teacher evaluations; they were sentenced to suspended prison terms. In general, the authorities tend to associate civic mobilization with the political opposition, and high-ranking public officials may dismiss the legitimate right of CSOs to mobilize. In October demonstrators who had requested advance permission to march against the finance law were prohibited from entering the Place de la Concertation in Niamey and clashed with the police. In 2017 the government criticized street protests by CSO activists as politically motivated and driven by self-interest. The government made a similar critique of civil society during a review of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. These actions have significantly reduced the possibility of peaceful advocacy efforts.

The central government and CSOs have signed a protocol agreement that defines the rights and obligations of both sides in the implementation of development activities to benefit the public. According to the agreement, CSOs are eligible for tax relief on equipment and materials and in-kind donations imported for projects that benefit the local population. The agreement requires CSOs to submit documentation to apply for these tax exemptions. Yet even when CSOs submit all of the required documentation, the state does not always comply with its commitment to provide tax relief. Domestic CSOs denied tax exemptions in 2017 included Dounibon, the Network of Organizations and Associations for the Health Sector in Niger (ROASSN), Karkara, and the School Sponsorship and Development Actions-Niger (EPAD-Niger). While national and local organizations struggle to access these exemptions, international organizations generally receive tax exemptions. Corporations often make donations to CSOs that support disadvantaged populations, such as handicapped persons, women with fistulas, people with leprosy, and widows of terrorism victims, for which they receive tax reductions.

The law authorizes CSOs to provide services to generate income, provided the income is used to support their nonprofit activities.

CSOs have the legal right to bid on local and central government tenders. Sometimes CSOs need personal contacts in the government and political parties to win these contracts. The Ministries of Finance and the Interior prohibit CSOs from conducting fundraising campaigns without prior government approval. During the year, the Ministry of Finance closed a bank account that CSOs used to keep funds that they raised to support activism and investigation related to the “Uraniumgate” scandal, which involved accusations that the president’s former chief of staff had improperly participated in the state mining company’s purchase of 5.5 million pounds of uranium. CSOs aligned with the former chief of staff were allegedly recipients of some of the embezzled funds.

CSOs are authorized to accept funds from foreign donors, including by contracting for activities with service providers. In 2017 the National Financial Intelligence and Processing Unit of Niger (CENTIF) imposed measures on CSOs receiving funds from outside the country because of concerns about funding for terrorism.
These measures can be used to block funding for CSOs that oppose the government, since the authorities have excessive discretion in their interpretations of the law.

There are no attorneys who specialize in CSO law in Niger. In Niamey and other major cities, CSOs can receive legal advice from generalist attorneys and experts who consult on institutional, legal, organizational, and contractual issues.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs’ organizational capacity did not change in 2017.

CSOs’ work with target groups is based on shared goals. In general, communities and target groups support CSOs’ initiatives, particularly if they involve self-advocacy and improvements in social accountability. Participatory approaches developed by CSOs, known as faire faire, help beneficiaries communicate their needs. CSOs also rely on local planning documents and technical and financial partners’ identification of target locations, groups, and activities.

CSOs with less experience and skills often lack the capacity to write clear mission statements and goals and do not have strategic plans. CSOs with external funding are more likely to follow their stated missions and have strategic plans. At the end of projects, CSOs conduct evaluations to measure actual results compared to expected achievements. In 2017 more than 300 CSOs filed annual reports that evaluated and analyzed their projects and achievements.

Most CSOs have general assemblies that provide strategic direction, executive or permanent secretariats that implement activities, and internal auditors and monitoring and evaluation committees that provide oversight. Although transparency among experienced CSOs has increased, most CSOs’ management capabilities continue to be poor, which prevents them from being transparent about their activities. CSOs that are well structured and receive support from technical and financial partners use their resources to create management tools, such as written procedures, plans, and audit manuals. These organizations also include policies in their procedure manuals to prevent conflicts of interest. In theory, codes of conduct are also tools for preventing and managing conflicts within CSOs.

External funding allows CSOs to hire qualified staff. In particular, CSOs that are part of funded consortia with international partners tend to be able to hire qualified staff and offer job descriptions. CSOs do not make use of volunteers, mainly because young people want paid jobs, and older, experienced people are more attracted to consulting work. Depending on their funding, CSOs may hire specialists such as accountants, information technology specialists, and attorneys on contract or as needed. For example, the Local Initiative Support Network (RAIL) has an attorney and a process server on contract to assist it with a real estate dispute.

CSOs’ meager financial resources prevent them from acquiring equipment such as computers, software, printers, and mobile phones. The difficulties CSOs face in receiving tax exemptions exacerbate the problems they have acquiring equipment. CSOs depend on support from technical and financial partners and donations to afford Internet access. Software remains costly and out of reach for CSOs that do not have external funding. Some CSOs, including service-providing CSOs that are partners of the United Nations (UN) World Food Program or Lutheran World Relief, as well as CSOs that work on basic education, use modern money transfers and communication tools for their activities.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0

CSOs’ financial viability improved in 2017 as CSOs enjoyed many funding opportunities from foreign donors. Certain national and local CSOs created partnerships with international CSOs to respond to calls for proposals. The international CSOs are generally the leads in these partnerships: they manage the funds and the international staff, while the in-country organizations implement activities in the field and manage the in-country staff. For example, in 2017 RAIL, along with Alternative Citizen Spaces, NGO DIKO, and other local organizations, received grants to implement community mobilization and social partnership activities in Agadez, Zinder, Diffa, and Niamey under a USAID-funded project implemented by Counterpart International.

In 2017 CSOs continued to rely on funding from international partners, ranging from bilateral partners such as ADF, Germany’s Agency for International Cooperation, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, some Arab countries, and USAID, to UN agencies and international CSOs, such as Oxfam International and Publish What You Pay. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation also provided support. Larger CSOs tend to dominate these opportunities, while smaller or less experienced CSOs struggle to access foreign funding, especially since they do not know how to prepare funding-worthy applications. No data are available on the level of foreign support in 2017.

Funding sources were multiple and varied in 2017. CSOs often ask for financial or in-kind contributions to specific projects from the communities that benefit from their services. For example, clinics run by the Niger Association for Family Well-Being (ANBF) provide health services to women and children in exchange for small contributions from the public, which barely cover the association’s operating expenses. Elected officials at the national level and Nigerien expatriates sometimes also fund development activities, although rarely through CSOs. Because of growing poverty, CSOs cannot rely on a network of volunteers to provide non-financial support.

Nigerien law authorizes the central or local governments to provide grants to CSOs. Some municipalities fund local CSOs in their areas, but all too frequently these grants are awarded in a manner that is neither open nor transparent. In addition, municipalities sometimes sign service agreements with CSOs for time-limited activities. Some CSOs working on sanitation receive small contracts with municipalities or public facilities to provide services. These contracts can involve training stakeholders, preparing municipal strategies, writing funding documents, and supporting the setup of water and sanitation services. For example, the city of Zinder contracted with RAIL to train city sanitation workers. The central government has some funding available to support civil society. These funds are usually channeled to CSOs within the framework of international projects, such as those funded by the World Bank, which have strict requirements to include CSOs in aspects of the funded operations, or through agreements between the public sector and CSOs, primarily to enhance the delivery of social services.

CSOs receive a wide range of financial support from foreign corporate sponsors, such as Orange, Veolia, Airtel, and Areva. Unions and fadas rely on dues and other contributions from their members to fund their activities. Some women’s groups, such as the Mata Masu Dubara (MMD) movement, have formed investment funds known as tontine groups to generate income. CSOs also generate income by renting their meeting rooms and vehicles. Some youth CSOs have established small and medium-sized social enterprises with support from the French-Speaking World Conference of Ministers for Youth and Sports.
The most robust CSOs have reliable financial management tools and use audit firms, account auditors, procedure manuals, and planning manuals to improve their management practices. Newer CSOs generally do not have appropriate financial management systems. Some CSOs work transparently by organizing general assembly meetings, conferences, or union consultations to report to their members on management performance. The law requires CSOs to file annual reports with narrative, financial, and accounting components.

**ADVOCACY: 4.4**

The work of advocacy organizations in Niger deteriorated in 2017. As described above, the government took actions to harass CSOs criticizing the government, thereby reducing opportunities for constructive advocacy. There are few lines of communication between CSOs and the central or local governments. CSOs’ formal and informal communications with the authorities are generally haphazard, although CSOs are involved in an advisory capacity in the decision-making process. For example, CSO collectives, such as the Private Support Group (GAP), ROASSN, and International Organizations Represented in Niger, have representatives on the High Council for Communications; National Human Rights Commission; National Independent Election Commission; Economic, Social, and Cultural Council; the national council that regulates postal and telecommunications services; and various joint government-CSO committees. However, CSOs’ opinions are not often considered by these groups. In 2017 the preparation of PDES 2017−21 included extensive consultation with CSOs after they called for increased openness in the process. However, this contact was not sustained once the document was finalized. The government has designed an implementing structure for PDES that includes venues of consultation, but its introduction has been delayed. Furthermore, these venues of cooperation do not include a regular interface whereby CSOs can voice concerns, grievances, and preferences. In addition, the texts of public policies and national laws are not always available.

Overall, CSOs’ efforts to mobilize the public and influence the political agenda were not very successful in 2017. While Nigeriens organize themselves into community-based networks ranging from cooperatives to tontines and fadas, they tend to be inwardly focused on self-help activities and territorially limited in reach. Thus these collective actions rarely translate into civic mobilization aimed at influencing the government’s agenda. CSOs advocate in various sectors, including rural development, social and economic development, the environment, governance, human rights, and gender; and they consult local communities before beginning their initiatives. Individual CSOs and topic-specific coalitions sometimes conduct large-scale advocacy campaigns aimed at influencing public debate, public opinion, or legislation. For example, in 2017 the social protection network Protesco promoted a law on social protection, focusing on food security as an urgent priority in the country’s policy development agenda. Other CSOs working on campaigns at the local or national levels in 2017 included the Popular Movement for Responsible Citizenship, focused on increased accountability in the government’s management of the country’s resources; Citizen Spaces Alternative (AEC), on the participatory budget to increase social accountability mechanisms; Nigerien Association for Human Rights Defense (ANDDH), on laws and other recourses to enhance access to justice; Network of Organizations for Transparency and Budget Analysis (ROTAB), on transparent governance in the resource extraction industries; and SOS Civil Society, on citizen monitoring at the municipal level. In general, these campaigns did not yield the desired results, mainly because of the state’s resistance to change.
CSOs sometimes lobby to influence the drafting of new laws. For example, the Confederation of NGOs and Women’s Organizations in Niger (CONGAFEN) endorsed the decree of December 5, 2017, on protecting, supporting, and assisting young girls in school.

CSOs are aware that aligning the legal and regulatory framework with the constitution and other legal and regulatory changes could help improve their activities and make them more effective and more sustainable. However, no advocacy was undertaken in this regard in 2017.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

In 2017 CSO service provision improved slightly. CSOs provide services in diverse areas, ranging from basic social services, such as health, education, shelter, water, and energy, to economic development, environmental protection, governance, and self-sufficiency. Many CSOs take part in development projects funded by international donors or organizations. For example, in 2017 RAIL provided capacity-building services for city sanitation workers with EU funding.

CSOs rely on public policies, municipal development plans, and regional development plans and studies to assess community needs. CSOs also determine needs through situational analyses and surveys, which are usually performed within the framework of projects funded by foreign donors, especially the World Bank. Depending on their skills and level of expertise, CSOs also gather data and evidence to demonstrate their contributions to addressing local needs and implementing sector-specific policies. In 2017, for example, as part of the Niger Safety Net Project, CSOs administered surveys of beneficiaries to gather information on the program’s performance, including the performance of targeting and payment systems. In 2017 projects such as the Niger Community Action Program, Phase 3, and the Community Action Project for Climate Resilience used participatory approaches to involve CSOs and citizens in creating municipal development plans.

CSOs sometimes market and distribute products such as publications, training sessions, and expert assessments to other CSOs, universities, businesses, religious institutions, and government entities. For example, human rights groups such as ANDDH continued to distribute their reports to their foreign donors and partners, the government, and other CSOs to raise awareness about Niger’s human rights situation. In general, CSOs provide goods and services without regard to race, gender, ethnic group, or sexual orientation.

Some CSOs generate income by charging for services. For example, the Nigerien Association for Family Welfare operates clinics as social enterprises; GAP and ANDDH offer capacity-building training to other CSOs; and Kaani, Mutual for Women’s Credit and Savings, and MMD run banking cooperatives.

Government entities at the national and local levels clearly acknowledge the added value that CSOs provide by signing protocol agreements and providing facilities and land for free or for rent to some CSOs such as GAP. CSOs also sign agreements with the government to conduct activities at the national and local levels. For example, RAIL, Karkara, and Debout Niger have contracts to create municipal and regional development plans.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector improved in 2017 as organizations helped CSOs become more professional in conducting their activities.

Resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) provide training and technical support to CSOs. For example, GAP offers trainings focused on CSO institutional capacity building at the national level. In Koiratègui in Niamey, Scout opened a center to give local organizations access to computers and communications services. The EU-funded Program to Support Civil Society (PASOC) created four resource centers in 2017 to support CSOs' technological needs and build their capacity. ANDDH has a library and provides consulting support, and the Maison de la Presse supports members that do not have the resources to do their work. Other organizations offering support to CSOs include ROTAB and AEC.

ISOs sometimes reallocate funds from international donors to local CSOs for locally identified projects. In 2017 such ISOs included the First Ladies’ Foundation and Rotary.

Some CSOs, especially consumer-protection and human rights organizations, work in coalitions and networks to achieve common objectives and coordinate members’ activities in order to increase their efficiency. Major coalitions include ROTAB, Network of Nigerien Journalists for Education and Development, and Network of Nigerien Journalists for Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation. CSOs such as RAIL, Karkara, SOS Civil Society, Agir Plus, DIKO, and Educate a Child work together on projects related to food security, governance, and basic social services. ROASSN brings together groups working on health-related issues, and CONGAFEN coordinates the work of women’s associations. The NGO and Development Association Collaboration Group is present at the municipal, regional, and national levels and designates CSO representatives to serve on government bodies and take part in activities in which CSOs need to be present, such as the Independent National Electoral Commission, technical and financial partners’ discussions, and municipal activities.

Basic CSO management training is available in the capital and secondary cities from organizations such as PASOC and GAP. Advanced and specialized training is available on demand on such topics as strategic management, accounting, financial management, advocacy, and association boards. In 2017 CSOs focused on empowering women and children such as MMD and COFAGEN helped young people learn to lead and manage CSOs. Available training meets CSOs’ needs. Qualified local trainers and consultants are available to work with CSO management, but their services are seldom requested. In certain areas training modules are available in French and local languages.

Intersectoral partnerships, particularly with the private sector, are underdeveloped. CSOs cooperate officially or informally with municipalities, regions, and ministries to deliver training. CSOs also assist the government with certain issues of national interest, such as terrorism prevention, humanitarian crises, and natural disasters. Relations between businesses and CSOs are still weak because for-profit entities see themselves as very different from CSOs. CSOs and the media have a mutually supportive relationship. For example, CSOs marched alongside the media in demonstrations for freedom of the press in 2017.
CSOs’ public image improved in 2017 as CSOs improved their relationship with media.

CSOs usually rely on traditional media, such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines, to spread information about their work. The relationship between CSOs and the media improved during the year, as demonstrated by CSOs’ presence on radio and television debating current issues. The media do not require payment to cover social topics such as public demonstrations but do charge CSOs for other sorts of coverage. The public media never cover CSOs’ activities if they are intended to protest the government’s actions, but they might cover other activities if they are available.

The public increasingly sees CSOs’ work, particularly their delivery of basic social services, as important. While the public’s perceptions are largely positive when it comes to the delivery of basic social services, opinions tend to vary in line with political attitudes when it comes to advocacy or criticism of the government. Although they do not have close working relationships, the private sector sees CSOs’ activities as useful.

CSOs organize activities such as sports events, cultural festivals, and community-based programs to educate and inform their members, raise awareness among expatriates, and generate public support. CSOs also use radio and television coverage to improve their image. CSOs’ relationship with the media is fairly well developed, and the media support them if needed. Some opinion leaders from civil society were engaged in developing media outlets in 2017. For example, AEC has a printed periodic newspaper and a radio station that broadcasts in communities and the main urban centers, and the national coordinator of ROTAB, who also leads the Publish What You Pay Niger coalition, is CEO of the radio and television station Labari. CSOs use social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and text messaging widely to promote their activities.

In 2017 CSOs continued to work on improving their transparency. Some large CSOs, such as ROASSN and the Organization for the Promotion of Women in Niger, have codes of conduct that focus on promoting citizen oversight of the government’s actions and on social and societal accountability. CONGAFEN, which is active on women’s and children’s rights, reports regularly to its members through general meetings and reports. Some CSOs such as ANDDH produce annual activity reports for their partners and the ministries that oversee them. Major CSOs produce periodic reports covering their implementation of certain projects and programs. In 2017 some CSOs participated in institutional capacity-building workshops to, among other things, improve their communications strategy with the public in order to avoid any misconception about their use of funds. Also, with the support of international organizations, CSOs continued to be actively engaged in social accountability projects, working closely with the government and the local populations.
In the first part of 2017 Nigeria was enmeshed in an economic recession, and large numbers of people suffered from poverty and inadequate access to basic services. In some of the Middle Belt states people were displaced by persistent conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, and in the North East zone the Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa insurgencies continued to traumatize local communities. CSOs responded by working alongside the government and international donors to provide humanitarian services to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and calling on the government to address the country’s urgent security needs. President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration began to implement its Economic Recovery and Growth Plan for 2017-2020, which aims to turn around Nigeria’s deteriorating economy through economic diversification, especially in agriculture. CSOs continued to pressure the government to prosecute corrupt officials, and the government accused civil society of not doing enough to support its anti-corruption drive.

Overall CSO sustainability did not change in 2017. The legal environment deteriorated slightly as the House of Representatives attempted to introduce a restrictive new bill on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and there is some evidence that security agents stepped up harassment of CSO staff. However, CSOs’ organizational capacity improved as organizations continued to make inroads in building community trust, and their financial viability strengthened with increased direct funding from private foundations such as the MacArthur Foundation. Advocacy was also stronger as CSOs successfully opposed the NGO Bill, pressured the government to negotiate with Boko Haram on the release of abducted Chibok girls, and took part in government budgeting processes in the framework of the Open Government Partnership (OGP). CSOs’ service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image were unchanged from the previous year.

The CSO sector in Nigeria is diverse, with organizations ranging from faith- and community-based groups to national-level organizations. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), which registers national CSOs, is unable to provide exact data on the total number of organizations operating in Nigeria in 2017. However, more than 90,000 CSOs were registered with CAC at the national level in 2017. At the state and local levels, it is difficult to estimate the total number of CSOs, because they are registered with various agencies or not at all.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

The legal environment for Nigerian CSOs deteriorated in 2017 because of the House of Representative’s attempt to introduce a restrictive new NGO law and some increased government harassment of CSO staff.

CAC’s new online registration platform operated smoothly during the year, and at the national level registration was relatively easy. Most new organizations registered as incorporated trustees under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. The registration process can be slow if organizations are thought to pose security risks or CAC views proposed organizational names as overtly political. For example, in 2017 CAC disallowed the registration of CSOs with names containing such words as “governance” or “democracy,” although there is no known policy that explicitly denies registration of organizations with such names. CAC also disallowed the registration of CSOs on the grounds that their objectives were political and only the election management body has the mandate to register political associations. For example, CAC refused to register the Abuja-based Grassroots Development and Advocacy Center in 2017, because one of its objectives was to promote democratic governance for development. CSOs may also register as companies limited by guarantee, but the process is somewhat more difficult, in part because approvals are usually routed through the minister of justice and the attorney general, who sometimes slow down the process for political reasons.

At the state level, the registration process varies. For example, in Cross River State CSOs must renew their registrations annually, while in many other states registration is granted permanently. Registration fees also vary dramatically. In Delta State in 2017, new CSOs paid registration fees of as much as NGN 100,000 (approximately $280) to the state Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, while in Kwara State CSOs paid annual registration fees of NGN 10,000 ($28) to the same state ministry. Meanwhile, in Borno State CSOs paid only NGN 3,000 (approximately $8) to register with the state Ministry of Poverty Alleviation and Youth Empowerment and the secretary to the state government.

The House of Representatives attempted to introduce new legislation in 2017 that would have established an NGO Regulatory Commission to register CSOs, regulate their finances, and approve their annual plans. The NGO Regulatory Commission Bill was allegedly meant to curb diversions of donor resources for private use, and it would have compelled CSOs to renew their registration every two years. CSOs vigorously opposed the bill at a public hearing in late 2017, and the bill was subsequently buried in committee.

The operating environment for CSOs was favorable at the national level in 2017. However, at the state level several governors equated citizens’ advocacy groups with the opposition and sought to undermine them. For example, Kaduna State proscribed the Islamic Movement of Nigeria after its members protested the federal government’s continuing detention of their leader; and Kogi State proscribed the Academic Staff Union of Universities at the state university after members held frequent strikes to demand payment of salaries and other allowances. In Cross River State CSOs were required to renew their registrations with the state government annually, which CSOs believed was a strategy to check their activities and eliminate organizations that the state government perceived as adversarial. It is not known whether any organization was refused re-registration as part of this process.

State harassment of CSO personnel increased in 2017. Many journalists, social media bloggers, and activists were harassed and arrested, evidently because the government was not comfortable with their criticism of certain of its policies and actions. For example, the police and Department of State Services harassed people working on citizen advocacy campaigns, such as #BringBackOurGirls, which called for the release of schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram, and #OurMumuDonDO, a coalition advocating for good governance.
The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) indiscriminately arrested innocent persons in Lagos and elsewhere on the pretext of combating criminality, and many people accused SARS of human rights abuses. The arrests led to the #EndSARS social media campaign and a promise by police authorities to review SARS’s operations. In some localities CSOs’ activities were largely unrestricted, and only certain organizations encountered obstacles. For example, in the South East an unregistered group, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), was proscribed as a terrorist organization and all of its activities were banned, while other advocacy organizations, including the Civil Resource Development and Documentation Center (CIRDDOC), had ample space in which to operate.

The Companies Income Tax Act (CITA) of 2004 generally relieves CSOs from paying income tax except on income generated from business transactions. Benue State has introduced a new pay-as-you-earn tax on volunteers. Businesses may claim deductions for donations to organizations engaged in religious, charitable, educational, and certain other activities. Individual donations to CSOs do not qualify as deductions.

CSOs may earn income from the provision of services, and such income is taxable. Although the law permits CSOs to establish social enterprises, it is not a common practice.

There was a slight improvement in legal aid to CSOs in 2017, as more lawyers in major cities grew skilled in CSO-related law. However, legal services for CSOs remained largely insufficient, especially at the state and local levels. A few large national CSOs accessed legal services in 2017. For example, the Center for Research and Documentation required legal services to address an issue with an employee.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

The organizational capacity of CSOs in Nigeria improved moderately in 2017 as CSOs’ services and humanitarian activities continued to make inroads in building community trust. For example, many international and local CSOs, including ActionAid Nigeria, Civil Society Action Coalition on Education for All (CSACEFA), Save the Children Nigeria, and Christian Aid Nigeria, continued to meet the urgent needs of hundreds of thousands of IDPs in the North East. CSOs’ success in building constituencies among IDPs led to new collaborations with a wide range of stakeholders. For example, the Network of NGOs in Borno State, in collaboration with the Borno State Emergency Management Agency, National Emergency Management Agency, International Committee of the Red Cross, and other humanitarian agencies, mobilized several IDP community members, including youth and persons with disabilities, as IDP ambassadors in 2017. They were trained to resolve problems in areas such as meals and hygiene in the IDP camps, with the support of CSOs and other stakeholders. The Network of NGOs in Borno State also organized a town hall meeting in 2017 for communities affected by insurgency. Community members discussed their need for security and formulated a position on the issue, which their representative presented at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference in Norway in 2017, where international organizations pledged more than $600 million to address the plight of people affected by the insurgencies in Nigeria’s North East. Thus CSOs built constituencies among populations needing humanitarian relief in a way that involved the communities themselves in meeting their own needs.

A few national CSOs undertake strategic planning, but they often lack the discipline and resources necessary to implement their plans fully. In addition, strategic planning is sometimes meant only to satisfy the requirements of donors, which are the main or only source of funding for many CSOs. Many state and local CSOs have neither the capacity nor the resources to develop strategic plans.
Board engagement is limited in CSOs at all levels. Many CSO boards are passive and meet irregularly. Board members often do not turn over; and boards sometimes retain the names of deceased persons on their lists of members. In 2016 and 2017 the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria attempted to institute a code of corporate governance among faith-based organizations (FBOs), which led to the removal from boards of some influential church leaders who had stayed in their positions beyond mandated term limits. FBOs criticized this action for its lack of prior consultation, and the board members’ removal was suspended.

The number of people interested in working in the CSO sector as full-time employees and volunteers continued to increase in 2017 because of the country’s high unemployment. Many active national CSOs have permanent staff members who offer a balanced mix of competencies. Some national organizations have started to hire professional staff in areas such as accounting, auditing, and information and communications technology. Many CSOs have human resource policies, but staff turnover is very high, largely because of poaching by development partners in major cities. For example, a CSO in the North East reported that in 2017 six of its employees moved to development partners working in the region. High staff turnover remains a major challenge for local CSOs that are unable to compete with the compensation and benefits packages offered by international development partners.

The technical capacity of national CSOs improved in 2017. This growth was evident in the increased use of web-based applications in advocacy campaigns. For example, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) launched its Advocacy and Legal Advice Center using information technology, and #dorocorruption and Follow the Money were also web-based campaigns. National CSOs continued to invest in modern office equipment, such as computers and Internet equipment, but locally based CSOs cannot afford such equipment.

Institutional support for CSOs to grow is largely missing from donor funding, and local organizations are unable to finance training and capacity-building needs from their lean resources.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

The financial viability of the CSO sector improved slightly in 2017. Donor support remained the primary and sometimes only type of funding available to many CSOs. Major donors included USAID; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development; Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; Ford Foundation; and Open Society Institute of West Africa (OSIWA). As part of its program to strengthen anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria, the MacArthur Foundation provided grants directly to more than one hundred CSOs, including the International Federation of Women Lawyers, Arewa Research and Development Project, and African Center for Leadership, Strategy, and Development (Center−LSD). Most foreign donors continued to channel their funding to projects focused on the North East, post-conflict reconstruction, or humanitarian services. As a result, sectors such as the environment and regions such as the Niger Delta no longer received sufficient funding.

The sources of funding for CSOs are not sufficiently diversified, and many CSOs, especially state and local organizations, still lack the capacity to write proposals. CSOs’ ability to raise funds locally in 2017 was also constrained by a lack of pooled public funds earmarked for CSO operations and activities. The lack of public funding especially undermined the sustainability of CSO interventions in rural areas. The Nigerian government has yet to institute a broadly focused grantmaking program to support CSOs and instead provides only counterpart funding to support specific donor-funded interventions in education, health (especially HIV/AIDS), the environment (including water and sanitation), and agriculture. Government funding is occasionally available through contracts for services such as training and program monitoring, but the selection process often lacks transparency.
Corporate social responsibility programs are still developing in Nigeria. Many corporate foundations, including MTN, Globacom, and Dangote, implement their own programs or contract with private firms rather than CSOs. One of the few exceptions is the TY Danjuma Foundation, which provides grants to local organizations for community-based health and education projects.

Membership-based organizations, such as trade unions, professional associations, service-providing organizations, and FBOs, self-funded in 2017 through membership dues, in-kind and corporate sponsorships, and donations. A few national CSOs that rely largely on donor funding rented out conference rooms, sold books, or provided training to generate modest income. Fundraising through special events, such as cultural festivals, sporting events, and lotteries, is fairly limited, especially as the cost of organizing such events appears to be much higher than the sums raised. Social entrepreneurship is a new trend and not widely embraced. Among the few CSOs venturing into this field are BudgIT and Convention on Business Integrity, which have private-sector affiliates that provide training and other services. The affiliates bid on contract opportunities and invest the income back into the civic engagement and advocacy programs.

A few CSOs, especially at the national level, have functioning financial management systems, since they are a basic requirement for donor funding and demonstrate a degree of transparency and accountability to the public. For the same reason, CSOs are professionalizing their finance departments by recruiting competent staff. Most larger CSOs publish annual reports and financial statements for a wide audience of stakeholders. At the state and local levels CSOs often do not have sound financial management systems and rarely publish annual reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

CSO advocacy improved slightly in 2017. Overall, the space for collaboration between CSOs and the government expanded at all levels. For example, in the North East CSOs were represented in the IDP relocation committee established by the federal government, and Partners West Africa Nigeria (PWAN) worked with the Office of the National Security Adviser as a member of the counterterrorism team. In addition, the government responded to public pressure arising from Nigeria’s low score on the Open Budget Index to collaborate with CSOs on budgetary issues. The Senate invited CSOs to its first-ever public hearing on the federal budget. As a result of CSOs’ campaigns for greater budget transparency, Borno and a few other states uploaded their budget documents online. The OGP, a multilateral initiative between governments and civil society that Nigeria joined in 2016, opened up space for improved collaboration between the government and CSOs, especially in the budgeting process.

The governments of states that have signed onto the OGP such as Kaduna, Enugu, Kano, and Ebonyi, now invite CSOs to take part in public expenditure oversight and contribute to their medium-term strategies and frameworks. CIRDDOC became the co-chair of the Anambra State OGP Steering Committee because of its expertise and programs in budget transparency.

Many CSO advocacy campaigns were effective in 2017. For example, the #NotTooYoungToRun campaign led by the Youth Initiative for Advocacy Growth and Advancement resulted in the passage of a constitutional amendment to lower the minimum age for elected positions. Independent policy analysis was provided by some CSO advocacy groups, including the Citizens Wealth Platform, which promotes budget transparency; and CISLAC, Human and Environmental Development Agenda, and Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice, which work on asset recovery and whistle-blower protection.
The Lagos-based Coalition on Violence Against Women persuaded Lagos State to launch a domestic violence and child abuse hotline in September 2017, which enables the public to report cases of child abuse, rape, and domestic violence to government agencies. Although CSOs determine the issues on which to engage, the vibrancy and possibility of success of advocacy campaigns depend largely on the availability of donor funding. Lobbying is still not common among CSOs in Nigeria. However; a few CSOs cultivate the support of legislators by using lobbying tactics, such as underwriting legislative committee retreats and sponsoring media advertorials for special events. Intense lobbying by the Gender Technical Unit, which has offices in the National Assembly complex, and the National Coalition Against AIDS led to the reintroduction of the Gender Equality Bill, which the National Assembly had thrown out in 2016. The Senate passed the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill in 2017 thanks to strong lobbying by several stakeholders, including CSOs.

The CSO sector in Nigeria remained alert in 2017 to any attempt by the government to introduce adverse laws. Leading CSOs urged other organizations across the country to resist the NGO Regulatory Commission Bill and used a social media platform (#NoNGOBill) to mobilize CSOs to attend the public hearing on the bill at the House of Representatives. At the hearing CSOs unanimously opposed the bill, and it was buried in committee. Otherwise, there is no evidence that CSOs pushed for changes in the policy and legal framework to benefit the sector in 2017.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

Service provision by CSOs in Nigeria did not change significantly in 2017. The sector is largely service oriented and includes a wide assortment of organizations, including socio-cultural groups, township unions, cooperative societies, professional associations, trade unions, FBOs, CBOs, and other local self-help groups in rural and semi-urban areas. Many CSOs work to complement government services in diverse thematic areas (with the notable exception of social housing and rural electrification, which are too capital intensive).

A large number of CSOs, including ActionAid Nigeria, Christian Aid Nigeria, and Street Child, focus on meeting humanitarian needs in the North East and in IDP camps across the country caused by the Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa insurgencies.

CSO services are usually demand driven. This is more evident in rural areas, where basic governmental services such as health clinics, schools, and piped water supplies are in short supply. For example, in 2017 CSACEFA ran mobile schools for IDPs, and Global Peace implemented a World Bank-supported project in Delta State, in which communities were directly involved in managing resources for watershed management. Communities also helped maintain peace and improved their livelihoods by organizing into interest groups that engaged with the Global Peace project.

CSOs generally provide services in a non-discriminatory manner. For example, the Nigerian Medical Association usually incorporates direct medical outreach into its annual general meetings, with members offering free medical services to local communities.

Evidence of the government’s recognition of CSOs’ value is extensive. It ranges from regular references to CSOs in official communications to inviting CSOs to take part in the government’s program delivery and policy formation. For example, CSO representatives were asked to witness the transfer of assets recovered from the Abacha government in an event with the governments of Switzerland and Nigeria in New York in November 2017. CLEEN Foundation continued to build police capacity through research and training.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Nigeria was stable in 2017. Organizations such as CIRDDOC, Women Environmental Program (WEP), Center for Social Justice (CSJ), Center for Information Technology and Development, and Good Governance Team operate resource centers where CSOs may obtain information relevant to their work and draw on capacity-building support. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) such as CISLAC, Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic Research, and Center for Management Development also operate resource centers and provide training in research, fundraising, strategic planning, project management, and other topics. Another ISO, Center−LSD, provides leadership and management training for CSOs as well as technical support in strategic planning. Training is mostly available in major cities, such as Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, and Abuja, which makes it difficult for local CSOs to attend because of the cost of travel.

Several local grantmaking organizations provide funding to CSOs in Nigeria. For example, the Tony Elumelu Foundation and Victim Support Fund supported CSOs in the North East in 2017. Many national CSOs, such as WEP and CLEEN Foundation, re-grant international donor funds to local partners for the implementation of small projects. In 2017 CIRDDOC re-granted donor funds to thirty-six partner organizations in thirty-six states for sub-national activities focused on budget transparency. Several formerly international CSOs, including ActionAid Nigeria, are now registered as local CSOs so they can more easily sub-grant to small local CSOs.

Formal coalitions such as the Network of Civil Society Organizations in the North East continued to provide support to IDPs in 2017. However, the current trend favors loose, ad hoc collaborations, with CSOs that are strong in particular areas providing leadership to other organizations to achieve shared advocacy goals. For example, the Policy and Legal Advocacy Center convened the Situation Room, a loose coalition of CSOs advocating for the reform of Nigeria’s electoral process, and the Center for Social Justice brought together the Citizens Wealth Platform to promote the prudent management of public resources. CISLAC initiated two other loose coalitions, Publish What You Pay and Zero Corruption, which promote transparency in the extractive sector. These examples suggest that national CSOs prefer working together in clusters to joining more formal coalitions, perhaps because internal strife in some formal coalitions has undermined their effectiveness and sustainability. For example, the Transition Monitoring Group, a formal coalition of more than 400 pro-democracy and election-monitoring CSOs, was largely passive in 2017 because of infighting.

CSOs collaborated with the government at various levels in 2017. For example, with support from the International Trade Center, the Nigeria Export Promotion Council connected women entrepreneurs to global markets through its SheTrade Initiative. The government also engaged CSOs to provide financial management and other business-related training to the women entrepreneurs. In cooperation with the Lady Mechanic Initiative, a CSO based in Lagos and Benin City, the government of Edo State hired women to work as mechanics on government vehicles. WEP partnered with the federal Ministry of Environment to develop a gender-affirmative change policy for the ministry, and CSJ collaborated with the Fiscal Responsibility Commission to publish the Budget Equality Index in 2017.

CSOs are growing more aware of the enormous resources available in the private sector and recognize the need to forge partnerships with private sector groups to achieve common objectives, especially in health and humanitarian response. CSOs partnered with the Dangote Foundation, for example, to meet many of their needs for humanitarian and relief materials.
National CSOs also collaborated effectively with the media to achieve common goals in 2017. For example, PWAN worked with Cool FM and Naija Info radio stations to disseminate the findings of its Court Observation project, which aims to increase CSOs’ access to government information as a tool for fighting judicial corruption and enhancing access to justice. WEP worked with Cool FM and Naija Info to sensitize the public to environmental issues. CSOs in Borno State cooperated with the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria to provide security tips to the public. Journalists now regularly participate in CSO workshops, advocacy meetings, and field monitoring activities.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9**

CSOs’ public image was stable in 2017. CSOs continued to command extensive positive media coverage, and they cultivated public support through innovative media engagements that raised awareness of their activities. For example, WEP, Center for Research and Documentation (CRD), and other organizations invite journalists to take part in their events as participants. The journalists then often report on those activities as public service announcements. CRD is a member of a loose coalition known as the Voice and Accountability Platform in Kano that also has media outlets as members, which often also report on CRD’s activities as public service announcements. Board members and executive directors from leading CSOs, such as CSJ and the Center for Democracy and Development, serve on the editorial boards of media organizations and contribute regular columns to some newspapers. In a few states, such as Delta, media houses request payment from CSOs to cooperate, and some privately owned television channels charge prohibitively high fees for coverage. These media seem to see CSOs’ activities as opportunities for corporate advertising rather than public service announcements, which limits the ability of resource-constrained CSOs to publicize their work.

The government’s regard for CSOs continued to improve in 2017, especially at the national level and in certain states such as Kaduna, where BudgIT worked with the state government on open budgeting processes. The private sector’s perceptions of CSOs were also positive. For example, the Nigeria Economic Summit Group, a private-sector think tank, established governance policy boards to advise the national government on economic issues and included CSO representatives among their members.

Overall, public perceptions of CSOs continued to improve in 2017. CSOs’ service and humanitarian activities helped increase community trust and confidence in the sector. However, public misgivings about some CSOs’ activities lingered. The assumption that CSOs are established only to collect funding from the international community was reinforced by allegations of corruption leveled against several international CSOs in the North East. While these allegations have aggravated negative perceptions of CSOs, they are balanced by CSOs’ readiness to penetrate the most difficult terrain to provide relief and humanitarian support. CSOs in the South East tend to have more favorable reputations because of the impact of their activities in the region. For example, CIRDDOC reported that no traditional ruler in the South would turn down an opportunity to show respect for CSOs by attending their events.
In 2017 many CSOs used social media to promote their activities in the area of good governance. Social media remained an effective way to facilitate engagement between Nigerians, their elected officials, government institutions, and the public. Many e-campaigns took place during the year, including during the Sixteen Days of Activism Against Gender-Based Violence, when CSOs such as the Center for Gender Economics Africa, ACTS Generation, and Alliance Against Domestic Violence and Abuse used social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter extensively.

There is no code of ethics or conduct for CSOs, even though the need for self-regulation has been strongly expressed, including at a 2017 meeting convened by CSOs to discuss a strategy for mobilizing against the NGO Regulatory Commission Bill. Overall, the CSO sector still faces accountability and transparency issues. Only leading CSOs publish their annual reports with audited financial accounts. However, CSOs in states such as Delta rarely make their financial reports publicly available, in part because they fear the publication of financial data will trigger kidnappings, which remain a threat throughout the country. CSOs at the state and local levels rarely publish annual reports.
Presidential elections were held in Rwanda in August 2017, and Paul Kagame of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front party won a third term with 99 percent of the vote. During the election period some members of opposition groups were intimidated and arrested. No effort was made to contest the election outcome.

During the year the government began to implement its National Strategy for Transformation One (NST1), which aims to develop Rwanda’s economy, society, and governance from 2017 to 2024. As part of its development efforts, the government continued to invest heavily in infrastructure projects, such as the construction of roads and commercial structures in Kigali and secondary cities. International observers have documented complaints that in pursuing these projects the government expropriated land without compensation and threatened, beat, or arrested residents who resisted its efforts to force them off their land.

The overall sustainability of Rwandan civil society did not change in 2017. The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector strengthened as resource centers and intermediary support organizations began to offer services such as training. Although the government became more tolerant of divergent views, mainly as a result of pressure from CSOs working in various sectors, including governance and service delivery, the legal environment deteriorated as harassment of CSOs persisted and CSO licensing fees increased. All other dimensions of CSO sustainability were stable.

In 2017 approximately 700 CSOs received permanent registration, for a total of 1,429 registered organizations, according to the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), the main oversight agency for CSOs. Another 556 organizations received temporary licenses. The high number of newly registered organizations during the year was due in part to the RGB’s reform of its internal structure and procedures. These numbers exclude faith-based organizations, churches, and unregistered CSOs still trying to comply with registration requirements. CSOs work mainly in the fields of education, health, justice, reconciliation, law and order, agriculture, the environment, governance and decentralization, and social protection.

1 The introduction and sections on the Legal Environment and Advocacy were not authored by the implementing partner and contain text inserted by other contributors during the editing process.
The legal environment for CSOs in Rwanda deteriorated in 2017 as harassment of CSOs persisted and CSO licensing fees increased.

CSOs continued to register under Law No. 04/2012 Governing the Organization and Functioning of National Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Law); Law No. 05/2012 Governing the Organization and Functioning of International Non-Governmental Organizations; or Law No. 06/2012 Governing the Organization and Functioning of Religious-Based Organizations. During the year the government reconstituted the RGB in accordance with Law No. 56/2016 Establishing the Rwanda Governance Board and Determining Its Mission, Organization, and Functioning. The RGB now enjoys administrative and financial autonomy rather than falling under the Ministry of Local Government. It also assumed responsibility from the Director General for Immigration and Emigration for registering and overseeing international CSOs in addition to domestic organizations. Under new leadership, the RGB responded to CSOs' complaints and sped up the time for processing registration applications from a previous average of three months to an average of one month in 2017. However, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2017 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Rwanda, Law No. 56/2016 was said by some CSOs to introduce “additional requirements and exacerbate the difficulties faced by civil organizations.” For example, the fee for a provisional license was increased from RWF 1,200 (approximately $2) to RWF 50,000 (approximately $57) and for a permanent license from no cost to RWF 100,000 (approximately $115). Because of limited funding, some organizations were unable to register. Moreover, according to the U. S. State Department report, the government “delayed or denied registration to local and international NGOs seeking to work on human rights, media freedom, or political advocacy.” No organization was reported to have been dissolved in 2017.

New organizations operating on provisional licenses, which are valid for twelve months, must provide action plans at the time of registration and performance reports after nine months. After they receive permanent licenses, CSOs must file annual activity and financial reports with the government, according to Article 29 of the NGO Law.

During the year the government started to draft new laws governing domestic and international CSOs. The draft laws included a provision that CSOs allocate 30 percent of their budgets to their daily operations and 70 percent to program activities, which CSOs pushed to have removed.

Some observers believed that CSOs, including those working in governance and human rights, faced fewer hurdles in 2017 as they sought to hold government officials to account. However, the U.S. State Department’s 2017 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Rwanda details reports of multiple cases of the detention, arrest, surveillance, or harassment of journalists, members of unregistered opposition groups, and human rights workers by local police and state security forces.

Article 28 of the NGO Law gives CSOs the right “to enjoy tax exemption in accordance with relevant laws.” CSOs may obtain exemptions on goods related to their areas of operation by concluding memoranda of understanding with their line ministries. In practice, however, the government seems reluctant to grant exemptions, and typically only organizations involved in social and economic sectors such as health and education manage to obtain them.

Under Article 4 of the NGO Law, CSOs may conduct commercial activities only when authorized to do so and may earn profits as long as they are used to fulfill their missions. CSOs that conduct commercial activities are subject to commercial law and related tax regulations and must pay taxes on any profits generated by income-generating activities.

CSOs such as Kigali Bar Association, Great Lakes Initiative for Human Rights and Development (GLIHD), Legal Aid Forum (LAF), and Umbrella of Human Rights Organizations in Rwanda (CLADHO) provide legal and arbitration services to other CSOs.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

The organizational capacity of the CSO sector did not change in 2017.

Some constituency building efforts during the year were effective. For example, several CSOs continued to reach sizable audiences through community dialogues, open days, and talk shows on national and community radio and television. Groups conducting such activities included CLADHO, GLIHD, and Rwanda Civil Society Platform (RCSP), which work in human rights and governance; Collaborative Council of Organizations for Basic Initiative Support (CCOAIB), an umbrella organization of CSOs working in development; Rwanda Education for All Coalition (REFAC), which focuses on education; and Human Development Initiative (HDI), which works in health. However, the Rwanda Environmental Conservation Organization, Rwanda Environmental NGOs Forum, Rural Environment and Development Organization, and other CSOs working in environmental protection and research had smaller constituencies because of the public’s inadequate knowledge of environmental issues and their own limited resources to use on promoting awareness of their activities.

Most CSOs have clearly defined missions and strategic plans, although some organizations do not comply with their plans because of inadequate funding. CSOs’ strategic planning improved in 2017 as the result of training provided by international CSOs and the government’s Rwanda Management Institute. CSOs such as RCSP, CLADHO, Transparency International Rwanda, Rwanda Women’s Network, and Profemme Twese Hamwe (PTH) have developed advocacy strategies during periodic strategic planning sessions and adhere to them during implementation. Many CSOs implement activities outside of the scope of their strategic plans or core missions if funding becomes available.

Most CSOs have clearly defined management structures. Board members usually engage in their organizations by, for example, overseeing compliance with codes of ethics. Most CSOs have written policies and try to adhere to them. Conflicts of interest are rare.

CSOs are usually unable to maintain permanent staff because of resource constraints. Some larger, urban-based organizations, including RCSP, CCOAIB, CLADHO, PTH, LAF, Rwanda Youth Organization Forum (RYOF), Rwanda Men’s Resource Center (RWAMREC), and Rwanda Workers’ Trade Union Confederation (CESTRAR), hire professionally qualified staff on a temporary basis. Insufficient funding forced some CSOs to lay off staff or close their offices in 2017. For example, the Child Support Center (CSC) shut down its operations and the People’s Movement for Human Rights Education reduced its staffing during the year. CSOs often follow standard human resource practices, such as offering contracts and job descriptions and developing payroll and personnel policies. However, reports of infighting at CSOs are common and can destabilize staffing structures. CSOs sometimes engage volunteers from among their constituents.

Because of insufficient funding, some CSOs find it difficult to cover administrative costs such as rent for offices. CSOs were warned by the government not to operate in residential houses and were asked to relocate to commercial buildings in 2017. This shift posed hardships for many organizations because of the high cost of rent in commercial buildings. Rural CSOs have little or no access to the Internet because of limited funding and insufficient infrastructure, but urban CSOs easily access the Internet at an affordable rate. Some CSOs use the Internet to apply for funding from donors and submit monthly reports. CSOs use social media to facilitate their operations.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2017. Many CSOs in Rwanda did not have adequate or reliable sources of funding, and CSC closed because of funding shortfalls. However, the closure of one organization in 2017 compared favorably with 2016, when three CSOs (Fact Rwanda, ADL, and Solidarity for Community Development) closed for the same reason. Similarly, unlike in 2016, when financial difficulties caused many organizations to avoid registration, the high number of registrations in 2017 suggests that many CSOs had sufficient funding to register during the year.

The CSO sector relies heavily on foreign funding, which in 2017 was approximately the same as in the previous year. Major donors include USAID, European Union (EU), Norwegian People’s Aid, Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency, the United Kingdom’s Department For International Development (DFID), and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Other funding organizations include Kindernothilfe, Plan International, World Vision, Care International, and Oxfam International. The Rwanda Multi-Donor Civil Society Support Program, known as Ikiraro cy’iterambere, is a five-year, $12 million fund to support the development of civil society and encourage constructive dialogue between civil society and the government. Donors such as the United Nations Development Program support CSOs through a basket fund controlled by the government. This funding is channeled through the RGB and accessed by CSOs in a competitive process to ensure transparency. The Ikiraro funding can be difficult for domestic CSOs to access, since most of them lack the capacity to prepare high-quality proposals. Some CSOs have only one donor, and the lack of funding diversification can pose a risk to their operations. Both rural and urban CSOs often lack access to donor networks or databases and thus are unaware of funding opportunities.

Other than RGB, no local institutions or programs provide financial resources to CSOs. The culture of corporate philanthropy is just beginning to develop in Rwanda and has yet to benefit CSOs.

Umbrella CSOs sometimes mobilize contributions from their members, but the amounts raised in this way are usually small. In 2017 some CSOs diversified their income sources by generating revenue through research, consultancies, and other activities. For example, Aveng has a training center and PTH rents out houses that it owns.

International CSOs and umbrella CSOs usually have the capacity to comply with sound financial management standards. In response to donors’ requirements, they typically submit monthly, quarterly, and annual reports with financial statements and conduct external audits, which must be clean or close to clean. Larger CSOs use software programs to manage their finances. Newer organizations and those that are financially constrained or understaffed have lower capacities to implement sound financial management systems.
ADVOCACY: 4.3

The advocacy capacity of CSOs in Rwanda remained the same in 2017. CSOs continued to be consulted by the government on various issues. For example, after CSOs pressed to participate in high-level meetings, the government invited them to participate actively in its semi-annual joint reviews and quarterly working groups in all sixteen sectors, including education, health, and agriculture. The government prepared working documents in advance to facilitate CSOs’ participation in these groups. After the elections CSOs were invited to join the government in implementing its Seven-Year Program (2010−17) to bolster economic growth. The government encouraged REFAC, CLADHO, CCOAIB, HDI, Adi Terimbere, Tubibe Amahoro, Rwanda Religious Forum, Never Again Rwanda, and many other organizations to participate in implementing sectoral priorities defined by the program. In addition, CCOAIB, LAI, RYOF, CLADHO, PTH, GLIHD, National Union of Disability Organizations in Rwanda (NUDOR), and Transparency International Rwanda analyzed the government’s new plan, the NST I, and provided suggestions addressing the many gaps in the plan. After persistent follow-up, 95 percent of CSOs’ recommendations were incorporated into the approved NST I. National CSOs, including RCSP, CLADHO, and PTH, signed memoranda of understanding with government institutions to promote collaboration and consideration of their recommendations. For example, RCSP, a pro-government umbrella organization, signed an agreement with the RGB to urge CSOs to engage in joint advocacy, while PTH agreed with the Gender Monitoring Office to monitor implementation of gender initiatives and priorities. CSOs having such agreements with the government were able to pursue advocacy initiatives for implementation by relevant ministries.

During the elections CSOs advocated for peaceful campaigning and encouraged the public to stay calm. CSOs’ issue-based coalitions and advocacy campaigns were relatively effective in 2017. The government addressed issues raised by umbrella organizations such as RCSP, CLADHO, PTH, and Rwanda Education for All Coalition (REFAC). Media outlets aired multiple debates to inform the public about important human, civil, and political rights, and CSOs continued to participate in talk shows on community radio stations and national television about sensitive topics, such as land expropriation and medical insurance. Political figures sometimes participated in these events and were questioned by the public through call-in arrangements. CSOs held a series of community dialogues on issues of importance to the public and pushed the government to implement their resolutions. For instance, RCSP, whose members include umbrella organizations such as NUDOR, CCOAIB, LAI, RYOF, CLADHO, and PTH, conducted a national dialogue on land issues, which alerted the public to problems that the government had neglected, such as the delayed issuance of land titles, unfair expropriations, and the undervaluing of land. After CSOs advocated for rapid government intervention on these issues, the government implemented recommendations emerging from the public dialogue. CLADHO conducted research on teenage pregnancy and presented its findings publicly, which prompted the government to form a national ministerial steering committee to work with CLADHO on investigating the issue. As a result of pressure from CSOs in the educational sector, including REFAC and Watoto, the government started to replace double shifts with single shifts in primary schools to boost the quality of education. CSOs also advocated for citizens’ participation in local planning and budgeting, which prompted the Ministry of Local Government to issue an appeal to local authorities to engage the public in identifying community priorities.

CSOs are comfortable with lobbying and contributed to the formulation of a number of laws in 2017. For example, CSOs proposed amendments concerning abortion to Penal Code 165, which the law reform commission took into consideration. CSOs participated actively in parliamentary hearings on the national budget, and they voiced public concerns and criticized budget agencies for poor planning and faulty prioritization of such issues as the lack of markets, impassable feeder roads, and the need for more health centers.
In 2017 the government started to draft new laws governing domestic and international CSOs. Under CCOAIB’s auspices, CSOs responded to the government’s invitation to provide input into the draft law. CSOs recommended that the provision allocating 30 percent of CSOs’ budgets to their daily operations and 70 percent to program activities be removed so that organizations could decide independently on financing the cost of efficient and effective interventions. The proposed changes were pending before the Law Reform Commission at the end of the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.3**

CSO service provision did not change significantly in 2017. The services offered by Rwandan CSOs are diversified and cover nearly all sectors. For instance, HDI works in health, CCOAIB and Imbaraga offer services in agriculture, and REFAC is active in education. These organizations also monitor service delivery and advocate for changes in policies affecting their constituents. In 2017 financial constraints continued to limit the ability of some CSOs to offer services. For example, CSC ceased to offer child-related support services and closed its doors because of financial insolvency. However, some CSOs managed to get funding from RGB for service delivery.

The goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents. For example, CLADHO and ActionAid Rwanda conducted community scorecards in 2017 to assess local service delivery. One of their key findings was that farmers were hurt by delays in the delivery of fertilizer by the Ministry of Agriculture. This finding was presented to the government, which responded by ensuring the timely delivery of fertilizer. CSOs used other participatory and research approaches to develop action plans and trained their staff and constituencies in results-based management to maintain their programs’ achievements.

CSOs do not usually generate income from service delivery, since donors fund services to be offered free of charge to beneficiaries. For example, farmers’ networks promote good agricultural practices without pay. However, some organizations, such as the Rwanda Association of Land Government Authorities and Aveng, generated income by offering research and consultancy services in 2017.

CSOs share products such as publications and reports through open days, radio and television talk shows, dialogues, joint sector reviews, sector working groups, and planning and budgetary hearings. CSOs’ goods and services are provided to communities and constituents without any discrimination.

Government officials largely recognize the value of CSOs in service provision and social service monitoring, although they usually claim credit for achievements in these areas. For example, some local government officials received improved annual performance evaluations because of the positive results of CSOs’ work in 2017. Government officials often attend events hosted by CSOs that support government priorities. For example, district mayors and their deputies mobilized the public to participate in CSOs’ activities and attended the official openings of pre-budget hearings and community dialogues organized by CLADHO, RCSRYouth Association for the Promotion of Human Rights and Development (AjPRODHO), and other organizations.
**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Rwanda improved in 2017. In an improvement over the previous year, when there were no resource centers or intermediary support organizations serving Rwandan CSOs, several organizations offered support to CSOs in 2017. For example, with funding from USAID and other donors, AJPRODHO began to offer services such as training, The Rwanda Management Institute and centers operated by HDI also offered services to CSOs.

There are no local institutions, organizations, or programs that provide financial resources to CSOs.

CSOs continued to work together through umbrella organizations, partnerships, coalitions, and think tanks in 2017. Groups such as RWAMREC, RCSP, CCOAIB, CESTRAR, PTH, REFAC, and Rwanda Women’s Network participated in joint research and advocacy and met to share ideas. For example, RCSP organized CSOs into governance, social, and economic clusters, which shared information with each other and the public through workshops, websites, and other channels.

Donors and international CSOs, including Norwegian People’s Aid, EU, DFID, and ActionAid Rwanda, offer specialized training. The training is usually based on capacity-needs assessments conducted by the recipients. For instance, in 2017 Norwegian People’s Aid offered training to national and district partners on financial management and advocacy strategy formulation. Knowledgeable trainers from the Rwanda Management Institute provided training to fifty-one CSOs on strategic management, financial management, fundraising, resource mobilization, and project management under the auspices of the government-supported Capacity Services Employment Board, which offers capacity building for CSOs. Training workshops are sometimes conducted in local languages, with training materials in English.

CSOs worked with the private sector, government, and media through public dialogues in 2017. For example, the government consulted with CSOs while considering new policies and invited CSOs to join sector working groups and joint sector reviews. Through RCSP CSOs reached out to government institutions and negotiated collaborations set forth in memoranda of understanding. In addition, government officials attended events hosted by CSOs that supported citizen participation in planning and budgeting. CSOs also invited media and private-sector representatives to open days, budget hearings, and community and public dialogues.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

The public image of CSOs in Rwanda improved in 2017, especially as the government’s attitude towards CSOs was more positive. CSOs’ activities were widely covered in both state and private media. The media provided positive analysis of the role of CSOs and closely followed the government’s implementation of CSOs’ recommendations. For example, the media was invited to the NSTI discussions and helped publicize CSOs’ contributions to the draft document. Community dialogues and open days organized by CSOs were aired live on community radio and television stations, and journalists asked dialogue panelists questions and then publicized the key points in their news reports. CSOs also organized a number of radio and television talk shows on the national planning and budgeting process, service delivery, and performance contracts, which included live call-in participation. CSOs are obliged to pay for all media coverage, with charges varying depending on the type of coverage.
The public has a positive perception of CSOs, understands the concept of CSOs, and was supportive of their activities in 2017. For example, the public participated in CSO-sponsored meetings, seminars, workshops, hearings, and dialogues, which helped communities identify their needs in areas such as land and medical insurance and then advocate for their interests with the government.

The government’s attitude towards CSOs improved in 2017, as it came to see CSOs as partners in national development. As it interacted with CSOs in meetings, public debates, dialogues, and talk shows, the government started to consider CSOs as influencers rather than mere implementers and relied on them to provide expertise and credible information. Mayors and other high-ranking officials made positive public statements about the ways in which CSOs helped their localities achieve quick and sustainable development. The private sector has not adopted a culture of donating financial resources to CSOs.

CSOs raised awareness about their activities through community dialogues, radio and television talk shows, newspapers, and their own websites in 2017. For example, CSOs distributed press releases about their events, and some organizations took part in Civil Society Week, a national event publicizing CSOs’ programs among beneficiaries and donors. CSOs have excellent relationships with journalists, which encourages positive coverage. Journalists are sometimes hired to cover CSOs’ activities. CSOs also use social media for public outreach. CSOs have codes of ethics and try to abide by them. Leading CSOs publish their annual reports on their websites, which has elevated their public visibility.
The political situation in Senegal was tense in 2017. Parliamentary elections were held in July 2017, with the ruling majority party, Benno Bokk Yaakkar, winning 125 out of 165 seats. Following the elections, relations between the government and the opposition were very tense. In the run-up to the elections, the authorities banned peaceful demonstrations and arrested protesters. Opposition leaders later charged that the elections were tainted by fraud and delays in issuing voting identity cards, resulting in hundreds of voters being unable to cast their ballots. During the year the country was also shaken by a scandal involving the mayor of Dakar, who was arrested and charged with fraud, money laundering, and other crimes. While in detention the mayor was elected to parliament, but in November the National Assembly lifted his parliamentary immunity at the request of the public prosecutor, which CSOs viewed as demonstrating a lack of judicial independence. Regional security shocks fueled by terrorist groups active in neighboring countries also continued to pose a threat to stability in Senegal in 2017.

During the year the government continued to implement its 2015 Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), which envisions sustainable growth through structural transformation, human development, and improved governance. Its implementation has helped boost public investment and stimulate private-sector activity. According to the World Bank, Senegal’s economic growth was estimated at 6.8 percent in 2017, the third consecutive year of growth above 6 percent. Despite this economic growth, Senegal ranked 164 out of 188 countries in the 2017 Human Development Index issued by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), with a poverty rate of 46.7 percent. The high cost of healthcare is a key barrier to social development, especially among the poorest Senegalese. Although the coverage rate is slowly increasing, it remained far from the government’s target of 75 percent of the population at the end of 2017. CSOs were increasingly involved in promoting access to health services as the government decentralized service provision to the municipal level.

The CSO sector in Senegal is dynamic, and CSOs played multiple leadership, service-providing, and conflict-mediating roles in response to the year’s social tensions. However, overall sustainability declined slightly during the year as a result of negative developments in the legal environment and organizational capacity dimensions.
The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated as CSOs’ rights to freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression were restricted, while limited funding weakened CSOs’ organizational capacity, including their internal management structures and their ability to employ and retain staff. The other dimensions of CSO sustainability were largely stable in 2017.

Senegal’s civil society encompasses several organizational forms. Associations, which are governed by Decree 76-040 of 1976, are the most common type of CSO. While the Ministry of the Interior has not released statistics on the number of associations in the last few years, older estimates place it at over 10,000. There are also approximately 589 CSOs registered with the government as NGOs. Informal community-based organizations (CBOs) also operate in Senegal, but there are no estimates available on the number of these organizations. Last, numerous labor unions are registered with the government.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.0**

The legal environment for CSOs in Senegal declined in 2017, as CSOs’ rights to freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression were less free than in previous years. In addition, a framework agreement between the central government and NGOs that was prepared in January 2015 has yet to be formalized.

Two main laws govern CSOs in Senegal. Decree 76-040 of 1976 governs CSOs in general while also detailing the specific obligations of public sports, educational, and cultural associations and unions. The registration of these groups is validated by the Ministry of the Interior and completed through a notice in the official journal within three months of the issuance of a registration receipt. Decree 2015-145 of 2015 governs non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a separate form of CSO defined as “nonprofit private associations or organizations whose goal is to offer support to development.” Organizations may apply for NGO status, which confers eligibility for certain tax and customs waiver to NGOs that have been in existence for at least two years. Applications for NGO status must include investment programs describing planned areas of activity with budgets. An inter-ministerial advisory commission approves the applications. But the commission meets infrequently and processes applications slowly, thereby hindering NGOs’ operations and impeding project timelines set with funders. CSOs may endure especially long waits for approval of their investment programs by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Economy.

CSOs are overseen by the Ministry of the Interior and the line ministries involved in their areas of work. The laws clearly state reporting requirements and other obligations to ensure the accountability of CSOs—particularly NGOs—operations. Some CSOs see the requirement to submit quarterly reports to prefectures in the regions in which they operate as overly cumbersome, particularly if they have multiple projects in diverse locations. CSOs have recourse against being dissolved by the central government for political or arbitrary reasons and other governmental abuse. Any CSO that feels that it has been harmed by a government decision may take legal action and be represented by a lawyer.

The government may impose punitive measures such as suspension if it discovers any mismanagement of funds. However, no such measures were imposed in 2017. The government has proposed that NGOs contribute to the Ministry of the Interior’s Monitoring and Evaluation Fund for NGO Activities, but NGOs resist the idea because of their limited resources and the high costs of these evaluations.
Senegal’s laws do not impose any particular constraints on CSOs, except when advocacy activities may lead to ethnic, religious, or political discrimination. CSOs are allowed to operate freely as long as they comply with the laws. Since the implementation of Decree 2015-145 on NGOs, the laws and regulations have gradually been implemented in a more consistent manner. CSOs may freely exercise the right to freedom of expression in addressing issues of public debate and also have the right to assemble, participate in public events, and organize social mobilization or advocacy activities, to which they may invite the government. However, CSOs’ rights to freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression were restricted in 2017 when, for example, the authorities banned peaceful demonstrations and arrested protesters in the run-up to the July elections. In addition, about twenty members of the Collective of One Thousand Youths for the Release of Khalifa Sall were arrested for public disorder in June and November while holding peaceful demonstrations in Dakar calling for the release of the mayor from jail. Journalists, artists, social media users, and others who expressed dissent were also arbitrarily arrested.

A new press code adopted by the National Assembly in June 2017 has the potential to further repress CSOs’ voices, especially of those that are active on social media. The vaguely worded code bans “offending” the head of state, defamation, insults, transmitting or distributing offensive information, and distributing false information. Article 227 provides restrictions on access to online content deemed “contrary to morality.” The code allows the ministers of the interior and communications to impose prison terms and fines on anyone violating the code’s provisions and criminalizes various techniques used by whistleblowers.

NGOs receive tax exemptions. However, when purchasing equipment, NGOs may be required by customs to provide a deposit to cover the tax in case the exemption is not given, and often have trouble getting this money back. Individuals and corporations receive tax deductions on eligible donations.

CSOs are legally allowed to bid on government contracts at the local and national levels. CSOs are also allowed to earn income from goods and services by charging for them and operating social enterprises such as cultural gatherings and trade fairs, provided the profits go to supporting their missions. CSOs may fundraise, provided they obtain advance approval to do so from the Ministry of the Interior.

Legal experts work in consulting firms in all major cities in the country. Their fees are generally within CSOs’ budgets. However, most organizations prefer to obtain legal counsel from CSOs that work in human rights, because their services are usually free.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.1

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated in 2017, mainly because limited funding weakened their internal management structures and rendered them unable to employ or retain staff.

The organizational capacity of CSOs in Senegal is evolving in diverse ways. Some organizations such as local development associations are striving to achieve NGO status. Other organizations choose to retain their association status while broadening their scope on the policy, strategic, and operational level. Still other organizations are moving toward a professional model. For example, the Forum Civil, the local chapter of Transparency International, has established 100 chapters across fourteen regions in Senegal and in developing its strategy is working with the Laboratory for Research and Studies on Governance, which brings together some thirty researchers in governance and corruption prevention.

CSOs try to actively support communities’ needs.

For example, in 2017 the Abeille Association set up a small library and offered tutoring to children in the village of Lompoul in French, mathematics, and English.
Most CSOs seek to cultivate relationships with their target groups by using a participatory approach. CSOs increasingly use mobile phones to help build solidarity in facing challenges that communities and CSOs share. For example, CSOs have developed partnerships with mobile phone companies such as Orange Money and Wari to facilitate money transfers. CSOs also collaborate with community leaders who hold high-level positions and are able to support the communities they come from with expertise in areas such as access to water, health, education, and training.

CSOs have clearly defined missions, and most organizations have strategic plans. NGOs have investment programs, which are required to receive NGO status and must be approved by the central government. Depending on their capacity and available human and financial resources, CSOs adhere to their missions and strategic plans to varying degrees. CSOs have criteria to measure the success of their work, including monitoring and evaluation systems and internal and external reviews. As specified in Decree 2015-145, the government’s oversight of NGOs includes evaluation visits. While an employee of the Ministry of the Interior, which oversees NGOs, conducts the visits, the evaluation team also includes a member of the Council of Non-Governmental Development Support Organizations (CONGAD). After these visits are completed, the NGOs receive reports with recommendations to improve their work.

The performance of CSOs’ internal management bodies worsened slightly in 2017. For example, these bodies ignored documents on internal governance; general assemblies did not meet by deadlines; turnovers in the composition of internal entities faced excessive and unwarranted delays; and shortcomings were evident in the submission of reports and compliance with accountability requirements. In addition, technical committees, ad hoc committees, and topic-specific networks that were meant to enrich association life no longer functioned.

CSOs are rarely able to retain permanent paid staff. Project funding sometimes covers the salaries of project managers and accounting assistants. CSOs develop their staff’s leadership and other skills through training, coaching, and capacity-building activities, which are usually offered by platforms such as CONGAD. CSOs generally have adequate human resource policies, including procedural manuals with pay policies, job descriptions, hiring letters, and performance contracts. CSOs typically benefit from volunteers who serve on their governing bodies or participate in their activities on an ad hoc basis. More and more CSOs are using professional services such as accountants and information technology managers as they professionalize their operations.

In general, large national and international CSOs that receive foreign funding have access to modern office equipment. Obsolete office equipment and the lack of offices generally hinder other CSOs. CSO funding rarely covers computer equipment. At the end of a project donors sometimes ask CSOs to return items such as cars and motorcycles if they are still useful, so that they can be given to other stakeholders, such as local municipalities or associations. As a result, some organizations do not have efficient equipment and may find it difficult to maintain head offices. In a study of 200 NGOs conducted by CONGAD in 2017, only ninety organizations had offices. Despite these constraints, CSOs are enthusiastic users of modern technology, including social media. Mobile phones are ubiquitous, and the Internet, which is widely available except in isolated areas, is now critical to the work of CSOs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs’ financial sustainability did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs continued to face difficulties in mobilizing resources for activities other than responses to the few calls for proposals that international partners issued.

CSOs’ funding sources are neither multiple nor varied. Most CSO funding comes from bilateral and multilateral development initiatives and project-based partnerships with international organizations working in Senegal. Major donors in 2017 included the European Union (EU), World Bank, UNDP, and French Embassy. Under the EU Support Program for Civil Society Initiatives (PAISC), €5.5 million (approximately $6.3 million) was made available to strengthen CSO capacity and promote freedom of expression and assembly. The EU also funded eight projects amounting to €4.3 million (approximately $5 million) to support CSOs working with street children and children who are victims of abuse. The French Embassy’s Innovative Projects of Civil Societies and Coalition of Actors (PISCCA) program is providing support of XAF260 million (about $459,000) to CSOs between 2017 and 2019.
Changes in funding levels or in foreign donors’ priorities, which occur often, may cause CSOs to cut staff and fail to meet their commitments to intermediary partners.

At the local level, funding sources are paltry. The government is gradually offering more service-provision contracts to CSOs for activities in governance, education, water and sanitation, and health. For example, the Emergency Program for Community Development (PUDC), National Family Grant Program, Regional Express Train (TER) project, and Reproductive Health Program offer service-provision contracts to CSOs. As part of a 2017 program between the central government and the EU, CSOs signed service contracts with the government to support various citizen initiatives: the CSOs include Civil Forum, Professionals for Fair Development (GRET), the movement We’ve Had Enough, IPAR (a think tank on public policy in the agricultural and rural sector in West Africa), and CONGAD. But such programs are rare, and small CSOs in particular have difficulty obtaining funding through them. The Ministry of Youth selects some national associations governed by Decree 76-040 and recognized as benefiting the public good to receive annual subsidies.

Some corporate foundations, including the Orange, Ecobank, and Sococim Foundations, fund CSOs. But the scope and thematic spread of their support remain limited. Mining companies in southern Senegal fund CSOs’ educational activities in mining areas. Some CSOs receive non-financial support from their communities and target group members. Membership-based organizations collect membership dues with difficulty, and CSOs earn very limited amounts from this source. To generate income some CSOs run small-scale cultural, sporting, and recreational events, such as art nights, fairs, wrestling matches, and soccer tournaments, but these events do not always recover their costs.

CSOs generally have financial management systems. Some donors require financial reports and annual audits of larger amounts. Audit requirements can be difficult for CSOs to fulfill if donors do not provide funding for this purpose.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSO advocacy did not change in 2017. Daily communications between CSOs and government officials facilitate information sharing and collaboration. Communication channels can be informal and ad hoc but are increasingly formal. For example, CSOs take part in the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, National Anti-Corruption Office, Agency for the Standardization of Government Contracts, and the framework for public policy monitoring. In September 2017, Together 2030, along with Sightsavers and CONGAD, organized a workshop to discuss preparation of the voluntary national review to be presented by the Senegalese government at the UN High Level Political Forum in July 2018. At the meeting government officials reinforced their commitment to consulting with civil society in the process leading up to the report. The workshop included representatives from the Ministry of the Economy, National Office of Statistics and Demography, Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development, UNDP, Federation of Associations for People with Disabilities, CONGAD and other CSOs, as well as the media.

CSOs increasingly address public policies in formal discussion settings. For example, Enda Third World, which focuses on environmental development, held public hearings on the budget and collaborated with other organizations such as Forum Civil on civic engagement and the environment. CSOs also ran projects or informed the public about citizen monitoring and oversight, access to water, and health insurance options providing access to care. Organizations such as CONGAD increasingly worked in coalitions to influence public policies. A major aim for CSOs in 2017 was to promote transparency by raising public awareness of the electoral process in the run-up to the presidential elections.
CSOs engaged in public education campaigns focused on the importance of elections, voter registration, and the electoral process.

CSOs held information, education, and advocacy sessions about the provisions of the new Press Code, adopted in June. Certain aspects of the law, especially the criminalization of press offenses, are perceived as a threat to freedom of the press and regressive compared to many other countries. Social networks actively engaged in these efforts. The Association of Journalists (which comprises the Convention of Young Reporters (CJR) and the Association of Online Editors and Press Professionals (APPHEL), and the National Syndicate of Information and Communication Professionals (SYNPEC) also contributed to these efforts. These advocacy efforts resulted in a partial consensus. Nevertheless, these pecuniary and administrative sanctions still create discord.

In the extractive industries, CSO advocacy has led to the establishment of mechanisms that, for example, compensate people for harm and provide others new housing in Thiès, where zircon is mined. In Kédougou, mine operators participate in priority investments such as hydraulics and education through the Social Fund for Miners.

CSOs are comfortable with lobbying, as doing so allows them to influence decision makers and promote public policy changes.

Some CSOs such as CONGAD are deeply involved in efforts to improve the legal and institutional framework for CSOs in Senegal, particularly by enhancing the role of CSOs in the government’s development processes and CSOs’ inclusion in social accountability efforts, such as social audits. In April 2017 CONGAD and governmental authorities launched several workshops throughout the country to discuss the advantages of the new action framework for NGOs that was adopted in 2015 (Decree 2015-145, dated February 4, 2015). The workshops reinforced dialogue between the government and NGOs and aimed to strengthen capacity in registration procedures and in developing investment programs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

CSO service provision did not change in 2017. CSOs actively provide basic social services to improve living conditions in their communities. They work in areas such as health, education, water, and sanitation and make significant contributions in the social and human development sectors. For example, Abeille Association supports association-based or community schools if public resources are insufficient, and the Union for Solidarity and Mutual Aid provides more than 60 percent of eye care in Senegal. CSOs are heavily involved in training youth and women in such areas as processing local products, running a household, and working in general mechanics and with computers.

CSOs use a participatory approach in which communities determine their own needs. CSOs often help beneficiaries organize themselves, understand their situations, identify solutions and actions to be taken, and act independently for their own benefit. For example, in 2017 Enda Third World engaged local communities in participatory budgeting mechanisms. CSOs collect data to demonstrate their contributions to the fulfillment of local needs, drawing on the results generated by monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, reporting tools, surveys, and meetings with communities. In 2017 CSOs conducted or contributed to studies for the central government, donors, and national CSOs. For example, with the support of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the West Africa Civil Society and Development Research Report documented the impact of Senegalese CSOs in areas ranging from justice reforms to elections and security mitigation.
CSOs’ actions are generally open to and benefit stakeholders other than the CSOs’ own members. For example, Forum Civil has a governance research section with more than thirty university academics and experts that informs the public and government on economic governance issues. Citizen Movement distributes its research reports widely to the public, experts, academics, researchers, and the media. Resource materials are also made available to training institutions. CSOs generally provide their goods and services without discrimination.

Since their activities are largely funded by donors or the government, most CSOs do not seek to recover their costs. Some CSOs working in education and training (such as the Cultural Association for Personal Educational and Social Advancement (ACAPES)) or in health (such as the Union for Solidarity and Mutual Benefit (USE) and Action and Development (ACDEV)) provide products and services accessible to the disadvantaged by sharing costs with donors.

The government recognizes that CSOs contribute effectively to the delivery and monitoring of basic social services. In 2017 the government invited CSOs to participate in designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating development projects supported by the World Bank. For example, the African Women’s Association for Research and Development took part in the World Bank’s collaboration with public-sector entities to address challenges in service delivery and increase the effectiveness of public institutions.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5**

The infrastructure for CSOs in Senegal was unchanged in 2017. Resource centers for CSOs and the public operate at the national level. For example, one resource center offers training and information services to handicapped youth using information and communication technologies (ICT). However, their operations, computer equipment, and technical support capabilities depend on ever scarcer funding. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) such as the African Convention for Human Rights (RADDHO) and CONGAD foster discussion and cooperation and offer training and capacity building for members on such topics as land ownership, project management, and citizen monitoring. CONGAD also helps associations with the administrative procedures for registering as NGOs and preparing investment programs. These services do not generate revenue.

Local community foundations and ISOs try to secure funds for specific projects such as trainings and dinner-debates.

CSO platforms, including the Platform of Non-State Actors, Platform of EU NGOs, and Association of International NGOs in Senegal, defend members’ interests and promote information sharing through publications, discussion meetings, and earned income. With a membership of 178 Senegalese and foreign organizations and nine thematic networks, CONGAD is the only coalition that promotes the CSO sector’s interests as a whole.
The training sector is highly developed and covers almost all areas, including strategic management, accounting, and financial management. Many trainers skilled in CSO management work as consultants with input from academics, researchers, and professionals in the public and private sectors. Trainers are often members of CSOs or CSO networks. Many training schools offer training on organizational management in the capital and other cities. CONGAD offers capacity building for CSOs in resource mobilization, advocacy, and public policy dialogue. CSO training needs can generally be met, either through existing schools or through one-off sessions, provided funding is available. More and more CSOs translate training manuals and study reports into the most widely spoken national languages.

Some CSOs work in formal and informal partnerships with the private sector, governments, and the public and private media. All sectors know that these partnerships are indispensable. Public programs increasingly use a multi-stakeholder approach. For example, Green Senegal works with the government on the environment, and Eau Vive and Caritas work with the government on access to water. CSOs and journalists have solid relationships. Partnerships are often established through institutions or joint projects, and communication professionals organize themselves into networks to better deal with emerging topics. International pressure has also forced the Senegalese government to cooperate with CSOs. For example, the World Bank-supported Global Financing Facility (GFF) Trust Fund established a platform to streamline CSO messaging about GFF’s work. The Senegalese Association for the Welfare of the Family is among the CSOs that sit on the CSO Steering Committee. Within the GFF framework, CSOs developed an action plan to improve reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.7**

The public image of CSOs did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs received media coverage of their activities at all levels through media entities such as Senegalese Television Broadcasting, online press services such as Senenews, and community radio stations. The media generally provide positive analysis of the role of CSOs. They distinguish between public-service announcements and corporate advertising, which allows CSOs to access media at a very low cost. This coverage helps to raise the visibility of CSOs and spread their advocacy messages.

Local and national audiences had a positive opinion of CSOs’ initiatives in 2017. CSOs’ focus on social issues, outreach work, and nondiscriminatory practices created a positive image of their contributions to public life. Although civil society’s diversity causes some confusion about the sector’s role, the public increasingly understands the concept of CSOs and the distinction between CSOs that are active in politics and those that are involved in development and promote the economic and social rights of the most vulnerable populations.

Government and private-sector officials have positive perceptions of CSOs and recognize their expertise, role in social mediation, and contributions to economic and social development. The central government and the private sector trust CSOs, thanks to the impact of their projects.

CSOs effectively carry out their work through information sharing, awareness raising, and alerts. CSOs widely use social media to communicate with the public.

CSOs understand the value of codes of ethics. For example, the Association of International NGOs in Senegal has an anti-corruption charter that every organization wishing to become a member must sign. Large CSOs have a tradition of producing and publishing quarterly and annual reports, which they post on their websites.
In 2017 Sierra Leone’s political environment was dominated by preparations for the 2018 presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections. After months of uncertainty and urgent calls to President Ernest Bai Koroma by the National Election Watch (NEW), a coalition of more than 375 organizations, to announce the date for the elections before triggering a constitutional crisis, the president finally set elections for March 7, 2018. Since Koroma’s constitutional limit of two five-year terms will come to an end in 2018, he will not run for president again.

Environmental issues became a critical focus for Sierra Leoneans after flooding and a mudslide near Freetown in August cost the lives of more than 1,000 people, including many children. The mudslide was thought to be the worst natural disaster in the country’s history. Austerity measures introduced after a drastic fall in the global price of iron ore and the Ebola crisis in 2016 contributed to a higher cost of living and worsening living conditions for many people.

Several challenges to freedoms of speech and association were noted during the year. In what some observers considered a heavy-handed manner, the police prevented citizens’ groups from publicly demonstrating against several important developments, including rising fuel and transportation costs and the elimination of a government subsidy on the price of rice, a staple food. A planned referendum on the constitution was suspended, and the government released a white paper in which it rejected 105 of 138 recommendations made by the Constitutional Review Committee, which had been appointed in 2013 to consider ways to strengthen multi-party democracy and establish an open and transparent society in Sierra Leone. Among the rejected recommendations were progressive measures to ensure women’s inclusion in governance.

CSO sustainability showed modest improvement in 2017. CSOs’ organizational capacity improved thanks to more effective cooperation through consortia and coalitions. Donor funding for election-related projects increased, and CSO advocacy was stronger as organizations relied on evidence-based strategies to conduct several successful campaigns.
Service provision also improved as organizations served as critical sources of information in the pre-election period, while extensive media coverage of CSOs’ activities boosted their public image. However, CSOs’ legal environment deteriorated as the government introduced restrictive new policy regulations and denied CSOs permits to hold public protests. The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector was stable.

The number of CSOs in Sierra Leone is difficult to ascertain, since organizations register with various entities, and consolidated data is not available. Past estimates have put the total number of organizations, including community-based organizations (CBOs), a distinct legal form, at about 1,000. In 2017 NEW screened about 400 organizations to serve as domestic election monitors. Two hundred and thirty-eight local organizations and 100 international organizations were reported in 2017 to be registered with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), which registers organizations that seek to obtain status as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a distinct legal form.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated in 2017 with the introduction of new policy regulations, the government’s denial of permits to hold public protests, and increased state harassment of CSOs.

CSOs and CBOs must register to gain legal status or interact formally with other entities. There is still no harmonized law for registering CSOs and no law that prevents them from operating without registration. Organizations may register with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), government ministries, other institutions responsible for their area of intervention, or, at the local level, city or district councils. CSOs wishing to obtain NGO status, which confers eligibility for tax waivers, must register with the Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO) and then with MOFED. The CAC eased the registration process in 2017 by replacing annual registration renewals with a single permanent registration. However, NGOs must still renew their registrations annually with MOFED in a complex process that involves the submission of numerous documents. Registration as a not-for-profit company with the Office of the Administrator and Registrar General is also difficult and time consuming, as it requires prior registration with the Ministry of Social Welfare as well as a police clearance. While no organization was prevented from registering in 2017, several organizations reported difficulties with the registration process, especially if they were critical of the government. For example, local authorities in the northern area of Sierra Leone demanded that the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CDHR), a national organization that had already registered with central authorities, register at the local level as well to operate programs in the area. To attract much-needed donor support, many unregistered organizations are now considering registering to obtain legal status, and CAC records show a marked increase in the registration of local organizations in 2017.

Although there are no clear limits on government oversight of CSOs, most CSOs operate freely. However, in December 2017 the government hurriedly adopted the NGO Policy Regulations, a new regulatory framework governing CSOs that imposes several significant constraints. The government introduced the policy regulations surreptitiously after failing to address CSOs’ concerns following a two-year review process. The new rules require NGOs to fulfill even more strenuous requirements for registration with MOFED, including obtaining attestations from their line ministries and aligning their mission statements with government development policies. CSOs must also sign service agreements with sector-level ministries before commencing operations, and ministries must scrutinize CSOs’ operations and finances more closely, which they lack sufficient capacity to perform. In addition, CBOs’ annual budgets may not exceed SLL 500 million (approximately $70,000). CSOs believe that enactment of the NGO Policy Regulations is inimical to their interests and will close the space for their operations.
State harassment of CSOs increased in 2017. In an ongoing conflict, the Socfin Group, a large international agro-business company, brought charges against Maloa, a local CSO that is part of the Malen Landowners Association, after Maloa accused Socfin of grabbing farm land, destroying livelihoods, diverting rivers, and denying local communities access to fishing in the Sahn Malen chiefdom. Socfin claimed that it had acquired the land legally and accused Maloa of destroying its farms. The court sided with Socfin, levied huge fines against the leaders of Maloa, and incarcerated several of them. Because the government had entered into an agreement with Socfin over the disposition of the farmland, many observers felt that Maloa was being punished for contesting the government’s decision.

In another state-sponsored effort to restrict CSO activity, the clerk of parliament sought to prohibit a workshop by Accountability Now Sierra Leone. The purpose of the workshop was to address a report by the auditor general revealing shortfalls, waste, and a failure by government ministries and agencies to account properly for their spending. When Accountability Now proceeded with the workshop, the speaker of parliament, who belonged to the ruling party, the All Peoples Congress (APC), directed members of parliament not to attend. In addition, after NEW issued press releases calling for due process in advance of the 2018 elections, APC’s secretary general repeatedly attacked the organization in the media, calling it a member of the opposition.

The police denied countless requests by CSOs to hold peaceful protests against government policies, including a request by the Renaissance Movement to protest the government’s lifting of subsidies on the costs of fuel and rice. CSOs were also denied an opportunity to protest publicly against the introduction of higher tolls for the main road between Freetown and the provinces.

There are no tax exemptions for CSOs in Sierra Leone. The National Revenue Authority continues to insist that CSOs pay a 5.5 percent withholding tax on services. It is difficult for CSOs to obtain duty waivers, since they are usually given only to organizations that have personal relationships with the individuals who make decisions about the waivers.

There are no laws that prevent CSOs from generating income through the provision of services. However, Sierra Leone’s political environment and nonprofit culture do not encourage CSOs to charge for services or compete for government contracts.

Staff at the Society for Democratic Initiatives and Namati provide legal representation to human rights defenders and communities in conflict with the law, mostly on a pro bono basis. AdvocAid, Legal Access through Women Yearning for Equal Rights and Social Justice, and Timap for Justice offer paralegal services throughout the country to people whose rights have been violated or are in conflict with the law, especially women and young people.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7**

The organizational capacity of Sierra Leonean CSOs improved in 2017, thanks to the success of their efforts to work together in consortia and coalitions. Their cooperation enhanced their access to funding, including funds for organizational development, and increased their impact, especially on critical political issues. Since the end of the Ebola crisis in 2015, donors have shifted from funding local CSOs directly to passing funds through international CSOs, which provide services directly and also award small grants for project implementation to local organizations. This trend makes it difficult for many Sierra Leonean CSOs to finance their institutional costs and ensure that their organizations develop. They find that working together in consortia helps attract funding, which in some cases includes opportunities for institutional strengthening.

Key examples of such consortia include the newly formed Standing Together for Democracy consortium, which promotes free, fair and peaceful elections in 2018, and the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Network (WASH-Net) of Sierra Leone, which focuses on WASH issues and needs.

Most organizations have a thematic focus, but few have updated strategic plans. Among the CSOs with written mission statements and strategic plans are NEW, Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), and Center for the Coordination of Youth Activities (CCYA). Their strategic plans were developed by external consultants, whose services tend to be costly and thus possible only with designated funds from donors. Otherwise, organizations across Sierra Leone
may have strategic directions, but without funding they find the development of strategic plans too costly and time consuming to undertake.

In recent years, many CSOs have improved their internal management systems, especially since reviews of internal processes and functioning operational systems are now core donor requirements. For example, in 2017 the United Kingdom’s Department For International Development (DFID) requested all seven members of the Standing Together for Democracy consortium to undertake due diligence investigations into their internal processes. Several other coalitions, including NEW, also brought their members together for internal process reviews aimed at building members’ capacities and operations.

Management structures are also evolving. In the past two years there has been steady growth in the number of organizations restructuring their boards, and most larger CSOs now have fully constituted boards to oversee operations. Service on CSO boards is usually voluntary and without remuneration. Board members are often friends and relatives, and finding new board members can be difficult, especially if there are no defined criteria or nominees for board positions are uninterested in the CSO’s work. Smaller CSOs find it especially challenging to constitute and operate boards, since the cost of board meetings can be quite high. CSOs generally have written policies to guide their operations. Conflict of interest is not well understood in Sierra Leone, which makes it difficult for CSOs to address conflict-of-interest situations.

Because most CSOs do not have consistent revenue flows and survive on a project-to-project basis, they have trouble maintaining permanent staff. There is a very high turnover of trained CSO staff, some of whom consider work with CSOs a steppingstone to better job opportunities. Very few CSOs are able to retain the services of professional accountants, lawyers, and information technology specialists, so they usually outsource these services on a temporary basis. Most CSOs implement their projects by using volunteers, which is cost effective and creates leaning opportunities for the volunteers.

CSOs have begun to make progress in acquiring permanent assets, although their ability to obtain office equipment depends greatly on their success in securing projects that offer funding or material support for operations and longer-term sustainability. CDHR in Makeni Bombali District and the 50-50 Group in Freetown Western Area have constructed offices and conference facilities with funding obtained from international agencies, donations from families and friends, and fundraising events. The 50-50 Group also received seed money for its building from the African Women’s Development Fund, a pan-African foundation that supports women’s rights organizations. CSOs’ access to information technology has improved as social media platforms become popular throughout the country. CSOs generally use smart phones rather than computers to reach audiences in far-off communities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

The financial viability of Sierra Leonean CSOs improved in 2018 as donor funding for election-related projects increased and CSOs’ financial systems and practices grew stronger.

Most registered CSOs in Sierra Leone depend largely on funding from foreign donors. In 2017 donors increased funding for election-related projects. For example, DFID started to disburse GBP 3 million (approximately $4 million) for CSO activities during the elections. Funding was also available from other donors, including the European Union (EU) and USAID, mainly for programs involving non-violent campaigning, outreach, and women’s empowerment.
The possibilities for CSOs to secure diversified funding are limited in Sierra Leone. In 2017 the government set aside funds for non-state actors working on public financial management. The funds were accessible through the ministries of trade, mines, and agriculture, but the disbursement of the funds was politicized, and some observers alleged that they were directed towards groups colluding with the ministries. In 2017 the World Bank Fund for Non-State Actors, which is administered by the Ministry of Finance but had been discontinued in 2016, was re-introduced and issued a call for proposals but did not award funds.

CSOs benefitted from several corporate philanthropy programs in 2017. For example, the Youth and Child Advocacy Network received SLL 2 million (approximately $250) from the Aureol Insurance Company to feed children at a school for the blind. Don Bosco, Caritas, Street Child, and other service-providing organizations received humanitarian support from companies and local businesses to support the victims of the August floods and mudslide.

Some CSOs raise funds from their constituencies. Members of organizations such as the Sierra Leone Teachers Union and Market Women Association pay dues. Membership CSOs may also raise money through contributions to internal social funds to take care of members’ needs related to sickness, weddings, funerals, or naming ceremonies. Although in general CSOs earn very little revenue from their assets, a small number of organizations operate social enterprises to generate funds. For example, the Market Women Association owns a water company in Kono District, Eastern Province, which was funded by UN Women. In Northern Province Miwoda has milling machines, which it rents out to farmers, and the Mankind Activities Development Accreditation Movement Sierra Leone generates revenues from training and educational facilities, a restaurant, a garage, and a guesthouse. The child protection agency Don Bosco has acquired thirty hectares of land in the Western Area Rural District, where it is constructing a village to accommodate all of its child protection programs in one location. This innovative project is attracting wide multi-donor support, with donors identifying specific aspects of the village to fund. Don Bosco also processes Maringa tea, which donors market in Europe, and is building a refrigerated storage facility for local fishermen, which it will operate on a cost-recovery basis. The Council of Churches in Sierra Leone, Young Men’s Christian Association, and Young Women’s Christian Association own recreational and conference facilities, which they rent out on a cost-recovery basis. These facilities are sometimes offered free of charge to other CSOs as a way of supporting community volunteer initiatives. CSOs do not have the skills to raise funds through websites or other Internet platforms.

CSOs showed marked improvement in their financial systems and practices in 2017. Financial audit reports are now a key donor requirement, and to qualify to work with donors such as DFID and the EU and international organizations such as Christian Aid, CSOs must upload certified financial reports into an automated system. In addition, to register all CSOs must submit proof of basic financial management systems, such as bank accounts, voucher approval systems, designated signatories for bank accounts, and a list of board members. Established CSOs often hire trained and qualified accountants and auditors to ensure that they adhere to international financial management standards. Smaller CSOs struggle to afford the high cost of professional auditing services and instead access such services on a contractual basis.

**ADVOCACY: 4.0**

Sierra Leonean CSOs are known for effectively advocating and shaping public debate. In 2017 there was a marked improvement in CSO advocacy, as organizations relied on evidence-based strategies and tools to understand societal challenges and demand actions to address them. Major victories included successful campaigns to set the date for the elections and prevent parliamentary approval of a proposed constitutional amendment concerning presidential elections.
CSOs communicate and collaborate directly with the government at all levels. The government encourages CSOs to participate in various platforms to promote public confidence in its own work, since people believe that CSOs will protect their interests, especially in decisions involving the annual budget, constitution, and elections. CSOs take part in budget hearings; ministry, department, and agency planning meetings; and boards and committees overseeing reform. For example, in 2017 CSOs took part in a committee monitoring Sierra Leone’s compliance with international socio-economic and political benchmarks; Coalition 2030, which tracks Sierra Leone’s adherence to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; and the Sierra Leone Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, a platform that ensures adherence to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Principles. CSOs also took part in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), Population Census Committee, and the boards of the Office of National Security and National Civil Registration Authority. A number of organizations worked with election management bodies, such as the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and Political Parties Registration Commission, to prepare for the 2018 elections and validate each stage of the electoral process. CSOs also sat on the National Population and Housing Census Technical Committee, Elections Basket Fund Steering Committee, Political Parties Liaison Committee, National Civil and Voter Registration Task Force, and Integrated Elections Security and Planning Committee. CSOs working on the Boundary Delimitation Monitoring Committee helped draw constituency and ward boundaries for the elections and afterwards educate communities about the way in the boundaries were drawn. Several organizations worked closely with the Office of National Security to distribute food and medical aid to mudslide victims. At the local level, CSOs collaborated with local councils and leaders on community projects and participated in council meetings, district and provincial security committee meetings, and sensitive security discussions at the district level and in some chiefdoms.

Notable CSO advocacy campaigns in 2017 included the NEW-led effort to pressure the government to adhere to the legally mandated election calendar. NEW and other civil society groups held simultaneous meetings across the country and released joint statements calling for the elections to be held as scheduled. Finally, bowing to pressure, the president set the elections for March 7, 2018. In a separate effort, the Election Before Constitutional Referendum campaign fought the government’s attempt to amend the constitution to decrease the threshold for winning the first round of presidential elections from 55 percent to 50+1 percent. CSOs viewed the clandestine attempt in the parliament to table the proposed amendment as violating the election protocols of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, which state that no new legislation may be reviewed or voted on in the six months preceding an election. CSOs obtained a draft copy of the bill and, through press releases and media talk shows, quickly organized a national call to the parliament to reject the amendment and also pressed the donor community to support their position. After this push from CSOs, the bill was aborted. Another CSO victory was the implementation of a single treasury account, a CSO initiative under the OGP that committed the government to strengthening public financial management and curtailing the leakage of funding by establishing a national consolidated fund.

CSOs increasingly worked together in thematic consortiums to achieve greater impact in 2017. CGG cooperated with other CSOs and CBOs on community building and citizen engagement at the national and local levels. The Strengthen Electoral Accountability and Governance consortium and Standing Together for Democracy consortium were created to undertake a wide range of activities to ensure credible and just participatory elections in 2018. The Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) worked with CSOs at the national and district levels to enhance their ability to hold politicians, government officials, and multinational companies accountable. NEW lobbied the parliament to ensure passage of a document on boundary delimitations, which is key for conducting the 2018 elections.
The Native Consortium and Research Center sought reforms in telecommunications and technology industries and called for reduced tariffs from mobile phone operators.

Before the NGO Policy Regulations were approved by parliament in December 2017, CSOs conducted awareness-raising events, including seminars, public meetings, and radio programs, to outline the ways in which the policy would restrict CSOs’ space if passed into law. These events were mostly organized by the Society for Democratic Initiatives and the Human Rights Defenders Network. When the policy was eventually passed unchanged in December, CSOs began to plan a response for 2018.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

CSO service provision improved in 2017, as organizations served as critical sources of information in the pre-election period and collaborated effectively with the government in service-related activities. CSOs provided services in a broad range of fields, including education, health, land and the environment, natural resources, food and agriculture, roads, governance, democracy and elections, and local government. For example, ActionAid Sierra Leone constructed, rehabilitated, and provided materials to schools; promoted village saving schemes in rural communities; and supported women in agriculture by providing rice seeds, fertilizers, and livestock. WASH-Net equipped schools, hospitals, and local communities with water and sanitation services. CCYA trained local youth in skills, financial literacy, and livelihoods and supported “second-chance education” for rural girls who had dropped out of school, usually because of early marriage or pregnancy.

Participatory assessments and evaluations to understand communities’ needs are now common features of CSOs’ projects. They help ensure that community leaders and beneficiaries buy into the projects and the efforts of other community actors are not duplicated. For example, the Giving Voice to the Sierra Leonean Youth project of Taksvarkki, a Finnish CSO, working in partnership with CCYA, engages unskilled youths in agriculture and offers a second-chance education for teenage mothers. The project conducts pre-assessment meetings to identify beneficiaries and post-assessments and evaluations to ensure that monies saved by the unskilled youths are put into banks, where the owners can tap into them to pursue further agricultural activities on their own.

Some CSOs provide goods and services to a broad range of users. For example, as 2017 was a pre-election year, CSOs became an important source of accurate and reliable information on the political situation and governance, since the statements of other groups such as political parties were seen as highly biased. In particular, researchers from academia, the government, international partners, and other organizations solicited information from CSOs as trusted sources. The Center on Governance served as a one-stop source of information on national issues, and the Institute for Governance Reform produced quality research related to governance. CSOs provide goods and services without discrimination.

Except for a few organizations that offer consultancies or operate social enterprises, CSOs recover little or no money by charging fees for their goods and services. Cost recovery is inhibited by the nonprofit culture among CSOs, and they mostly offer their services on a pro bono basis. For example, AdvocAid provides free legal aid and training to imprisoned women at no cost to the Sierra Leone Correctional Services.

Even though the government and CSOs disagreed on a number of issues, their collaboration improved in 2017. For example, civil society representatives sat on the board of the Millennium Challenge Cooperation, which oversees a $44.4 million grant to improve water and electrical services in Sierra Leone.
CSOs also sat on the board of the National Civil Registration Authority, which, in partnership with NEC, registered voters and children in 2017. In working with these entities, CSOs had an impact on their decision making and helped ensure greater transparency in their operations as well as better public understanding of ways in which they operate. CSOs also worked with the Office of the Chief Justice and the Ministry of Justice to develop and popularize bail and sentencing guidelines for the judiciary.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

The infrastructure for the CSO sector was stable in 2017. CSOs have access to resource centers in various parts of the country that often focus on thematic areas. For example, Namati operates a resource center on governance, environmental justice, and human rights; Sensi Hub hosts platforms for innovative technology; and the Methodist Church Sierra Leone has resource centers for youth in Freetown, Bo, and Kenema. Access to resource centers and the training that they offer is usually free of charge. International organizations also provide various types of support to CSOs. For example, in 2017 the Westminster Foundation for Democracy trained CSOs and CBOs in the work of the legislature and, in partnership with the Sierra Leone Union on Disability Issues, in election-related research techniques and issues related to persons with disabilities. Christian Aid trained CGG and other organizations in community engagement and local accountability.

While most grantmaking organizations in Sierra Leone are international, a few local grantmaking organizations distribute funds from international donors. For example, ActionAid Sierra Leone funds small-scale projects at the community level, and Focus 1000 provides grants to organizations in the health and hygiene sector. A new local organization, Purposeful, was established in 2017 to support CSOs focused on girls’ education and welfare. By the end of the year, Purposeful was still identifying possible grantees and had yet to disburse funds.

Capable CSO management trainers offer advanced and specialized training in such fields as financial management, advocacy, election observation, and leadership. Trainers work for CSOs, for-profit companies, or on their own. Training is available in Freetown and other major cities. The language of instruction is English. In 2017 the Fund for Global Human Rights supported training in change leadership organized by CCYA, and the British Council offered a training and mentorship program.

In 2017 CSOs worked closely with the government and private sector on many fronts, especially mining and agriculture. Among other activities, CSO groups in Bo, Kono, and Port Loko signed memoranda of understanding with mining companies to help their mining operations, management of environmental hazards, and utilization of property. CSOs and the government conducted joint monitoring of mining and agro-businesses through the Environmental Protection Unit and the National Mines and Mineral Agency. Organizations such as Namati, CGG, NMJD, National Coalition on Extractives, and Green Scenery cooperated successfully with the government and businesses on establishing an expert panel to draft minerals and artisanal mining policies. Sierra Leone’s Kimberley Process Multi-Stakeholder Task Force, which seeks to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, included representatives from the government, mining companies, and civil society, and NMJD served as its co-chair. Finally, representatives from civil society, the government, and mining companies developed a template community development agreement to help structure mining companies’ relationships with their communities. By the end of the year, five large mining companies had signed the agreement and provided funds for its implementation.
CSOs have a cordial, cooperative relationship with the media, as both entities depend on each other for support. For example, in 2017 CGG and the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists started a series of national dialogues to promote healthy political debate in the run-up to national elections.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4**

CSOs’ public image was more favorable in 2017 as media coverage of their activities increased and they served as an important source of accurate and reliable information about the political situation.

CSOs enjoy a good relationship with the media, particularly radio, which often give CSOs access to publicize their concerns and engage in advocacy. Both print and electronic media provided extensive coverage of CSO activities in 2017. The media also relied on CSOs to provide data from their sectoral-monitoring activities in health, education, human rights, and other areas and to supply panelists for radio and television programs, who could present neutral perspectives on important issues and educate the public about their political and legal rights to participate in governance, especially during the pre-election period. Although the media distinguish between public service announcements and corporate advertising, CSOs must sometimes pay for their programs.

The public tends to perceive CSOs positively. The public generally understands the concept of CSOs, has faith in the work that CSOs do, and believes that the majority of CSOs serve the public interest. CSO's image was enhanced significantly in 2017, as they became an important source of accurate and reliable information about the political situation and governance, especially since the statements of other groups such as political parties were seen as highly biased. CSOs’ work with NEC and the National Civil Registration Authority on voter registration also strengthened their public image.

The government appreciates the work of CSOs and relies on them to assess and communicate citizens’ perceptions of the government. The private sector is still developing in Sierra Leone, and only a small number of businesses, mostly in telecommunications, mining, and agriculture, have a real impact on the economy. Their relationship with CSOs is one of checks and balances to ensure that citizens are not exploited and poverty is not deepened in an already challenged society. Despite many disagreements with CSOs, especially community-based groups, companies perceive CSOs as a readily available source of expertise and credible information. The Budget Advocacy Network, for example, conducted a number of analyses of the way in which tax holidays for mining companies affect government revenue streams. In many instances, the government and business sector operate with preferred CSOs, which articulate the interests of the two sectors and even serve as their mouthpieces.

CSOs publicize their work using all forms of media. For example, CGG and CCYA arrange for journalists to visit their program activities. In 2017 social media gained prominence, especially for advocacy organizations, which could access and share information on a real-time basis. Some organizations and coalitions used Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter to profile their organizations, share information, and otherwise improve their public outreach. CSOs also published press releases and research documents on social media.

NMJD led a process to develop the code of ethics for CSOs in 2017. Organizations across the country signed on to the code and pledged to abide by its principles. Compliance with the code is monitored through self-assessments. Some CSOs found it challenging to implement certain provisions of the code, such as the publication of annual reports. CSOs that publish annual reports share them mostly with their donors and partners. A common practice among CSOs is to engage in discussions of lessons learned after major activities, which helps improve the quality of their work and interactions with stakeholders.
In 2017 several important developments culminated in South Africa. In March President Jacob Zuma of South Africa fired the minister and deputy minister of finance without warning or explanation, sending the economy into a temporary tailspin. Many observers assumed that the president had fired them in retaliation for their public statements about government corruption, which was rampant under Zuma. The newly formed campaign Save South Africa organized a protest against the president, which attracted thousands of marchers across the country. Zuma’s standing continued to deteriorate, and in August he barely survived a parliamentary motion of no confidence, with about thirty members of his own party, the African National Congress (ANC), voting to remove him from office. In December the Constitutional Court ruled that the National Assembly had failed to hold the president to account for using ZAR 246 million (nearly $17 million) of public funds to renovate his private residence.

Events during the fifty-fourth ANC Elective Conference in December were the final blow to the president’s legacy. The main task of the conference was to select the party’s candidate to succeed Zuma, who had been reelected to a second five-year term as president in 2014 and was ineligible to run again. Zuma’s preferred candidate, his ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, lost the bid to become the party’s president to Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. Much of the public saw the election as a victory over government corruption. During his final speech at the conference, Zuma partly blamed civil society for divisions in the ANC, stating that “some NGOs [non-governmental organizations] appear to exist merely to fight the ANC and the ANC government.” In November 2017, citing South Africa’s political instability, the credit ratings agency S&P Global downgraded South Africa’s credit rating to full junk status, and Moody’s Investor Service placed the country on review for a downgrade.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in South Africa remained unchanged in 2017. However, the financial viability of the sector worsened substantially over the year, as funding from international sources decreased and the local private sector showed “donor fatigue. This trend undermined CSOs’ organizational capacity, service provision, and sectoral infrastructure. The legal environment for CSOs, CSO advocacy, and the public image of CSOs remained much the same as in 2016.
In 2015–16 there were 153,667 non-profit organizations (NPOs) registered with the Department of Social Development (DSD), of which 94 percent were voluntary associations, 4 percent were nonprofit companies (NPCs), and 2 percent were nonprofit trusts. Social services are the leading area of activity (36 percent of organizations), followed by development and housing (26 percent). As of March 2017 there were 16,149 public benefit organizations (PBOs) listed by the South African Revenue Service (SARS).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

The legal environment for South African CSOs remained largely unchanged in 2017. The NPO Act of 1997 remained the primary legislation governing CSOs. A draft bill to amend the act, the framework for which was originally presented in 2012, was not introduced to parliament in 2017 because of delays in the bill’s socio-economic impact assessment. Two laws came into effect in 2017 that also affected CSO operations: the Financial Intelligence Center Amendment Act, which stipulates that NPOs must ensure that their board members are verified with banking institutions or risk losing access to their own bank accounts, and the Protected Disclosures Amendment Act, which protects employees from reprisals if they engage in whistle-blowing activities.

An evaluation of the CSO sector conducted in 2015–16 and released by the Department of Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation in 2017 found that the regulatory system for CSOs has evolved in a piecemeal manner. As a result, CSOs must register multiple times for different purposes at a high cost. Legal registration varies by type of organization, with the registration of trusts being slower and more onerous than the registration of voluntary associations and NPCs. While trusts register with the Department of Justice, voluntary associations and NPCs register with the DSD, which gives them legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the government, and potential funders. In addition, certain CSOs must register with various government agencies to comply with legislation establishing criteria to provide services. CSOs are also subject to specific regulations if they apply for government funding. Maintaining compliance with all of these regulations is a significant burden, particularly for small CSOs with limited human and financial resources. A 2016 report by DSD stated that the majority of CSOs in every sector except social services were noncompliant with DSD registration requirements, which highlights the challenge of maintaining compliance. In 2017 the National Treasury worked on a framework to help relieve small and emerging CSOs of complicated registration and compliance requirements and improve the efficiency of government funding streams to CSOs. The guidelines would set financial management and reporting requirements according to the amount of money an organization receives, establish funding renewal procedures based on past performance, and monitor CSOs according to their risk profiles. However, the guidelines have yet to be published or implemented.

CSOs are generally free to operate, and there are no legal barriers to CSOs’ activities, speech, advocacy, entry, international contacts, or access to resources. CSO can participate in public protests without state harassment, but they are required to give seven days’ notice before holding public assemblies and face restrictions on assemblies near government buildings. Some CSOs feel that the government discourages protest actions short of cracking down on the protests themselves. For example, although the #FeesMustFall protests of 2015 and 2016 were authorized and ultimately successful, several student activists remained in jail in 2017 on charges having to do mainly with property damage and public violence, which can result in years in prison if they are found guilty.

To qualify for preferential tax treatment, CSOs must register as PBOs with the SARS. Once registered, PBOs may apply to the SARS for approval to receive tax-deductible donations and partial tax exemptions. However, PBOs may use donations only for specified public benefit activities, and they may have their status revoked if they do not comply with the requirements of the Income Tax Act.
All CSOs may earn income from business and trading activities. CSOs registered as PBOs may earn income provided their principal objective remains the provision of public-benefit activities. Income-generating activities are tax exempt provided they are directly related to a CSO’s primary activities, are conducted on a cost-recovery basis, and do not result in unfair competition with taxable businesses. However, many smaller grassroots CSOs, particularly those lacking legal counsel, refrain from engaging in income-generating activities because they are concerned about losing their PBO status. CSOs are able to compete for government contracts, engage in fundraising activities, and accept funds from foreign donors.

Lawyers specialized in nonprofit law provide legal services to CSOs throughout the country. However, access is generally limited to organizations able to afford lawyers or access pro bono services. Amendments to the Legal Services Act in 2017 potentially restrict access to pro bono services provided by legal aid clinics to organizations that cannot afford services or, in relation to public interest litigation, to those that can show confirmation by the South Africa Legal Practice Council that the matter is in the public interest. Smaller local organizations that comprise most of the sector are usually unable to access legal services and are not aware of the laws governing CSOs or their organizational rights. As a result, they may inadvertently become non-compliant with laws and face de-registration or be susceptible to government harassment. The Legal Resources Center serves as the country’s largest public-interest human rights law clinic.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8

The overall organizational capacity of the CSO sector was stable in 2017. Building constituencies and identifying appropriate beneficiaries are long-standing strengths of South African CSOs, and this continued to be the case in 2017. Small local CSOs build constituencies organically in the communities in which they work. Well-known national CSOs build constituencies through membership programs, which they often implement through online platforms. For example, the Botanical Society of South Africa allows members to sign up on its website for a small fee.

Mission and vision statements are very common among CSOs. Organizations of all sizes commonly outsource strategic planning because of poor internal capacity to develop plans. However, outsourcing often leads to a lack of a sense of ownership for the plans, and as a result, the plans are rarely implemented. CSOs acknowledge that even when they wish to implement their plans, they can be overruled by funders or receive funding to implement only a small portion of their overall plans.

The quality of CSO governance varies and depends on an organization’s resources and the reach of its reputation. For example, a small CSO based in a rural area may have a great reputation in the local community but still be unable to attract a lawyer to its board because service on the board of an unknown organization is not considered career enhancing. Although the Independent Code of Governance for NPOs in South Africa and the King IV Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa provide excellent guidance on board governance, they can be difficult to implement, particularly for smaller operations. Large and well-known national CSOs usually have board members who observe term limits and have appropriate skills. The boards of smaller CSOs may consist only of the chief executive and chief financial officer and often have vacant board seats. In addition, term limits are often not observed, because individuals refuse to vacate their posts or no one is available to replace them. Board members in smaller CSOs often lack the skills needed to steer the organizations effectively.

According to a 2017 report by the Funding Practice Alliance, more than half of South Africa’s CSOs are staffed by volunteers. The CSO sector offers about one half-million volunteering opportunities, which is the same as the number of full-time employment positions.
Managerial staff tend to stay at organizations for many years, but turnover is high among lower-level staff because of low wages and flat organizational structures, which impede career advancement.

CSOs’ access to technology varies according to their locations and resources. Most areas outside of big cities experience frequent power and network outages, which can disrupt the use of technology for days at a time. Internet access is a luxury for many small CSOs because of the high cost of cellular data and Internet access in South Africa. Many CSOs operate with one computer, which is used mainly to prepare reports for funders. Because budgets are usually project driven and do not include allowances for overhead, many CSOs find it difficult to invest in technology.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.4**

The financial viability of the CSO sector worsened in 2017. Focus group discussions and stakeholder engagements held by the Funding Practices Alliance in 2017 revealed a perception among CSO leaders that all aspects of financial sustainability had deteriorated. Funding from international sources decreased, the local private sector showed “donor fatigue,” the competition for scarce resources was intense, and budgets were less flexible and more limited to a narrow range of allowable activities.

CSOs in the health sector, which rely heavily on foreign donors, were destabilized in 2017 by the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy by the U.S. government. The policy prohibits U.S. government funding from going to CSOs that provide abortion counseling or referrals, advocate to decriminalize abortion, or promote abortion as a method of family planning. The policy was expanded in May 2017 to require CSOs that receive U.S. government funding to certify that they do not use non-U.S. funding for these purposes. Moreover, they may not sub-contract with CSOs that work in the prohibited areas. To protest the new policy, some European donors began to prohibit their funding recipients from accepting U.S. funding. The result is that previously funded CSOs in the health sector, particularly those focused on reproductive health and women’s rights such as Sonke Gender Justice, lost substantial amounts of potential U.S. and other foreign funding, to the detriment of their beneficiaries. Overall, in a survey conducted by Trialogue in 2017, 12 percent of CSOs surveyed reported a decrease in foreign donor funding levels, 8 percent reported an increase, and 80 percent reported no change.

Sources of funding for CSOs vary by sector. Development and housing CSOs are generally funded by the South African government, international donors, and self-generated income. In the health sector, funding from international donors is directed to a few large CSOs, which then sub-contract with smaller CSOs to provide services. The social services sector, which is the largest sector in terms both of the number of CSOs and funding levels, is funded largely by the South African government, National Lottery Board, and individual donors and receives comparatively little international funding.

Lack of funding diversification is a challenge for South African CSOs. In particular, small community-based organizations (CBOs) often rely on a single source of funding, which can make it difficult for them to maintain staff and operations. For example, many smaller CSOs in the health sector receive international donor funding through sub-contracts from larger CSOs, but the funding is channeled largely into specific activities and provides little allowance for overhead costs. In 2017 many CSOs in the social sector struggled with the impact of a mandatory “cooling off” period introduced by the National Lottery Commission in 2015, which stipulated that organizations that receive funding from the commission must wait twelve months before applying for new funding.
Most government funding for CSOs comes from the DSD through subsidies to organizations that provide social welfare services on behalf of the government. These subsidies are meant to cover only a portion of the service costs, and CSOs are expected to cover the remaining costs through donations or grants. Most DSD funding is disbursed at the provincial level. Because no national standard has been set, policies governing provincial subsidies vary widely within and across provinces. For example, a court decision handed down in 2014 stipulates that Free State DSD subsidies must be based on the full core costs for delivering services if CSOs are unable to obtain additional funds, but this policy was still not implemented in 2017.

The government continued in 2017 to enter into service-level agreements with CSOs to provide services that it is unable to provide, such as running early childhood development centers. The amounts that such contracts offer are not enough to ensure quality services and the sustainability of recipient organizations. CSOs continued to find that even when they enter into such agreements, reporting requirements can change in the middle of agreements, funding may not be disbursed on time or may be reduced without warning, and proper communication channels may not be respected. However, CSOs are hesitant to challenge government officials because they do not want to lose their funding.

Corporate social investment (CSI) accounts for a substantial proportion of funding to CSOs in South Africa, in large part because of the CSI requirement in the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment scorecard, which requires large corporate and government entities to work with companies that have high scores in terms of benefiting racial groups that were previous targets of discrimination. CSI spending, adjusted for inflation, peaked in 2013, decreased in 2014 and 2015, and remained stagnant in 2016 and 2017. Companies increasingly offer community service work by corporate staff rather than cash donations, and their in-kind donations increased from 13 percent of total CSI in 2012 to 45 percent in 2017. Nearly half of CSI funds go to the education sector, followed by social and community development and health. According to the 2017 Trialogue survey, 87 percent of businesses surveyed reported that they engaged with the communities in which they had CSI projects, mostly to conduct needs assessments. However, CSOs report feeling increasingly left out of CSI projects and believe that in recent years CSI has become focused more on promoting business rather than meeting community needs. The downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status is likely to decrease the flow of international funds into the country and negatively impact local businesses, thereby further shrinking their funding to CSOs.

Most CBOs are unable to raise funds from their constituencies, because they are seen as service providers that ought to offer their services for free. CSOs also struggle to set up income-generating projects, because they do not have the human resources required to manage them. CSOs with national name recognition are more successful in obtaining donations and managing income-generating initiatives, because they have wealthier constituencies, can afford staff to manage these initiatives, and often have access to legal advice to ensure that their income-generating activities do not violate their PBO status. However, the volatile economy of the last few years has had a negative impact on charitable donations, as fewer people are inclined to donate.

In terms of financial staff, most CSOs have, at the very least, a chief financial officer. Larger, well-resourced CSOs have additional financial management staff or a finance department. Auditing requirements depend on registration type and funder requirements. For CSOs with small budgets and those in remote areas, auditing requirements can be very cumbersome. In 2017 the National Treasury presented draft guidelines to help relieve small and emerging CSOs of complicated registration and compliance requirements, but the guidelines have yet to be published.

**ADVOCACY: 3.0**

In 2017 CSO advocacy remained robust. Democratic South Africa has an established tradition of public consultation, and formal processes such as public hearings and written submissions allow civil society to participate in the legislative process. The government often invites CSOs to participate in working groups to assist with policy development. CSOs participating in policy processes are usually large and from urban areas. When invited to take part in working group meetings, rural grassroots CSOs often cannot cover transportation costs, which the government will not pay for. Despite institutionalized processes for consulting with CSOs, the government still controls the end result.
For example, during government-CSO consultations on the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Sexually Transmitted Infections in 2016 and 2017, the decriminalization of sex work became a priority issue but eventually had to be removed from the plan so that it could secure the government’s endorsement.

One of the most newsworthy civil society initiatives of 2016 and 2017 was the #FeesMustFall movement to abolish fees for higher education. The campaign began in 2015 during widespread student protests against a hike in university fees and continued over the following years. Partly as a result of the campaign, in 2016 the finance minister announced that university subsidies and student financial aid would be increased, and in 2017 President Zuma announced that fees for poor and working class students would be abolished.

Advocacy campaigns also aimed to expose government incompetence and corruption and maintain the rule of law. Corruption Watch, a CSO that tracks corruption in South Africa, received 5,334 reports of corruption in 2017, the highest annual number in its history. CSO advocacy and investigative reporting contributed greatly to Zuma’s failure to get his preferred candidate elected as the new ANC president. This achievement has been viewed globally as a victory for the rule of law and democracy in South Africa and a condemnation of the flagrant corruption that permeated the government under Zuma’s rule.

Several prominent examples of effective coalition building were evident in 2017. For example, after the president’s shocking midnight firing of the minister of finance and his deputy, the SaveSA campaign, which was supported by more than 130 CSOs, organized a march that drew tens of thousands of people from across the country. However, coalition building is sometimes not as effective as it could be, because CSOs often compete for funding, which limits their willingness to collaborate to effect change.

CSOs frequently use the court system to fight governmental abuse. For example, in 2017 Black Sash went to the Constitutional Court on behalf of social assistance grant recipients to demand that court oversight be reinstated over the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). Black Sash argued that SASSA still required court oversight because it had not proven its ability to be responsible for making grant payments. Black Sash also discovered that Cash Paymaster Services, a company that provided electronic cash services, was making unauthorized, unlawful deductions from the bankcards of grant recipients, thereby exploiting the poorest individuals in the country.

Several CSOs have expertise in lobbying the government for legislative change. A few public law advocacy organizations make frequent submissions on proposed legislation. In 2017 several CSOs, including the Institute of Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies, the Legal Resources Center, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, made policy submissions on the Communal Property Association Amendment Act, which seeks, among other things, to provide for more effective and efficient functioning of community property associations.

The CSO sector recognizes that a proper legal and regulatory framework improves its ability to conduct its work. CSO resource centers such as Inyathelo are involved in policy work for the CSO sector but do not seem to have been active in this area in 2017.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.3

Services continued to be provided by CSOs in 2017 across a number of sectors, with the highest expenditure in social services, housing and development, and health. During the year CSO service provision suffered as financial constraints reduced the volume and quality of service-providing activities. For example, funding from DSD to the South African National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence declined by 15 percent in 2017, prompting the closure of the organization’s Port Elizabeth center, which was the oldest and largest non-profit drug and alcohol rehabilitation center in the city. By November 2017 the National Association of People With AIDS (NAPWA) had shut down seven of its nine offices in South Africa, citing lack of funding. In December 2017 the Thohoyandou Victim Empowerment Program in Limpopo province, which provides services to several thousand victims of sexual assault and domestic violence, was evicted from its premises by the Department of Public Works, because it could not afford to pay rent.

Community needs assessments are a standard practice for most CSOs, as the importance of responding to the community’s self-identified needs is widely recognized. However, in South Africa there is a great need for services that address taboo issues, such as domestic violence and child abuse, which needs assessments may not identify, since they are often not brought up by community members. CSOs are also subject to donor priorities, which may differ from community-identified needs.

Some membership associations provide goods and services to their members and, at a higher cost, to non-members. If they are large and well financed, CSOs often offer or sell products such as publications, workshops, and technical expertise to other CSOs, the government, private enterprises, and academia. CSOs provide goods and services without discrimination, as required by Section 9 of the constitution.

Cost recovery for CSOs is challenging because of the general perception that CSOs should provide services free of charge, since they receive funding from the government or donors.

CSO service provision is generally undervalued by both beneficiaries and the government. The government is willing to pay more to private service providers than to CSOs for the same services or products. The government generally recognizes the areas in which it lacks expertise and requires the services of CSOs, such as adoptions and early childhood development.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector remained more or less the same in 2017. However, there is a general perception among CSOs that, because funding has dried up, there are not as many networks and resource centers as there used to be, and the currently available services do not meet the demand of the ever-growing number of CSOs. For example, NAPWA, which serves as a resource center for other groups serving people living with HIV and AIDS, shut seven of its nine provincial offices in 2017.

Most sectors have network or member organizations that serve as CSO resource centers. Prominent examples include the National Association of Social Housing Organizations; NACOSA, a network of 1,500 CSOs working on the HIV/AIDS response; Shukumisa, a network of CSOs working on gender-based violence; and Inyathelo, which works to sustain CSOs across all sectors. Bigger organizations may act as intermediary support organizations (ISOs) to incubate smaller organizations.
This is particularly common in the health sector, where most international donor funding goes to a few large CSOs, which then sub-contract with smaller CSOs, to which they provide capacity building and training. One of the limitations of this arrangement is that capacity building is often limited to the activities that the CSO is contract to perform (such as HIV testing) and does not include the organizational, governance, and computer training that is often desperately needed.

CSO resource centers and ISOs earn some income by, for example, selling training courses or materials to other CSOs, the government, and private enterprises.

Local grantmaking is not common in South Africa, as most funding comes from government or foreign donor sources. However, South Africa has been a leader in the community foundation movement since the Community Development Foundation Western Cape was established in 2007. In 2017 the Global Fund for Community Foundations awarded Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT), a Cape Town-based community foundation, a grant to support the establishment of Youth Development Funds. ISOs often sub-contract with smaller CSOs to provide services in the communities in which they work.

The CSO sector in South Africa has seen a shift from general CSO support networks to topic-specific networks. These smaller networks often work towards very specific goals. For example, the Stop Gender Violence campaign network emerged when the National Council on Gender-Based Violence suddenly shut down. In 2017 the network released the National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence Shadow Framework. However, not all of these networks emerge as grassroots calls for change, and they often include only larger, better known organizations.

Capacity building and training for CSOs has become a small industry in South Africa’s CSO sector. Many larger CSOs offer training courses and workshops, which can be expensive and unaffordable for smaller CSOs. The government also offers training to CSOs through the National Development Agency’s Capacity Building program, though the program is not well advertised among the CSOs that need it. The Capacity Development and Support program run by FHI 360 and funded by the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief focuses on improving CSOs’ organizational management, technical capacity, and financial sustainability in high HIV-prevalent districts. Trainings are conducted in local languages when feasible.

Intersectoral partnerships exist in South Africa, most commonly in the form of CSI initiatives. The government frequently calls on CSOs to participate in working groups to inform policy development.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6**

The public image of CSOs in South Africa did not change in 2017. As in prior years, there was a mix of positive perceptions of CSOs, generally related to advocacy efforts on behalf of the public against the government, and negative perceptions, resulting from CSO-related scandals such as the Life Esidimeni tragedy of 2016, in which 150 psychiatric patients died of neglect, starvation, and other causes in facilities managed by poorly qualified CSOs.

The media continues to cover civil society extensively, and there is a long history of collaboration between journalists and advocacy groups. For example, the Gupta Leaks investigation was a collaboration between the investigative nonprofit company amaBhungane and two mainstream newspapers, News 24 and Daily Maverick. Arbitration hearings into the Life Esidimeni tragedy were covered extensively in the news in 2017 because of the relationship between media and Section 27, a public-interest law center that represented the families of the deceased patients.
However, not all stories related to the CSO sector receive equal media treatment. CSOs that lack connections in the media may not see their issues covered as fully as those that do. Nationally coordinated protests are often covered in a more positive light than protests by local communities.

The public’s perceptions of CSOs vary greatly depending on context. CSOs that provide services are often perceived as extensions of the government and can be viewed negatively if they do not have the resources to provide services at the same level as government departments. On the other hand, CSOs that are involved in national-level advocacy often have positive reputations among the public. Black Sash received solid public support in 2017 thanks to its Hands Off Our Grants campaign, which fought against dysfunction at SASSA.

The unevenness of public opinion regarding CSOs makes it difficult to interpret the Edelman Trust Barometer, which found that trust in the CSO sector dropped from 58 percent to 50 percent from 2016 to 2017. This drop may have been due solely to the Life Esidimeni tragedy.

Public relations engagement depends on CSOs’ capacities. The media generally want immediate responses, which can be difficult for organizations that do not have communications staff or are located in areas where cell phone and Internet networks are unreliable. Membership in a CSO network can help member CSOs to get better publicity, since the media are more likely to contact one big network than multiple smaller organizations. Networks also point the media to member organizations that are sources of expertise on given topics. Social media are still not used widely by CSOs in South Africa, and CSOs with a presence on social media do not use it strategically. Larger CSOs sometimes assist smaller CSOs with public relations. For example, Sonke Gender Justice provided media and public relations training to smaller organizations in the women’s rights sector.

South African CSOs have adopted the Independent Code of Governance for Non-Profit Organizations in South Africa, which sets out eight fundamental values and principles. By 2017 189 CSOs had subscribed to the code and in return may use its logo to verify their commitment. Only six more organizations endorsed the code in 2017, indicating that momentum to sign on is low. The King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa contains guidance on ethics, governance, strategy, and stakeholder relations, which are applicable to the CSO sector and beginning to be used by larger CSOs. CSOs are not required to publish annual reports, but their value is recognized, and it is standard practice for large CSOs to produce annual reports and publish them on their websites.
The civil war in South Sudan continued in 2017. The leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), Riek Machar, who fled Juba following the outbreak of clashes in July 2016, was still under de facto house arrest in South Africa at the end of 2017. During the year more armed groups emerged across all three regions of the country (Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal) and fought not only the government but among themselves. While the fighting mostly concerned the national-level conflict, inter-communal violence over local issues such as land and cattle rustling was also prevalent in several areas.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, an eight-country trade bloc in Africa, convened the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) in December 2017 to revive the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan signed in 2015. The first outcome of the discussion was a cessation of hostilities agreement signed on December 21 by the government, SPLM-IO, and several other armed groups that had sprung up in the aftermath of the July 2016 clashes. However, the agreement was immediately violated by the signatories, and active fighting continued in various locations, exposing local populations to distress, displacement, disease, sexual and gender-based violence, food insecurity, family and community dissolution, and disrupted education.

As of December 2017, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), at least 1.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs) were spread across South Sudan. More than 209,000 IDPs were in protection-of-civilian sites, and another 2.1 million South Sudanese refugees were in neighboring countries. At the beginning of the year, the number of individuals reliant on food aid and other humanitarian assistance was estimated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) at 7 million, up by 1 million from the previous year. Famine was formally declared in parts of South Sudan between February and June, with an estimated 100,000 people facing outright famine and another one million people living in near catastrophic conditions. Diseases such as malaria, meningitis, measles, and cholera continued to spread, yet only an estimated 22 percent of health facilities remained fully operational because of the destruction of infrastructure, supply shortages, the lack of skilled personnel, and attacks on health workers. Humanitarian access, especially to large parts of Equatoria, was hampered by opposition and government authorities.
According to UNOCHA, nearly 630 incidents curtailed humanitarian access between January and July, including attacks on humanitarian compounds and looting. Security-related incidents imposed a need to relocate at least three hundred aid workers during this period. Overall, the year was the deadliest to date for aid workers in South Sudan, with thirty aid workers killed.

The overall sustainability of CSOs in South Sudan did not change in 2017. The legal environment declined as civil society faced increased pressure, arbitrary arrests, and intimidation. However, CSOs’ organizational capacity was somewhat stronger as emerging coalitions gathered new constituencies, and advocacy improved as organizations responded to opportunities involving the peace process. All other dimensions showed no change from the previous year.

The exact number of CSOs in South Sudan is not known, since the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), the regulatory body for CSOs, does not normally publish such information. The NGO Forum, an independent umbrella body of CSOs, reported that it had 320 member organizations in 2017, including 205 national and 115 international CSOs. This figure represents a 30 percent increase since 2016, but it is important to note that this is a paid membership organization, and an estimated 100 other organizations are not members of the forum.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.7**

The legal environment for CSOs declined in 2017 as the National Security Service (NSS) increasingly made illegal demands of CSOs and organizations faced greater obstacles to registration.

The South Sudan Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Act 2016 and the Relief and Rehabilitation Act 2016 govern the establishment and operations of CSOs. To operate legally in South Sudan, every CSO must register with the RRC, which has sweeping powers to deny registration to any organization involved in “tribal and political differences in the country.” Section 10 of the NGO Registration Procedures and Regulations 2016 issued under the Relief and Rehabilitation Act provides for penalties, including jail time for CSO leaders, if organizations operate outside of their mandates.

The law requires CSOs to renew their registration certificates and operating licenses annually, which can be a burdensome process, especially for organizations operating far from the state capitals where registration centers are located. Further complicating the registration and renewal process is the requirement that CSOs hire lawyers to help draft their constitutions and complete their applications. CSOs that seek to complete these tasks independently are turned away by the Chief Registrar and told to consult a lawyer. This requirement adds to the financial burden associated with registration. The government made no meaningful effort to reform the laws or procedures governing registration in 2017.

The government encroached in various ways, both legal and illegal, on the space for civil society in 2017. The NSS posed a stronger threat than in previous years. For example, although it is not a legal requirement, the NSS began to demand that CSOs ask permission to organize workshops and public events. A coalition of women’s groups obtained, as required, permission from the NSS for a silent march in December. Nevertheless, the NSS summoned the organizers after the event, questioned them, and criticized messages displayed during the march, including “Give our children books and not guns” and “Let love reign in the country.” Activists and CSOs were deeply concerned over the killing of at least one human rights activist in 2017. The individual, who was from Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria, died on February 23 while in a detention facility in Juba, after being held incommunicado since his arrest in 2014 on allegations that he had provided support to the SPLM-IO. CSOs were similarly concerned by reports of the disappearance, extradition, detention, and abuse of other activists in 2017.
According to Human Rights Watch, an activist living in neighboring Kenya disappeared from Nairobi on January 23 and is feared to have been abducted by or at the request of South Sudanese officials and taken illegally to South Sudan, where he was likely subjected to abuse. Although detentions without formal charges or presentation in court for a long period are unconstitutional, in December NSS officers raided a small CSO in Juba and detained its members for days and, in some cases, months. Some members were reportedly beaten and sexually abused.

The media and media-related CSOs experienced harassment in 2017. The National Communications Authority (NCA) suspended the Association for Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) and the Union of Journalists of South Sudan (UJOSS) for allegedly failing to comply with registration requirements under the Media Act 2013. AMDISS and UJOSS were both legally registered with the appropriate authorities, and they argued that there is no legal requirement for them to register under the act, since Clause (7.5) of the act clearly limits the authority of the NCA to broadcast media only. However, in the face of government harassment, AMDISS and UJOSS ultimately complied without taking up the long process of appeal, so that they could preserve their ability to operate. In addition, although the law stipulates that registrations must be renewed every five years, the NCA required local radio stations to renew their frequency registrations annually and charged varying fees of up to $10,000.

This arbitrary rule made it difficult for local media CSOs to operate and undermined citizens' access to information. Moreover, when the Catholic Radio Network (CRN) applied for registration, its program was altered by RRC on the grounds that certain topics are sensitive. Following registration, CRN submitted a request for an exemption on customs duties for radio equipment, which was denied without explanation. In numerous cases, the NSS ordered the deletion of newspaper articles before printing. For example, on May 17, 2017, the Juba Monitor daily newspaper was published with a blank front page because of excisions ordered by the NSS. The government also unevenly applied new rules for licensing journalists as a way of generating revenue and silencing independent media outlets. For example, South Sudanese journalists working for international media outlets were charged the fees normally paid by only expatriate journalists.

The NGO Act 2016 entitles CSOs to exemptions on customs duties and taxes on assets and equipment imported or purchased for their work. However, success in acquiring these exemptions depends more on personal and institutional connections than on meeting legal or regulatory requirements. CSOs often find it difficult to process their tax payments. For example, government officials are often missing or unable to locate records of CSOs’ previous tax payments. In such instances, CSOs are usually required to pay taxes for all years for which no records can be found.

CSOs may engage in income-generating activities as long as such income is applied to their public benefit purposes rather than private gain.

There are few lawyers trained in CSO law in South Sudan. Although CSOs sometimes need legal advice, it can be unaffordable for many organizations, as lawyers’ fees are high and not covered by project funding. The NGO Forum often employs local lawyers who can provide general guidance to CSOs. Otherwise, pro bono legal services are limited.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.6**

The organizational capacity of some CSOs improved in 2017 as they bounced back after a tough year in 2016, when the deeply unstable security situation caused their organizational capacity to decline dramatically. CSOs in Juba showed a renewed ability to mobilize constituencies, build new coalitions and campaigns, and organize citizens to engage in civic activities in 2017.

CSOs demonstrated improved capacity to network and build constituencies on several occasions during the year. For instance, women’s groups formed the South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace and used various means, including social media, to mobilize about 300 women to take part in a silent March in December (#SouthSudanWomensMarch). The AnaTaban Arts Initiative mobilized youth, including boda boda riders, at events focused on citizen engagement and peace. In November major CSO campaigns, groups, and coalitions formed the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF) to serve as a joint platform for CSOs to engage in the HLRF and the ensuing peace process.
In December the group jointly launched the #SouthSudanIsWatching campaign, which went on to attract a significant following, as it enabled the public to express its views of the HLRF process. The campaign demonstrated CSOs’ increased skill at engaging constituencies in their work. Nevertheless, CSOs beyond the capital still found it difficult to build constituencies, mainly because of pervasive insecurity, poor infrastructure, and the associated disruptions of lives and livelihoods.

Many CSOs still have clear visions and mission statements but do not adhere to them strictly. Since most donors are unwilling to provide core funding, CSOs feel they must implement as many projects as possible so that they can survive on overhead. Strategic plans are frequently shelved as CSOs respond to donors’ calls for proposals in specific thematic areas. As available funding determines the focus of their programming, CSOs’ overall impact can suffer, especially if their efforts are thinly spread and they fail to develop expertise in a particular niche.

Although CSOs usually have boards, their value varies from organization to organization. Some boards help raise funds or implement projects, while others are purely ceremonial. Although most CSOs are required by their constitutions to hold annual general meetings, the vast majority of organizations do not do so because project-based funding from donors does not include funds for this purpose. Certain organizations are “one-man shows” run by the founders or executive directors. These organizations usually became dormant or non-existent after their founders leave to assume new jobs elsewhere.

Many CSOs have written policies in areas such as finance, procurement, and human resources, in part because most donors look for them while conducting capacity assessments before signing funding agreements. Most CSOs operate more or less transparently, although their commitment could be better communicated through such means as annual reports with audited financial statements, public lists of board members, and general assembly meetings that foster the growth of democratic practices in organizations.

Because of their lack of core funding, most CSOs are unable to maintain permanent staff. Employment with CSOs is usually project based. Donors often fund contracts for individual consultants. CSOs are increasingly tapping into the efforts of volunteers. For example, most members of the AnaTaban Arts Initiative are volunteers, and in 2017 they helped the organization with its mobilization and public outreach efforts. Similarly, Crown the Women and the South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace obtained voluntary support from other women to organize events. Organizations such as Assistance Mission for Africa, Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), and South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) have established voluntary security committees in communities across the country.

Most CSOs have offices equipped with computers, telephones, printers, and, if they are located in national or county capitals, Internet access. However, without core funding, the vast majority of CSOs, especially at the state and county levels, are unable to keep their office equipment up to date. CSOs that are unable to afford office space and information technology often work out of the offices of international CSOs or resource centers located in some states including Torit, Wau and Rumbek.
The financial viability of CSOs did not change significantly in 2017. There was no major increase in funding for CSOs or any notable economic recovery to ease their financial strain.

CSOs depend heavily on donor funding for their operations. Of the $1.5 billion dollars reported by UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking Services as designated for South Sudan in 2017, at least $15.1 million went to more than eighty national CSOs to provide humanitarian services. Among the major recipients were Nile Hope, Universal Intervention and Development Organization, Health Link South Sudan, Universal Network for Knowledge and Empowerment Agency, and Christian Mission for Development. Most donor funding went to projects rather than core costs.

Funding from local sources, such as individuals, governments, businesses, and local foundations, is still insignificant in South Sudan. The potential exists, but the economic hardships created by the war makes cultivating local sources of funding a daunting prospect. In addition, many CSOs lack the basic skills needed to develop proposals.

Although the economic crisis caused by the civil war continues to severely limit the ability of banks to meet the foreign currency demands of their clients, a few banks managed to help CSOs in 2017. CSOs whose bank accounts had been abruptly closed without reason in 2016 moved to more CSO-friendly banks, which reduced the need to keep significant amounts of cash in their offices. Nevertheless, banking was still a challenge for CSOs outside of the capital, because the banks that were most suitable for CSOs do not have branches in most field locations in which CSOs operate. CSO staff still often carried large amounts of cash when traveling to implement activities at the state level, which increased the risk of robbery.

The financial management systems of large and small or emerging CSOs vary. Smaller CSOs often use computerized spreadsheets for basic accounting and adopt more sophisticated financial management procedures only when required to do so by donors. Donors increasingly demand that CSOs acquire professional accounting systems, but the lack of core funding makes it difficult for many CSOs to maintain qualified financial staff to manage these systems and improve their approaches to financial management. Donors sometimes offer training in financial management to address this challenge. Only a few CSOs are externally audited. Because of their cost, most audits focus on projects rather the entire organization, which limits CSOs’ ability to recognize the flaws in their financial management systems. The vast majority of CSOs do not publish annual reports with financial statements.

CSOs made notable progress in advocacy in 2017, thanks mainly to the emergence of new coalitions around the peace process. The relationship between CSOs and the government varied during the year. The government tended to leave alone organizations focused on service delivery whose work did not challenge the status quo. Direct channels for CSOs to interact with the government included the HLRF talks, where CSO representatives pushed both the government and the opposition to end the civil war and respect their commitments. CSOs engaged both formally and informally with other parties participating in the HLRF. Formally, CSO delegates took part at the invitation of the mediators, and CSOs formed a technical team to advise the delegates on thematic issues during the talks. Informally, CSOs lobbied other delegates on the sidelines of the talks.
This dual engagement was sustained through successive rounds of talks, although individuals on the government side harassed certain CSO representatives because of the nature of their participation in the HLRF, and several activists were forced to find safe haven in neighboring countries because of threats to their life and security from the security forces. In other efforts, CSOs continued to invite government officials to their meetings, workshops, and other public events at both the national and sub-national levels. For example, numerous government officials participated as speakers as well as participants at public forums organized by the Ebony Center for Strategic Studies and the Sudd Institute, which addressed topics such as peace building, balancing peace and justice, the reunification of SPLM factions, and economic reform.

The South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace organized a silent march to express disappointment with the status quo and stress the urgent need for a peaceful resolution. This was the first time that South Sudanese women organized a public protest of such scale to express their desire for an end to their political repression. Their efforts were notable in bringing together a wide range of civil society actors. The coalition produced a position paper demanding that women be better represented in the HLRF talks and that all transitional structures established under the revitalized peace agreement be composed of 50 percent women. Consequently, in December 2017 a slot was created for the South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace in the HLRF talks, and the parties agreed that the transitional governance arrangement would include 35 percent women.

The SSCSF was formed near the end of 2017 primarily to coordinate civil society involvement in the South Sudan peace process, particularly the HLRF. As described above, the SSCSF launched the #SouthSudanIsWatching campaign to mobilize citizens to closely follow and comment on the peace process.

Coalition building among CSOs grew in 2017. The SSCSF and the South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace jointly organized meetings with party representatives, mediators, regional national governments (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan), the Troika (United Kingdom, United States, and Norway), and other stakeholders. They also published a joint press statement at the end of phase two of the HLRF talks, when a cessation of hostilities agreement was reached. However, according to some members, the sustainability of these coalitions is not certain, since it depends on many factors, including the availability of funding and transparent, accountable, and effective management.

CSOs in South Sudan are increasingly familiar with the idea of lobbying and take part formally in shaping legislation as it moves through the parliament. CSOs usually attend public hearings to critique proposed legislation and provide alternative language. For instance, a coalition of CSOs working on land rights issued a position paper jointly with the South Sudan Law Society on the amendments to the Land Act, 2009, and the Draft National Land Policy. In addition, South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections prepared analyses of the Political Parties Act and the National Elections Act and shared its recommendations with CSOs, the National Elections Commission, National Constitutional Amendment Committee, and the public.

CSOs did not make any significant effort to advocate for reform of the NGO Act in 2017.
SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0

There was no change in CSOs’ service provision in 2017. South Sudanese CSOs helped reach more than 5.4 million people needing humanitarian services during the year, according to UNOCHA. The services provided by CSOs included basic health care, management of acute malnutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, food security, emergency shelter, livelihoods, and education. South Sudanese CSOs were often funded as sub-grantees of the UN Children’s Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Program, International Organization for Migration, international CSOs, and other organizations.

South Sudanese workers for CSOs were disproportionately affected by security incidents in both government and opposition areas in 2017, in part because they are targeted by security forces and are not usually entitled to evacuations. According to the Aid Worker Security Database, thirty South Sudanese humanitarian workers were killed because of violent conflict during the year; four more than in 2016, in a trend that runs directly counter to efforts to resolve the country’s humanitarian crisis. In March 2017, the worse month so far for humanitarian workers in South Sudan, six aid workers and their driver were killed in a road ambush in Pibor. Four of the dead were national staff. Several other South Sudanese humanitarian aid workers were reported murdered in various settings. Other aid workers were forced to leave their jobs and flee to protection-of-civilian camps because of threats to their lives, and active hostilities caused a total of 612 aid workers to be relocated from various areas of the country in 2017. Bureaucratic impediments and operational interference from various sides in the conflict also persistently undermined humanitarian operations.

CSOs usually employ quick assessments to establish the needs of the communities in which they work. Often these needs are obvious, especially when people are forced to flee from their homes to IDP camps.

In providing services to beneficiaries, CSOs generally do not discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity. Given their own traditions as well as the extensive need for services, the vast majority of CSOs provide services to beneficiaries beyond their memberships.

Cost recovery by way of charging fees and creating social enterprises is not a prominent practice in the CSO sector in South Sudan. The slow development of income-generating measures can be attributed largely to the dire economic conditions created by the civil war.

The government is more favorably inclined towards CSOs providing services than advocacy organizations. For example, the RRC issued a circular in July 2017 that set a lower threshold for clearance of cash for shipments to the field, saying that it did so to improve effectiveness of CSO service delivery.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.8

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change significantly in 2017. CSO resource centers in state capitals, such as Torit, Rumbek, Wau, and Juba, enable CSOs to access information and communications equipment. The centers are typically equipped with computer labs, free Internet access, and libraries, and they also provide free meeting space for CSOs. They are largely utilized by emerging CSOs that lack communications equipment, although established CSOs also use the meeting spaces. Users of the Women’s Union Center, one of the few resource centers in Juba, say that they often have to wait in long queues to access services, which highlights the need to expand the operational capacity of CSO resource centers so that they can serve more organizations.
Some national-level CSOs sub-grant funds to community-based groups and associations. For instance, CEPO supported CSO networks in Wau and Jonglei with funding from Oxfam International in 2017.

In 2017 three major coalitions emerged: SCSSF, with more than two hundred member organizations, which existed previously but formally announced its formation as a coalition in November; South Sudan Women Coalition For Peace, with forty-six member organizations; and the South Sudan Young Leaders Forum (SSYLF), with more than fifty members. These newly formed consortia have created WhatsApp groups and mailing lists to facilitate information exchange among members. CSOs also share information through mailing lists, such as those managed by Development Policy Forum, Citizens for Peace and Justice, and AnaTaban Arts Initiative discussion group.

National-level CSOs often provide training to sub-national CSOs and community-based groups. Their wide range of training topics includes project management, peace building, human rights, governance, and coalition building. Some paid training opportunities exist in accounting and financial management. In addition, some organizations benefit from training offered by donors. For example, Norwegian People’s Aid provided its partners with training in financial management and PAX provided training in security in 2017. Local CSOs may register with the NGO Forum to take part in meetings and workshops, including on security.

The government and CSOs work together when they have shared objectives on issues such as girl’s education, domestic violence, and inter-communal conflicts, including land-related conflicts. The South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control works closely with SSANSA on trying to control small arms and light weapons. Government officials are regularly invited to make opening statements at events organized by CSOs. Partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are limited. CSO-media partnerships are developing. For example, members of the media belong to the newly formed SCSSF, and the UN-run Radio Miraya began to air more material from CSOs in 2017.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0

The relationship between CSOs and the media was stable in 2017. There was increased coverage of CSOs’ work in private media that is not controlled by the state. The media provided positive analysis of the role of CSOs in South Sudan, and Radio Miraya honored some CSO leaders for their analysis of several issues during the year. CSOs’ press statements on the peace process were consistently picked up by media outlets, and CSO representatives were offered radio airtime to articulate views on such issues as human rights and the economy. Radio stations across the country often accepted public information materials developed by CSOs. For instance, messages collected by The South Sudan We Want Campaign in 2017 and a radio drama series produced by Sawa Shabab were aired on Radio Miraya and other stations. CSOs do not pay for journalists to cover their events, but donors sometime pay stipends to journalists interested in reporting on CSOs’ activities. Private media usually charge fees if CSOs want to use radio airtime to promote messages about less newsworthy issues, such as malaria prevention or reproductive health.

The public has mixed perceptions of CSOs and in general has a more positive view of service-delivery than advocacy CSOs. Although educated people tend to view advocacy organizations positively, others sometimes find CSOs’ advocacy stances highly politicized and even dangerous, especially CSOs’ demands that those who have failed to serve the country relinquish power, those who violate the cessation of hostilities agreement be subject to tough punitive measures, and arms transfers to South Sudan cease.
Public participation in CSOs’ public events increased in 2017. For instance, #SouthSudanIsWatching drew participation from a range of CSO coalitions, including SSCSF, SSYLF, and AnaTaban Arts Initiative, and non-members of AnaTaban also participated in the initiative.

The government generally sees CSOs as promoting the public interest and serving as a source of credible information. The government has a positive perception of organizations engaged in service delivery and acknowledges that they are important actors. However, the government assumes a defensive position if CSOs report on issues such as human rights violations and may attack them as foreign-influenced actors. The business sector holds a similar view.

CSOs publicize their activities through press conferences, public marches, T-shirts, brochures, and billboards. In 2017 CSOs made a greater effort to reach out to the media by distributing press statements and inviting media houses to their events. CSOs implementing humanitarian and other programs sometimes benefit from funds to use for branding and highlight their activities through signs, t-shirts, and other materials.

Most CSOs do not publish annual reports. Networks usually have codes of ethics and membership charters to guide the behavior and interactions of their members.
A new administration known as the government of national conciliation assumed power in Sudan in 2017. For the first time since before the 1989 coup, the government included the post of prime minister, thereby fulfilling one of the main recommendations of the National Dialogue, which was launched in 2014 to bring together representatives of the country’s opposition, armed movements, civil society, and government in discussions of ways to resolve Sudan’s most pressing challenges. Also of great importance in 2017 was the outgoing Obama administration’s announcement of the possible revocation of sanctions, which had cut Sudan off from international markets after their imposition in 1997. The lifting of sanctions was conditioned on progress in a series of benchmarks, including sustained unilateral cessation of hostilities in Darfur and the Two Areas; improvement of humanitarian access throughout the country; and cooperation with the United States to address regional conflicts and the threat of terrorism. In October 2017 the sanctions were permanently lifted.

Despite these major steps forward, the new government was unable to prevent the national economy from quickly sliding into crisis by the end of the year. In December 2017 inflation stood at 25.15 percent, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. In the black market the Sudanese pound declined to half its value against the U.S. dollar one year earlier. The economic decline increased inequality, deepened unemployment, and exacerbated the suffering of Sudan’s population, half of which lives below the poverty line. According to the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan produced by the United Nations (UN) and other key actors, 4.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2017. This figure was considerably lower than in 2016, when the El Niño-caused drought severely limited agricultural production.

Overall CSO sustainability in Sudan remained the same as in 2016. Although the government assumed a less aggressive stance towards civil society while discussions about lifting sanctions were underway, the legal environment deteriorated, mainly because of government efforts to influence CSO programming. CSO advocacy also declined, driven by the high risks associated with advocacy activities and a general sense of fatigue in the sector. Organizational capacity was stagnant as CSOs struggled unsuccessfully to retain what little progress they had made in this dimension in previous years. CSOs’ financial viability, sectoral infrastructure, and public image were also more or less the same as in 2016.
The only dimension showing improvement was service provision, which benefitted from a new government policy that rewarded organizations working on “hard” interventions, such as the construction of wells and schools, rather than “soft” interventions, such as awareness raising and civic education. CSOs’ access to conflict areas was still generally hindered, especially outside of main towns and cities.

The CSO sector in Sudan is made up of numerous types of organizations registered under various national laws. Estimates put the cumulative number of the more modern type of CSOs, which are commonly known in Sudan as “non-governmental organizations” or “NGOs,” at well over 15,000. This number includes voluntary organizations, cultural groups, and training centers. Other types of CSOs include faith-based organizations (FBOs), such as Sufi and Salafi groups and the Ansar Affairs Authority; groups in the native administration system of indirect rule, in which local tribal chiefs perform some functions of government; and tribal groups.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.7**

While the legal environment for most types of CSOs did not change significantly in 2017, the legal and operational environment for NGOs in Sudan deteriorated in 2017. The deterioration was largely driven by the efforts of government officials to influence their programming priorities and acquire some of their resources. For organizations registered under the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), this development was driven by the introduction of more complicated operating requirements.

All CSOs must register with a national state institution before they can begin operations. The more modern type of organizations known as NGOs continue to register as voluntary organizations with the HAC under the Voluntary and Humanitarian Works Act 2006 (also known as the NGO Law). Less often, NGOs register as cultural groups under the Law Regulating Activities of National Cultural Groups or as training centers under the National Training Act. CSOs must renew their registrations annually. Registration can be a lengthy process, depending on the nature of the CSO and its work. For example, withholding registration has become one way in which the state obstructs organizations it deems “less desirable” or “problematic”—typically watchdog organizations or organizations working in areas such as human rights—and eventually drives some of them into voluntary termination. In contrast, CSOs providing “hard” interventions in line with the government’s goals generally enjoy facilitated registration and renewal processes. International CSOs are not permitted to establish local branches in the country before signing agreements with the HAC stipulating the terms (including duration) and areas of activity of their work in Sudan.

The NGO Law hampers the sustainability and effectiveness of registered CSOs. A revised NGO Law introduced in 2016 remained in draft form in 2017 without making progress in the legislative pipeline. Under the current law, project implementation, access to areas in need, and deployment of staff and other personnel are subject to tight regulation and state interference. For example, before implementing projects, CSOs must sign technical agreements with the HAC and relevant line ministries at both the federal and state levels. The agreements allow the HAC to control funding flows to CSOs and decide whether to permit them to work in specific locations. In an unwritten policy implemented by several officials overseeing CSO access and permissions, CSOs registered at the federal level must now partner with state-based CSOs to work in local areas. Previously this rule applied only to international organizations as part of a HAC policy to localize humanitarian work in the country. However, in 2017 it became a widespread practice to require almost all federal-level CSOs to partner with locally registered organizations. In one case, a national-level organization that was seeking permission to implement a project in Red Sea State was told by a government official that working in partnership with a specific CSO that the official recommended and hiring a particular person that the official knew would greatly ease the permission process.
Since most national and international CSOs fear antagonizing the authorities or having their programming obstructed, they usually comply with such requests.

Harassment of CSOs and their members continued to take many forms in 2017. Foremost among them were arbitrary arrests and detentions. In April the head of the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, an independent body formed during a physicians’ strike in 2016, was detained on charges of damaging the health security of the country by forming an illegal body. He was later released without charges. A prominent engineer and human rights defender, who had been detained in December 2016 on charges related to his human rights activities, was released in August only after obtaining a presidential pardon. Three activists from the Center for Training and Human Development, who had been arrested on charges of publishing false information in 2016, were found guilty and punished with one year’s imprisonment and a fine of SDG 50,000 (approximately $7,500) each. Three civil society activists and affiliated human rights defenders from the training institution TRACKs were sentenced, fined, and finally released in March 2017 after ten months of arbitrary detention. In Kassala State, security authorities imposed a two-week suspension on the activities of Sharie Al-Hawadith, a voluntary organization that provides medical treatment services to the needy, because of the organization’s delay in establishing an intensive care unit at Kassala Hospital. Other forms of state harassment included travel bans on political activists.

Tax benefits in the form of exemptions from customs duties on imported goods are available only to CSOs registered under the NGO Law. In practice, these exemptions are provided only to a few CSOs that make it through a lengthy application process. Approvals for exemptions became more difficult to secure in 2017 as the deteriorating economy apparently caused the government to rely on taxes as the primary source of domestic revenue. CSOs are not subject to business tax but must pay a value-added tax of 17 percent on the goods and services that they procure locally. Individual and corporate donors may not deduct donations to CSOs.

CSOs are generally not allowed to earn income from the provision of goods and services. CSOs that charge fees or establish social enterprises may be subject to closure and confiscation of their assets. The NGO Law restricts CSOs from receiving funding from foreign sources without the prior approval of a relevant minister. In late 2017 the HAC proposed a slight revision to Article 7 of the NGO Law, which would extend this restriction to CSO networks and unions, which were previously not included. The proposed revision also justifies the state’s right to vet foreign sources of funding by citing the need to comply with guidelines issued by the Financial Action Task Force to prevent money laundering and transfers of funding to terrorist organizations.

The deteriorating legal environment and constant governmental pressure on CSOs increased their need for professional legal support in 2017. Although legal services were available to meet most CSOs’ needs, they are often unaffordable, forcing CSOs to resort to foreign legal aid programs to pay for them.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.5**

The organizational capacity of CSOs did not change in 2017. Despite government hostility and the challenging political and economic environment, constituency building was a priority for the majority of CSOs. For example, organizations such as the Al-Shouroug Center in Al-Geddaref and the Sudan Democracy First Group operating out of Uganda convened roundtables and seminars to discuss social, development, and governance issues with their constituencies. Constituency building and meetings were sometimes obstructed by the authorities, which saw them as a threat since they could be used to mobilize populations against the state and its policies. This was evident in May 2017, when the state banned a large assembly of Sufi groups, despite the fact that they had received the authorities’ prior approval to meet.

Very few CSOs appreciate the value of strategic planning and incorporate it into their decision-making processes. The organizations that do engage in strategic planning are mostly NGOs. Other types of CSOs, especially traditional organizations, are relatively knowledgeable about strategic planning but lack the necessary technical capacity to leverage it.

By law CSOs registered under the NGO Law are required to have general assemblies of members, which serve as governing bodies, and executive committees of five members each, which run the organization.
Any deviation from this structure could result in the rejection of their registration. CSOs do not have boards. Traditional CSOs usually have complex internal governance structures involving fluid personal, religious, or tribal allegiances.

Given the state’s predatory actions towards CSOs, organizations often sacrifice transparency for safety and survival. This tendency has dampened CSOs’ efforts to introduce accountability measures such as accurate public statements of their finances. At the same time, the scarcity of funding has increased the need for greater efficiency, and some CSOs are developing and applying policies and procedures that improve organizational performance.

The quality of CSO staffing and their competencies improved in 2017, thanks to the capacity building offered by a large number of international organizations. For example, the Kulana lil-Tanmya Program (KLP), a multi-year initiative of the British Council, invested heavily in improving the governance, leadership, and human resource management of several strategically targeted CSOs. Unlike most donor programs, KLP also made resources available to meet the core costs of partner CSOs, thereby allowing them to maintain permanent staff. Otherwise, many CSOs find it difficult to retain permanent staff, and they rely mainly on volunteers. In June 2017 the minister of security and social development issued a decree establishing the National Voluntary Work Forum, which, under the minister’s supervision, is expected to perform several functions related to national voluntary work in Sudan. Its formation has been criticized by several civil society activists, who see it as an attempt by the government to co-opt civil society to serve its own agenda.

The use and availability of technology in the CSO sector is steadily increasing, especially among NGOs, which use social media tools such as Facebook and WhatsApp to facilitate their internal communications and operations. Outreach to the public using social media is limited, as only a quarter of the Sudanese public have access to the Internet. Only NGOs have modern basic equipment such as computers, printers, and copiers.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

CSOs’ financial viability remained the same in 2017. The main sources of funding included locally based international donors, membership dues, charitable contributions from private individuals, and corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. The majority of CSOs rely mostly on membership contributions to sustain themselves, and they have limited ability to diversify their funding sources. NGOs have access to more types of funding, including contracts for services or grants, which usually come from one or two donors.

Donor funding declined in 2017. The December 2017 consolidated annual financial report of the Sudan Humanitarian Fund, a pooled funding mechanism established by the UN, reported a decrease in funds from approximately $46.1 million in 2016 to $38.8 million in 2017. The European Union delegation to Sudan continued to provide small grants through its development assistance grants program. Other funders included USAID, Japanese International Cooperation Agency, and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Although exact data is not available, it is likely, given the HAC’s control over the flow of foreign funding to NGOs, that some organizations experienced problems obtaining funding for foreign-funded projects.

Support from corporate philanthropic and CSR programs is increasingly available from actors such as the Haggar Foundation, a subsidiary of the Haggar Group; companies in the telecommunications sector, including MTN, Zain, and Sudani; and the family-owned DAL Group. The multinational Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan has established the Al-Faisal Cultural Center as its CSR arm and uses it to provide funding to a few local CSOs.
Government funding to CSOs is mostly available through the Ministry of Social Welfare, Woman, and Child Affairs. It is largely directed towards fighting poverty, supporting orphanages, and implementing other social solidarity programs. For example, the ministry supports the Al-Shaheed (Martyrs) Organization, which helps meet the educational needs of the families of deceased Muslim soldiers. At the minister’s discretion, and without any form of official guidance or regulation, funding may be made available to other CSOs registered under the HAC. In addition, funding for microfinance operations may be leveraged from state-run banks such as the Savings and Social Development Bank through state-affiliated institutions such as the Social Development Foundation in Khartoum.

Given the deteriorating economy and rising inflation, the ability of CSOs to raise resources and other kinds of support from their communities and constituencies was insignificant in 2017. Larger and more traditional CSOs were also hampered by the lack of organizational capacity to maintain updated membership rosters and communicate effectively with their members. For example, the FBO Ansar Affairs Authority has many thousands of followers across the country but had difficulty collecting contributions because of its poor organizational capacity.

Earned income from the sale of products and services is generally restricted by law. However, some CSOs, especially several affiliated with the government, such as Al-Zubair Charity Organization and Islamic Bir Organization, have substantial investments and assets that generated revenue for their programs in 2017.

CSOs registered under the NGO Law are required to undertake independent audits and submit their financial statements to the HAC at the end of every calendar year. For this reason, the majority of NGOs maintain some form of financial management system. Otherwise, most organizations have rudimentary approaches to accounting and bookkeeping. More traditional forms of CSOs and most FBOs lack financial management systems and procedures entirely, and only a handful of them carry out annual audits of their accounts.

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

Policy advocacy initiatives and the formation of issue-based coalitions by CSOs declined in 2017. The deterioration was driven in part by a sense of fatigue among CSOs, which felt that their intense advocacy in 2016 had failed to bring about desired results. Their momentum was also slowed by their awareness of the risks associated with advocacy in the prevailing hostile environment.

The involvement of civil society in law and policy making in Sudan is limited. When the government invites CSOs to take part in its policy or legislative processes, it is rarely a genuine opportunity to inform those processes but rather a token gesture to symbolize inclusion or an effort to gauge the public’s response to a proposed policy or legal reform. The rare opportunity to provide input into decision-making processes is ad hoc and often fraught with the risk of being targeted by the government or even other CSOs, since an organization’s participation in such processes can be perceived by other organizations as tantamount to co-optation by the regime. For example, in 2017 a famous human rights lawyer and defender came under intense criticism on social media for testifying at a National Assembly hearing about a law that was under discussion.

A few advocacy initiatives and campaigns undertaken by CSOs in 2017 enjoyed a degree of success. For example, a campaign undertaken by CSOs resulted in changes in the construction code to ensure that government buildings accommodate people with disabilities. In Freedom on the Net 2017 Freedom House reports that between June 2016 and May 2017, “social media users were active in organizing civil disobedience campaigns against cuts to subsidies on fuel, basic commodities, and medicine, though so-called Cyber Jihadists [associated with national security forces] worked to thwart the campaigns through the impersonation of social media.
accounts and dissemination of misinformation.” Campaigns advocating for the release of human rights activists were launched largely through Facebook and WhatsApp.

Because of the risks associated with trying to influence government decision making, CSOs usually focus on non-controversial legislation. In an exemplary effort in 2017, environmental activists and CSOs successfully convinced the authorities to change an article in the environmental law that would have transferred supervision of the Sudan Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources from the President to the Ministry of Environment, thereby compromising its independence.

During the year Sudanese civil society continued its long and sustained effort to remedy the disabling environment for CSOs registered under the NGO Law. CSOs advocating for reform of the act included the Sudan HAC Law Campaign, which is coordinated by the Sudanese Development Initiative (SUDIA) in partnership with other CSOs. Their campaign seeks to ensure changes to several problematic articles in the existing act, especially relating to registration, funding, networking, and ownership and disposal of assets. In late 2017 the HAC organized a one-day event to solicit feedback on the 2016 draft NGO Act from the wider CSO community. However, many CSOs felt that the government was no more open to changing the law than in previous years.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

Service provision by CSOs improved in 2017, driven largely by the government’s tendency to recognize and favor organizations working on service delivery. CSOs’ service provision continued to focus on health, water and sanitation, and education. Within the health sector, a large number of CSOs provided medications to counter an outbreak of cholera across the country. Additionally, the country’s deteriorating economic conditions has led to the growth of local cooperatives and informal organizations, which responded to communities’ increased need for basic goods and services.

According to the Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan, 186 international and national organizations provided humanitarian services in 2017, of which 165 organizations, or 86 percent, operated in the Darfur region. These services were funded largely by international donors. While there were some modest improvements in access in 2017, the government continued to impose politically motivated restrictions, and CSOs’ access to conflict areas was still generally hindered, especially outside of the main cities and towns. For example, the government exercised its authority to direct CSOs’ services to areas dominated by ethnic groups that it perceived to be pro-government, while CSOs aiming to deliver services in locations viewed as less friendly to the government were often blocked from accessing target communities. The delivery of humanitarian services and goods to beneficiaries in the conflict zones of South Kordofan and Blue Nile State was limited in 2017, as talks between the Sudanese government and the opposition to cease hostilities were stalled.

Informal organizations such as Sharia Al Hawadith (“Emergency Road,” named after the main street in Khartoum on which the majority of medical facilities and hospitals are located) also provided medical supplies and services to the needy in 2017. This youth-led initiative crowd-funds healthcare using mobile phones. As it has expanded its services into states such as Kassala and El Gedaref, it has been targeted by the government on the basis that it cannot provide services unless it is formally registered. The organizers believe that formal registration would undermine the group’s decentralized management system and greatly hinder its ability to move about freely and respond to community needs.
Multi-sectoral needs assessments and data collection efforts are usually led by UN agencies, which train and partner with national CSOs. CSOs are instrumental in collecting data related to gaps in basic services. Data collection methods included perception surveys, questionnaires, community focus group discussions, and a mixture of other participatory approaches and tools. Data collection and needs assessments were mostly confined to Darfur and South Kordofan and Blue Nile State in 2017.

Several CSOs produced and shared knowledge in 2017. For example, Al-Faisal Cultural Center established cultural libraries in Kassala, Dongola, and Dabasin, each of which provides public access to more than 1,200 books. The Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society Organizations (CSCSOs), in cooperation with the Sudanese Journalists Network and Journalists for Human Rights, continued to release its quarterly bulletin, Sudan Freedom of Association and Expression Watch, which monitors fluctuations in the space for exercising these freedoms throughout the country. The Sudanese Writers Unions and the Sudan Film Factory organized public seminars on cultural and intellectual topics and produced and distributed creative films.

CSOs are generally not allowed by law to earn income from the provision of goods and services and so do not establish social enterprises or other income-generating activities. Moreover, few national CSOs are able to calculate the actual cost of the goods and services that they provide, since their projects are funded through large humanitarian donor programs. However, a few CSOs earn revenues from services such as micro-finance based on Islamic-lending principles, which, although they may violate the NGO Law or other legislation, the government ignores because of the deteriorating economic environment and rising poverty.

The government overwhelmingly relies on CSOs to provide basic social services, especially at the local level outside of main cities and towns. Over the years this reliance has increased to the point that the role of local government has eroded. CSOs and community-based organizations now take the lead in providing and managing basic services, including water, and educational inputs, such as chairs, textbooks, and meals for students. In 2017 the State Ministry of Social Protection and Development in Khartoum convened an unprecedented meeting at which representatives of CSOs and some prominent CSR programs discussed ways to more proactively provide goods and services to those most in need. Government officials recognize CSOs’ contributions in public speeches during official events and ceremonies.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4**

There was no significant change in the sectoral infrastructure for Sudanese CSOs in 2017. CSO resource centers remain extremely limited in number, and no new centers were established in 2017. The handful that provide training and other capacity-development services, such as the Regional Center for the Development of Civil Society and the Al-Ayam Cultural Center, remain dependent on donor funding. Outside of Khartoum, especially in the remote regions of Darfur and Northern states, CSOs are served mainly by small, private, for-profit enterprises, which provide a limited range of services, such as typing, printing, photocopying, and scanning. These services are available for a fee and do not necessarily target only CSOs.

Sudan has only a handful of local grant-making organizations, including the Islamic Charity Organization and private foundations such as Haggar Foundation. Although they are located in Khartoum, their grant making extends to other states and regions.
CSOs often compete with each other over limited resources and funding opportunities, so evidence of information sharing and collaboration among them is scant. Their cooperation is further impeded by their limited communication capacity, poor equipment, and a lack of mutual trust overall. Nevertheless, several networks and coalitions founded before 2017, including CSCSOs, Darfur Bar Association, and Sudan Call Group, have managed to survive despite the repressive environment and intimidation tactics deployed by the government, which believes that they are a threat and used by opposition and foreign bodies to resist its authority.

In 2017 the Sudan Council of Voluntary Associations (SCOVA), which was established to promote the interests of the CSO sector and represents more than 120 CSOs, was reconstituted after several years of inactivity. A new governing board was elected, with the consent and influence of the government, to oversee the council’s revitalization. CSOs are hopeful that SCOVA will further the interests and capacity of its members and contribute to the overall viability of the sector.

Training and capacity-development services for CSOs are offered intermittently and are usually available only through projects and programs run by national and international organizations. Because of decreasing funding and the difficult operating environment, training opportunities for CSOs declined markedly in 2017. Nevertheless, several noteworthy training interventions were offered. For example, KLP provided an opportunity for individuals and groups to develop their capacities in the vital areas of contextual analysis, leadership, and fiduciary management. As part of this program, the UK-based organization Mango provided a handful of the British Council’s strategic partners with financial training tailored to the nonprofit sector. In addition, training for Sudanese CSOs was sometimes offered in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia if foreign trainers had trouble securing visas to enter Sudan.

Intersectoral cooperation and partnerships were scant in 2017. Among a few laudable instances of cooperation was the Sudan Red Sea Did You Know? campaign, which raised awareness about efforts to protect Sudan’s marine environment. Its success rested on a fully engaged partnership involving a wide range of government, private-sector, international and local CSO, media, and local community stakeholders. The campaign’s partners included the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Physical Development; Ministry of Tourism, Environment, and Wildlife in Red Sea State; UN Environment; Sudanese National Commission for UNESCO; Environmental Initiative for Sustainable Development; Cousteau Society; Marine Environment Protection Society Sudan; Red Sea University; Sudanese Wildlife Society; and Capital Radio. Otherwise, CSOs rarely engage in partnerships with the business and media sectors.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.2**

There was no change in the public image of CSOs in 2017. The media are generally appreciative of the role of CSOs. During the year, media coverage of CSOs and their activities occurred mostly in the print media, which are mostly privately owned, although the government maintains proxy ownership interests. The coverage was neutral to positive in tone. Coverage on radio or television was minimal, since the state has a monopoly on broadcasting and the cost of producing and airing programs is high. However, Capital FM, a private radio station that broadcasts in English and focuses on social issues, occasionally hosted CSO representatives and activists to talk about their work. The station also supported the CSO sector by providing airtime at costs far below market rates. As a partner in the Sudan Red Sea Did You Know? campaign, Capital FM broadcast campaign messages practically for free.
Public perceptions of CSOs were mixed and based on the type of CSO. The public tends to positively perceive and appreciate more traditional, less formal CSOs, such as FBOs and tribal administrative structures. In contrast, the more modern organizations, especially NGOs, were sometimes perceived negatively, especially if they worked on human rights or good governance or acted as government watchdogs. Contributing to the public’s negative perceptions were the government’s smear campaigns in previous years, which claimed that these organizations and their associates were western funded and sought to drive a foreign agenda.

Private-sector and government views of CSOs were generally positive in locations outside of Khartoum, where most organizations, including NGOs, work on service delivery and humanitarian assistance. In the capital city, the government and business sector had positive views only of CSOs engaged in providing basic services. The business community viewed CSOs engaged in advocacy or policy issues as toxic and avoided association with them lest it attract the government’s disapproval. In 2017 the CSO sector, led by organizations working on controversial rights-oriented programs, tried to address the suspicions and accusations occasionally levelled against them by government officials. However, their efforts were inconsistent, and they lacked an effective counter-narrative. For example, the media recorded hardly any reaction by CSOs to cases brought by the state against several human-rights defenders and activists in 2017. Despite a sympathetic attitude on the part of many journalists, CSOs did not seem to plead their case to them. The absence of coverage may also be attributed to newspapers’ increasing self-censorship as they seek to avoid punishment by the government.

Self-regulation in the form of a code of ethics for the CSO sector has yet to materialize. However, in its strategic plan for 2018-20, the CSCSOs set a goal of establishing a self-regulatory body for its members. Transparency measures such as the production and publication of annual reports are mostly lacking except among a handful of NGOs. In a trend that has increased in recent years, the few CSOs that produce annual reports prefer to share them discreetly because of the punitive environment, in which the government easily uses information against its provider.
The political atmosphere in Tanzania in 2017 continued to be tainted by the government’s authoritarian tendencies, a growing police presence, and diminished respect for civil and political rights. Freedom of assembly grew more restricted as the government banned some public meetings and demonstrations and the police used brutal force to counter nonviolent protests. Special parliamentary and local elections to fill vacant positions were stained by reports of irregularities and violence, which the government discredited or attempted to refute.

The government withdrew Tanzania from the Open Government Partnership, an international initiative that seeks to make governments more open, accountable, and responsive to their citizens, with the explanation that the country already participated in the African Peer Review Mechanism, a self-monitoring instrument that fosters political stability and economic growth. Generalized fear spread among critics of the government following several reported cases of kidnapping and disappearance of journalists, artists, and other individuals in 2017, as well as an alleged attempt to assassinate a key member of the opposition. There was also growing self-censorship by media outlets.

Tanzania’s economy continued to be the fastest growing in the East African Community in 2017, although the growth rate slowed to 6.8 percent from 7.3 percent in 2016. Although government statistics indicated healthy macro-economic trends, economic uncertainty increased as businesses shut down, banks failed, monetary and credit policies tightened, and the government engaged in unplanned taxation and public spending. The government continued to combat corruption at all levels, including by banning the uncontrolled export of mineral extracts. Several influential businessmen were indicted on charges of money laundering, corruption, and tax evasion.

CSOs operated in an increasingly hostile environment in 2017. The legal environment deteriorated as the government subjected CSOs to greater scrutiny, harassed individual organizations, restricted media, applied laws inconsistently, and halted all registrations for three months to conduct a “verification exercise.” CSO advocacy declined as the government imposed new permitting requirements and silenced media outlets.
Nevertheless, in the face of these challenges, the sectoral infrastructure strengthened as CSOs relied on training and other support to help ensure their survival. CSOs’ organizational capacity, financial viability, service provision, and public image were stable during the year.

According to the Office of the Registrar of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 385 new NGOs, a distant legal form, were registered in 2017. The new registrations brought the total number of registered NGOs to 22,910, accounting for about two-thirds of the CSO sector. Most other organizations are community-based organizations (CBOs). Most CSOs are based in urban areas and implement projects and programs in rural areas.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for Tanzanian CSOs worsened in 2017 as the government took various steps to constrain freedoms of association, assembly, and expression.

The laws governing CSOs’ registration and operations were unchanged. CSOs continued to register either as NGOs with the Office of the Registrar of NGOs under the NGO Act No. 24 of 2002; as companies limited by guarantee with the Business Registration and Licensing Agency; as trusts with the Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency; as CBOs with local authorities; or as other types of organizations with relevant ministries and government agencies. The relationship between CSOs and the Registrar of NGOs, the main regulatory body, was fairly positive in 2017. In practice, all CSOs were treated like NGOs in an effort to keep them in check. In Zanzibar CSOs registered with the Registrar of Companies, which tended to operate slowly since its mandate includes the registration of other entities.

From the end of August to the end of November 2017 the government suspended all NGO registrations to prepare for a “verification exercise,” which sought to establish the numbers and capacities of the country’s NGOs. All registered NGOs were required to submit original registration certificates and proof of payment of all annual fee or face deregistration. Although some NGOs were initially mistrustful of the exercise, they accepted it more widely after the government agreed to allow the National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) and the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRDC) to facilitate the process. In general, CSOs interpreted the verification exercise as a clear message that the Registrar of NGOs intended to scrutinize them more closely. No NGO is known to have been deregistered during the exercise, but the registrar temporarily forfeited the registration of several organizations while their verifications were underway.

State scrutiny of CSOs increased in 2017 as the President’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government ordered all CSOs to obtain permits at the regional and district levels before undertaking projects. This requirement, which seemed redundant for organizations that already had certificates of registration, made it difficult for CSOs to implement activities for which they were lawfully registered. For example, CARE International had a valid memorandum of understanding at the ministerial level but was required to submit documents to the Iringa local government before implementing a proposed sunflower project. As a national organization THRDC should be accountable to the Registrar of NGOs, but it was ordered by the Kinondoni District administrative office to submit reports, audited accounts, and other core documents. Organizations were also required to seek the approval of local government authorities before submitting project proposals to development partners. In some areas, such as Bahi District, local government authorities demanded that CSOs allow government officials to serve on their monitoring and evaluation teams.
During the year, legal and regulatory provisions were applied inconsistently, and some CSOs were more closely monitored than others. CSOs operated with greater freedom if their activities aligned with those of the government and they were not too critical of government policies. For example, after the president introduced a prohibition on the re-enrolment in school of pregnant girls and teenage mothers, the minister of home affairs announced that organizations would be de-registered if they continued to encourage affected girls to return to school contrary to the government’s directive. However, no CSOs were de-registered for this reason. Certain advocacy CSOs were individually targeted. When the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC) reported on irregularities and violence during the special elections, the government attempted to discredit the reports and the organization itself by claiming that it had violated election guidelines. The government also challenged the credibility and legal mandate of LHRC to observe elections and, through the National Election Commission, directed LHRC to submit its election observation report before making it public. The Community Health Education Services and Advocacy (CHESA) was barred from operating on the grounds that it advocated for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people and same-sex relationships, which are against the law. The minister for constitutional and legal affairs threatened to deregister the Tanganyika Law Society (TLS) for “elements of political activism,” because a candidate to become the organization’s president belonged to the opposition party. Individual activists were accused of being anti-government and non-patriotic and were sometimes interrogated by the government or required to prove their citizenship.

Media freedom also declined markedly during the year. For instance, Section 16 of the Cyber Crimes Act was cited repeatedly to charge individuals whose online comments were taken to be seditious. The Media Services Act was used to suspend or close down publications considered to have violated the law, including the daily newspaper Tanzania Daima and the weeklies Mawio and Raia Mwema. Several instances of unexplained disappearances and physical harassment and the arrests of journalists and other critics of the government caused widespread fear. Draft Online Content Regulations under the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, published by the Ministry of Information, Culture, Arts, and Sports in 2017, may further restrict freedom of expression. The draft regulations order blogs and online forums to register, instruct Internet cafes to install surveillance cameras, prohibit the posting of material online that could be deemed “offensive” or “morally improper,” and recommend fines and jail time for violators.

A general prohibition on public assemblies led to restrictions on peaceful outdoor and indoor events. Attendees at a meeting on health rights hosted by CHESA in a Dar es Salaam hotel were arrested and held in police custody for several days. Several foreign participants from Uganda and South Africa were declared prohibited immigrants. In June the police beat members of the Promotion and Women’s Development Association during a peaceful rally in Dar es Salaam and later prohibited an indoor gathering of women who wanted to conduct prayers for the assaulted persons. The police arrested several human rights defenders during the launch of a book about the right to education in higher-level institutions. In Zanzibar in October, Jumaza, a faith-based organization (FBO) that supports the Muslim community, obtained a permit to hold a meeting to discuss gender-based violence (GBV) but had to cancel the meeting on short notice when the permit was withdrawn. The use of the arts for advocacy purposes was frustrated by the abduction of several politically critical artists and a ban on some political songs.

The Finance Act of 2017 treats CSOs as businesses and therefore taxable entities, unless they obtain charitable status, which involves a difficult and time-consuming bureaucratic process. The Tanzania Revenue Authority is responsible for issuing tax exemptions to charitable organizations but has no established guidelines for doing so. Under the new law, FBOs are now eligible for tax exemptions. Under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Financial Intelligence Unit has imposed restrictions on the transfer of funds from abroad, although CSOs are still allowed to accept international funding as long as they file annual reports and audited accounts.

CSOs that are registered or have certificates of compliance under the NGO Act are allowed to engage in fundraising from the public. CSOs may also compete for government contracts but rarely did so in 2017, because they found it difficult to access information about tenders or fulfill the bidding requirements.

CSOs registered under the NGO Act may generate income to support the implementation of their organizational objectives.
In Tanzania civil society law is not usually covered in legal training curricula, and only the University of Dodoma offered training in this field in 2017. Most lawyers are not aware of the legal framework for CSOs, and no specialized organization or initiative provides legal support to organizations that are in conflict with the law. The Office of the Registrar of NGOs has lawyers on its staff to assist CSOs with legal matters involving registration.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

The CSO sector experienced few major changes in organizational capacity in 2017, other than its increased use of technology to enhance solidarity as civic space continued to close.

Some CSOs use a bottom-up approach to coordinate activities suggested by grassroots groups and funding organizations and to ensure that constituencies take an active part in local interventions. For example, in 2017 CARE worked with local authorities in Iringa Region to ensure that their proposal, plan, and budget for a project involving sunflowers were in line with public needs. FCS based its training programs and capacity-building interventions on needs assessments conducted with its grantees and other CSOs. The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations of Zanzibar (ANGOZA) coordinated grassroots CSOs participating in activities related to national public policies.

The 2017 State of CSOs in Tanzania Mainland published by FCS indicates that 89 percent of CSOs regarded strategic plans as a very important guide for their activities during the year. About 45 percent of CSOs performed well or very well and 7 percent performed very poorly against targets stated in their strategic plans. CSOs’ capacity to implement strategic plans was curtailed by funding shortfalls and uncertain funding prospects. Donors generally determine the focus of CSOs’ work, regardless of CSOs’ own priorities, contexts, and approaches. To win funds many organizations focus on quick results to prove their impact. Responses to a call for proposals issued by FCS in 2017 suggested that a substantial number of CSOs do not follow their missions, visions, and strategic plans in their pursuit of funding.

In accordance with legal requirements, all CSOs registered as companies and trusts have defined management structures, including boards with supervisory and oversight responsibilities. CSOs registered as NGOs are not statutorily required to have boards and instead often have executive committees formed by members. The 2017 State of CSOs reports that 89 percent of CSOs in Tanzania mainland said they have boards of directors, and 87 percent of CSOs said they have financial policies in place.

Staffing remained a critical issue for CSOs in 2017. The 2017 State of CSOs indicates that the CSO workforce continued to be dominated by non-permanent workers, most of whom were temporary staff and volunteers. In Zanzibar only 26 percent of employees work full-time and are paid. The ability of CSOs in both Zanzibar and the mainland to recruit qualified and competent staff was compromised by the unwillingness of most donors to cover salaries. In January the government began to implement new regulations governing the employment of non-citizens, which caused some difficulties for CSOs attempting to bring foreign staff into the country.

The 2017 State of CSOs indicates that 40 percent of CSOs in the mainland and 54.5 percent of CSOs in Zanzibar do not have Internet access or computers. Seventy percent of organizations do not have their own websites. However, technology use is growing and has helped CSOs work more effectively on conventional tasks such as collecting data, sharing videos and documentaries, mobilizing constituents, and coordinating their activities.
For example, the CSO Directors Group, which THRDC created in 2016, used WhatsApp efficiently for online discussions and information sharing in 2017.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0**

CSOs’ financial viability was stable in 2017, despite the continuing shrinkage of overall levels of funding and extremely stiff competition for any funding that remained available. Even FBOs, which traditionally gather funds from their followers and parent churches abroad, felt pinched and, unusually, applied for grants from FCS in 2017.


Local funding sources are few. Government funding often overlooks CSOs. Paradoxically, political parties are subsidized from taxpayers’ monies, while CSOs struggle to access public funds, even though they supplement government activities to ensure the public welfare. For example, the Public Procurement Act provides that 30 percent of tenders must be given to groups with special needs, including CSOs composed of persons with disabilities, but there is no evidence that this provision has ever been implemented. Similarly, the 2017 Legal Aid Act recognizes paralegals but fails to establish a fund to enable them to provide services to indigents. The parliament does not allocate funding for individual CSOs. The government in Zanzibar, in contrast, supplied funds in 2017 to groups such as the Vikokotoni Environment Society, which seeks to reduce pollution by promoting environmental awareness and sustainable waste management. In addition, the Zanzibar Non-State Actors Support Program, which operates under the Ministry of Finance of Zanzibar, funded a social accountability project implemented by Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA), Zanzibar Association of People Living with AIDS, and ANGOZA. The private sector has begun to implement corporate social responsibility programs, but these have yet to assist CSOs.

CSOs are allowed to engage in public fundraising, but most organizations lack adequate fundraising skills. Only 10 percent of organizations pursued some kind of income-generating activity in 2017, according to The 2017 State of CSOs. However, TAMWA organized a successful public fundraising event to raise money for constructing new offices, and the Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP) renovated its building so that some space could be rented out to generate income for program activities. Most membership CSOs collect nominal membership fees. Professional associations, such as the Teachers Union of Tanzania and the Tanganyika Law Society, raise funds through membership fees and other contributions from their members. A group of CSO directors that met in 2017 to reflect on the sustainability of their organizations reported that they are starting to include income-generating activities among their fundraising strategies.

NGOs must submit financial reports annually to the Registrar of NGOs. According to The 2017 State of CSOs, external audits were conducted on more than 70 percent of organizations in 2017. A 2017 audit of its grantees by FCS indicated that 98 percent of grantees received unqualified opinions from their auditors. This record suggests that CSOs’ financial systems and compliance with financial regulations has improved.
ADVOCACY: 3.7

Advocacy and lobbying by Tanzanian CSOs was not very successful in 2017. The government’s withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership was one signal of the closing of space for lobbying and advocacy work by CSOs. The space was further constricted by the new requirement that CSOs obtain permits to operate at regional and district levels, the repressive application of the Cyber Crimes and Media Services Acts, and the announcement by the minister of home affairs that CSOs violating the ban on re-enrolling pregnant girls and teenaged mothers in school would be deregistered. The attempted assassination of an outspoken politician and human rights defender, the abduction and arrests of human rights defenders and journalists, and the silencing of media outlets with the imposition of broadcast restrictions or penalties instilled a country-wide climate of fear that inhibited advocacy work. In a particularly disturbing case, the authorities cited the Cyber Crimes Act of 2015 to force Jamii Forums, Tanzania’s most popular social media site, to expose its sources and disclose the identities of persons using pseudonyms on its online platform. All in all, CSO advocacy in Tanzania has been gradually declining over several years, and this trend continued in 2017.

Nevertheless, several advocacy successes were recorded during the year. Iringa Civil Society Organizations, an umbrella group, worked effectively with local authorities to promote maternal health. The campaign to re-enroll teen mothers and pregnant girls in school continued despite threats to participating CSOs. Some CSOs responded to the government’s diminishing respect for the rule of law by holding press conferences on the unlawful muzzling of the media and abuses of the principles of good governance, including the lack of separation of executive, judicial, and legislative powers.

CSOs’ comfort with lobbying usually depends on the issue. CSOs worked effectively with the government on the enactment of the 2017 Legal Aid Act, which recognizes paralegals and guarantees the quality of the legal assistance that they provide to indigents facing civil and criminal cases. Zanzibar CSOs formed a platform and appointed a representative to submit their recommendations on a bill to establish the Zanzibar National Business Council. CSOs also participated in the reform of Kadhis’ Court Act No. 7 of 2017, which addresses gender and women’s rights, and the revision of the penal law to classify GBV as a non-bailable offense in Zanzibar. CSOs continued to submit analyses of bills and other papers to parliamentary committees. TLS, for example, submitted opinions on fifteen bills, five regulations, and two policies, with the parliament taking on board about 75 percent of its recommendations. The Zanzibar Institute for Research and Public Policy and the Policy Forum in the mainland held monthly discussions on public policy issues and their reform.

CSOs participated in discussions addressing their legal framework in 2017. For instance, the CSOs Directors Forum, which was formed to provide a social media platform to address issues of importance to CSOs, met in Arusha in October to discuss urgent issues facing the sector, including the need for a new constitution, the shrinking space for civil society, and the reform of laws and policies affecting CSOs.
SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5

Service provision by CSOs did not change much in 2017, although some traditional service providers, including FBOs, struggled because of the lack of funds. In an ongoing trend, the proportion of international CSOs implementing projects at the grassroots level without partnering with local CSOs seemed to increase, perhaps because of their diminishing funding. The practice contradicts the NGO Code of Conduct, which requires international CSOs to refrain from directly implementing projects at the grassroots level.

In general, CSO service provision is gradually changing because of the shrinking funding base. CSOs continued to provide services in health, sanitation, water, education, livelihoods, economic empowerment, and other areas in 2017. CARE, for instance, provided four ambulances to Tabora and improved 270 health facilities. However, in February 2017 the minister of health prohibited CSOs from distributing lubricants as a means of combating HIV/AIDS, which curtailed the provision of related services to targeted groups and reduced funding for implementing partner organizations. USAID had to shut down some programs as a result of the ban. Lead domestic service-providing CSOs included Comprehensive Community-Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania, Camara Education Tanzania, Shule Direct, Medewell, Tanzania Youth Alliance, Femina Hip, and Anza. Active international CSOs include World Vision, CARE, WaterAid, HelpAge International, and Aga Khan Foundation.

CSOs continued to address local socio-economic needs in 2017. Some organizations undertook social accountability activities to track public budgets and monitor public services, including those provided by local governments. TGNP’s initiative on participatory research, for example, was implemented in four districts in 2017, with researchers shadowing public officials to learn about challenges in their work before jointly designing solutions with them.

Membership associations continued to provide goods and services, such as publications, awareness programs, and technical support on matters of public interest, to individuals beyond their members. A number of CSOs continued to offer, distribute, and market publications, workshops, and expert analysis to other CSOs, academia, businesses, religious institutions, and the government. For example, in collaboration with the Zanzibar Legal Service Center (ZLSC), LHRC published the Tanzania Human Rights Report. ZLSC also published the Zanzibar Yearbook of Law, and TLS published a number of booklets on legal topics.

Efforts by CSOs to recover the costs of their services by charging fees, creating social enterprises, or signing contracts have been controversial and therefore are rarely pursued. Some service-providing CSOs have adopted cost-sharing approaches to sustain their operations. For instance, the Global Resource Alliance in Mara Region has introduced cost sharing for drilling water holes.

The government recognizes CSOs by allowing them to provide a wide range of services that it considers suitable in the current political landscape. For example, the government supports CSO interventions focused on poverty reduction and has partnered with the Economic and Social Research Foundation and Research on Poverty Alleviation to advance Tanzania’s economic development. Similarly, the government supports the efforts of Under The Same Sun to provide education for children with albinism and recognizes the Msichana initiative, which provides sanitary pads for schoolgirls. Activities by the Tanzania Horticultural Association, Practical Permaculture Institute of Zanzibar; and other CSOs to promote agriculture in the town of Fumba have also attracted considerable government support.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.1

In 2017 organizations that provided training and technical support were increasingly important as CSOs demanded techniques and skills to ensure their survival. CSO resource centers offering access to information, technology, training, and technical assistance included the MS Training Center for Development Cooperation (MS–TCDC), East African CSO Forum, and Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) in Arusha; NACONGO, FCS, LSF, TGNP, THRDC, LHRC, TAWIA, Agriculture Non-State Actors Forum, Twaweza, Asylum Access Tanzania (AATZ), and TAMWA in Dar es Salaam; and ANGOZA, ZLSC, TAMWA, and Zanzibar Female Lawyers Association (ZAFELA) in Zanzibar. Except for MS–TCDC and ESAMI, which charge affordable and reasonable fees for their trainings, resource centers do not earn operating revenue through the provision of services to CSOs.

Several CSOs continued to receive funds to pass on to other organizations. In Zanzibar the Milele Foundation provided funding to CSOs to improve rural communities’ access to health, education, and livelihood opportunities. In mainland Tanzania, FCS, LSF, and Women Fund Tanzania remained the largest local funding organizations. In 2017 LSF provided $1.5 million to more than twenty organizations to mentor new paralegals, and FCS offered nearly $4.5 million in grants, up from $2.3 million in 2016. However, the number of CSOs accessing FCS funding was fewer than in 2016, thanks to a new policy of funding 20 percent of grantees’ administrative costs, which reduced the overall number of grants, as well as a shift in FCS’s strategic direction from arms-length grantmaking to close partnerships with grantees. Whereas FCS used to fund more than 500 CSOs annually, in 2017 it provided grants to only 161 organizations.

New networks in 2017 included the Anti-Torture Network and Demand for Democracy Network. These groups have deliberately remained loose and unregistered to avoid any difficulties in registration. Network events included a gender festival organized by TGNP, a self-reflection session organized by THRDC, a resources dialogue organized by Haki-Rasilimali, monthly breakfast talks and research presentations organized by Twaweza, and a briefing on human rights issues organized by LHRC and ZLSC. In partnership with THRDC, NACONGO led CSOs in monitoring the verification exercise in 2017.

A few formal and informal partnerships took place between CSOs and the private sector, government, and media in 2017. For instance, TLS established a centralized membership renewal system in collaboration with the judiciary of Tanzania and organized meetings sponsored by private-sector entities, such as insurance companies, social security funds, and banks. AATZ cooperated with the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police, and TAMWA and ZAFELA cooperated with a number of local governments on campaigns against GBV and for reform of the Muftis Law, which allowed the government of Zanzibar to appoint a mufti to oversee Muslim organizations. The pedestrian and passengers association Chakua worked with the police and Tanzania Bus Owners Association during Road Safety Week to promote safe and secured transportation facilities and safe driving. TAMWA partnered with the media to promote its national campaign against GBV and launch a public fundraising campaign, which suggested that new possibilities for partnerships among CSOs, the private sector, and other local and international stakeholders are emerging.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

The public image of CSOs was unchanged in 2017. While the media provide positive coverage of service-providing CSOs, they tend to be more interested in CSOs’ advocacy work, which they consider more newsworthy. In 2017 the media often covered advocacy efforts if their own interests were at stake or CSOs paid the journalists allowances. Most state-owned media repeated the government’s negative comments about advocacy CSOs as anti-government and unpatriotic, and the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority instilled fear in most media outlets through its strict application of punitive regulations involving bans and fines. As a result of these actions, many outlets refrained from covering CSOs’ issues, even if they were unrelated to national politics.

The government’s perception of CSOs is mixed, with only a handful of officials recognizing the contribution of CSOs to national development and willing to work with them. While the Registrar of NGOs has always been supportive of the sector, other government officials, especially some district and regional commissioners, consider CSOs as affiliates of the opposition.

The public is not yet fully aware of the role of CSOs but generally views service-providing CSOs as helpful, since they help fulfill basic needs for water, medicine, education, and infrastructure. In 2017 the media reported that the public was positively impressed by a CSO named BRAC Maendeleo in Tanga Region, which helped housemaids and girls who had dropped out of school support themselves with self-reliance projects. Otherwise, the public was sometimes swayed by the government’s negative labeling of advocacy CSOs as unpatriotic, foreign-driven entities.

CSOs raise awareness about their activities and promote their images by training journalists and holding press conferences, producing documentaries, and supporting social services.

NGOs that are registered under the NGO Act are bound by NACONGO’s NGO Code of Conduct. The code, which is binding and has the force of law, requires NGOs to adhere to principles of accountability and transparency. The majority of CSOs prepare annual reports and circulate them to their stakeholders, publish them on their websites, or print them in hard copy for distribution at forums, workshops, trainings, and similar events.
The major political event in Uganda in 2017 was the introduction of a bill to amend the constitution by a ruling party parliamentarian. Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2017 proposed to allow President Yoweri Museveni to run for a sixth consecutive term in 2021, eliminate the constitutional requirement that candidates for the presidency be under seventy-five years of age, and extend the terms of members of parliament from five to seven years. A survey commissioned by the Citizens Coalition on Electoral Democracy and Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform (UGMP) found that 85 percent of more than 50,000 survey respondents opposed the proposed amendments. The bill prompted countrywide protests by members of parliament, civil society activists, students, and other members of the public. The police responded to the protests with a crackdown, and on September 27, after a brawl broke out between opposition and pro-government parliamentarians in parliamentary chambers, armed security agents forcibly ejected several legislators who opposed lifting the presidential age limit. Parliament passed the bill in December, and Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2017 was signed into law by the president on December 27.

During the year the Ugandan economy continued to struggle to reach the government’s target of middle-income status by 2020. Public debt increased rapidly and was projected to reach nearly 45 percent of GDP by 2020. Household incomes stagnated, while the number of poor people increased from 6.6 million in 2012–13 to 10 million in 2016–17, according to the 2016–2017 Uganda National Household Survey, published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. In addition, Uganda hosted more refugees than other countries in the region, including more than 1 million people fleeing violence in South Sudan. The available funding was largely inadequate to meet the refugees’ needs.

In 2017 CSOs in Uganda experienced several acts of government repression that were among the most severe in recent years. Between September and November 2017 the offices of several advocacy organizations were raided. Freedom of association and assembly were curtailed as public protests about the proposed constitutional amendment were banned, civil society activists were detained, and opposition party members were arrested on charges of unlawful assembly. Freedom of expression was also restricted as the Uganda Communications Commission banned live broadcasts of the parliamentary debate on the bill to amend the constitution.
The overall sustainability of CSOs in Uganda declined in 2017, mainly because of the government's constriction of civic space and reductions in donor funding. CSOs' legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, service provision, and advocacy were negatively affected by these trends. However, the sectoral infrastructure and public image of CSOs did not change appreciably in 2017.

The number of CSOs registered with the National Bureau of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Bureau), the main regulatory agency for CSOs, increased from 12,237 in 2016 to 13,000 in 2017. Many of these organizations delivered services to refugees in the northern and western areas of the country.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.5**

The legal environment for CSOs worsened as new regulations under NGO Act 2016 came into force in 2017. The registration process, already restrictive, became more complex as CSOs were required to incorporate as trusts or companies, register with the NGO Bureau, obtain permits to operate, and finally obtain approvals and memoranda of understanding from local governments. Section 4 of the new regulations stipulates other burdensome registration requirements, including mandatory submission of a certified copy of an organization's certificate of incorporation, a copy of its constitution, a chart showing its internal governance structure, proof of payment of the prescribed fee, proof of sources of funding, copies of valid identification documents for at least two founding members, and minutes of the resolution by members to register the organization with the NGO Bureau. The new regulations increased the cost of registration from approximately $10 to $25 for domestic organizations and from $75 to $140 for foreign organizations. The NGO Act also requires that all not-for-profit companies incorporated at Uganda Registration Service Bureau register as NGOs. Section 50 of the act provides that the High Court may dissolve an organization for committing fraud, threatening national security, or committing a gross violation of the laws. No organization was dissolved in 2017.

According to the NGO Act, CSOs must submit narrative reports and audited financial statements annually to the NGO Bureau, district NGO monitoring committees, or sub-county NGO committees. Although some organizations failed to comply with this requirement in 2017, no action was taken against them. In October 2017 the Ministry of Internal Affairs gave twenty-nine CSOs one week to submit specified information, including three years of bank statements, annual reports with descriptions of activities and sources of funding, bank account numbers, and the names of board members and executive directors. The information was similar to the documents that they submit every year as part of their statutory annual returns submissions. While the government did not fully explain the reason for these investigations, some government officials alleged that the organizations were involved in activities that they were not registered to perform or were funding illegal activities aimed at destabilizing the government.

During the year state authorities clamped down on advocacy organizations at the national and sub-national levels. Several CSOs, most of which were advocating against the proposed constitutional amendment, experienced raids on their offices, seizure of equipment and other assets, interrogation and arrest of their staff or the staff of partners, surveillance and intimidation of management, and suspension of programs and other activities. For example, on September 20 and 21 the police raided the offices of ActionAid Uganda, Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies, and Solidarity Uganda and confiscated their computers and phones. On October 2 the police raided the office of the Uhuru Institute and confiscated its property.
As the NGO Act does not stipulate that certain advocacy activities are impermissible, these raids occurred outside of the NGO Act and without consultation with the NGO Bureau, suggesting that the agency sometimes has limited power over the police. The bank accounts and personal accounts of the executive directors of raided organizations were frozen. In a separate incident, the government froze the bank accounts of ActionAid Uganda on spurious charges of money laundering, thereby denying the organization access to its funds for more than two months. The accounts were unfrozen only after ActionAid Uganda reached an out-of-court settlement with state agencies.

The police used the Police Act and the Public Order Management Act to stifle freedoms of peaceful assembly and association in 2017. During the dispute over the constitutional amendment, public protests about the amendment were banned, civil society activists were detained, and opposition party members were arrested on charges of holding unlawful assemblies. The Ministry of Health threatened members of the Uganda Medical Association with dismissal following their strike to demand better pay and reliable stocks of drugs and other supplies for their work. Freedom of expression was also curtailed as the media came under state scrutiny. According to the news site Eagle Online, the Uganda Communications Commission justified its ban of live broadcasts of parliamentary debates on the proposed constitutional amendment with claims that the broadcasts were “inciting the public, discriminating, stirring up hatred, [and] promoting a culture of violence.” In December Endigyito Radio and Kanungu Broadcasting Services were closed for allegedly breaching minimum broadcast standards, and several journalists at those services were suspended. In November police raided the offices of the local tabloid Red Pepper and did not allow it to resume operations until February 2018. Eight of the tabloid’s directors were incarcerated for nearly a month after publishing a story alleging that the president was planning to overthrow the government.

CSOs pay a number of taxes, including value-added, pay-as-you-earn, withholding, and local service taxes. The law provides for income tax on all incomes at either the individual or organizational level, but there are differing interpretations as to whether grants to CSOs qualify as income. Some donors request that CSOs have income-tax exemption certificates before awarding them grants, but the exemption process is bureaucratic and tedious, and as a result, few CSOs apply. The constitution empowers the minister of finance to waive or vary taxes imposed by law, and partnership agreements between the government and development agencies or international CSOs sometimes include tax exemptions. In 2017 the Ministry of Finance proposed to grant tax relief to the Association of Volunteers in International Service Foundation, Emmaus Foundation, All Nations Christian Care, and International Cooperation and Development. During the year Chapter Four conducted campaigns to raise awareness among CSOs, faith-based organizations, and women’s groups about the need for compliance with the Ugandan tax regime.

The NGO Act allows organizations to earn income, provided that any revenue that exceeds administrative costs is invested in the organization and its projects. Although the act does not specify whether CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, a stringent and bureaucratic process generally deters them from doing so.

The clampdown on CSOs protesting the constitutional amendment increased their demand for legal support in 2017. However, organizations and activists outside of the main cities found it difficult to obtain timely legal services. The number of lawyers in Uganda offering pro bono services remains low.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated in 2017, mainly because of reductions in funding and weaknesses in CSOs’ internal governance.

In 2017 the Ugandan public was unusually engaged in political and governance processes. CSOs worked with their constituencies to protest Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2017, as well as Land (Amendment) Bill 2017, which would allow the government to acquire land on a compulsory basis if ordered to do so by the government-instituted Commission of Inquiry on Land Matters. PAC Uganda developed an innovated approach to working with volunteers to collect the public’s views on Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2017, and CSOs shared information about the bill with their constituencies and other stakeholders through online newsletters and social media such as Twitter and Facebook. ActionAid Uganda obtained more 17,000 signatures on a petition to the prime minister to unfreeze its accounts. Although religious institutions and trade unions regularly engage their members in their work, in 2017 some labor unions failed to consult closely with their constituents before undertaking collective bargaining actions.
The National Organization of Trade Unions, Uganda Medical Workers Union, and Uganda Nurses and Midwives Union filed a case against the Uganda Medical Association challenging the terms and conditions for striking medical workers that it had negotiated with the government, claiming that the association had sidestepped its mandated role.

Strategic planning is usually donor driven, and as a result, organizations that have strategic plans regularly take on projects that do not necessarily help them achieve their stated missions or objectives. Building on efforts begun the previous year, a number of organizations, including the Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) and Uganda Youth Network (UYONET), launched new strategic plans in 2017.

CSOs’ internal governance deteriorated in 2017, as evidenced by gaps in transparency and accountability identified by annual forensic and system audits of certain organizations. Development partners requested special audits after they received reports from whistleblowers about flaws in procurement systems and a lack of financial accountability at three CSOs. Overall, the performance of boards was mixed. While most boards try to operate within generally accepted bounds of good corporate governance, some boards were inactive, and others were overactive in the sense of overreaching their mandates because of conflicts of interest and imperfect understanding of their roles.

CSOs in the capital and secondary cities have adequate human resource practices, including employee contracts, human resource policies, and job descriptions. In 2017 CSOs struggled to maintain permanent paid staff as their core funding shrank and their available funding offered paltry support for staff salaries. Very few organizations can afford to hire full-time information technology managers or legal counsels. It is common for organizations to recruit volunteers as support staff for campaigns and other events.

Most CSO staff use basic office equipment, which can be either organizational or personal property. CSOs outside of the capital and secondary cities often do not have new software or stable Internet services. CSOs increasingly use social media to profile their work and fundraise for their activities, especially if they have received training from media associations such as the African Center for Media Excellence (ACME). In an effort to build a safer digital environment for CSOs, Defenders Protection Initiative trained forty district networks on digital security in 2017.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1**

The financial viability of Ugandan CSOs deteriorated in 2017. CSOs continued to depend largely on external sources of funding. In 2017, when the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF), one of the largest donor basket funds in Uganda, changed its funding modality from strategic to project support, neither DGF nor its grantees were ready for the transition. DGF offered bridge grants to grantees so that they could finalize activities from the concluding funding cycle, and the fund later issued a call for the next funding cycle. But a number of its partners, especially at the sub-national level, were not considered for renewed funding. Private international foundations, including the Aga Khan Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and Ford Foundation, continued to support CSOs in the areas of education, governance, and capacity building. Most funders offered project funding, which is usually short-term. Major development agencies, including DGF, usually require CSOs to show registration certificates to qualify for funding, thereby eliminating informal networks and social movements from support.

CSOs’ capacity to raise funds locally remained poor in 2017. The Independent Development Fund (IDF), an indigenous grantmaking organization that relied on funding solely from the DGF, wound down in 2017. In rare instances the government sub-grants to CSOs for service delivery. However, the process for obtaining government contracts remains bureaucratic, and the government does not offer institutional support.
In 2017 thirty-one CSOs in northern Uganda signed memoranda of understanding with the Inspectorate of Government to help monitor the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund project, which is funded by the World Bank. A few corporations sponsor corporate social responsibility programs that benefit CSOs. For example, Barclays Bank invested in a vocational training program implemented by Reach Out Mbuya, which provided 300 vulnerable children and youth with training in shoe making in 2017.

Membership organizations, such as the Uganda Law Society, Uganda Debt Network, and Human Rights Network, collected subscriptions from their members during the year. However, the amounts raised were insufficient to support operational costs. Some organizations hosted fundraising events, but the funding collected was usually limited and not enough to ensure their sustainability. Several CSOs explored fundraising through the Internet. For example, 40 Days Over 40 Smiles Foundation conducted an online fundraising campaign aiming to collect $23,000 for the construction of a learning center in Kibuli for children from slums in 2017. By May the foundation had collected nearly $5,500. The number of CSOs earning revenue from consultancies or rent remained low in 2017.

Although the CSO sector has yet to embrace social enterprises as a means of raising income, several organizations tried out this approach during the year. For example, Nafasi Multipurpose Cooperative Society pooled funds to establish for-profit businesses and build strong social capital for its members. However, CSO membership in Nafasi remains low.

Financial management is weak at most CSOs. Forensic and systems audits carried out at the request of development partners in 2017 revealed weaknesses in some CSOs’ internal control systems and fraud procurement procedures, as well as failures to comply with statutory obligations. In 2017 Hivos and DGF withdrew funding from some partners because of financial impropriety, including the misappropriation of funds.

**ADVOCACY: 3.5**

CSO advocacy efforts declined in 2017 because of the restrictive operating environment. Self-censorship was evident as the government clamped down on advocacy organizations during consideration of Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2017. The police stifled freedoms of peaceful assembly and association and blocked meetings between CSOs and members of parliament. For instance, in October 2017 the police prevented CSO and parliamentary representatives from attending a joint consultative meeting on the proposal to raise the age limit for candidates for the presidency. Organizations at both the national and local levels scaled down their advocacy activities when the DGF’s funding cycle ended and the IDF phased out.

Despite these challenges, CSOs maintained constructive dialogues with the government in 2017. For example, CSOs and members of parliament worked together to mobilize citizens across the country to reject the amendment that would raise the age limit for presidential candidates. The Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) was appointed to the government’s Economic Management Group and campaigned jointly with the Equal Opportunities Commission to extend the FY 2017–18 Certificate of Gender and Equity, which requires any government agency seeking an appropriation to meet minimum requirements for gender and equity.

In other advocacy efforts in 2017, UNNGOF and Defenders Protection Initiative launched the Digital Security Alliance, a coalition of organizations and security experts working to secure the digital assets of civil society, human rights defenders, journalists, and other activists.
The Forum for Women in Democracy launched the Uganda Gender Consortium on the SDGs, which seeks to harness the collective power of women’s, gender-equality, and other civil society movements to champion the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). ActionAid Uganda, Lira NGO Forum, and Global Rights Alert led a campaign against the Land (Amendment) Bill 2017. Akina Mama Wa Afrika ran a social media campaign celebrating young women who transform societies in Africa, which the organization said reached 4,000 people worldwide. Chapter Four convened a human rights convention, which brought together human rights defenders to share good practices, experiences, and emerging trends in public-interest litigation. In November 2017 the executive director of Chapter Four was honored with the 2017 German Africa Award in recognition of his defense of the rule of law and political liberty in Uganda.

Lobbying remains an expensive undertaking for CSOs, as most legislators require financial incentives to engage with the sector. Nevertheless, Ugandan CSOs are increasingly involved in lobbying and in 2017 registered several successes. As a result of CSBAG’s lobbying efforts, for example, forty-seven of the ninety-one budget proposals that CSOs submitted to parliamentary committees for fiscal year 2017–18 were adopted. CSOs working on governance and transparency in the oil sector submitted a petition to the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities, and State Enterprises, which contributed evidence to Uganda’s arbitration against the Tullow and Heritage oil companies.

CSOs undertook several initiatives to promote a favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector. CSOs working under the leadership of UNNGOF convened joint consultative meetings with the NGO Bureau to collect the views of diverse stakeholders on the draft NGO regulations and disseminate the text of NGO Act. Chapter Four Uganda published a simplified guide to the NGO Act and offered training on legal compliance for CSO leaders in Teso, Karamoja, and Acholi regions. The Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum released a helpful publication entitled *NGO Regulation Regime: Implications for Organizations Working on Marginalized Peoples’ Rights.*

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

CSO service provision deteriorated significantly in 2017 because of declines in donor funding, especially for the health sector. The U.S. government’s reinstatement of its Mexico City Policy, which prohibits U.S. government funding for CSOs that provide abortion counseling or referrals, advocate to decriminalize abortion, or promote abortion as a course of family planning, resulted in a reduction of funds for organizations that provide family planning, sexual, and reproductive health services. According to Human Rights Watch, Reproductive Health Uganda (RHU), which provides family planning services, lost funding for three programs during the year, including $500,000 for its program Advocacy for Better Health. As a result, RHU had to cut back on providing contraceptives, safe abortions, and youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health services. The policy also affected community advocacy initiatives focused on access to free healthcare, improved supply chain management to prevent drug shortages, and training for healthcare workers on protecting human rights in sexual and reproductive healthcare.

CSOs continued to provide services that the government was unable to provide. For instance, host communities, community-based organizations (CBOs), and CSOs complemented the government’s support of nearly 565,000 registered refugees who arrived in Uganda, mainly from South Sudan, between January and October 2017. World Vision provided psychosocial services to more than 40,000 children in Yumbe and Arua, and Save the Children supported families with financing and mothers with training on business management.
CSOs worked with local communities as part of their effort to establish democracy in Uganda. In partnership with AgriProFocus and Uhuru Institute, for example, ActionAid Uganda launched a five-year campaign entitled “Youth in Agri-Business: Feeding the World, Changing Lives!” to help youth overcome traditional barriers to their participation in agribusiness. As part of the campaign, young people were provided with training and introduced to model farms, youth-led enterprises, farmers’ groups, research institutes, and government, private-sector, and development partners.

CSO projects are largely donor driven, and beneficiaries have limited involvement during the formulation phase. However, some CSOs empower local communities through collective grassroots action. For example, CSBAG helped communities in Sheema, Abim, Agago, Kibale, and Kibuku districts create participatory budget committees to identify and follow up on local service-delivery concerns. In February 2017, after participatory budget committees alerted the district health team to the problem of congestion at Kibuku Health Center IV, UGX 20 million (approximately $5,400) was allocated to remodel the facility.

CSOs and think tanks continue to produce publications and usually disseminate them to the public and policy makers online and during public events. For example, in 2017 the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment published research papers, policy briefs, and fact sheets on governance, public finance management, agriculture, and the environment. The majority of CSOs in Uganda do not recover costs or undertake market research.

Although it sometimes vilifies CSOs engaged in governance works, the government appreciates the work of service-providing CSOs. In 2017 the government showed its respect for their efforts by selecting several organizations to serve on sector-related working groups. For example, UNNGOF was chosen to represent local and national organizations on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework Steering Group and the National SDG Taskforce. CSBAG signed a memorandum of understanding with the Equal Opportunities Commission to formalize a joint effort to ensure that government entities comply with gender and equity obligations. The government’s 2017 Water and Environment Sector Performance Report also highlighted CSOs’ contributions.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in Uganda was stable in 2017. Resource centers continued to host libraries and Internet access. However, since they are mostly located in urban areas, the centers are inaccessible to district-based organizations and CBOs. CSOs consider the centers’ number and range of services inadequate and often find the older centers poorly equipped.

In 2017 one of the main local grant-making organizations, IDF, closed when DGF, its only donor, discontinued funding. IDF’s demise will affect grassroots organizations that had relied on it for financial and technical support. By 2017 IDF had nurtured ten CBOs into successful national organizations able to attract funding from international donors.

CSO coalitions offered critical support in 2017. Key CSO coalitions included UNNGOF, Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda, Civil Society Advocacy Group, Human Rights Network for Journalists, and Uganda Medical Association. These coalitions produced newsletters, press statements, and research products on a wide range of issues, including human rights, governance, access to justice, elections, the welfare of medical personnel, and budgetary transparency and accountability.
At the height of the government’s clampdown on CSOs, UNNGOF convened more than ten meetings with the NGO Bureau, CSOs, and other stakeholders. As a result of these meetings, the NGO Bureau was able to rein in some high-handed police action against CSOs. The Legal Aid Service Providers Network continued to strengthen access to justice by leveraging the contributions of various legal aid providers in Uganda. Save the Children, in partnership with Plan International, started an initiative to harmonize the programming of child-sponsorship organizations to minimize the duplication of efforts and the double enrollment of children. Despite this strong performance, some coalitions faced leadership challenges because of their lack of plans for leadership transitions and interference and manipulation by their boards.

Training remained largely available for organizations in the capital and secondary cities. UNNGOF, for example, trained 147 sub-national CSO leaders on policy advocacy; Pallisa CSO Network trained 150 community health monitors; and Akina Mama Wa Afrika offered training on gender mainstreaming, feminist analysis, and communications. Most donors included capacity building as part of their grants. Advanced, specialized, and issue-based training was available through institutions such as ACME and ACLAIM Africa, a management consulting firm. Training materials are rarely available in local languages.

CSOs continued to engage the government in formal and informal partnerships in 2017. For example, since 2011 the Advocates’ Coalition for Development and Environment has partnered with the Uganda Local Government Association to conduct annual assessments of the performance of local government councils and provide training to local officials. Organizations in the humanitarian sector continued to work with local and national government to protect the rights of refugees and ensure that they live in dignified environments. The work of CSOs involved in evidence-based research continued to serve as reference points for policy formulation, monitoring, and analysis by ministries and development agencies. Representatives of research organizations were selected to represent CSOs on various technical working groups because of the credible information that they can contribute.

CSO-private sector partnerships continued in 2017, with Grant Thornton, for example, providing training on financial management to UNNGOF members. Organizations such as CSBAG, UNNGOF, UGMP, UYONET, and Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment partnered with two television networks, NBS and NTV, on live broadcasts of their policy dialogues and launch events.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

The public image of CSOs did not change significantly in 2017. CSOs and professional associations were covered extensively, especially in private traditional and online media. Overall, the coverage was positive. The topics ranged from break-ins, closures, and the freezing of bank accounts at some CSOs to CSO activities and welfare for the members of professional associations. The coverage elicited public sympathy as well as responses from the government, such as its release of activists and improved benefits for members of the Uganda Medical Association, Uganda National Teachers Union, and other professional associations. The relationship between the media and CSOs remains largely transactional, except in instances in which journalists approach CSOs for commentary on topical issues.

Public opinion about CSOs was mixed in 2017 and was usually based on people’s experiences with organizations in their localities. In particular, the public increasingly appreciated service-delivery organizations because of their ability to meet basic needs for water, schools, medicine, and other essential services.
In 2017 the central and local governments continued to have negative attitudes towards CSOs involved in governance, as demonstrated by the targeting of certain CSOs and media agencies, the arrest of civil society leaders, and investigations of twenty-nine organizations for unknown reasons. Governance and advocacy CSOs worked with government institutions to demystify negative perceptions of CSOs, but they were not successful. Organizations in the humanitarian sector had cordial working relations with local and central governments because they help fill the gap in services for refugees. Some businesses perceived CSOs as “cash cows” and a potential market for their products.

CSOs, particularly advocacy organizations, increasingly used social media to publicize their work in 2017. Organizations such as Center for Constitutional Governance, Akina Mama Wa Afrika, Wizarts, and Youth Equality Center used social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to discuss a range of issues, including women’s and land rights, elections, sexual and reproductive health, governance, and government budgets. UNNGOF signed a partnership with a local television company to relay live broadcasts of some of its activities.

CSOs’ involvement in Uganda’s Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), a self-regulatory mechanism designed to enhance CSOs’ capacities and promote ethical conduct, remained limited in 2017 as its popularization drive stalled because of a lack of funds. However, fundraising for QuAM continued, and the mechanism is expected to be revamped in 2018. Leading organizations continued to share annual reports with donors, policy makers, and the public both in hard copy and online.
The year 2017 in Zambia was largely defined by the tense post-election environment. Following the tightly contested presidential race in 2016, which resulted in the reelection of President Edgar Chagwa Lungu of the Patriotic Front (PF), the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court contesting the election results. The court threw out the petition after failing to hear it within fourteen days, as required by the 2016 amended constitution. This development, along with ambiguities in the constitution itself, threatened to cause a constitutional crisis and eventually led to a constitutional review process, which was still underway at the end of the year. The political environment was further roiled by the arrest in April of Hakainde Hichilema, the UPND leader who was narrowly defeated in the presidential election. Hichilema was charged with treason after his motorcade failed to give way to that of the president during the Kuomboka traditional ceremony in Western Province. Countrywide protests broke out after Hichilema’s arrest, and the president declared a state of threatened emergency. In August, following an intervention by the Commonwealth secretary, Hichilema was released from jail and charges against him were dropped. The PF and the UPND committed to engaging in a national dialogue, which had yet to take place by the end of the year.

Zambia’s economy was on a positive trajectory in 2017. The slowdown of previous years was largely overcome with improved performances by the manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors. GDP growth was better than expected, and inflation stabilized at 6.1 percent, the lowest rate in more than thirty years. Zambia also recorded a fiscal deficit well below its target of 7.0 percent. Nevertheless, the country continued to struggle to reduce public debt. Discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance-of-payment support broke down during the year, and the IMF’s rating of Zambia as at high risk of debt distress posed a significant challenge for implementation of the country’s Seventh National Development Plan, which was launched in 2017.

The overall sustainability of Zambia’s CSOs was stable in 2017. However, CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated as public support for advocacy organizations dwindled and CSOs had limited ability to hire qualified permanent staff. CSOs’ financial viability also declined because of shifts in donor funding. Despite these challenges, advocacy improved as CSOs were increasingly assertive in pursuing a robust agenda of issues. CSOs’ legal environment, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image were basically unchanged.
No firm data on the size of the CSO sector in Zambia is available, mainly because organizations can register under multiple laws or operate as unregistered social groupings and movements. According to the Registrar of Societies, there are more than 12,000 CSOs in Zambia, including clubs, associations, and trade unions.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

The legal environment for Zambian CSOs did not change significantly in 2017. Most CSOs register fairly easily under the Societies Act or, less commonly, the Companies Act. The procedures and fees for registering under these laws were unchanged from 2016. They were mostly implemented in a consistent fashion, and few CSOs reported problems in dealing with the Registrar of Societies. Under the Societies Act the minister of home affairs may deregister CSOs without explanation, and deregistered organizations have no right of appeal. However, actual instances of deregistration are rare.

The controversial Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act of 2009, which CSOs felt opened the door to the exercise of arbitrary governmental authority, was suspended in 2015 and is slated for repeal or amendment once a review of the regulatory framework is completed and an NGO policy is finalized. Civil society advocated for and contributed to the drafting of the policy, which was presented to the cabinet for approval in 2016 but still awaited action in 2017. In the meantime, some CSOs continued to register under the NGO Act, either because they lack knowledge about the law, funding agencies require it, or, if they are pro-government, seek to give legitimacy to the law by registering under it. Organizations registered under the NGO Act continued to have legal status in 2017.

CSOs are generally able to engage in public debate and express criticism of the government. However, during the tense post-election period in 2017, Zambians experienced several curtailments of their recognized civil and political rights. According to the 2017 CIVICUS State of Civil Society report, Zambia’s civic space was “obstructed” by the authorities, who used various means to undermine basic rights, including systematic infringement of freedoms of association and assembly. Some observers noted that the possibility of citizen participation seemed to be based mainly on the goodwill of technocrats and politicians, who sometimes impeded organizations they perceived as anti-government. Public assemblies and protests were sometimes limited under the Public Order Act (POA) of 2012. For example, activists from the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) and Alliance for Community Action were arrested and charged with unlawful assembly while protesting suspected corruption in the purchase of fire-fighting equipment. Other legislation was similarly used to silence or intimidate human rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, environmental activists, women’s rights campaigners, and other activists. Citing the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, for example, the government closed or suspended the licenses of media outlets. Negative government treatment caused some CSOs to self-censor.

The lack of an access to information law makes it difficult for CSOs to acquire government documents and information. Government ministries do not consider requests for information unless they are in writing, and their responses are usually negative. As a result, CSOs have resorted to using informal channels to access information, including soliciting information from colleagues and interested individuals in the bureaucracy.

All domestic CSOs except faith-based organizations are required to pay taxes, including value-added tax and duties on goods and services used in their work. International CSOs and donors are eligible for exemptions from these taxes. The 2017 tax code allows domestic CSOs to apply for exemptions to the Ministry of Finance, which grants them on a discretionary basis. However, the process of applying for exemptions is long and rarely successful. Corporate donors and individuals are entitled to tax deductions on their donations.
CSOs registered as nonprofits, including societies, foundations, and churches, may not conduct any type of business directed at making a profit for members or others involved in the organization. CSOs that want to engage in profit-making ventures must register as businesses. There is no restriction on fundraising as long as the source of funding does not put the security of the state at risk, such as by promoting a foreign agenda or benefiting a terrorist group. Access to quality legal expertise remains problematic for many CSOs, especially advocacy organizations, which have a higher risk of litigation than service-providing CSOs. Few lawyers in Zambia have expertise in CSO legal issues, their service are extremely expensive, and donors are usually unwilling to support their cost. In rural areas legal services are often non-existent.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

The organizational capacity of Zambian CSOs declined in 2017 because of dwindling public support for advocacy organizations and CSOs’ limited ability to hire qualified permanent staff.

The highly politicized environment in Zambia following the 2016 elections weakened the ability of advocacy organizations to build public support. In particular, campaigns focused on issues such as public resource abuse, the corruption of political leaders, abuses of power by government officials, and police brutality lacked public support, because they were perceived as politically motivated rather than aimed at public accountability. For example, when ActionAid Zambia (AAZ) highlighted the case of an opposition leader whose name was included in the Panama Papers, its work was thought to be supportive of the ruling party, and the organization was targeted by the opposition, its sympathizers, and even other CSOs. Service-providing CSOs continued to find it much easier to build constituencies.

Fewer CSOs undertook strategic planning in 2017, mainly because prevailing funding approaches encouraged short-term, project-based planning rather than the pursuit of longer-term strategies. This was particularly true for advocacy organizations, which were more inclined than service-providing organizations to deviate from their missions and strategic directions in the search for funding.

Larger CSOs tend to have very clear organizational structures, with functioning boards and written policies and procedures. Smaller CSOs often lack these structures. Even in larger CSOs, good corporate governance remains a challenge, usually because the lack of institutional funding prevents CSOs from investing in good governance practices and attracting the right kind of leaders. Weak governing bodies usually failed to ensure that organizations followed their mandates and policy directives in 2017.

CSOs faced worsening staffing problems in 2017. Some organizations opted to engage staff on less expensive short-term contracts, while other CSOs resorted to employing all staff on a consultancy basis to reduce their statutory expenses. These approaches can breed insecurity among staff and lead to high staff turnover; loss of skills and knowledge, and difficulty in attracting highly qualified, competent personnel. In 2017, for example, following the departure of a major donor, the Non-Governmental Organization Coordinating Council (NGOCC) continued to restructure its staff, which included laying off employees to maintain a lean profile. Other major organizations, including ZCSD, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), and the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), had to lay off staff when the projects that they were working on ended. To avoid staff layoffs, CSPR disregarded its organogram and realigned staff with available projects. The Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR) provided staff with contracts of one year’s duration only.
Most CSOs, especially in urban areas, use modern Internet technology to enhance their communications. They may rely on common social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, to advance advocacy campaigns and disseminate information. Some organizations have developed specialized applications and web-based platforms to enhance their programs. Many smaller organizations have limited access to social media because of the high cost of Internet services and website and database development as well as the lack of qualified personnel. In addition, smaller organizations often lack updated software and computers because donors offer limited support for their procurement.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2017. As donors continued to withdraw, CSOs experienced ongoing financial constraints, and some organizations have slowed down or closed their programs. In addition, donors have changed their models of funding and now emphasize project-based support over longer-term and institutional support. For instance, AAZ originally participated in a multi-country grant for an educational project from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, but it was eliminated from the grant in 2017 with the explanation that Zambia was no longer a priority country. Danida’s funding to ActionAid International, which paid for a major part of its program in Zambia, shrank from covering countrywide activities to targeting selected, smaller-scale projects. In addition, many donors have shifted their focus from governance to service delivery in areas such as social protection, climate change, HIV/AIDS, and gender-based violence. These changes have tended to shrink the space for CSOs working in advocacy areas, which are more heavily dependent on international donors than service-providing organizations. NGOCC, CSPR, ZCSD, TIZ, SACCORD, Foundation for Democratic Process, and Caritas Zambia all had to discontinue some programming in governance or take up programing in new areas because of insufficient funding in 2017. Most of these organizations laid off staff when the projects that they were working on ended.

CSOs’ efforts to diversify their funding sources continued to face barriers in 2017. Advocacy organizations found it particularly difficult to find local funding, as the private sector is unwilling to be seen as supporting efforts aimed at holding the government accountable. It is somewhat easier for service-providing CSOs to obtain local funding, although even they find that government grants are usually available only to organizations that promote the government’s programs and are in good standing with the authorities. Some CSOs have started to explore social enterprises, although these efforts have yet to mature to a sustainable level. For example, CSPR and ZGF have set up social enterprises to provide paid services such as consultancies and specialized trainings. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and philanthropy programs support projects such as orphanages operated by service-providing CSOs. Other CSR-funded activities include the rehabilitation of schools and the construction of water boreholes.

Most membership organizations charge fees that are so low that they serve more as symbols of beneficiaries’ commitment than as a source of support. The use of communications technologies for fundraising is taking hold but has achieved only limited success. CSPR, for example, has set up a donation portal on its website to foster individual giving, but most of its donors are from developed countries rather than locally based. AAZ launched a fundraising campaign on Danish television in 2017 to raise funds for its program to provide clean and safe water in the Nalolo District of Western Province.

Since most CSOs are registered as nonprofit organizations, revenue generation from the sale of products and services tends to be difficult. A few CSOs with strong asset bases—usually FBOs such as Caritas Zambia—are able to generate revenue by renting buildings that they own. However, very few local CSOs have such assets, since their funding is not usually sufficient to support investments of this kind.
Furthermore, even if donor funding for a project is sufficient to purchase rather than rent facilities, it is a condition of most grants that CSOs may not procure non-moveable assets. CSOs that offer paid services such as consultancies may find it difficult to generate revenues to meet operational costs, since their staff is limited and usually tied to specific projects.

Most formally registered CSOs have financial management systems, since they are required by law to submit annual returns and financial statements. They also regard strong financial management as a good practice for building donor and stakeholder confidence, especially as most donors demand effective internal controls as a condition for grants. This requirement has been gaining momentum over the past few years in response to reports of resource abuse in the CSO sector. For example, in 2017 a consortium of CSOs under the Zambia Accountability Project, which is funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, was alleged to have misapplied funds designated for election monitoring during the 2016 elections. Most organizations publish financial statements and reports on their websites or distribute them in hard copy to their stakeholders.

**ADVOCACY: 3.5**

CSO advocacy improved in 2017, as advocacy organizations were increasingly assertive despite declines in funding and dwindling public support. Although Zambia’s laws and governmental policies do not necessarily require public access to government decision making, the CSO sector takes part in policy formulation at all levels. For example, in partnership with the Ministry of National Development Planning, CSPR coordinated CSOs’ recommendations for volume two of the Seventh National Development Plan and began to develop a scorecard on portions of the plan in 2017 under USAID’s Fostering Accountability and Transparency in Zambia (FACT Zambia) program. CSPR also facilitated the participation of CSOs in cluster advisory groups and associated technical working groups. ZCSD worked with the Ministry of Justice to coordinate CSOs’ involvement in a review of the POA and, with AAZ, contributed to the Revised Decentralization Policy. Many CSO coalitions, including the Civil Society Constitution Agenda, took part in the newly launched constitutional review process, emphasizing the need for an extended bill of rights and resolution of perceived ambiguities in the amended constitution.

CSOs continued to work through coalitions in 2017, and their policy initiatives focused on topics ranging from taxation to child marriage. For example, the Zambia Tax Platform (ZTP) worked on a progressive approach to taxation, which emphasized curbing multinational corporations’ tax avoidance and providing an open platform for the public to engage on tax policy. Advocacy by CSO coalitions was significant in criminalizing child marriage, and in 2017 the Scaling Up Nutrition (CSO-SUN) Alliance and other groupings, under the leadership of NGOCC, focused on changing the cultural and economic conditions that force children into early marriages.

CSOs continued to develop expertise in advocacy at all levels in 2017. For example, the activities of Caritas Zambia and Operation Young Vote resulted in a review of the POA and the government’s acceptance of 183 of 203 recommendations in the UPR process. AAZ, CSPR, JCTR, Oxfam, Center for Trade and Policy Development (CTPD), and CUTS International developed papers on the effect that the IMF’s austerity measures would have on safety nets for the poor and vulnerable. Partly as a result of these papers, the government doubled its allocations for cash transfers to the needy in the 2018 budget. Efforts by individual CSOs and coalitions such as the Zambia Land Alliance spurred the government to resume the development of a policy to guide the ways in which land is accessed, controlled, used, and conserved.
After AAZ advocated for more efficient resource utilization by providing alternative water and educational services, its approach served as an incentive for the government and local communities to develop similar services. However, the government resisted other key CSO advocacy efforts in 2017, including proposals for an access to information bill and planning and budgeting bill, both of which the government considered sensitive because of their promotion of public accountability and transparency.

Efforts by CSOs to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the sector focused on repeal of the NGO Act in 2017. CSOs opposed the law as unconstitutional and took part in consultations led by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother And Child Health to ensure that their interests were protected. CSOs continued to work with the government to develop an NGO policy. Organizations leading this effort include NGOCC, ZCSD, and AAZ, which also sought to raise awareness among CSOs of the negative effects that the NGO Act, if enforced, could have on their operations.

### SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4

CSO service provision was stable in 2017. Unlike advocacy organizations, service-providing CSOs receive government support and enjoy a conducive operating environment. CSOs complement or supplement the government’s provision of goods and services in health, education, relief, housing, water, and, to some extent, energy. Service-providing CSOs include the Churches Health Association of Zambia, which continued to provide health services in partnership with the government; Campaign for Female Education and Zambia National Education Coalition, which provided educational services to local communities; WaterAid Zambia, which provided water and sanitation services, especially in rural areas; and AAZ, which provided alternative water and educational services as a way of advocating for more efficient resource utilization by the government.

The goods and services delivered by CSOs usually respond to the needs of local communities. CSOs have adopted more participatory approaches to programming, including local participation in needs assessments and decision making as supported by USAID’s FACT Zambia program. CSOs use a number of tools to engage communities. For example, AAZ uses a methodology called Peer Review and Reflection Programming, which serves both to determine community priorities and to measure accountability. At the same time, it is not uncommon for community members to view CSOs as serving the interests of donors rather than the community. This perception may lead to a mismatch between the needs of beneficiaries and the goals of service providers. For instance, AAZ raises donations for sponsorships to support needy children and their communities, such as through the construction of schools. However, often both the children’s parents and their communities would like to see the support go directly to affected families rather than into community projects.

Most CSOs abide by the principles of inclusiveness, equality, and respect for human rights. Some organizations state their commitment to these values in response to donors’ urging, while other organizations such as WaterAid Zambia profess these values as part of a human rights-based approach to their work. It is common for CSOs to share publications and other informational products.

As most CSOs are nonprofit, they rarely engage in cost recovery by charging fees. Exceptionally, ZGF has registered a private subsidiary, which is profit oriented and offers paid consultancy services, expert analysis, and training to CSOs, the government, and other stakeholders.
The government recognizes CSOs’ role in service provision and acknowledges that their efforts complement its own. The government is less eager to allow CSOs to monitor its activities. CSOs sometimes provide the government with expert analysis and training. For example, in 2017 CSPR, JCTR, and CTPD provided training on budgets and taxation to members of parliament, and CSPR provided training on social accountability and parliamentary oversight of public resource management, also to members of parliament.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The support services available to the CSO sector in 2017 were stable. A number of CSOs, including Women in Law in Southern Africa, CSPR, JCTR, and Caritas Zambia, operate resource centers that provide theme-specific information to other CSOs.

Sub-granting to local organizations is common, especially among organizations that work in partnership with other CSOs and community-based organizations. For instance, in 2017 AAZ sub-granted donor funding to more than thirty-five local CSOs for programs in capacity building and CSO sustainability. NGOCC continued to re-grant pooled donor funding for members’ gender-based programming. ZGF, which normally sub-grants pooled funds to local organizations working in governance, did not make grants in 2017 because it was restructuring its operations and developing a new strategic plan.

Information sharing among CSOs is common. Major CSO networks and coalitions in 2017 included CSPR, NGOCC, ZCSD, ZTP, and the Zambia Alternative Mining Indaba (ZAMI). The Social Accountability Network developed by FACT Zambia led to a national symposium on citizen engagement in development in September 2017, at which CSOs shared best practices and interacted with government officials. The spread of the Internet has allowed CSOs to share information online in areas of common interest. National platforms that facilitate CSO cooperation include ZTP, Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance, Zambia Youth Platform, and the Civil Society Constitution Alliance. However, cooperation is sometimes hampered by CSOs’ increasing competition for resources and their struggle for operating space, particularly among advocacy CSOs. In addition, CSOs that are members of coalitions increasingly fail to meet obligations such as the payment of membership fees because of financial shortfalls.

Very few CSOs provided training and technical support to other CSOs in 2017. The CSOs offering training were mostly grantmaking organizations such as ZGF, which provided support in strategy development, governance, and fundraising. ZGF changed its business model in 2017 to include paid training services for CSOs. AAZ seconded technical experts to local partner organizations so that they could help with capacity building and volunteer management. This approach was effective in strengthening the capacity of local CSOs and fostering their sense of responsibility for their own sustainability. Advanced specialized training was available in strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, and board development, but these were costly for local CSOs unless paid for by donors.

In 2017 many CSOs took part in collaborative intersectoral partnerships. For example, coalitions such as CSO-SUN Alliance, ZAMI, and ZTP continued to work with government ministries, traditional leaders, and international CSOs, donors, and UN agencies on a campaign to end child marriage. ZAMI engaged with the Ministry of Mines to develop policies involving extractive industries; ZTP worked with the Ministry of Finance on progressive taxation and investment policies; and CSPR cooperated with the Ministry of National Development Planning on the Seventh National Development Plan.
However, despite their commitment and contributions, CSOs were sometimes concerned that the government did not incorporate their ideas into its final products. This situation has demotivated some CSOs, which are beginning to think the government’s engagement with them is purely for public relations purposes.

CSOs’ partnerships with the media in 2017 were limited to capacity-building initiatives begun by CSOs. For example, the Women’s Lobby trained journalists on election-related gender reporting, ZTP offered training on tax and illicit flows, and CSPR provided training on fiscal policy analysis. These initiatives were mainly aimed at influencing media content rather than establishing collaborative efforts that could achieve common objectives.

In 2017 CSOs had relatively few partnerships with the private sector. The private sector remains suspicious of advocacy CSOs because of their scrutiny of corporate practices, including human rights violations and tax avoidance. Businesses seem more responsive to working with service-providing CSOs through their CSR programs, as such cooperation offers them positive visibility.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2017 as organizations in all areas received mixed media coverage. Because of the polarized media landscape after the 2016 elections, some CSOs experienced coverage reflecting the political bias of media outlets, especially if a sensitive subject matter was involved. For example, after the arrest of Hakainde Hichilema, CSOs’ commentaries in favor of the arrest were carried mainly on public media such as the Zambia National Broadcasting Company, while their comments against the arrest were carried on private media, such as The Mast newspaper and the online Zambian Watchdog platform. Media coverage is highly regulated, especially in the government-controlled media, which is skewed toward portraying the government and the ruling party in a positive light. For this reason, CSOs that are critical of the government usually have access only to private media, although private media outlets can also be intimidated from providing space for divergent views.

Public perceptions of CSOs were mixed in 2017 and were largely driven by the types of organization and their political affiliations. Service-delivery CSOs were usually perceived positively, since they deliver tangible goods and services. Advocacy CSOs, on the other hand, were usually perceived as championing foreign agendas or as working on politically motivated issues. While pro-government sympathizers criticized the work of advocacy CSOs, especially if they worked in a watchdog capacity, opposition sympathizers expected CSOs always to be critical of the government, even if it did good work. Certain segments of the public, along with political leaders and government officials, viewed some CSO leaders as using their organizations to pursue personal interests, such as political appointments or inclusion on election slates.

Views of CSOs by the government depended on their areas of work. CSOs that provided services were viewed as partners complementing government efforts, while CSOs that were constantly critical of government’s wrongdoings were considered anti-government and pro-opposition. CSOs viewed as pro-opposition included ZCSD and the Alliance for Community Accountability, mainly because of their public protest against the suspect purchase of fire-fighting equipment. However, the government positively viewed some advocacy CSOs, including CSPR and NGOCC, because of their work on the Seventh National Development Plan and gender programming, respectively. CSOs have made strenuous efforts to inform the government about their role in providing necessary checks and balances, but in the polarized political environment, some advocacy CSOs tended to self-censor to avoid being perceived by the government or the opposition as aligned with a particular side. CSOs sometimes looked disorganized in the view of donors and the state.
The private sector seemed generally to view advocacy CSOs with suspicion and was more comfortable collaborating with service-providing CSOs through their CSR programs in 2017. This view may stem in part from advocacy CSOs’ targeting of the private sector in their push for more responsible approaches to the payment of taxes, the environment, human rights, and other issues.

CSOs use social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to share information and issue calls to action. Some organizations have developed specialized applications and web-based platforms for programming purposes. For example, ZGF offers its own Social Accountability and Say apps, which provide access to legislation and other official documents. CSPR offers a budget tracking and service-delivery monitoring app, and AAZ has a political campaign tracker website and mobile app. CSPR, ZTP, CTPD, and the Media and Sources Connect all host WhatsApp groups.

As part of their effort to do away with the NGO Act, CSOs are developing a self-regulatory mechanism to improve their effectiveness and accountability. However, in 2017 CSOs were not able to conclude and adopt a code of conduct, which is required by the NGO Act and draft NGO policy. Nevertheless, larger CSOs usually subscribe to international standards. For example, CSPR is the Southern Africa regional representative for the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and leads discussions with CSOs and the government about committing to its global standards, which are promoted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and member countries in the global south. CSOs with sufficient capacity increasingly publish their annual and financial reports on their websites and distribute them to the public.
Zimbabwe experienced a major shift in its political framework in 2017 when the military backed the removal of President Robert Mugabe, who had led the country for thirty-seven years. Earlier in the year, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front had split into two factions, one led by First Lady Dr. Grace Mugabe and the other by Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. As tensions between the two factions intensified, Mugabe fired Mnangagwa and threatened to try him on charges of corruption and plotting a coup. Mnangagwa fled the country, the army occupied key government institutions, and hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the street to demand that Mugabe step down. On November 21 Mugabe finally gave in to the pressure and agreed to leave office, marking the end of his long incumbency as president of Zimbabwe.

Following these events, the military temporarily captured the state and privately owned media and urged them to paint a positive picture of the country as undergoing a constitutional transition backed by citizens. Although not in total agreement with each other, CSOs provided an alternative narrative and claimed that the military was interfering in civilian affairs in ways that threatened the republic and its constitutional foundations. On November 24 CSOs convened the National People’s Convention and urged the new establishment to return Zimbabwe to its constitutional order through a credible, free, and fair electoral process. The same day Emmerson Mnangagwa was sworn in as interim president, and he promised to reunite the people of Zimbabwe, promote the country’s economic growth, and respect civil and political rights.

Zimbabwe’s economy plunged in 2017 as the state failed to stop a liquidity crisis and companies closed, rendering more and more people unemployed. As southern Zimbabwe continued to experience a severe drought followed by crippling floods, the United Nations (UN) estimated that more than four million people were in need of food assistance. CSOs urged the new government to implement radical macro-economic reforms to attract local and foreign investments, but continuing political uncertainty caused businesses to take a cautious approach.
The sustainability of Zimbabwean CSOs was steady in 2017, and no dimension recorded a change in score. The overall legal environment was stable, although after the November transition CSOs’ operating environment improved slightly as there were fewer incidences of harassment. Advocacy groups adjusted to the new political order and helped prepare for general elections in 2018, while service-providing CSOs escalated their provision of humanitarian aid to reduce the effects of the drought. CSOs’ public image continued to be mixed, and their financial viability, organizational capacity, and sectoral infrastructure did not show significant changes during the year.

Statistics from the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO), the official coordinating body for CSOs, indicate that there were 993 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Zimbabwe in 2016, the most recent year for which statistics are available. Estimates suggest that there are also more than 5,000 trusts and common-law organizations known as universitas.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

The legal environment for CSOs remained largely the same in 2017. PVOs register with the PVO Registration Board under the PVO Act; trusts register with the Registrar of Deeds under the Deeds Registries Act; and universitas are recognized as common-law entities and excluded from registering under the PVO Act. Although PVO status has certain benefits, such as allowing CSOs to enter more easily into memoranda of understanding with local authorities, the directive threatens CSO operations, since the PVO Act allows the government to inspect the accounts and documents of PVOs at any time. In addition, the PVO Registration Board includes members of the Office of the President, including the Central Intelligence Organization, and does not approve the registration of CSOs deemed to be critical of the government. Finally, the process of registering as a PVO is cumbersome and costly, with an application fee of $10,000. For these reasons, many organizations register as trusts, which is a less cumbersome process, although also costly, with fees ranging from $500 to $2,000. In December 2017 the government circulated a memo instructing all CSOs to register as PVOs with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare or face closure. Although the directive was not enforced before the end of the year, it caused civil society to question the sincerity of the new government’s intention to uphold fundamental rights of association.

The harassment of CSOs was not as severe as in 2016, as there were fewer protests than in previous years. CSOs’ activities continued to be curtailed by restrictive legislation, including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information Publicity and Privacy Act (AIPPA), which conflict with constitutional provisions ensuring freedom of expression, association, and assembly. For instance, citing sections of POSA, the police denied clearance to the Chitungwiza Residents Trust to hold a meeting on voter registration in August 2017. The government introduced a bill on cybercrimes that seeks to criminalize certain online activities, such as the dissemination of revenge pornography and false information. At the same time, some CSOs argue that CSO operations grew easier after the November transition. Police clearances were easier to secure, and cases of police brutality decreased. However, CSOs noted that the military seemed to usurp policing roles in the post-Mugabe period. For example, in Bulawayo the military arrested protesters demanding that the new president publicly own up to his involvement in the state’s massacre of more than 20,000 civilians in the Matabeleland region in the early 1980s.
CSOs pay income tax and, in some cases, value-added tax to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. CSOs registered as PVOs may receive tax rebates and import products that benefit communities without paying value-added tax, as long as they reveal the source of donations to the government. CSO employees must pay income tax, and organizations are required to contribute to staff pensions under the National Social Security Authority.

All CSOs may engage in income-generating activities provided they meet statutory obligations, such as acquiring vendor numbers so that they can issue tax-compliant invoices and receipts.

CSOs have access to free legal services from Veritas, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Abammeli Lawyers for Human Rights, Legal Resources Foundation, and other organizations. In 2017 these CSOs continued to operate mobile legal clinics that provided services to CSOs and their members. They also represented CSOs in court, including the Constitutional Court, as part of their public interest litigation.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.4**

CSO’s organizational capacity largely remained the same in 2017. Social movement groups that were formed in 2016 were no longer vibrant, but mainstream CSOs maintained their ability to work in various thematic areas, ranging from constitutionalism and electoral reform to women and children and the provision of social safety nets for victims of human rights violations.

CSOs used multiple approaches in 2017 to ensure that local communities and project beneficiaries were included in project activities. For example, local community members took part in strategic planning sessions, goal-setting workshops, and the creation of community structures for membership-based organizations. The Young Voters Platform formed thirty-three voters’ clubs to mobilize young people to participate in the electoral process.

As part of registration requirements, CSOs must state their visions, missions, and goals. Most CSOs, including universitas, undertake strategic planning to define their goals and projected results for three to five years. For example, in 2017 the Zimbabwe Organization of Youth in Politics undertook a strategic planning exercise to review its institutional goals, and the Masvingo Residents Trust developed a new strategic vision. Strategic plans are used to guide program delivery and often include a fundraising component. However, as donor funds dwindle, CSOs sometimes undertake work outside of their plans if funding is available for it.

Broadly speaking, all CSOs have governance structures that include boards of directors or, in the case of trusts, boards of trustees. The boards provide oversight on policy issues, guide program delivery, and employ the secretariats, which are tasked with day-to-day operations. Well-established, institutionalized CSOs also have procedural manuals, administrative systems, and policies to guide operations. Most organizations, including universitas, have conflict-of-interest policies.

Well-established CSOs may employ experts in media relations, economics, research, policy analysis, financial management, and other areas. However, in 2017 CSOs continued to downsize their staff because of limited funding to cover the salaries of permanent employees. CSOs revised job descriptions for remaining staff, and some organizations replaced permanent staff with part-time employees, volunteers, or interns. Larger CSOs have human resource manuals, which offer clear job descriptions and contracting conditions.

Well-established CSOs in Zimbabwe have modernized office facilities, including computers and laptops, digital printers, cellphones, and advanced research software such as Nvivo and Statistical Package for Social Sciences. ZLHR offers training on digital security. Larger CSOs rely on the Internet for most of their communications and media relations and increasingly use social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp to relay their messages.
The 2017 CSO Sustainability Index for Zimbabwe

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

Foreign donors continued to provide the bulk of funding for Zimbabwean CSOs in 2017. Among the main donor agencies were USAID, UN Development Program, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), European Commission, Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, Germany’s Agency for International Cooperation, Open Society Initiative For Southern Africa, DanChurchAid, Norwegian People’s Aid, Freedom House, and Trust Africa. The Transparency, Responsiveness, Accountability, and Citizen Engagement (TRACE) fund, which seeks to empower citizens to hold the government to account with funding from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), was also active.

Most donor funding was available on a short-term basis, although several donors such as USAID still offered longer-term funding. During the year many international donors seemed to be waiting for a clear timeline for the 2018 elections before releasing grants. After the transition international partners made no obvious changes in their country strategies. Most funding was channeled towards service provision, as well as advocacy initiatives calling for gender equality, social accountability, and an end to child marriages, among other areas. DanChurchAid funded eight residents associations to conduct advocacy on the proposed local government bill, and the Norwegian People’s Aid supported twenty-three CSOs working on social and economic justice advocacy.

Because of Zimbabwe’s poor economic situation, there is limited domestic funding available to CSOs. Among the few domestic sources of philanthropy, Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT) supported a significant number of youth-led CSOs to undertake election-related work. The government has no facility for providing funding and, in fact, both the former and new governments seem convinced that CSOs work on an illegal regime-change agenda. However, there were a few instances in which the government contracted with CSOs for services in 2017. For instance, with funding from UNICEF, the Ministry of Gender and Women’s Affairs contracted with Real Open Opportunities for Transformation and Support for consultancy services related to ending child marriages in Zimbabwe.

Businesses offered limited support to CSOs in 2017. Funding from the diaspora, which got off to a promising start during the protests of 2016, discontinued in 2017 after reports of embezzlement involving individuals leading the protests. Some volunteers offered in-kind support.

A few organizations raise money by collecting membership fees. For instance, the constitution of the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union in Zimbabwe allows the organization to collect membership subscriptions. However, very few organizations are able to collect membership fees because the unemployment rate is high and members complain that they cannot afford to pay dues. CSOs increasingly raise funds from Internet-based funding platforms, although the amounts are not significant. For example, in 2017 the Occupy Africa Unity Square Movement raised funds through the platform GoFundMe for its campaign to hold the state to account for the abduction of activist Itai Dzamara. Some CSOs have developed business models based on providing services such as consultancies or selling products online, including the sale of publications on Amazon. Although few CSOs own property, several well-established institutions, such as the ZLHR, YETT, and Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, rent out their facilities for meetings. The Southern Africa Political Economy Series Trust (SAPES) runs a restaurant and lets its premises to other CSOs at competitive rates.

Well-established, donor-funded CSOs have sound financial management systems, recruit qualified accountants, and use financial management software such as Pastel. To fulfill donor requirements, CSOs are expected to have their grant accounts audited by external auditors.
ADVOCACY: 4.2

CSOs’ advocacy work did not change during most of 2017. At the beginning of the year, CSOs were occupied with electoral reform, particularly of the Electoral Act, equal access for political parties, media space, and gender-related issues. Key interest groups, such as youth and persons living with disabilities, sought to ensure their inclusion in the electoral process. At the time of the November transition, CSOs re-focused their advocacy on the need for the military to respect the constitution and rule of law. CSOs convened the National People’s Convention and produced a roadmap for restoring constitutional order through credible, free, and fair elections. The convention also urged the government to take steps to curb the economic crisis and strengthen social protections for citizens.

During the year CSOs had ongoing relationships with key government institutions, including ministries, parliament, and independent commissions, such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe Gender Commission, and National Peace and Reconciliation Commission. CSOs used these platforms to petition the government and lobby for reforms on various issues. For example, the Zimbabwe Institute continued to work with the Ministry of Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs on realigning legislation with the constitution. Other CSOs urged the Office of the Attorney General and parliamentary Committee on Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs to reform the Electoral Act and POSA to conform to the constitution. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and Election Resource Center convened meetings with the Zimbabwe Election Commission so that CSOs could impress upon the commission its duty to uphold the constitution and implement the guidelines for credible, free, and fair elections issued by the Southern Africa Development Community.

CSOs in Zimbabwe have a well-deserved reputation for effectively using policy-based advocacy to shape the national agenda and mobilize citizens on issues related to economic, political, and social governance. In 2017 CSOs in Matabeleland formed the Western Region CSO Coalition, which pointed out gaps and challenges in a biometric voter registration exercise. Individual CSOs, such as the Women in Leadership Development and Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association, convened meetings and launched campaigns urging citizens to provide feedback on local government legislation. In Mutare the African Self-Help Assistance Program (ASAP) led initiatives on social policy and the protection of citizens in the Marange diamond fields. The Zimbabwe Environmental Lawyers Association (ZELA), Center for Natural Resource Governance, and Marange Development Trust brought a successful court case against the government-owned Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Mining Company to stop it from mining diamonds in the Marange area without an environmental impact assessment certificate. The Passengers Association of Zimbabwe issued a statement on the unsafe condition of Zimbabwe’s roads, which prompted the former president to declare a state of emergency regarding the poor condition of roads and prioritize refurbishment of road infrastructure.

CSOs in Zimbabwe engaged regularly with parliamentarians to reform legislation in 2017. For example, Blue Agenda and the Community Water Alliance led an initiative to petition parliament to protect the Kambuzuma area wetlands, which were designated to become the site of a fuel station by the Harare City Council. Parliament responded by inviting Blue Agenda to present oral testimony and subsequently carried out an investigation that resulted in steps to amend the Environmental Management Act. However, some parliamentarians were not open to working with CSOs, because they were pressured to adhere to their parties’ positions on certain issues.
During the year CSOs engaged in advocacy on POSA, AIPPA, and the Electoral Act to protect their freedoms in the 2018 elections. The Elections Resource Center made a presentation to parliament on sections of the Electoral Act that need to be realigned with the constitution to ensure that Zimbabwe holds free and fair elections in 2018. Veritas proposed an alternative electoral act. CSOs also sought reform of sections of the PVO Act that have a bearing on their work during elections.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2**

CSOs offered diversified services throughout the country in 2017. CSO services focused on economic development, social service delivery, environmental protection, empowerment, governance, and humanitarian assistance related to the prolonged drought. For instance, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) partnered with diocesan Caritas branches, justice and peace commissions, and other organizations that are part of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference to provide livelihoods support to communities in Gokwe North, Binga, Hwange, and Hurungwe. UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization supported local groups through a number of projects focused on improving livestock and crop production. The European Union, DFID, and UNICEF supported organizations helping to deliver water and sanitation services in rural and urban areas. The Netherlands Development Organization and CAFOD also supported local organizations working to improve the country’s water infrastructure and build the capacity of local authorities, schools, and community members to manage water and sanitation service delivery. Residents’ associations and community-based organizations helped stem outbreaks of cholera and typhoid with support from UN agencies such as the World Health Organization.

CSOs provide goods and services that address local needs. CSOs conduct careful assessments of needs based on their own research and information from other sources and then prioritize service provision to ensure that almost all community members benefit. For instance, in 2017 the Weidenfeld-Hoffman Trust supported a study of citizens’ access to water in Masvingo, in which eighty-two households were sampled and interviewed in thirteen suburbs. The research findings informed implementation of a water, sanitation, and hygiene project by Masvingo United Residents and Ratepayers Alliance targeting residents in Ward 1.

Membership associations, coalitions, and alliances provide services to their member organizations, including training, information, and funding for startup projects. In 2017 ZESN trained its members on election monitoring. CSOs provide goods and services without discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, although some projects target certain groups, such as women or boys. However, Zimbabwean law does not recognize transgender issues, and the constitution is not very specific about the legal status of transgender populations, although it does not promote discrimination. CSOs regularly share information and expert analysis and conduct workshops with academia, businesses, religious institutions, and the government.

Cost recovery by CSOs in Zimbabwe is marginal. A few institutions recover costs by charging consultancy fees or operating social enterprises. For example, the SAPES Trust charged admission to meetings to generate income for administrative costs and other activities in 2017.

In 2017 the government acknowledged the role played by CSOs at both the national and local levels. For instance, the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing supported the position of the Chitungwiza Residents Trust that the demolition of housing in Chitungwiza was illegal.
The government also pledged support for the Climate Change Policy Advocacy and Lobby program implemented by Action 24, noting that it would enforce adherence to laws that are meant to strengthen environmental conservation.

**SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The infrastructure supporting CSOs was stable in 2017. CSOs had access to information, training, and technical support from resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs). For instance, Pact Zimbabwe circulated useful research reports on social accountability through networks and coalitions, and the Zimbabwe Women Resource Network offered training sessions on gender mainstreaming to CSO community structures and local government authorities.

ISOs also provided grants to CSOs for projects and other activities in 2017. For example, Pact Zimbabwe funded projects that sought to promote good governance by strengthening the ability of local CSOs and other actors to demand accountability from office bearers. Zimbabwe has no local community foundations.

CSOs in Zimbabwe pursue common agendas through a number of coalitions and networks, including the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Coalition of Community-Based Organizations, NANGO, Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, and National Association of Youth Organizations. These platforms seek to amplify the voices of their members in national and international contexts. For instance, in 2017 the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition supported a visit by a delegation of civil society leaders to South Africa, where they met with President Jacob Zuma and appealed to the South African government for help in resolving the economic and governance crises facing Zimbabwe.

CSOs have access to basic training conducted by ISOs, consultants, and universities in the capital and secondary cities. In 2017 the TRACE program hosted a number of training workshops for its implementing partners on such topics as grants management, results-based monitoring and reporting, corporate governance, and local community advocacy. The Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies offered training in civic activism to youth-led organizations. Pact and DanChurchAid offered training in grants management and advocacy. ISO training is free of charge and includes accommodations and travel. Trainings are conducted in local languages.

CSOs increasingly partner with media to respond to community needs. For example, in December 2017 the Election Resource Center and ZESN partnered with the Zimbabwe National Editors Forum to train journalists on reporting about election-related issues. The partnership resulted in increased media coverage of elections.

CSOs also maintained partnerships with the government under the Zimbabwe UN Development Assistance Framework, which began in 2016. These partnerships focus on economic governance and social policy issues. CSO-business partnerships on governance issues are rare, as the business community fears they will lead to state-sponsored reprisals such as deregistration.
PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

The public image of CSOs did not change in 2017. As in previous years, state-owned media under the former and new governments accused CSOs of working as agents of regime change. For example, the Center for Natural Resources Governance was accused of seeking to tarnish the government’s image and perpetuating the country’s economic misfortunes by inviting sanctions on Zimbabwe’s diamond industry. However, state-owned media also gave a voice to CSOs marching with citizens on November 18 to demand that President Mugabe resign. It is important to note that this coverage was convenient for the military, as civil society’s message served the military’s ultimate ends. Privately owned media usually covered CSOs positively during the year. For instance, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition reported that its advocacy initiative calling for resolution of the governance crisis was covered in 401 stories in private online media. Its media statements and updates were critical during and after the political transition, as CSOs called for a return to constitutional order. CSOs also placed paid advertisements, statements, and editorial commentaries in private media to spread information about their services.

The public holds divergent views of CSOs. People who support the government tend to believe its propaganda that CSOs are agents of ‘unconstitutional’ regime change. Those who support a broader democratic space in Zimbabwe have positive views of CSOs, support their role as watchdogs protecting the interests of ordinary citizens, and take part in their initiatives.

The Mugabe government’s view of CSOs providing services was largely positive, while its view of advocacy CSOs focused on democracy, human rights, and governance was overwhelmingly hostile. The military did not share its public view of CSOs until late December 2017, when it called on them to register as PVOs and threatened to crack down on those that did not. The business sector has differing perceptions of CSOs but tends to be cautious about overtly labeling CSOs as agents of either positive or negative change.

CSOs work through privately owned media to highlight their values, principles, missions, and goals. CSOs also use social media platforms regularly, and some organizations have huge followings. For instance, Open Parly has more than 100,000 followers on Twitter, and the Gwanda Residents Association has more than forty WhatsApp groups. CSOs have solid relationships with journalists and at times employ them to publicize their work through media coverage. For instance, Media Monitors employs journalists to monitor media freedoms in Zimbabwe and assess whether media coverage of political issues is fair and unbiased.

In 2017 numerous CSOs, including the Center for Community Development, Habakkuk Trust, Disability Action Trust, and Chitungwiza Center for Community Development, published annual reports detailing their work and administrative status. There was no initiative involving CSO self-regulation in 2017. However, CSOs tend to have internal ethics policies to ensure that transparency and accountability are maintained.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

2017 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID’s Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (the Index or CSO SI) reports annually on the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The CSO Sustainability Index is a tool developed by USAID to assess the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in countries around the world. By analyzing seven dimensions that are critical to sectoral sustainability, the Index highlights both strengths and constraints in CSO development. The Index allows for comparisons both across countries and over time. Initially developed in 1997 for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the CSO SI is a valued tool and methodology used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, donors, academics and others to better understand the sustainability of the civil society sector. USAID is continually striving to ensure the cross-national comparability of the Index scores, and to improve the reliability and validity of measurements, adequate standardization of units and definitions, local ownership of the Index, transparency of the process of Index compilation, and representative composition of panels delivering the scores.

Beginning with the 2017 Index and for the following four years, FHI 360 and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) are managing the coordination and editing of the CSOSI. A senior staff member from both FHI 360 and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials. FHI 360 will provide small grants to local CSOs to implement the CSOSI methodology in country, while ICNL will be primarily responsible for editing the reports. Local Implementing Partners (IPs) play an essential role in developing the CSO SI and need a combination of research, convening, and advocacy skills for carrying out a high quality CSOSI.

Local Implementing Partners should please remember:

- Panels must include a diverse range of civil society representatives.
- Panelists should formulate initial scores for dimensions and justifications individually and in advance of the Panel Meeting.
- Discuss each indicator and dimension at the Panel Meeting and provide justification for the proposed score for each dimension.
- Compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year being assessed.
- Note changes to any indicators and dimensions in the country report to justify proposed score changes.
- The Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report. If adequate information is not provided, the EC has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed by the IP to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2017 Civil Society Organization (CSO) Sustainability Index.

1. Select Panel Experts. Carefully select a group of at least 8-10 civil society representatives to serve as panel experts. Panel members must include representatives of a diverse range of CSOs and other stakeholders, such as:

   - CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
   - CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
   - CSOs involved in local and national level government oversight/watchdog/advocacy activities;
   - Academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
   - CSO partners from government, business or media;
   - Think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
   - Member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers’ associations and natural resources users’ groups;
   - Representatives of diverse geographic areas and population groups, e.g. minorities;
   - International donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
   - Other local partners.

   It is important that the Panel members be able to assess a wide spectrum of CSO activities in various sectors ranging from democracy, human rights and governance reforms to the delivery of basic services to constituencies. CSOs represented on the panel must include both those whose work is heavily focused on advocacy and social service delivery. To the extent possible, panels should include representatives of both rural and urban parts of the country, as well as women’s groups, minority populations, and other marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The Panel should to the extent possible include an equal representation of men and women. If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, they can only cast one vote. It is recommended that at least 70 percent of the Expert Panel be nationals of the country that is being rated.

   In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to better reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. For countries where regional differences are significant, implementers should incorporate, to the greatest extent possible, differing regional perspectives. If financial constraints do not allow for in-person regional representation, alternative, low cost options, including emailing scores/comments, teleconferencing/Skype, may be used.
If there is a USAID Mission in the country, a USAID representative must be invited to attend the panel. USAID representatives that attend are welcome to provide some words of introduction to open the event, as it is funded by USAID, and they are welcome to observe and participate in the discussion. However, they will not have the ability to cast their vote in terms of scores.

Please submit to FHI 360 for approval the list of the Panel members who you plan to invite at least two weeks before the meeting is scheduled to occur using the form provided in Annex A. It is the responsibility of the IP to ensure that the panel composition, and the resulting score and narrative, are sufficiently representative of a cross-section of civil society and include the perspectives of various types of stakeholders from different sectors and different areas of the country.

2. Prepare the Panel meeting. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the Panel, including developing a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Index and articulating a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. We encourage you to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. This is particularly important for new panelists, but is also useful to update all panelists on methodology and process changes. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions. Other partners provide a more general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

The overall goal of the Index is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. To ensure a common understanding of what is being assessed, the convener shall provide a definition of civil society to the panel members. The CSOSI uses the enclosed definition to ensure the report addresses a broad swath of civil society.

In order to allow adequate time to prepare for the panel, distribute the instructions, rating description documents and a copy of the previous year’s country chapter to the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three days before convening the Panel so that they may develop their initial scores for each dimension before meeting with the other panel members. It is critical to emphasize the importance of developing their scores and justifications before attending the panel. It is also important to remind panel members that the scores should reflect developments during the 2017 calendar year (January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017). We also recommend you encourage panelists to think of concrete examples that illustrate trends, since this information will be crucial to justifying their proposed scores.

Lastly, it is highly recommended to compile and send to panelists data and information sources to guide them as they score. Recommendations of information sources are listed below under #4.

**Definition of CSO:** Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

These methods will be supplemented by brief satisfaction surveys that will be used to help evaluate the success of methodological and process innovations.

3. **Convene a meeting of the CSO Expert Panel.**

3.a. We do not require panelists to score individual indicators but only overall dimensions. For each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. (Note: If two or more representatives of the same CSO participate in the Panel, only one vote can be cast on their behalf.) Although scoring will not take place at the indicator level, please be sure that panel members discuss each indicator within each dimension of the CSOSI and provide evidence-based, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events within each of the dimension narratives. Please take notes on the discussion of each indicator and dimension, detailing the justification for all dimension scores, in the template provided in Annex B. These notes must be submitted to FHI 360 with the first draft of the narratives (they do not have to be translated to English if not originally written in English).

At the end of the discussion of each dimension, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, for each dimension, eliminate the highest score and the lowest score (if there are two or more of the highest or lowest scores, only eliminate one of them) and average the remaining scores together to come up with a single score for each dimension. Calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members. Use a table similar to the one provided below to track panel members’ scores without personal attribution.

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<tr>
<th>Panel Member</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Sectoral Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
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3.b. Once a score is determined for a dimension, please have panel members compare the proposed score with last year’s score to ensure that the direction and magnitude of the change reflects developments during the year. For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year that are noted in the report. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a lower score.

A change of .1 should generally be used to reflect modest changes in a dimension. A change of .2 is considered more significant and is appropriate when several indicators within a dimension improve or decline. Larger differences may be warranted if there are more significant changes in the sector. In all of these cases, the evidence to support the scoring change must be discussed by the panel and documented in the dimension narrative.

In addition, for each dimension score, review the relevant description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.” Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment.

If the panel does not feel that the proposed score is accurate after these two reviews, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension. Ultimately, each score should reflect consensus among group members.

3.c. **Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.** Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the overall CSO sustainability score. Please submit the table with the scores from the individual panelists together with the narrative report. Panelists should be designated numerically.

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1. Arithmetic mean is the sum of all scores divided by the total number of scores.
3.d. Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. The Editorial Committee will ensure that all scores are adequately supported and may ask for additional evidence to support a score. If adequate information is not provided, the EC may adjust the scores.

4. Prepare a draft country report. The report should focus on developments over the calendar year 2017 (January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017).

The draft report should begin with an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as a description of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate. Also include a brief overview of any key political, economic, or social developments in the country that impacted the CSO sector during the year. If this information is not provided, the editor will request it in subsequent rounds, which will require additional work from you.

The report should then include sections on each dimension. Each of these sections should begin with a summary of the reasons for any score changes during the year. For example, if a better score is proposed, the basis for this improvement should be clearly stated up front. These sections should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses that impact the operations of a broad range of CSOs. Each indicator within each dimension should be addressed in the report.

The report should be written based on the Panel members’ discussion and input, as well as a review of other sources of information about the CSO sector including but not limited to analytical studies of the sector, statistical data, public opinion polls and other relevant third-party data. Some international sources of information and data that should be considered include the following:

- CIVICUS Monitor - https://monitor.civicus.org/
- World Giving Index - https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/publications
- Varities of Democracy (V-Dem) - https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/
- Media Sustainability Index - https://www.irex.org/projects/media-sustainability-index-msi
- Nations in Transit - https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.VdugbqSFOh1
- ITUC Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights - https://survey.ituc-csi.org/
- Afro-Barometer - http://www.afrobarometer.org/

Please limit the draft reports to a maximum of eight pages in English. Please keep in mind that we rely on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written.

While the individual country reports for the 2017 CSO Sustainability Index must be brief, implementers may write longer reports for their own use to more fully describe the substance of the panel meetings. Longer reports may include additional country context information or examples and could be used for a variety of purposes, including advocacy initiatives, research, informing project designs, etc.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel using the form provided in Annex A with the report. This will be for our reference only and will not be made public. Also, please remember to provide the individual panelists’ ratings for each dimension (with the names replaced by numbers).
5. **Initial edits of the country report.** Within a few weeks of receiving your draft report, FHI 360 and its partner, ICNL, will send you a revised version of your report that has been edited for grammar, style and content. As necessary, the editors will request additional information to ensure that the report is complete and/or to clarify statements in the report. Please request any clarification needed from the editor as soon as possible, then submit your revised report by the deadline indicated.

6. **Editorial Committee review.** In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores and revised draft country reports. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, FHI 360, ICNL, and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in the region. A USAID representative chairs the EC. If the EC determines that the panel’s scores are not adequately supported by the country report, particularly in comparison to the previous year’s scores and the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the scores be adjusted, thereby ensuring comparability over time and among countries, or request that additional information be provided to support the panel’s scores. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee.”

7. **Additional report revision.** After the EC meets, the editor will send a revised report that indicates the EC’s recommended scores, and where further supporting evidence or clarification is required. Within the draft, boxes will be added where you will note whether you accept the revised scores or where you can provide further evidence to support the original proposed score.

The report should be revised and returned to the editor within the allotted timeframe. The project editor will continue to be in contact with you to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content. Your organization will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID.

8. **Dissemination and promotion of the final reports.** After the reports are approved by USAID and final formatting is conducted, the country reports will be grouped into regional reports. Each Implementing Partner will be responsible for promoting both the final, published country report and the regional report. Your organization will conduct activities to promote the Index’s use and its visibility. This may include organizing a local public event, panel discussion, or workshop and by making the report available electronically by web posting or creating a social network page for the country report and through the other methods described in your Use and Visibility Plan. Documentation that you have conducted these activities as described in that Plan must be submitted to FHI 360 before it will authorize the final payment.

III. **THE ROLE OF THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE**

As an important step in the CSO Sustainability Index process, all country reports are reviewed and discussed by an Editorial Committee composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, DC, and an expert based in the region. This committee is chaired by a USAID Democracy Specialist and includes rotating members from USAID (past members have included experts from regional bureaus, the USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DCHA/DRG), the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment’s Local Solutions Office, and USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance foreign service officers). The committee also includes civil society experts from FHI 360 and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports and scores to ensure that narratives are adequate and compelling from the standpoint of supporting the proposed score and to determine if the proposed change in score is supported by the narrative. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score results from evidence of systematic and widespread cases and is not based on one or two individual cases. For example, a country environment characterized by a growing number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that raise funds locally from diverse sources is a compelling justification for an elevated financial viability score. A country in which one or two large CSOs now have the ability to raise funds from diverse sources is not.
The Editorial Committee also checks that scores for each dimension meet the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” to ensure that scores and narratives accurately reflect the actual stage of CSO sector development. Finally, the Editorial Committee considers a country’s score in relation to the proposed scores in other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across all countries.

CSOs are encouraged to remind their panels from the outset that the Editorial Committee may ask for further clarification of scores and may modify scores, where appropriate. While implementing partners will have the chance to dispute these modifications by providing more evidence for the scores the panel proposed, the USAID Chair of the EC will ultimately have the final say on all scores. However, by asking panels to compare their scores with last year’s scores and “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the Editorial Committee does), it is hoped that there will be few differences between proposed scores and final scores. Ensuring that the narrative section for each dimension includes adequate explanations for all scores will also limit the need for the Editorial Committee to ask for further clarification.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CSOSI EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

I. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

Throughout the process of developing a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI), please use the following definitions:

Civil Society Organization (CSO): Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

CSOs typically include informal non-registered groups, but to be included in the CSOSI they must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships. In many countries, government, political parties, and private companies establish and support CSOs. However, the CSOSI includes only organizations and groups that are self-governing, with a distinct legal and/or functional identity.

Legal Environment: The legal and regulatory environment governing the CSO sector and its implementation.

Organizational Capacity: The internal capacity of the CSO sector to pursue its goals.

Financial Viability: The CSO sector’s access to various sources of financial support.

Advocacy: The CSO sector’s ability to influence public opinion and public policy.

Service Provision: The CSO sector’s ability to provide goods and services.

Sectoral Infrastructure: Support services available to the CSO sector.

Public Image: Society’s perception of the CSO sector.
II. PROCESS

Use the following steps to guide you through the individual rating process. This same process will be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the dimensions.

**Step 1:** Please start by reviewing last year’s report and other sources of information about sectoral developments from the last year that you are aware of. Then, rate each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development. Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

When rating each dimension, please remember to consider each indicator carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score.

**Step 2:** Review your proposed score for each dimension to ensure that it makes sense in comparison to last year’s score given sectoral and country developments. In addition, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment. For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. If after reviewing last year’s score and “Ratings: A Closer Look”, you determine that the score does not accurately depict the situation, please determine a more accurate score that better fits with the historical score and the description for that dimension.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability Enhanced</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 – 2.0</td>
<td>2.1 – 3.0</td>
<td>3.1 – 4.0</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

**Score Changes from Previous Year**

Because most change in the CSO sector is incremental, changes in dimension scores from the previous year should generally be within a range of 0.1 to 0.3 above or below the dimension score in the previous year. Changes in dimension scores from the previous year have the following significance:

- 0.1 Moderate change
- 0.2 Significant change
- 0.3 or greater Cataclysmic and often unexpected change

**Step 3:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating.

**Step 4:** Attend the Expert Panel discussion. Listen to other experts describe the justification for their scores. After discussing each indicator in a dimension, you will have the opportunity to revise your proposed score to achieve a consensus score for that dimension.

*It is very important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panel scores. Therefore, please come prepared to share specific evidence of examples to support trends you have noted during the year. If adequate information is not provided, the Editorial Committee has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.*
SCORING SCALE:
The CSO Sustainability Index uses a seven-point scale, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. These levels are clustered into three general stages: Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7). The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.

2. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.

3. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.

4. The civil society sector’s sustainability is minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.

5. The civil society sector’s sustainability is somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6. The civil society sector’s sustainability is impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7. The civil society sector’s sustainability is significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.

For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look,” which is attached.

SCORING: DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

I. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT _____

REGISTRATION – Legal procedures to formalize the existence of a CSO

- Are there favorable laws on CSO registration?
- Do CSOs have to register in order to operate?
- In practice, are CSOs – no matter what their legal form or issues they focus on – easily able to register (i.e., are there significant barriers in terms of duration, cost, or bureaucracy)?
- Do some types of organizations have more difficulty with registration than others?

OPERATION – The enforcement of the laws and its effects on CSOs

- Do the laws clearly set out clear and limited rules for the internal governance of CSOs?
- Do the laws limit the scope of a CSO’s permissible activities, for example, by restricting certain types of advocacy or expression by CSOs?
- Are CSO reporting and other accountability obligations clearly set out in the laws and are these burdensome to CSOs?
- Do the laws provide clear limits on government oversight over CSOs?
- Are the laws and regulations implemented consistently and in accordance with their terms?
STATE HARASSMENT – Abuses committed against CSOs and their members by state institutions and groups acting on behalf of the state

- To what extent are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely under the law?
- Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?
- Are CSOs free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police?
- To what extent do CSOs have legal recourse to contest government decisions (e.g., cancellation of a CSO’s registration, suspension of an activity, or refusal to authorize a grant) in court?
- Can CSOs freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?
- Do CSOs have the right to assemble and participate in public protests?

TAXATION – Tax policies that affect CSOs

- Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemptions or deductions on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity?
- Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

ACCESS TO RESOURCES – Legal opportunities for CSOs to mobilize financial resources

- Are CSOs allowed legally to earn income from the provision of goods and services by charging fees, establishing social enterprises, or other means?
- Is a broad cross-section of CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?
- Are CSOs allowed to engage in fundraising campaigns?
- Are CSOs allowed to accept funds from foreign donors?

LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY – Availability and quality of legal expertise for CSOs

- Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO-related laws?
- Is high-quality legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

II. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

CONSTITUENCY BUILDING – Relationships with individuals or groups affected by or interested in issues on which CSOs work

- To what extent do CSOs clearly identify potential constituents and beneficiaries and actively seek to develop relationships with them, for example by involving them in their activities or ensuring that their activities represent constituents’ needs and interests?
- How successful are CSOs in these endeavors?

STRATEGIC PLANNING – Organizational goals and priorities for a set timeframe.

- Do CSOs have clearly defined missions?
- Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?
- To what extent do CSOs follow their missions and strategic plans?
- To what extent do CSOs have metrics for measuring the success of their work?
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE – Structures and processes to guide the work of CSOs

- Do CSOs have clearly defined management structures, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members?
- To what extent do Boards actively engage in the governance of CSOs?
- To what extent do CSOs operate in an open and transparent manner, including allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?
- Do CSOs have written policies or procedures to guide organizational operations?
- Do CSOs take appropriate steps to avoid conflicts of interest?

CSO STAFFING – Quality and management of human resources

- To what extent are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff?
- To what extent do CSOs develop the skills/competencies of their employees, including leadership skills as part of succession planning?
- To what extent do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies?
- Do CSOs recruit and engage volunteers sufficiently?
- Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT – Access to and use of technology

- Do CSOs’ resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, printers, cell phones, etc.)?
- To what extent are CSOs able to access the Internet?
- Are CSOs effective in using modern technology and information communication technologies (ICT), including social media tools like Facebook, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, and Snapchat, to facilitate their operations?

III. FINANCIAL VIABILITY

DIVERSIFICATION – Access to multiple sources of funding

- Do CSOs typically have multiple and diverse sources of funding to sustain their operations in both the short and long term?

LOCAL SUPPORT – Domestic sources of funding and resources

- To what extent do CSOs raise their funding from local sources, including individuals, governments, businesses, and local foundations?
- Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies?
- To what extent do CSOs benefit from corporate philanthropy/corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs?
- Do governments (central and/or local) provide grants to CSOs in an open and transparent manner?

FOREIGN SUPPORT -- Foreign sources of funding and resources

- To what extent does the CSO sector rely on foreign funding?
- Have shifts in funding levels or priorities of foreign donors affected CSOs?
- How diversified is the support CSOs receive from foreign donors, both in terms of number and types (e.g. private, government)?
FUNDRAISING – CSOs’ capacity to raise funds

• Do CSOs actively seek to raise support from their communities and constituencies?
• Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach, resource mobilization activities (sporting events, cultural festival, diaspora outreach, etc.) or philanthropy development programs?
• Do CSOs use new information communication technologies (ICT) to raise funds?
• Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

EARNED INCOME – Revenue generated from the sale of products and services

• To what extent do CSOs earn revenues from services, products, or rent from assets?
• To what extent do CSOs establish social enterprises?
• Do government bodies or local businesses contract with CSOs for services?

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS – Processes, procedures and tools to manage financial resources and operations

• Do CSOs typically have sound financial management systems in place?
• To what extent do CSOs have access to professional financial management services?
• Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including the use of independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

IV. ADVOCACY 

COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT – Access to government decision-making processes

• Are there direct lines of communication or other avenues for collaborations between CSOs and policy makers at the central and local levels?
• Are these avenues informal and ad hoc or institutionalized into government decision-making processes?
• Do government policies or laws require public access to government decision-making processes, including requirements to have working groups, public hearings, etc.?

POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES – Initiatives to shape the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation

• Do CSOs—either individually or in issue-based coalitions—conduct broad-based advocacy campaigns aimed at shaping the public agenda, public opinion, or legislation?
• To what extent have these campaigns been effective, at either the local or national level?
• How do CSOs select policy advocacy initiatives and to what extent are other local CSOs and communities consulted in this process?

LOBBING EFFORTS – Engagement with lawmakers to directly influence the legislative process

• Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying?
• Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation?

ADVOCACY FOR CSO LAW REFORM – Initiatives to promote a more favorable legal and regulatory framework for the CSO sector

• Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability?
• Have CSOs made efforts to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc.?
V. SERVICE PROVISION ______

RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES – Variety of goods and services offered

• Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)?
• Overall, is the sector’s “product line” or services diversified?

RESPONSIVENESS TO THE COMMUNITY – Extent to which goods and services address local needs

• Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?
• How do CSOs determine these needs?
• Do CSOs collect data to demonstrate their contributions to local needs?

CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE – People, organizations and communities who utilize or benefit from CSOs’ services and goods

• Do membership associations provide goods and services to individuals beyond their own members?
• Do CSOs offer, distribute, or market some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, to other CSOs, academia, businesses, religious institutions, or government?
• Do CSOs generally provide their goods and services without discrimination with regards to race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.?

COST RECOVERY – Capacity to generate revenue through service provision

• Do CSOs recover any of the costs of service provision by charging fees, creating social enterprises, signing contracts, etc.?
• To what extent do CSOs have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT– Government appreciation for CSO service provision

• To what extent does the government, at the national and local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services through its public statements or policies and practices?

VI. SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE ______

INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS – Organizations and programs that provide CSOs with training and other support services

• Are there ISOs (organizations that provide access to training and technical support) that serve CSOs in the country?
• Are there CSO resource centers (places where CSOs can access information and communications technology), or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training and technical assistance throughout the country?
• To what extent do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs?
• Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources?
LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS – Local institutions, organizations or programs providing financial resources to CSOs

- Do local community foundations or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

CSO COALITIONS – Cooperation within the CSO sector

- To what extent do CSOs share information with each other or work together towards common aims?
- Are there networks or coalitions in place that facilitate such cooperation?
- Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

TRAINING – Training opportunities available to CSOs

- Are there capable local CSO management trainers?
- Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and secondary cities?
- Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, constituency building, advocacy, and board development?
- Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs?
- Are training materials available in local languages?

INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS – Collaboration between CSOs and other sectors

- Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with the private sector, government, and the media to achieve common objectives?
- Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

VII. PUBLIC IMAGE ______

MEDIA COVERAGE – Presence of CSOs and their activities in the media (print, television, radio and online)

- Do CSOs—both those engaged in advocacy and service provision—enjoy media coverage at the local and national levels, in both government-controlled and private media, and in traditional (print, radio, TV) and online media?
- To what extent is this coverage positive?
- Do the media make a distinction between public service announcements and corporate advertising?
- Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS – Reputation among the larger population

- Does the public have a positive perception of CSOs—both those engaged in advocacy and service provision?
- Does the public understand the concept of a CSO?
- Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?
- How relevant is the mission of CSOs to community members?

GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS – Reputation with the government and business sector

- Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs—both those engaged in advocacy and service provision?
- Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?
PUBLIC RELATIONS – Efforts to promote organizational image and activities

• To what extent do CSOs raise awareness about their activities or promote their public image?
• To what extent do CSOs develop relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?
• Do CSOs effectively use social media for public outreach?

SELF-REGULATION – Actions taken to increase accountability and transparency

• Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations?
• Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK

The following sections go into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector’s development. These characteristics and stages are drawn from empirical observations of the sector’s development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic stages: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced stage, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving stage corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded stage, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs, regardless of their affiliation or nature of activities, or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs, regardless of their affiliation or nature of activities, have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs, or certain types of CSOs, to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

3. The ‘Sustainability Evolving’ categorization does not assume a direct or forward trajectory. Dimension and Overall Sustainability scores that fall within this category may represent both improvements and regressions.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. At this stage, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability. Government restricts access to resources -- foreign or domestic -- through legislative and other restrictions.

ADVOCACY

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this stage of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations. Formal mechanisms exist and are utilized to allow a range of CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes.
Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead (“where the power truly lies”). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop. Formal mechanisms to allow for CSOs to participate in various levels of government decision-making processes may exist, however they are not effective or routinely used in practice.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries at this stage have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism, or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

**Sustainability Enhanced (1-3):** Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

**Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5):** The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

**Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7):** A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.
SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors’ fora are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

PUBLIC IMAGE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): This stage is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of “nongovernmental,” “nonprofit” or “civil society,” including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
## ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA

### 2017 AFRICA SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
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